A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?

A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?

Advanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they – being quantitative predictive economic evidence – can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates...

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Pubblicato in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 03-2008)
Autore principale: Budzinski, Oliver
Natura: Articolo
Lingua:inglese
Pubblicazione: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2008
Soggetti:
merger control
merger simulation
antitrust
economic evidence
Wirtschaft
Economics
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Collocazione: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2023-01902
Data di pubblicazione: 2023-12-21
Downloads: 32 (2024), 1 (2023)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
URL di accesso: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2023/0190
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2023.0190

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