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Who Should Be Allowed to Participate in Official Interreligious
Dialogues?
A Review of Issues
Anton Karl Kozlovic
School of Humanities
The Flinders University
of South Australia
Email: Anton.Kozlovic@flinders.edu.au
Abstract: Interreligious dialogue is an important
communications activity that has many of the characteristics and problems of
new religious movements. Failure can be devastating, and yet scant critical
attention has been devoted to assessing the legitimate qualifications of event
participants. Seven dialogic parameters were identified and explicated pertaining
to: (a) sanctioning, (b) representation, (c) relevancy, (d) knowledge, (e) technical
competence, (f) articulation, and (g) appropriateness. Professional awareness
of their range, depth and contours has important ramifications for participant
selection, preparation and event organisation.
Introduction
Nowadays, religious dialoguing
is “a necessity and a duty in a pluralist society” (Zago, 2000, p. 16), especially
given the demise of church isolationism and official estrangement policies.
Indeed, knowingly “to refuse dialogue today would be an act of fundamental human
irresponsibility—in Judeo-Christian-Muslin terms, a sin” (Swidler, 1996, p.
16). So, it is not surprising to discover that dialoguing has fast become “an
imperative of our common existence and survival” (Rambachan, 1999, p. 56) or
for Leonard Swidler (1990b, p. vii) to earnestly argue that the “future offers
two alternatives: death or dialogue. This statement is not over-dramatization.”
Prof. Swidler envisaged the demise of the “Age of Monologue” and the rise of
the “Age of Dialogue” because of the interpenetration of the world’s peoples
and their problems. Indeed, it is also the inbreaking “Age of Global Dialogue”
given the historical transformation of Christendom into Western Civilization
and now into Global Civilization (Swidler, 1996, p. 1).
Dialoguing is
certainly a tough job demanding “the intellectual, moral, and, at the limit,
religious ability to struggle to hear another and to respond. To respond critically,
and even suspiciously when necessary” (Tracy, 1990, p. 4). There are many problems
with the selection, nature and preparation of dialogue participants, but despite
its obviousness, scant critical attention has been devoted to this need. Seven
dialogic parameters were identified within the literature, namely: (a) Participant
Sanctioning: Official Recognition, (b) Representation: Are Participants Truly
Faithful to the Faith?, (c) Relevancy: Insiders or Outsiders of the Faith?,
(d) Knowledgeable: Understanding Oneself and the Other, (e) Technical Competence:
Argumentation and Presentation Skills, (f) Articulate: Knowing the Language
of the Dialogue, and (g) Appropriateness: Issues of Dress and Other Nonverbal
Behaviours. The following is a brief explication of these seven issues.
Participant Sanctioning: Official Recognition
Legitimate dialogue requires participants
who are carefully selected, approved and officially sanctioned by the appropriate
authorities, whether by Bishop, congregation, roshi, Bet Din, Central Committee
etc. They must be “capable of dialogue” to use Jürgen Moltmann’s (2000, p. 18) phrase. That is, “interest in the other
religion, an open-minded awareness of its different life, and the will to live
together - what Theo Sundermeier calls ‘convivence’ (Spanish convivencia).”
Why? To ensure the success of the specific dialogue, the dialogic enterprise,
and the reputation of the faiths involved. As Prof. Eric J. Sharpe (1992) pointed
out:
To most Christians, a Hindu is a Hindu is
a Hindu. No doubt to most Hindus, there would be no appreciable difference between
Ian Paisley and Cardinal Ratzinger. The terms of the dialogue, however, are
dictated not by what the textbooks tell you that each religion is or ought to
be, but by who happens to be doing the talking, and under what conditions (p.
231).
Official religious dialogue is
best viewed as a corporate activity where the chosen dialoguer is the
faith, organisationally speaking. It is imperative that the appointee(s) “come
to the dialogue as persons somehow significantly identified with a religious
[or ideological] community” (Swidler, 1982, p. 10). If “a person is, for example,
neither a Lutheran or a Jew, s/he could not engage in a specifically Lutheran-Jewish
dialogue” (Swidler, 1990c, p. 59). The chosen representatives must also have
the power commensurate with the task to avoid counter-productivity issues. Indeed:
It is a frequent experience that groups with
a mandate from their communities to engage in dialogue draw up a coherent and
far-reaching statement that represents real progress in mutual understanding
among the partners to the dialogue, only to find at the end of their labors
that the respective mandating authorities in their own communities will not
approve the statement. Such statements are then frequently reduced to rather
unsatisfactory evasions and compromises that were already in vogue before the
dialogue was set up (Hellwig, 1982, p. 78).
The need for official authorisations
was specifically recommended by the Aarhus Workshop (1978) regarding the Christian-Marxist
dialogue:
Only if the church has participatory exercise
of power and decision-making will it have the internal and external authority
to engage in critical involvement with Marxism. It will then create a publicly
visible example which will set a criterion for the whole of society. It will
witness in its life to the reality of “the universal priesthood of the baptized”
it professes (p. 77).
This authorisation principle also
applies to the integrity of the delegates chosen because anyone “who thinks
they will be betraying their faith cannot and should not enter the dialogue”
(Coff, 1989, p. 209). Regrettably, there are scant case reports but at least
one tantalisingly brief, unexplicated aside, namely: “I also include the sufferings
of those Christians and Marxists who entered into dialogue “without permission”
by their respective establishments” (Romic, 1978, pp. 123-124). Rev. Crow Jr.
(2000, p. 96) hinted at another source of participant difficulty when he advised
potential career dialoguers: “Do not seek or yearn for any exalted position
in the ecumenical movement until you are seventy years of age. In the meantime,
practice humility, patience, and evangelization.” Overall, the “problem of Christian
faith in a religiously plural world cannot be solved by ex-Christians learning
to relate to ex-Jews, ex-Buddhists, ex-Muslims, or ex-anything else, in the
name of conceptions that do not take these traditions seriously” (Dawe, 1978,
p. 17).
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Delegates must, in some fundamental
way, truly represent their faiths and be comfortable in that role, or as Jürgen Moltmann (2000) put it:
Only people who have arrived at a firm standpoint
in their own religion, and who enter into dialogue with the resulting self-confidence,
merit dialogue. It is only if we are at home in our own religion that we shall
be able to encounter the religion of someone else” (pp. 18-19).
Consequently, one needs to ask:
“who are these dialogue partners? Are they the elite and the intellectuals?
Do they really represent their societies or are they only fans of dialogue?”
(Younan, 1995, p. 17). This is important because “no dialogue partners can possibly
speak for all the segments of Buddhism any more than any Christian theologian
can speak for all branches of Christianity” (Cobb Jr., 1982, pp. x-xi). After
all:
...there are a host of different versions
of both Islam and Christianity and no single individual adherent of either religion
is fully representative of the entire spectrum. There is all the more reason,
therefore, for inter-religious dialogue on the international level to be conducted
between and among representative bodies of the religions concerned (Brockway,
1984, p. 14).
As Prof. Harvey Cox (1989) put
it:
...in the ideal interreligious dialogue,
we will have all the Hindus on one side of the table, all the Christians on
another side, all the Jews on a third, and all the Muslims at a fourth. The
truth is that there are elements within any of these movements that are more
like those within another tradition than they are like certain elements within
their own (p. 60).
Finding delegates who are representative,
loyal, and follow the religious party line is not going to be easy. As evidenced
by “the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith [who] has declared
that Professors Hans Kung and Charles Curran are no longer considered Catholic
theologians” (Swidler, 1990c, p. 60).
Nor is it too surprising to hear
that “the processes of official dialogue or negotiation between denominations
must be entrusted to relatively small numbers of elected or appointed persons”
(Black, 1991, p. 7), and/or “with small groups that represent the grassroots”
(Younan, 1995, p. 17). It is certainly counterproductive having persons attend
conferences representing “the faith” when they are only a minor, non-representative
faction. It would give a misleading, inaccurate and distorted picture of the
faith per se, especially to those unfamiliar with the religion in question,
let alone its various shadings and off-shoots. For example:
When a Zoroastrian approaches the question
of dialogue with another religion, due attention has to be paid to the divergent
currents of interpretations prevalent in the Zoroastrian tradition itself. There
are some who interpret texts philologically, others esoterically. Theosophists,
or those influenced by Hindu philosophy, would explain Zoroastrianism from their
particular perspective. It is persistent [sic] to know who the spokesman is
(Dhalla, 1989, p. 40).
Of course, the same rule applies
to dialogue with non-religious ideologies:
As with their secular counterparts, secular
ideologies exist in a variety of subtraditions...the doctrines of Soviet Marxism
diverge from those of Maoist China or Albania; the humanism of Julian Huxley
(with its emphasis on evolution) differs from the more ‘literary’, symbol-oriented
outlook of Jungian psychoanalysis; the existentialism of Heidegger is very different
from the more socially activist version of Satre (Smart, 1991, p. 170).
Even within a secular ideology,
there can be a diversity of focuses, as occurred during the 1986 Catholic-Marxist
dialogue in Budapest:
The first things that struck the Catholics
was the great variety of positions among their Marxists partners--a variety
unthinkable fifteen years ago. Some Marxists were ready to admit the presence
of injustices, inequalities and the erosion of moral values in Socialist societies.
Some questioned Communist certainties like the all-sufficiency of science and
the adequacy of mere structural changes (one of the participants had publicly
questioned, prior to the meetings, the justice of imposing a one-party dictatorship).
Some of the Marxists tended to reach back to the young Marx, to stress the humanist
aspect of Marxism rather than its scientific nature, to give precedence to the
development of the human person and society over class-warfare and to the interests
of the entire humanity over those of one particular class (Pereira, 1987, p.
274).
Similar concerns were raised with
new religious movements:
...any individual Methodist may or may not
conform (intellectually) to the norms of evangelical Arminianism or (ethically)
to the well-known taboos on the use of alcohol or tobacco, so individual Unificationists
may be (intellectually) more or less clear on the Divine Principle or (ethically)
more or less committed to the marriage customs of that church...No one person
anywhere is the embodiment of or personification of ideas or beliefs that are
set out systematically in text books for the convenience of students and other
interested outsiders (Cracknell, 1987, pp. 158-159).
Indeed, why “should the dialogues
invite only the modernized version of religions whose representatives may be
merely a minority of enlightened liberals which scarcely any religious constituency
to speak of?” (Braaten, 1992, p. 10).
PAGE 3Do these invited representatives
“think of themselves as ‘representative’ at all, or do they state that it is
a very personal voice with which they speak, even though an important part of
that voice is their religious affiliation within a cumulative tradition” (Morgan,
1995, p. 162)? As Munib A. Younan (1995) argued:
I believe that the future fruitful dialogue
must involve the different representation that reflects the reality of the society.
To have people who represent their own ideas and agreed on every item on the
agenda is not a healthy dialogue, but is rather a monologue or deceptive and
will not proliferate justice, peace and reconciliation. It is now time to involve
those that represent the proponents and opponents in one’s society (p. 17).
It is somewhat ironic that the
most qualified faith representatives, its leaders, are ineligible for dialoguing
precisely because of their leadership status:
Who participates in authentic interreligious
dialogue? Do we ever see the Pope sitting down with the Ayatollah, or either
sharing with the Chief Rabbis of Israel? No, we do not. Why? Because these men
cannot accept “Not in Heaven” [recognising their religion’s limitations] as
a prerequisite for genuine dialogue. As defenders of particular and mutually
exclusive faith traditions, the best these men could hope for is a cordial exchange
of doctrine (Shapiro, 1989, p. 34).
It was a point demonstrated by
the leader of the Unification Church, Rev. Sun Myung Moon when he addressed
an interreligious event sponsored by his Church:
Moon’s own speech at the Assembly bore more
than a hint of a Unificationist agenda. He saw religions aimed at an ideal individual,
family, nation, and world (the four stages of restoration), declaring that the
salvation of fallen humanity will be completed by God’s providence through the
Messiah. (One presumes he was referring to himself). Of course, it could be
argued that Moon, like other religious leaders, was exercising his right to
present his own religious heritage (Moss & Chryssides, 1986, p. 13).
As all true believers should be
allowed too! Even the officially approved representatives are rarely ever the
faith’s establishment spokespersons:
...genuine dialoguers, while deeply rooted
in their faith, are the risk takers, the radicals, the prophets who are not
afraid to affirm wonder wherever it is revealed. While participants may be and
often are abbots, roshis, gurus, priests, imams, established scholars, rabbis,
and others whose positions in their respective communities may well be exalted,
they are nonetheless not the official spokespersons of their faith. They represent
not so much the tradition to which they belong, but themselves and the spiritual
quest they personally undertake...Genuine dialoguers are rare and wonderful
people (Shapiro, 1989, p. 35).
This radicalisation phenomenon
was also noted during one Marxist-Christian dialogue:
One ought to mention that the “revisionist”
Marxists are the ones who support the dialogue most ardently. They are sometimes
very popular, but they are rarely in the position to make an impact in their
own societies, because they are very definitely opposed in those efforts by
the orthodox Marxists (Romic, 1978, p. 124).
Kate Zebiri (1997) noted how Muslim-Christian
dialogues could be politically constricted and internally biased by liberals:
...the few Muslim initiatives have tended
to be on the official government level, for example in Libya, Tunisia and Jordan.
The problem of representation is not easy to resolve on the Muslim side; governments
do not necessarily have strong Islamic credibility, the ‘ulama’ (Muslim
religious scholars) are not always willing to participate, and when they do
they are often either representing their governments or constrained by government
views. Most of those who have participated as individuals have been from the
liberal end of the Islamic spectrum, often resident in the West or having spent
time there (pp. 35-36).
Similar points were made by John
Baldock (1994), Secretary General World Conference on Religion and Peace/Australia,
which had important public relations consequences because of it:
Many senior Church leaders avoid interreligious
forums, as do some from other faiths who are concerned to maintain factional
loyalties...there is also a tendency in many denominations to leave interreligious
dialogue to those who are somewhat marginal within their own structures. While
obviously there are considerable time demands upon senior religious leaders,
this often creates a disparity in interfaith meetings. Some participants may
hold considerable representative status, while others will represent virtually
no one at all. It can also create an impression that the Churches are not really
committed to building strong relationships between faith communities, otherwise
more senior representatives would be found (p. 27).
Peggy Morgan (1995) also noted
this marginalisation effect:
If an invitation arrives on the desk of the
Archbishop of Canterbury for a member of the Church of England to attend, will
the person who volunteers or who is chosen to go be on the periphery of the
main tradition of that Church...In many religious communities interfaith activity
is not of central concern and those who are involved may well be on the boundaries
of their tradition...It does not mean, however, that the Anglican, for example,
at an interfaith gathering, may be an unusual Anglican, but may or may not choose
to identify herself in those terms (p. 162).
Interestingly, Marcus Braybrooke
(1993, p. 105) urged dialoguers to become aware of being marginalised/alienated
from their own tradition. Not only are marginalised persons chosen by their
faiths as dialoguers because of their marginality, but in Braybrooke’s view,
dialoguing can also make them marginalised. Such behaviour can also be a testing-the-water
engagement tactic:
...it is important to be aware that, especially
in the initial stages of any interreligious, interideological dialogue, it is
very likely that the literally ec-centric members of religious, ideological
communities will be the ones who will have the interest and ability to enter
into dialogue; the more centrist persons will do so only after the dialogue
has proved safe for the mainline, official elements to venture into (Swidler,
1990c, p. 60).
Both marginalisation and caution
is to be expected simply because dialogue may mean transformation and growth,
but it should not be necessarily feared.
PAGE 4John Baldock (1994) also raised
the issue of representation. He asked whether the organisers of an interreligious
dialogue event should focus upon either: (a) involving people of goodwill but
with little or no representative status; or (b) bringing together those in established
leadership positions (presumably with high representative status). Regrettably,
no mention is made of whether these established leaders with high representative
status are of goodwill, but from his comment that “experience would suggest
that it is difficult to combine both” (p. 27), it appears that he does not think
so. This is a pity because having established leaders with high representative
status who are also of goodwill would be the obvious dialoguer choice. Nevertheless,
he does raise a very interesting organisational idea, namely, that “a range
of forums be organised involving people at different levels of denominational
status, enabling participation for all those willing to meet” (Baldock, 1994,
p. 27).
Although Secretary General Baldock
(1994) considered forum ranges would diminish the organisations human and financial
resources, the idea has intrinsic merit because it allows the dialogue impulse
to be fostered and nurtured in practice (instead of pleasing PR rhetoric). It
also provides valuable levels of dialogue experience for those willing, especially
given the dearth of dialogue training courses. Indeed, if each denomination
adopted common standards of stratified dialoguing it would ensure quality control
and provide a graduated training ground that could accommodate every skill level
and aspiration. Baldock (1994) also raised the issue of women and representation:
Most leadership positions within the various
faith communities are held by men, also raising the question of whether it is
important to involve senior religious women in gatherings among denominational
leaders. This requires, however, a decision about who are the most appropriate
women to involve. Should it be the head of a religious women’s organisation,
or someone whose leadership is recognised according to different criteria? (p.
27).
The answer of course should be
determined internally by the faiths themselves. However, as Harvey Cox (1989,
pp. 57-58) predicted: “I am convinced that, when women become full partners,
the interreligious dialogue will change, so much so that what is now going on
will be regarded as only an insufficient and misleading beginning.”
Peggy Morgan (1995, p. 162) likewise
noted similar gender disparities: “If the participants are mainly leaders it
is almost certain that there will be many fewer women than is typical of actual
membership within traditions.” Ursula King (1998, p. 44) was also justifiably
annoyed because of women’s invisibility at official dialogue events: “At present
these [women’s own voices] are simply unheard and presumed to be included under
whatever men have to say about dialogue.” This problem is compounded when women
are actively excluded. “Another example [of shock and exclusion] was that of
two distinguished religious scholars dialoguing with each other on spirituality,
where one at least was adamant in not admitting a woman, however much experienced
in meditation and interfaith encounters, to this exclusive male dialogue.” It
resulted in what the French call un dialogue des sourds (a dialogue of
the deaf) (King, 1998, p. 43).
Although this may be demographically
true, imposing gender requirements under whatever flavour of political correctness
is current would be beyond the legitimate scope of dialogue organisers. However,
it is an important topic to raise with the faiths themselves as they discuss
what dialogue is and should be about. Overall, achieving a balance between bureaucratically
sanctioned authorisation, personalistic radicalism, marginality, representative
status and gender bias, are matters dialogue organisers and participants need
to be cognisant of.
As a corollary of the above, faiths
have to decide if their official representatives, these “unusual” (Morgan, 1995,
p. 162), “rare and wonderful” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 35) people are insiders
of the faith (e.g., priests, active laity) or outsiders of the faith
(e.g., professors of religion, but not members, or ex-members of the faith).
As John B. Cobb Jr. (1982, p. x) argued: “Too often in this country the dialogue
with representatives of other traditions has been in this way handed over to
historians of religion, many of whom are not committed to the Christian faith
and its fresh articulation.” As Sallie B. King (1990) argued:
Clearly, someone who has spent thirty years
as a Zen master has the authority to speak for the tradition, even if she is
willing to acknowledge that exposure to Christianity has made her see things
in an altered light. The same applies to someone who has seminary training,
ordination, and thirty years in the ministry, or someone with a Ph.D. and personal
commitment in Christian theology or Buddhism (p. 124).
Yet, it is a decision that goes
to the heart of dialoguing.
Whether insiders or outsiders are
ultimately chosen as representatives, they must at least think/believe/behave
like true religious insiders. Because “a theologian enters the Buddhist-Christian
dialogue not as a cultural anthropologist nor even as a philosopher but as a
committed Christian theologian” (Tracy, 1990, p. 73). Indeed, Stanley J. Samartha
(1981, p. 43) argued that “people who enter into serious dialogue should do
so on the basis of commitments to their respective faiths is obvious. The freedom
to be committed and to be open is the prerequisite of genuine dialogue,” as
also advocated by Marcus Braybrooke (1993, p. 105) who considered it vital that
dialoguers “be secure in their own faith.”
Only when a religion has become my
religion does the discussion about the truth reach its deepest depths. Truth
for me, therefore, means my faith, just as for the Jew and the Muslim,
Judaism and Islam, and for the Hindu and the Buddhist, Hinduism and Buddhism,
are their religion, their faith, and thereby the truth
(Kung, 1988, p. 246).
Maurice Friedman (1987) wanted
to extend the insider/outsider distinction beyond card-carrying, organisational
commitments to delegates who also actively lived their faith:
There has thrived in our day, unfortunately,
a form of pseudo-dialogue in which official representatives of religions carry
on official dialogues that are neither genuine meetings of religions, for religions
cannot met, nor genuine meetings of persons because these persons speak only
for their social role and do not stand behind what they say with their own persons
(p. 104).
Overall, the weight of opinion
tends to favour having committed insiders because:
The best dialogue occurs when the partners
are deeply convinced of many things. Truth is best approached not by the absence
of convictions but by submitting strong convictions to the light of criticism.
When one is really convinced, one does not fear such criticism or expect, in
advance, that criticism will greatly alter the conviction (Cobb Jr., 1982, p.
45).
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Getting committed delegates who
lived their faith and had both religious and academic qualifications would be
ideal (i.e., a priest-professor like Dr. Andrew Greeley). Alternatively, as
a compromise, a team dialogue approach using both elements (i.e., a priest along
side a vetted sympathetic professor). However, even here, care has to be taken
because in reality, only a Jew can know what it is like to be a Jew. As Jean-Claude
Basset (1992, p. 37) stipulated in his 5th decalogue dialogue rule:
“There is no real inter-religious dialogue without having one’s roots in a given
tradition and at the same time being open to others.” Since we live in an imperfect
world, selecting the best person to attend official events will always be difficult,
and to varying degrees, a compromise choice. As Prof. Sharpe (1992, p. 233)
noted: “genuine dialogue in depth between devotees is, I am sure, a comparative
rarity. Often what we have instead is a semi-secular dialogue among the partly
secularized, and between the secular fringe of the Church and the post-Christian
world out there.”
Such delegate choices will have
far reaching ramifications, especially for minority faiths (e.g., Tibetan Buddhism)
who may not have articulate sacred servants who speak the language of the dialogue
(e.g., English). Therefore, using a professor of religion who speaks English
and Tibetan, and can perform as translator, would be better than having
an inarticulate religious member, or no dialogue member at all! This arrangement
can effectively overcome many of the bureaucratic problems already highlighted.
As an important aside however, it is:
...wrong for anglophone scholars to presume
that all interreligious dialogues should be carried out in English. A Hindu-Christian
dialogue, e.g., could be carried out in Hindi, Tamil, or another Indian language
or in two completely different languages. The dialogue partners should avoid
imposing their own language on the other as the lingua of the dialogue
(Dunbar, 1998, p. 466).
Interestingly, this team approach
would allow Martin Buber’s 5th and 6th criteria for authentic
dialogue, namely:
Genuine dialogue does not require that everyone
present has to speak, but that no one can be there as a mere observer. Each
must be ready to share with the others, and no one can know in advance that
he or she will have something to say. Genuine dialogue can be either spoken
or silent. Its essence lies in the fact that each participant turns to the others
with the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship (Shapiro, 1989,
p. 33).
This genuine dialogue could be
achieved because these speaker and observer roles (i.e., speaking and silence
behaviours) are being reciprocally shared by the team members, which in a one-to-one
situation could have caused offence and/or stalled the dialogue. For example,
Participant-A (Christian) speaks their truth and awaits a response from Participant-B
(Buddhist) who sits silently, does not answer, and only succeeds in worrying
and possibly offending their dialogue partner by the apparent inaction, or presumed
lack of attentiveness. With team dialoguing, delegates can alternate between
speaking and silent contemplation without causing offence, and the more team
members, the less odious the individual personal stress. For example, J. L.
Sandidge (1992, pp. 240, 241) reported how the Roman Catholic-Classical Pentecostal
dialogue initially agreed that each “side would bring nine persons to the dialogue
table,” later upgraded to 12-15 Pentecostal observers with limited participation
roles. However, the size of the panel should not become too unwieldy and compromise
the efficacy of the dialogue.
If the issue is between: (a) having
dialogue sessions (however imperfect); or (b) not having dialogue sessions (because
perfection cannot be achieved) then the former is usually preferable, as Prof.
Sharpe (1992) grudgingly admitted:
Of course, a semi-secular Christian will
be able to meet and converse with a semi-secular Hindu about matters of secular
concern, without loss of temper or face on either side. If that is the best
we can manage, or that circumstances permit, then at least it is better than
open conflict. Where it squares with that which we are sometimes tempered to
claim about dialogue, is another matter entirely (pp. 233-234).
And, of course, whether dialogue
perfection can ever exist is another matter entirely, but both Sharpe (1992,
p. 233) and Tracy (1990, p. 4) acknowledged the rarity of genuine, in-depth
dialogue, and so one has to make the best of all possible worlds. The interesting
question of if and how members of religious dialoguing bodies should or should
not engage one another is another fruitful area for investigation but currently
beyond the scope of this work.
While acknowledging Stanley J.
Samartha’s (1981, p. 42) claim that “the deepest truths of any religion cannot
be distilled into clear, rational, logical, and self-evident propositions to
be compared with the truth of another religion,” one still has to act clearly,
rationally and logically when dialoguing. Why? Because “the sincerity of peoples
engaged in dialogue...[does] not necessarily build up an uncontested credibility
of their efforts, nor...[does] it guarantee their efficiency” (Mitri, 1995,
p. 22). “The ‘ordinary laypeople’, whether men or women, are the more typical
numerically and may therefore be deemed to have the most significant voices
but may or may not be well-informed enough to make a contribution” (Morgan,
1995, p. 162). Scott Daniel Dunbar (1998, p. 466) even suggested that “scholars
should enter into dialogues with the greatest breadth of participants possible...including
children, despite obvious disparities in knowledge.” Leonard Swidler (1990c,
p. 60) similarly argued that: “Dialogue should involve every level of the religious,
ideological communities, all the way down to the “persons in the pews.””
Although they are interesting inclusivist
sentiments, which does have a place during the entire life cycle of interfaith
communications, it is not particular useful advice for formal, official dialoguing.
The allegedly “exclusionary and elitist” (Dunbar, 1998, p. 466) nature of eschewing
children and the average person in the pews is, in reality, just basic fairness:
Surely no one would want to--or at least,
no one should want to--restrict thinking to the popular level. That would run
counter to the nature of our humanity, and indeed would be inimical to the welfare
of humankind...clearly dialogue must be conducted on all levels of human experience
and most certainly on the highest possible level, for it is precisely there
that many of the breakthroughs have occurred and will continue to occur, which
then will greatly liberate the dialogue at the other levels (Swidler, 1990a,
pp. 68-69).
Nor does Dunbar’s (1998, p. 466)
subsequent argument help resolve the root inequality, namely: “I agree that
dialogue should be between equals only in the sense that all participants are
equally teachers and learners.” This is pure semantics and no solution at all
because everyone is a teacher and learner in some regard, but does that
make them all equal? No! The logical gap here is frequently insurmountable.
Dunbar (1998, p. 466) failed in his own goal of keeping “scholars on the bridge
of dialogue instead of the waters of debate.” This lends weight to Pim Valkenberg’s
(2000, p. 109) suspicion that “the word “dialogue” can easily be exploited to
cover up a situation where equality is absent and even unwelcome.”
PAGE 6Officially-selected and approved
delegates must be well-informed and competent enough to represent their
faiths credibly. This entails: (a) being knowledgeable about their partner’s
dogmas, history, sensitivities, and even have “expertise in ethical issues”
(Swan, 1998, p. 356); (b) providing competent presentation of their faith’s
propositions; and (c) having dialogue specialists, like D. C. Mulder (2000,
p. 100) who reported: “I limit myself to the relation between Christians and
Jews and between Christians and Muslims.” Indeed:
In interfaith dialogue participants speak
responsibly as representatives of their communions; therefore they should have
thorough knowledge of what their communions teach, and should refuse to sacrifice
convictions in the interest of a superficial unity (Early, 1979, pp. 1820-1821).
(See also Baumer-Despeigne, 1989,
p. 70; Krieger, 1993, p. 352; Lee, 1991, p. 187). It is certainly counterproductive
sending delegates if they cannot represent the faith properly. It would be a
dialogue sham because:
Openness without the fulcrum of prior religious
self-awareness or faith commitments can weigh nothing in the balance. It is
like sewing a piece of cloth with no knot in the thread. One sews and sews,
but no seam results. In the end, one is left with the separate pieces of cloth,
thread and needle (Swearer, 1977, p. 42).
Leonard Swidler (1982, p. 11) even
argued that it was “mandatory that each dialogue partner herself define what
it means to be an authentic member of her own tradition.”
Not only must one understand one’s
own faith, the dialoguer must have appropriate knowledge of the Other’s faith,
if for no other reason than to allow meaningful dialogue. This requirement was
embodied in Paul Mojzes’s (1978, p. 10) 2nd and 4th ground
rules, namely: “Have a preliminary knowledge of your partner and the position
with which you are going to dialogue,” and “Be well informed about the topic
being discussed and present it clearly.” It was also an essential requirement
for Heinrich Dumoulin (1974, p. 37) who argued that: “An accurate knowledge
of other religions is necessary for the dialogue. Naturally, the dialogue ought
to correct, supplement and enrich this knowledge. But a certain preliminary
understanding is the indispensable prerequisite for a useful dialogue.” Interestingly,
Prof. Sharpe (1974) considered it important to also know the Other intuitively:
It is all very well to say that it is more
important for the Christian to meet the Hindu as a man than to meet the man
as a Hindu; but the man is a Hindu, and possesses (if this is the right
word) a ‘Hindu mind’, which needs to be understood intellectually, as well as
perceived intuitively (pp. 84-85).
The general knowledge requirement
was also inherent in the conclusion of the Theological Advisory Commission of
the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (1989, p. 110): “We need to be
conscientized and helped to free ourselves from prejudices, attitudes of self-defence,
and of seeking merely our own benefit by becoming open to the positive values
in other religions, and ready to learn from them.” For Reender Kranenborg (1987,
p. 129), this ready-to-learn-from-them attitude required that the church “should
meet and speak with the adherents of the NRMs [New Religious Movements] directly
and read carefully the literature they themselves produce.” Why? Because many
reviewers had never met any of the groups or read any of their literature, just
secondary sources and ill-informed opinions! Technically, they are speaking
from a position of ignorance.
A similar hands-on attitude was
advocated by Prof. Sharpe (1977). He required dialoguers to have a variety of
other faith friends, and more importantly, direct personal experiences that
went beyond the world of books. Because:
...a Christian missionary who has spent half
a lifetime working among the ‘popular’ Hinduism of the villages of Tamil Nadu
has a different image of the encounter from that of the Western student, whether
liberal, Barthian, Neo-Thomist or whatever, who has never set foot in India,
but who is attracted by certain of the propositions of Advaita Vedanta
(p. 133).
In short, advocating experience
of the real Other, as opposed to a projected Other; which had driven David Tracy’s
(1990, p. 4) ten year passion for interreligious dialogue. Obviously, Prof.
Sharpe (1992) felt strong about it because he repeated the sentiment:
...a fair proportion of recent Christian
literature on the subject [theories of dialogue] seems to have been put together
by people who appear never to have lived outside a Christian milieu, and who
may have no Hindu, Muslim, Jewish or Buddhist friends...in many cases they have
lived in a modern Western post-Christian milieu, most commonly that of the secular
university (I am tempted to say, with the seminary running a close second)...
(p. 233).
PAGE 7
This assessment still rings uncomfortably
true today.
The reporting of other faith friends
within the literature is not very common, but when it does occur it can be delightful
(see Gordis, 1991, p. 467). Indeed, having interreligious friendships was deemed
a new Christian theological virtue by James L. Fredericks (1998, p. 164) because
these friends contributed to the “decentering of the ego, and the expansion
of our horizons...[it] exposes our presuppositions and confronts us with our
misperceptions.” The Other’s “new stories are a tremendum and also a
fascinans... [with the] power to redirect our doing and stimulate our
imagining. In this way, the strangeness of the stranger itself can become for
us a resource for the cultivation of our souls and the appropriation of truth”
(p. 165).
Such friendships
are also important pragmatically. An “ecumenical initiative rarely makes significant
progress without the bonds of friendship and collegiality...Through genuine
friendship the “change of heart” which Vatican II placed at the center of ecumenism,
is able to happen and its fruits are able to become visible” (Crow, 2000, p.
97). After all, “dialogue can only take place among persons; systems cannot
converse with one another” (Burrell, 2000, p. 44). Indeed, for earnest Christians,
Jesus considered his followers not as servants but as friends (John 15:15 KJV),
but before one can be Jesus’s friend one must learn to befriend one another
(1 John 4:21 KJV). So, why not adopt this Nazarene strategy to interreligious
dialogue? As Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1991, p. 8) argued: “No one should, in
my view, have any views on any other aspect of interreligious questions until
he or she has friends among them.”
Cultivating
personal friendships while pursuing the mutually shared commitment to truth
is also a practical virtue. Why? Because it enriches our faith journey, the
Other is now transformed into a valuable companion instead of a rival, and it
can be done without ceasing to be the Other (i.e., no faith dilution
nor stressful conversion or colonising demands). As companion-friends, we are
now required to adopt the spirit of civility, correct understanding, and cooperation.
These are positive deeds which will speak far louder than promising words. Indeed,
David B. Burrell (2000) is in concert with this contention and also argued that
friendship is the postmodern solution to the spectre of relativism:
I have focused on friendship as a prerequisite
for the quality of intersubjectivity which can come to substitute for objectivity
in a postmodern context. Yet even more internally...the journey shared with
friends becomes a paradigm of that quest for truth which displays to us the
ubiquity and necessity of analogous discourse in negotiating the way set out
before us (p. 62).
While John B. Cobb Jr. (1982) acknowledged
the value of knowing the Other, he did not want participants to know too
much about the Other:
Prior knowledge of the religious tradition
from which the other speaks is beneficial to dialogue. But it is a mistake to
demand too much here. If only those Christians who are scholars in the field
of Islamics take part in dialogue with Muslims, the deeper purposes of dialogue
are unlikely to be realized...Dialogue with Buddhism is not primarily the province
of Buddhologists but rather of Christian theologians who are, for the most part,
but little informed about the Buddhist traditions (p. x).
It strongly appears that these
“unusual” (Morgan, 1995, p. 162), “rare and wonderful” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 35)
dialoguers are becoming even more unusual, rare and wonderful if they have to
walk a tightrope between: (a) specialist knowledge of the Other; and (b) neo-ignorance,
which has an uncomfortable anti-growth element about it. However, there is merit
in going beyond exchanges between specialists to where it is putatively needed,
the benighted. Interestingly, Heinrich Dumoulin (1974, p. 37) had prefigured
Rabbi Shapiro’s concern two decades earlier when he argued that: “Interest and
study are required to fulfil this condition [accurate knowledge of other religions],
and only a limited number of adherents of the various religions will be able
to qualify.” This may simply have to be accepted for now.
As an above corollary, dialoguers
should know how to articulate their points convincingly, appropriately and effectively.
If for no other reason than because poor “communication skills in listening,
speaking and questioning cause communication barriers” (Dwyer, 1993, p. 14).
For example, during the 1986 Catholic-Marxist Dialogue in Budapest:
...the dialogue was defective from both sides.
At times, it was more parallel discourse than dialogue. Language--not only in
a grammatical sense--sometimes seems to have posed a barrier. Some of the questions
asked were irrelevant, leading to tangential points or were needlessly embarrassing
(Pereira, 1987, p. 273).
It is of little benefit having
knowledgeable and approved representatives if they cannot do anything constructive
with their knowledge and authority.
In fact, many “ordinary Jews or
Christians lack the skills necessary to engage in a deeper, theological dialogue,
and are rightly wary of setting their faith at risk in a confusing enterprise”
(Braybrooke, 1993, p. 105). There is also little benefit having knowledgeable
and approved faith representatives who are not comparable scholastically because:
“Dialogue...presupposes egalitarianism and what one might call horizontal communication
between equals” (Sharpe, 1992, p. 230), as embodied in Leonard Swidler’s (1983)
7th commandment:
Dialogue can take place between equals, or
par cum pari as Vatican II put it. This means that not only can there
be no dialogue between a skilled scholar and a “person in the pew” type (at
most there can only be a garnering of data in the manner of an interrogation),
but also there can be no such thing as one-way dialogue (p. 3).
Marcus Braybrooke (1993, p. 105)
likewise considered this par cum pari requirement to be important: “Dialogue
needs also to be of equals, that is to say of those with similar levels of scholarship
and study.” Stanley J. Samartha (1981, p. viii) similarly argued that practical
dialogue required intra-community preparation. Presumably as confidence building
warm-ups: “Dialogue between communities of faith separated from each other for
so long is unlikely to bear much fruit without some dialogue within particular
communities of faith as preparation for encounters.” Skills in public speaking,
debating and negotiation tactics are obvious advantages here.
PAGE 8Indeed, Leonard Swidler (1988)
took the competency notion further by advocating a Lawrence Kohlberg analysis
of their cognitive, moral judgement, and faith-ideology development. As such,
all dialogue participants should be at postconventional stage five:
...so as to avoid unwarranted expectations
- and subsequent disillusionment. Being forewarned about what stage potential
dialogue participants are at, a sensitive person should be able to help all
concerned to work their way through the necessary prolegomena more successfully,
and perhaps even more rapidly (p. 39).
If this approach is seriously adopted
it might open the floodgates to the entire psychologist’s battery of psychometric
tests (e.g., IQ, personality, interest, attitude).
It is perhaps no accident that
the most prolific dialoguers are Christians, Jews and Buddhists because they
regularly engage in dialectics during their socio-religious training. As Tenzin
Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, recounted concerning the Tibetan
system of monastic education:
Wit is an important part of these debates
and high merit is earned by turning your opponent’s postulates to your own humorous
advantage. This makes dialectics a popular form of entertainment even amongst
uneducated Tibetans who, although they might not follow the intellectual acrobatics
involved, can still appreciate the fun and the spectacle. In the old days, it
was not unusual to see nomads and other country people from far outside Lhasa
spend part of their day watching learned debates in the courtyard of a monastery.
A monk’s ability at this unique form of disputation is the criterion by which
his intellectual achievements are judged (Gyatso, 1990, p. 26).
Making fun of your dialogue partner
during an interreligious event would certainly not be approved of, but
if wit and humour can be injected in a spirit of good will, then so much the
better. No one seriously expects dialogues to be dry, humourless events, or
would want them to be, indeed, to “insist that dialogue must always be about
clear and distinct ideas is to impose a narrowly Western verbal-doctrinal style.
What occurs, then, is nothing but a more subtle form of religious imperialism.
Exchanging jokes and anecdotes is also a form of dialogue” (Cox, 1989, p. 15).
Admittedly, orientating to this
humorous focus may require patience, as evidenced by Harvey Cox (1989):
When I was living among Tibetan Buddhists,
for example, it took me some time to appreciate the frolic-some way they approach
even the deepest tenets of their faith. They sometimes called it “crazy wisdom.”
I found that, as a Christian, I eventually had to lay aside the notion that
dialogue must always be serious...Perhaps we need to place the “theology of
play” at the service of interfaith encounter...(p. 14).
Indeed, it can be a very serious
dialogue tool. “Playfullness is a practical way to surrender...the presuppositions
that have become established in our lives in order to experiment with new possibilities
of identity and action” (Fredericks, 1998, p. 166), including interreligious
reflection, acknowledgment and self-realisation. In fact, during playful:
...interreligious friendships, religious
traditions become present to us in the spontaneity of human speech and action
and are no longer constrained by the limits of the text. The truths of religion
cannot be exhausted by inscription. Friendship between followers of different
traditions helps us to resist the tendency to reduce religious forms of life
to textuality. In the friend, the religious Other is present not as an abstraction
on paper but as an embodied truth in all its historical ambiguity...within its
living, existential context (Fredericks, 1998, pp. 167-168).
If dialoguers are not as well prepared
as their partners per session, then all might come to naught, as embodied in
Raimundo Panikkar’s (1975, p. 408) II:1 principle: “There must be equal preparation
from both sides, both theologically and culturally. Otherwise, misunderstandings
very easily creep in.” However, even this preparation requirement is not without
its own inherent problems. For example, Mary Hall (1987, p. 29) reported how
her attempts at thorough dialogue preparation resulted in less than gracious
suspicions about her personal integrity: “During the preparation of these [reports]
the group leaders visited me regularly, and one morning a Jewish neighbour asked
me, very seriously and politely, what was the reason for the frequent visits
of coloured gentlemen with briefcases to my flat!” The religious suspect was
now a sexual suspect.
PAGE 9
Participants should be capable
of delivering their messages articulately, as distinct from knowledgeably, emotionally
or rhetorically, so that others can understand them. It is counterproductive
using such complex arguments and arcane terminology that understanding is thwarted.
As Fr. Walter Fernandes (1995, p. 95) advised concerning dialogue with the poor,
it should be “in the language they understand,” no doubt emulating Christ accommodating
the people rather than vice versa (Matt. 9:35). What is needed is intelligibility.
It is a simple, obvious point that is frequently overlooked precisely because
of its simplicity and obviousness.
Participants should also couch
their information in a language style that is familiar to participants; for
the sake of identification, understanding and conviction transmission. As J.
Paul Rajashekar (1987) argued:
In this process of mutual interrogation our
claims for truth (and the claims of others as well) are put to the test and
tempered. This enables us to sharpen our doctrinal claims, spelling them out
not only in terms and categories familiar to us, but also in the language and
categories intelligible to our dialogue partners. A dialogical theology therefore
needs to be “multilingual” rather than “monolingual” in order to make its own
claims communicable (p. 15).
One must also be cognisant of the
pragmatic need for a common language for coherency purposes. It is important
that the faiths put their best feet forward, and event organisers ensure it.
If an undesirable state of affairs is allowed to happen, then not only are the
specific sessions dysfunctional, the entire dialogue enterprise is put in jeopardy
due to “bad press.” It is also a gross disservice to the religions involved,
especially if publicly disparaged in the media (secular and sacred) because
of their poor showing. Regrettably, biased media coverage is an inherent problem
worldwide:
One of the things that those involved in
the academic study of religions often have to unravel for students is the negative
imaging of both major religious traditions such as Islam and many new religious
movements (in this context designated as sects or cults) in the media. More
rarely do the media present pictures of people of different religious traditions
celebrating, talking, praying, eating or joining together in positive ways (Morgan,
1995, p. 165).
The media can, of course, sabotage
the dialogue before it starts, as Aelred J. Pereira (1987) reported:
Before the conference [1986 Catholic-Marxist
Dialogue in Budapest] there had been warnings in the press about the futility
and even impossibility of dialoguing with Marxist scholars who are linked with
political power, and about the risks of being led into compromises of the Christian
position and of being exploited for political propaganda (p. 265).
Media skills is therefore another
item to add to that ever-growing list of delegate competencies.
Each participant officially representing
their faith will want to come to the dialogue attired in the sartorial elegance
reflective of the occasion and their proud religious heritage. This is one of
the most striking features observable at such a gathering; a time and place
where orange robed Hindu swamis and Rajneesh can accompany grey and saffron
robed Buddhists. Clergy-collared Protestants pass by white-mantled nuns. Black-robed
Zen monks and Orthodox priests with their flowing robes, hoods and beards pass
by Rastafarians with their dreadlocks, in the company of Hassidics with their
side-burns and hats, shaven-headed monks, and blue-suited Mormons with their
obligatory short-back-and-sides. White and blue turbaned Sikhs can be seen alongside
Jews with skull caps, fez-wearing Muslims, business-suited rabbis, cassock clothed
Catholics, Nehru-jacketted Indians and numerous multicoloured saris, gowns,
sashes, veils and head scarfs of Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu women.
Likewise, Catholic rosary beads
can be seen alongside Mahikari omitama pendants in the company of feathered
and leopard-skinned Africans, or Tibetan Buddhists with their prayer wheels,
drums and bells. Jews can be seen wearing their parchment filled batim-houses
of the tephillin upon their heads and strapped to their arms, and other associated
phylacteries. There are also the numerous assortments of crosses to be found.
Whether they be small unobtrusive ones worn on the collars of civilian-clothed
priests and nuns, or ostentatiously embroidered on the backs of Bishops’ robes,
or hanging pendulously around Greek Orthodox necks.
All this is made more sensuous
when surrounded by chanting and prayers, gongs and silence while the smells
of herbs, flowers, candles and incense from Shintoists, neo-pagans, Zoroastrians
etc. gently waft over the attendees. Each day can be filled with Jews reading
the Law, or Buddhists in meditation near genuflecting, self-crossing Catholics,
hand-waving gurus, tai-chi practising Chinese, yoga practising Hindus, and Moslems
dutifully kneeling on their prayer mats after completing their various ablution
rituals. In short, there is a virtual microcosm of Earth’s religious macrocosm.
Such variations in dress sense
and behaviour must be respectfully tolerated and no deliberate offence is to
be assumed by any delegates. However, some may be tempted to be insulted for
good religious reasons. Generally speaking, Fundamentalist Christians like Jehovah’s
Witnesses consider it an insult to wear anything on one’s head while in God’s
house (Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania/ International Bible
Students Association, 1988, p. 1052). Whereas, the Jews honour the reverse behaviour,
they need to cover their heads in their temples and synagogues as a sign of
religious respect (Ausubel, 1975, p. 191).
PAGE 10It is incumbent upon event organisers
to judiciously inform participants of potential sources of insults beforehand,
whether via conference handouts, special letters or by private talks. The potential
problems and suggested responses will hopefully be put in their rightful perspective
before any major incidents occur. It is also the religion’s obligation to prepare
their delegates in this way.
If a Sikh suffers abuse to do with his wearing
a turban, or an Australian is the butt of jokes about kangaroos and beer, then
it is no good blaming the turban or the kangaroo. The barrier to free and friendly
communication is in the mind of the person offering the abuse or making the
joke. Once more it may be seen that meanings are in the mind, not in the sign
(Dimbleby & Burton, 1985, p. 83).
This makes the Victorian Ethnic
Affairs Commission’s advice about cross-cultural encounter even more appropriate:
Be aware that there are many differences
in non-verbal behaviour between cultures and try to familiarise yourself with
cultural differences in the areas of gesture, facial expression, touching, eye
contact, posture, distance and clothing...Learn about offensive non-verbal behaviour
in different cultures and avoid them (Community Education Unit, 1988, p. 97).
However, it is up to each participant
to decide if, how, and in what way to accommodate their partners during the
dialogue. If it is not a particularly important or sensitive concession, then
it should be encouraged as a sign of respect for the Other. If it is an important
issue, then the organisers should be chastised for allowing it to become an
issue at all, it being indicative of poor planning/Chairmanship, and then they
should set about coming to a compromise.
Similar consideration should also
be shown to the participants during the dialogue. For example, a Catholic delegate
might be fiddling with his rosary beads while listening to the Other, but this
does not necessarily indicate boredom, inattention or a snub; rather, it could
indicate deep concentration achieved through this traditional meditative technique.
If dialogue partners realise this beforehand, then potentially offensive behaviours
can turn into sources of pride precisely because the Other did take them seriously.
What was previously coded as a “distraction” is now categorised as respectful
pre-feedback behaviour.
Indeed, there are many ways that
people can show that they are paying attention, for example, by: (a) nodding
their heads; (b) looking directly into the delegate’s eyes, whether some, most,
or all of the time they are speaking; (c) averting the eyes and placing the
head in a way that indicates listening; (d) using appropriate sounds in the
right places (e.g., ‘uh-huh’, ‘oh?,’ tongue-clicking); (e) using words that
show one is following the speaker’s content (e.g., ‘Really?,’ ‘Did she?’); (f)
completing, or echoing, the speaker’s sentence; (g) remaining perfectly silent;
or (h) rocking one’s head from side to side (O’Sullivan, 1994, p. 74). Numerous
non-verbal factors can be addressed in this way. However, even these behaviours
have to be applied judiciously because of their variant cultural interpretations.
For example, direct eye-to-eye contact can be coded as offensive because staring,
a common Western practice, may be interpreted as intrusive and impertinent rather
than an indication of a serious willingness to understand the Other. Alternatively,
being silent, closed eyed, or looking down or away from a delegate, a typically
Eastern practice, may be interpreted as weakness, deception or snubbing rather
than humility, or possibly even a courtesy gesture of ritual submission.
Nonverbal behaviours have the potential
to confirm and repeat verbal behaviours, of denying and confusing them, of strengthening
and emphasising them, or of controlling and regulating what is happening. Yet,
surprisingly, only a few authors have suggested that their sacred servants take
important notice of facial expressions and body language (Pieterse, 1990, pp.
238-239). There is no doubt that each faith could supply innumerable examples
of potentially offensive behaviours which event organisers should be aware of,
and then try to prepare an appropriate response strategy.
The decision of who should officially
be allowed to participate in formal religious dialogues is not simple, easy
or unproblematic. Further research is needed to fully explore these contours.
What is clear is that successful religious dialoguing is premised upon both
organisers and delegates having a clear and sober understanding of the pragmatic
conditions of the dialogic enterprise and its many attendant needs.
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Copyright © Anton Karl Kozlovic 2001
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