A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?

A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?

Advanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they – being quantitative predictive economic evidence – can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 03-2008)
Autor Principal: Budzinski, Oliver
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2008
Schlagworte:
merger control
merger simulation
antitrust
economic evidence
Wirtschaft
Economics
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Número de Clasificación: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2023-01902
Data de Publicación: 2023-12-21
Downloads: 32 (2024), 1 (2023)
Lizenz: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
URL de acceso: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2023/0190
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2023.0190

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