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Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950–2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presiden...
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| 發表在: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 27-2010) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| 格式: | Arbeit |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2010
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | PDF-Volltext |
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| 總結: | We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950–2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems. Based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951–2000 for 146 countries, we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political leaders, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter. |
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| 實物描述: | 32 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0057 |