Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcome Don’t
We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950–2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presiden...
Spremljeno u:
Izdano u: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 27-2010) |
---|---|
Glavni autori: | , |
Format: | Arbeit |
Jezik: | engleski |
Izdano: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2010
|
Teme: | |
Online pristup: | PDF cijeli tekst |
Oznake: |
Dodaj oznaku
Bez oznaka, Budi prvi tko označuje ovaj zapis!
|
No references were found for this record.