New Players –
Same Game?

The influence of emerging donors on the policies of three traditional donors:
The cases of the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom

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<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação; Brazilian Agency for Cooperation</td>
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<td>AgriTT</td>
<td>Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low Income Countries (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>African Renaissance and Development Fund (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Assistance (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Group of Brazil, South Africa, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC/ BRICS</td>
<td>Group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and since 2010 South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICSAM</td>
<td>Group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIDGE</td>
<td>Building Responsibility for the Delivery of Government Services (USAID)</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Country Assistance Plan (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBJ</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Justification (USA)</td>
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<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategy (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>China Enterprise Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Company's Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CGA</td>
<td>Country Governance Analysis (UK)</td>
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<td>ClimAA</td>
<td>Clima, Agricultura e Alimentos, Arica-Brazil partnership on climate-smart agriculture and food security (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank)</td>
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<td>CSISA</td>
<td>Cereal System Initiative for South Asia (USAID and Gates foundation)</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (within OECD)</td>
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<td>DBT</td>
<td>India Department of Biotechnology</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Developing countries</td>
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<td>DCF</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Forum (UN)</td>
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<td>DF4D</td>
<td>Domestic Finance for Development (USA)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department for International Development and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Departmental Strategic Objective (UK)</td>
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<td>e.g.</td>
<td>exempli gratia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMBRAPA</td>
<td>Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EXIM Bank</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>Feed the Future initiative (USA)</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCI</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPP</td>
<td>Global Development Partnership Programme (UK)</td>
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<td>GHI</td>
<td>Global Health Initiative (USA)</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH; German Corporation for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GROW</td>
<td>Oxfam-led initiative enhancing agricultural productivity worldwide</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKDIBP</td>
<td>India-Kenya Dairy Innovation Bridge Programme (funded by India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INVENT</td>
<td>Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPRCC</td>
<td>International Poverty Reduction Centre (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ITEC</td>
<td>Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account (USA)</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation, institution organising MCA (MCA)</td>
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<td>MDCD</td>
<td>Most Different Case Design</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NDRC</td>
<td>National Development Reform Commission (China)</td>
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<td>NEITI</td>
<td>Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NHO</td>
<td>Confederation of Norwegian Entreprise</td>
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<td>NIPI</td>
<td>Norway - India Partnership Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMFA</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OfD</td>
<td>Oil for Development Programme (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>Portuguese Speaking countries in Africa</td>
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PEPFAR  President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USA)
PIKA  Partnership for Innovation and Knowledge in Agriculture (USA)
PROGRESS  Project on Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan (USA)
REDD  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN)
SACU  South African Custom Union
SADC  South African Development Community
SAREP  Southern Africa Regional Environmental Programme
SARI/EI  South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy Integration
SCAAP  Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (India)
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
SENAC  National Service for Industrial Training (Brazil)
SUCCESS  Programme on Systems to Uphold the Credibility and Constitutionality of Elections in South Sudan (USA)
TAF  The Asia Foundation (NGO)
TCDC  Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TEAM 9  Techno-Economic approach for India-Africa Movement
TERI  The Energy and Resources Institute
UK  United Kingdom
UKIERI  UK India Education and Research Initiative
UN  United Nations
UN GA  United Nations General Assembly
UN SC  United Nations Security Council
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
USA / U.S.  United States of America/ U.S.-American
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USD  U.S. Dollar
USDOT  United States Department of the Treasury
USGAO  United States Government Accountability Office
USSD  United States Department of State
USWH  United States White House
WB  World Bank
WFD  Westminster Foundation for Democracy (UK)
WGI  Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)
wPOWER  Partnership on Women's Entrepreneurship in Renewables (USA)
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1 Introduction and literature review

1.1 Research puzzle and aim of study

In June 2016, news services across the world reported that China was about to build the new headquarters of the Zimbabwean parliament for free. And this was not the first such gift that China had contributed to the political culture of African governments; in 2010 it built the new headquarters of the African Union (worth USD 200 million) in Addis Ababa. This fact was also commented on extensively across the world media; BBC News observed that “we couldn’t ask for a clearer example than this to show that China is to […] increase its influence right across the continent” (BBC News 29.01.2012; similar argument, see Diekhans 2012).

These incidents are illustrative of an ongoing debate about the increasing influence of emerging countries – especially China – on the African continent. It also reflects ongoing changes in the field of foreign aid, which has for a long time been dominated by an economic relationship between rich industrialized states that gave a small part of their gross domestic product to poorer, and less industrialized states.¹ Today, new trends are emerging. While the financial crisis has hit industrialized countries and reduced their commitment to helping other states, emerging countries are increasingly involved in the processes of giving aid. Most industrialised countries give about 0.30 percent of their gross national income to development projects (Humphrey 2010).² In 2014, a total of USD 137 billion was spent by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – the institution responsible for reporting on aid from industrialised countries – in bilateral and multilateral aid projects (OECD Stat 2015d). Foreign aid from rich countries has comprised an ever increasing flow of money since the 1960s with only smaller setbacks in the 1990s and after the financial crisis in 2007. In comparison, the amounts spent by so-called emerging donors³ are still rather modest. Whereas exact figures are hard to come by, approximately 10 to 15 percent of global aid is distributed by new providers (K. Smith, Yamashiro Fordelone, and F. Zimmermann 2010; for the higher estimate, see F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 10; Joshua S. Goldstein and Pevehouse 2011). This share has increased dramatically over the last ten years, a phenomenon which has not escaped the attention of traditional aid

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¹ I refer to “foreign aid” as a voluntary transfer of official resources with a grant component of at least 25 percent with the objective to promote economic development and welfare (OECD 2008a, 9). This is the definition for Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a think tank of mostly rich countries and excludes some of the actions undertaken by emerging donors (A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008, 6). For the sake of comparability, this study rigorously uses this definition. Whenever other activities from Southern providers are considered it will be specifically stated.

² The average of the club of rich donors, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD lies at 0.29 percent (Klingebiel 2014, 5–7).

³ The term “emerging donors” refers to two elements: first, it shows that the activities of emerging donors as donors of foreign aid are fairly recent, and second, that the category corresponds to another group – that of emerging markets. The term is ambiguous, as some of these donors have supported developing countries for a long time. China is such an example, having supported countries such as Ghana since the 1950s (Brautigam 2010, 7). However, it is only recently, through their fast economic development, that these donors have begun to influence politics of other donors (Rowlands January 2008, 3). The term is equal to “providers of South-South cooperation” and “Southern provider”, a terminology used by the DAC. Many studies have also shown that it is not easy to find a clear definition of who belongs to the group and who doesn’t (Knodt and Piefer 2012, 37). The following literature review and chapter 4 shed further light on this question.
givers, and which was often welcomed by recipient countries as a true alternative to funding from unloved Western donors.

These aid flows – whether from traditional or emerging donors – are significant for the income of many recipient countries. For all developing countries, they amount to 0.68 percent of gross national income. However, there is a huge variation between more or less aid dependent countries. For instance, though aid makes up 4.2 percent of national income for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for individual countries such as Burundi it is at an incredible 39.8 percent of gross national income (Klingebiel 2014, 7–8). Aid therefore is still a critical factor which defines the relationships between richer and poorer nations.

This increasing trend of spending from Southern providers has not been ignored by academics. The bulk of existing research – and of media attention as the above examples illustrate – has focused so far on the ambiguous relationship between China and diverse African countries. It is often claimed that Chinese development policies mainly provide help for rogue African leaders who would otherwise have been internationally isolated due to their lack of support from industrialized states (e. g. Halper 2010a). Few have looked at the tendencies of other emerging countries to participate in foreign aid under the principle of South-South cooperation. But the reaction of traditional donors to these new trends is perhaps the most neglected question of all. How do they adapt their development policies in response to this new, perceived source of competition?

This thesis is looking for answers to precisely this question. It looks at two thematic fields that are particularly affected by emerging donors: first, the field of conditionality – it is often argued (as the literature will illustrate in detail) that emerging donors do not attach political or economic conditions to their aid activities while traditional donors do; and, second, that of trilateral cooperation – the cooperation between a Northern donor, a Southern aid provider and a recipient country. This study looks therefore at the reaction of selected traditional donors to their perceived loss of the monopoly on the development paradigm in these two thematic areas.

The aims of the study are threefold. By illustrating the reaction of three traditional donors – namely the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom – to the emergence of a new group of donors it allows for wider speculation about the potential reaction of traditional forces to the emergence of new power centres – development policy being only one of many fields within

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4 The term “traditional donor” refers to industrialised countries. The group is congruent with the current 29 members of the DAC (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). This list is not perfect – other countries may qualify as traditional donors that are not a member of the DAC (for instance Hungary), while some DAC members may not entirely qualify for the definition given above (notably the Republic of Korea) (OECD DAC).

5 Conditionality refers to aid that is made conditional on the fulfilment of certain conditions before (ex-ante conditionality) or after (ex-post conditionality) the disbursement of aid. Stokke defines conditionality as “the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (Stokke 1995a, 12).

6 Trilateral or triangular cooperation is defined by Langendorf (2012, 25–26) as a cooperation “between DAC donors and providers of South-South cooperation to implement development programmes in beneficiary countries.” Triangular cooperation only started to become a popular concept in the mid-2000s (for a similar definition, see Ashoff 2010; Chaturvedi 2012a; Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2013).

7 The chapter on methods gives further insights into why these three cases were selected.
international relations that are affected by this shift. This might also lead to interesting hypotheses for the future broader relations between the North and the South, an area which is currently central to debates within international relations (IR). Moreover, another aim of the study is a theoretical one: in the process of investigating the reaction within traditional donor policy, the theoretical prism of discursive institutional change is used, investigated and further developed. The study conceptualises each country’s development policy as an institution (following an institutional approach) composed of narratives, rules, and practices, allowing for a very detailed understanding of what is going on in the individual cases (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Another theoretical contribution is the investigation about the influence of ideas on policy change – with the field of discursive institutionalism and constructivism as main inspirations (Schmidt 2011). Finally – and as the literature review will show in detail – what is currently missing from the numerous publications on the broader topic is an empirical study of the actual reactions that goes beyond pure speculation. This study fills that gap and provides revealing empirical evidence from the three traditional donors.

The following introductory chapter outlines how this investigation into the changes within traditional donor policies as a reaction to emerging donors is to be conducted. It begins with an overview of the main research questions, hypotheses and theoretical framework that this study is embedded in. The third section gives an overview of the existing body of literature on the topic and thereby identifies the potential gaps in the research that this thesis aims to fill. The final section gives an outline of the study and summarises the structure of the chapters.

1.2 Framework of this thesis: research questions, hypotheses and methods

This study aims to close the significant research gap – that the literature review will further discuss – when it comes to providing clear answers on the reaction of well-established donors to the emergence of new potential rivals. It is empirically driven and looks at the concrete reactions of three traditional donor countries – the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway.

Starting from this framework, the study investigated the following research questions:

How do the three selected traditional donors react towards the increased presence of emerging donors?

This thesis follows the theoretical approach of discursive institutionalism, which holds that ideas have the power to effect institutional change (or, indeed, prevent it). It is therefore essential that this work first looks at the relevant ideas that traditional donors put forward regarding emerging donors in order to address – in a second step – potential changes and reactions within their policies. Moreover, the literature review argues that the fields in which these consequences are most likely to be felt are that of conditionality and that of trilateral cooperation. Conditionality was chosen because it is seen as an area where the main differences persist between traditional and new donors. Trilateral cooperation was chosen because it is emphasized in the literature as the field in which traditional donors might best be able to influence and socialise emerging donors. Therefore, the following more targeted questions were addressed in the empirical chapters:
What are the reigning ideas that exist about emerging donors within the three traditional donors’ aid communities?

Is there, first, a change in their approach towards conditionality? And second, how do they approach trilateral cooperation?

Are there common reactions towards emerging donors from the three selected cases? If yes, can they be generalised even further (for other traditional donors); if no, how can these differences be explained?

Can the ideas about emerging donor policies explain potential changes within traditional donors’ aid policies?

The theoretical chapter further expands upon the theoretical hypotheses that are essential in addressing the empirical data. One of the biggest theoretical contributions of this study, is that it conceptualises the development policy of donor countries as an institution composed of three layers – narratives (spoken and informal), rules (written and formal), and practices (what is actually done) – in order to track down potential changes within these layers and thereby within the development policies of the three traditional donors. This model allows for a very detailed and empirically driven understanding of what happens in the three selected donor countries and allows for comparison between the three cases.

Moreover, as the next chapter illustrates in detail, the following theoretical assumptions were tested in this work:

**H0**: Ideas play a decisive role in explaining institutional change within development policy. More precisely, the way emerging donors are perceived plays a decisive role for explaining change or the lack of change.

This general hypothesis was tested in the fields of conditionality and trilateral cooperation. Moreover, the following two sub-hypotheses were tested in the two thematic fields:

**H1**: Change is more likely to occur on the layer of narratives than it is on the layer of rules or practices.

The background of this hypothesis lies in the varying properties of the specific layers of the development institutions that I investigate. The next sub-hypothesis is more embedded in the theoretical assumption that longer established policy fields are less likely to be affected by change than newer ones. This is because resistance (for instance from veto players) is less pronounced if the thematic area only recently emerged:

**H2**: Long established policy fields are more likely to be susceptible to path dependent behaviour and less influenced by reformative ideas than newer established policy fields.

In order to test these hypotheses and to find answers to the research questions above, this thesis needs to uncover the three theoretical layers within its empirical data: in order to uncover narratives, extensive research has been conducted on primary documents, mainly speeches and annual reports of the three selected donors. To reveal changes within the layer of rules, legal texts and guidelines have been studied. Finally, to identify change within the layers of practices aid statistics and several statistical indicators have been used. Moreover, this rich empirical data was complemented by expert interviews with representatives from the donor countries. Most of the empirical data was analysed through the method of qualitative content analysis, while a descriptive analysis and simple correlations were used for the quantitative materials. This study
analyses the changes in traditional donor policies over ten years – from 2004 to 2014. Chapter 3 further develops on these methodological issues.

The next section addresses the relevant academic discussions surrounding the research questions of this thesis. What has indeed been said about the impact of emerging donors so far?

1.3 Literature review on emerging donors and their impact

The concept of development cooperation is said to reflect many realities in the relationships between different world powers and between different levels of income across the world (Eckert 2015; Klingebiel 2014; Lancaster 2007). While foreign aid was often considered a “puzzle” or a “tricky” concept in political science, many analysts have come to agree that self-interest alone cannot explain foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). On the contrary, moral considerations also play a decisive part in explaining foreign policy without negating equally influential self-interested rationales (Lumsdaine 1993; Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 2005; Hook and Rumsey 2015; S. Brown 2012). In the last decade, two major themes have dominated the research within the field of development aid: the first concentrates on the usefulness of aid for triggering development in recipient countries under the umbrella of the discussions surrounding aid effectiveness (Easterly 2001, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Easterly and Williamson 2011; Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith 2009; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; Wright and Winters 2010).

The second important field of investigation is the one that is studied here: the debate between academics and political experts about the emergence of new aid-giving parties. This debate often refers to the effectiveness debate when inquiring into how emerging donors can best be integrated into existing structures working together towards a more effective outcome (Mahn and Weinlich 2012; Hackenesch and H. Zhang 2013; Rampa and Bilal 2011; Grimm and Hackenesch 2012; Herbert 2012). Furthermore, this body of literature is often embedded in larger debates about the increasing weight of emerging economies in the world (for instance Kappel and Pohl 2013; Hazard et al. 2009; L. M. Phillips 2008; Hurrell 2006; Komlosy 2013; Kristof 1993; Stähle 2008b; Schirm 2010; Giese 2013; H. Zimmermann 2007; Nölke 2015b). Aid is often seen as a field in which this trend materialises clearly (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 19). This question of how to study the relations between Northern and Southern states has also entered the debates within the field of international relations. While realists insist that cooperative results can only be short-lived, institutionalists and constructivists paint a more positive picture of the relationship. This thesis positions itself in the realm between institutionalist and constructivist approaches and puts an emphasis on questions relating to institutional change, as the theory chapter explains. Moreover, it contributes towards the application of theoretical prism to detailed empirical fields, arguing that individual development policies can be framed as an institution.

While some textbooks from the mid-2000s still completely neglect the importance of South-South cooperation (Nuscheler 2005, 482–85), many recent studies acknowledge the importance of new donors (while often stressing that the phenomenon itself is not new, but the scale on which it occurs is, see Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Engel 2012; Grimm et al. 2008; A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008). For instance, Adriana Abdennur and João da Fonseca (2013, 1476–77) argue that one of the major changes in development cooperation in the last ten
years is the appearance of new stakeholders in South-South cooperation. Similarly, Chris Alden (June 2013b, 8) calls the increasing engagement of an emerging South the “most significant development of the 21st century”. Stephan Klingebiel (2014, 16) argues that the inclusion of emerging donors, mostly of China, in the follow-up agreement of the Millennium Development Goals is essential for its success. Others have also identified new donors in foreign aid to be the most important development in the last two decades (see for instance, Tierney et al. 2011; Adugna et al. 2011; Soyeun Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012; Fues, Chaturvedi, and Sidiropoulos 2012). Gilles Carbonnier and Andy Sumner (2012, 4) state that emerging donors “erode the de facto oligopoly” of traditional donors.

Whilst many studies focus on the policies of China in Africa, in general volumes, or in particular country case studies (Dittmer and Yu 2010; Men and Barton 2011a; Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008a; Ampiah and Naidu 2008a; Eisenman, Heginbotham, and D. Mitchell 2007), some take other emerging donors into account (Hackenesch 2013). Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos (2012), for example add studies on the policies of India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico to that of China (Carbonnier 2012; other studies include Stuenkel 2010; for information on Russian development assistance, see Larionova, Rakhmangulov, and Berenson 2014; for information on Mexican assistance, see Lätt 2011; or M. Romero 2012; for information on Turkish development assistance, see Özkan and Turgut Demirtepe 2012; or Ipek 2015).

When it comes to the specific consequences that the activities of emerging donors trigger, the literature can be divided into three main strands of research that structure the following sections: first, the biggest bulk of publications addresses the potential positive and/or negative effects of the emergence of new players in the field of development cooperation. Second, many studies attempt to compare the policies of South-South Cooperation to the better researched field of traditional donor policies. Lastly, a minor focus is placed on the consequences of emerging donors for traditionally established donors. The ensuing, final section enquires into what has been said in this regard over the last decade. However, as will quickly become clear, much research is needed in this area as the majority of studies remain speculative.

1.3.1 Positive and negative consequences of emerging donors

The bulk of research focuses on the negative effects of China on the African continent, with the main focus, especially in the earlier years of research, seeming to lie on the negative or even colonialist attitudes of China regarding Africa (see for instance Alden 2007; Broadman and Isik 2007; Lee and Melber 2007; Brookes and Shin 2006; Lee 2006; Grill, 14.0.2006; Kazim, January 16, 2007). Giles Mohan states in an early review of books written on the topic that many publications were issued despite a clear lack of data on concrete Chinese projects. Most of the earlier studies, therefore, referenced each other and reproduced common misconceptions (Mohan 2008). More nuanced studies on China’s endeavours in Africa appeared shortly afterwards (see for instance Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b; Brautigam 2009, 2010; Ampiah and Naidu 2008a). These are often structured with particular case studies of specific recipients receiving support from China or other emerging donors.

When it comes to the consequences of emerging donors’ involvement in recipient countries, there exist two schools of thought, both of which oversimplify underling issues. One of these is purely negative and claims that the efforts of emerging donors have a purely detrimental effect
on recipients, whereas the other is purely positive and optimistic, arguing that with the emergence of new donors, development can finally be achieved by all recipients (Corkin and Naidu 2008; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010). What exactly are the arguments of each of these schools of thought and how have their arguments changed over time? The following paragraphs address these questions.

Studies arguing that the activities of China and others produce purely positive results are not hard to come by. Most such studies agree that the emergence of new players in the field of development cooperation has led to an alternative source of funding for recipients which ultimately improves their bargaining position (Abdenur and Fonseca 2013, 1476; African Economic Outlook 2011, 15; Chan 2008; Cornelissen 2009; Grimm and Fues 2007; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2011; Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012; Kragelund 2008, 2010b, 2012; Large 2008b; Pohl 2011; Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010; Shaw 2010; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010; Tietze 2011; Tull 2005; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011; The Financial Times, August 25, 2010).

This enhanced bargaining position, some argue, could lead to a “moment” in international affairs for developing countries where they assert themselves (Cheru and Obi 2010). Most emphasise however that in order to really enhance recipients’ economies, the recipients rather than the donors must begin to define the terms of the deals for themselves (Baregu 2008; Alden June 2013b, June 2013a; Broadman 2008). In this strand of literature, emerging donors (and most studies here focus on China) are not considered to be a competitor or colonizer, but a partner for developing countries (Alden 2007, 126–27; Le Pere 2008; Naidu 2007). Through the increased activity between recipients and emerging donors, the terms of trade for recipients are thought to improve because of numerous investments of emerging donors in much needed sectors (African Forum and Network on Debt and Development 2010). China, and other emerging donors, therefore finally treat recipients as an investment opportunity, as Dambisa Moyo (2010, 98–113) argues in her book that largely discusses the ineffectiveness of traditional aid. Others argue that China could be a model for a “better world” (Amin 2012; for similarly positive assessments, see Sautman and Hairong 2007; Schüller and Asche 2007). As the final section here on critical assessment will illustrate further, this optimism regarding China’s activities in Africa has sometimes been called “naïve” (Jakobeit 2009, 595).

The enhanced availability of resources for recipients has, then, generally been positively assessed. Alongside this positive assessment lie particular arguments about how emerging donors could contribute to the development process of their recipients. First, many argue that the local population reacts fairly positively to the increased involvement of emerging donors (Carling and Haugen 2008; Kragelund 2012; Kopiński, Polus, and I. Taylor 2011), even if some studies accept that this positivity often segues into a more sceptical attitude after the initial honeymoon period (The Economist 2011b, 2010d; Gaye 2008; Power and Mohan 2008; Chin 2012, 587; S. Romero, August 16, 2010). Moreover, many studies raise awareness that one needs to be careful when generalising about the impact to recipients as their background differs greatly (A. E. Goldstein et al. 2009).

A second line of argument is that emerging donors, because of their own experience in developing their country, are better suited to tailoring development projects that actually aim at enhancing development, unlike Western projects which are often considered ill-suited to the par-
ticular needs of recipients (P. Davies 2010; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011). Another argument for the greater efficiency of aid from emerging donors comes from the claim that their aid has a stronger focus on ownership – on the idea that recipients are themselves responsible for their development process. This argument is put forward in Lauren Walsh’s Rousell’s study (2013) about the consequences of emerging donors in Nicaragua. Similarly, Sebastian Paulo and Helmut Reisen (2009a) argue that the diaspora of many emerging donors in recipient countries actually ensures a stronger supervision of the aid projects than any traditional donor could ever hope to achieve.

The next argument is probably the one that is agreed upon by most studies: that emerging donors actually fill a gap in funding sectors, such as infrastructure projects, that were largely neglected by Western donors for a long time (Adugna et al. 2011, 34–35; Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b; P. Davies 2007, P. Davies 2010; Haefliger, February 10, 2010, March 31, 2011; Kragelund 2008; Tull 2008b). The aid of emerging donors is then often seen as “complementary” to traditional projects (African Economic Outlook 2011, 106; Kragelund 2010b), each group focussing on different investments that are all seen as necessary in the developing context.

The most balanced view is probably put forward by Deborah Brautigam. She claims that most studies – often those focusing on the negative consequences of emerging donors that we will now review – are characterised by misconceptions, such as, for instance, an inflated conception of the aid volume that emerging donors spend. She argues that, overall, Chinese aid might be beneficial for recipients and that the general mistrust towards Chinese projects can be explained by the general mistrust within Europe and the United States regarding China’s rise (A. Berger, Brautigam, and Baumgartner 2011; Brautigam, August 16, 2010). In her most recent book, Brautigam investigates Chinese interactions with the African agrarian sector and writes that “more than a decade after ‘China in Africa’ began to hit the headlines, there continues to be an enormous gap between what many in the West imagine Chinese intentions in Africa to be and the realities” (Brautigam 2015b, 162; similar line of argument, Brautigam 2009, 307, 2008a). Nevertheless, these misconceptions might bear some truth about Chinese – and more generally emerging donors’ – activities. The next section reviews the most prominent criticisms addressed towards South-South cooperation. Many of these views have influenced the perceptions reigning in the political elites of the three traditional donors that this study investigates. This is why it is important to review their points in detail.

The criticism that is most often addressed was first put forward by Moses Naim in an article, published in Foreign Policy, called Rogue Aid (2007, 1). The article defines “rogue aid” as “development assistance that is nondemocratic in origin and nontransparent in practice; its effect typically to stifle real progress while hurting average citizens” and targets Chinese aid in Africa. This highly influential article was often taken as a starting point for future research to argue that China, and other emerging donors, would favour nondemocratic regimes which in turn might undermine human rights and democratic standards put forward by traditional aid projects through conditionality (Gaye 2008; Halper 2010a, 2010b; Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012; Mawdsley 2010; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010; Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 152; Scheen, August 22, 2010; Stähle 2008a; Burgis, May 21, 2010; Gill, Morrison, and C.-H. Huang 2008; Woods 2008). Despite the support for that argument, many studies have

Interestingly, Emma Mawdsley and Gerard McCann (2010, 88–89) argue that India’s activities could be similarly criticised but are often spared because India keeps a low profile.
emerged that argue that this rogue aid might not pose much of a problem for governance (African Economic Outlook 2011; Dent 2011b) and that China has shown a remarkable evolution towards the principle of non-interference, mostly in dealing with the regime of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. Often, China was accused at the height of the Darfur crisis of supporting the dictator and thereby undermining Western sanctions. Nevertheless, many studies have shown that the initial position of China – of unconditional support to al-Bashir – evolved into a more careful and silent support that in the end pushed the unloved leader to solutions regarding the conflict that the West agreed with (Srinivasan 2008; Brautigam 2009, 281–84; Grimm and Fues 2007; Dyer, January 24, 2008; Hilsum 2008; Zhao 2011; Large 2008a, 2008c, 2008d; Srinivasan 2008; He 2010). In a similar vein, Berger, Brautigam and Baumgartner (2011) argue that China has no interest in limiting itself to only dealing with autocratic regimes, which further weakens the argument of a great threat emerging from China’s behaviour (similar argument for China’s stand on human rights, see I. Taylor 2011).

Moreover, further studies point towards the inefficiency of Western conditionality overall when it came to improving human rights standards or even to the willingness of the West to support dictators, like al-Bashir, Qaddafi and Mugabe (Brautigam 2009, 284–85; Bearce 2013; Coyne and Ryan 2008; Soysa and Midford 2012; Zhou 2012) or to the fact that traditional donors only use human rights as an argument when their economic interests are threatened rather than because they care for the human rights situation in remote areas (Breslin and I. Taylor 2008). Furthermore, Ian Taylor (2009, 89–112) argues that Chinese policies – in order to be successful – require political stability which, in turn, might benefit human rights and good governance standards in the country. Similarly, Zehlia Babaci-Wilhite et al. (2013) argue that, on the whole, the Beijing Consensus might be more beneficial to recipients than the Washington Consensus ever was. Finally, some moderate studies argue that the outcome of Chinese policies on the human rights and good governance record of recipients remains uncertain, but do need to be studied further (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 20–23). Similarly, Dreher, Fuchs and Nunnenkamp (2013, 407) argue that there is no evidence to label emerging donors as rogue donors.

Next to the potential political implications of emerging donors, economic problems are often mentioned in academic research. First, many commentators direct their criticism at a perceived lack of beneficial side effects for local residents (The Economist 2010b; A. E. Goldstein, Pinaud, and Reisen 2008; F. Müller and Ziai 2015; Ndulo 2008) as well as unfavourable terms of trade for recipients (Gebre-Egziabher 2009). This criticism is often linked to the conceptualisation of Southern aid as delivering ready-made concepts instead of transferring knowledge, often leading to unsustainable short-lived successes (P. Davies 2010; Russell, January 24, 2008). Second, it has been argued that the beneficial flow of money is often coupled with a better access to local economies which leads to the importing of cheap goods from emerging donors which could be problematic for local industries (Ampiah and Naidu 2008b, 8–10; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). Several case studies tell stories of deindustrialisation because of Chinese imports, for instance in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2008); about cutbacks in the textile industry in South Africa (Naidu 2008a); or generally for African manufacturing industries (Brautigam 2009, 308–10; Kamau, McCormick, and Pinaud 2009; MacNamara and Green, January 24, 2008; Zafar 2007; Lee 2007). But concerning this point, other studies argue differently that these cheap imports won’t be that much of a problem for recipient markets, because the Chinese also bring jobs and investments to the local economy (African Economic Outlook 2011; Dobler 2008; Brautigam 2008b; Marfaying 2010; M. Davies 2011). Moreover, Ian Taylor argues in his book about China’s new role in
Africa that the positive effects of cheap Chinese goods for the local African populations have often been overlooked (I. Taylor 2009, 161–85).

A third negative consequence for the economic development of recipients is the question about debt sustainability. Many argue that the funding from emerging donors could lead to an unsustainable rise in the debt of already highly indebted poor countries (Adugna et al. 2011, 34–35; Morazán et al. 2012; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010; Brautigam 2009; Wallis and Dyer, January 24, 2008). Another concern is the potential detrimental exploitation of natural resources in recipient countries. The overall focus lies here on China’s undertakings in the African oil sector (Ampiah and Naidu 2008b, 8–10; Clapham 2008; Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 2005; Dieterich, October 20, 2010; Downs 2007; Tull 2005, 2006; D. Curtis 2008). Henning Melber (2007, 8) claims for instance that “the new offensive pursued by China […] adds to the rivalry and conflicting interests” of other forces. Many argue, however, that further studies are needed to truly assess the impact of emerging donors on the natural resources of recipient countries (Soares de Oliveira 2008; I. Taylor 2009; Vines et al. 2009). A final concern regarding economic consequences is that of land grabbing, which some studies emphasis as a significant problem. Nevertheless, other studies argue that this issue is not prominent enough and has been exaggerated (Brautigam and Stensrud Ekman 2012; Brautigam 2015b).

Finally, there is some anxiety around the specific kind of aid Southern providers deliver. One concern is that such dealings will lead to increased corruption in recipient countries: Ian Taylor argues for instance that there is a tendency for increased corruption in the oil sector when China is involved (I. Taylor 2009; Hackenesch and Sousa, March 31, 2010; I. Taylor 2007); others argue that China might increase the despotism of some African leaders through favouring those regions that the African leaders themselves prefer or originate from (Dreher et al. 2015; Anderson, November 19, 2014). Some commentators have argued for a solidification of hierarchies in the relationship between Southern donors and recipients because of the aid relationship (Mawdsley 2012, 268), and others suggest that the growth rates of emerging donors are themselves unsustainable which makes their aid unsustainable, too (Peterskovsky and Schüller 2010). Helmut Reisen (2013), however, argues that China’s economic rise is built on strong legs.

The single criticism that is shared by almost all studies is that there is a lack of transparency when it comes to emerging donors’ aid projects which makes their aid and its consequences hard to assess (Adugna et al. 2011; African Economic Outlook 2011; P. Davies 2010; ONE 2010, 21; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010; Walz and Ramachandran 2011; Corkin 2008; Ogunsanwo 2008). This in turn, the studies argue, would further increase the fragmentation of aid and undermine essential initiatives for improving aid effectiveness (Abdenur and Fonseca 2013, 1476; Adugna et al. 2011; Kragelund 2008).

In recent years, this once rancorous debate has calmed down slightly and more and more studies argue that some of the concerns were exaggerated (Paulo and Reisen 2009b, 2010). Moreover, most state that the negative effects were often coupled with a general misunderstanding of how much (or in reality, how little) emerging donors spend on development projects (The Economist 2016b, 2015; Green, January 27, 2008; Brautigam 2015b, November 03, 2015). Yet, the concerns were raised, published and informed many of the policies that this study investigates and therefore influenced the empirical field of this study considerably.
1.3.2 Same, same but different? Contrasts and parallels between “new” and “old” donors

Alongside the focus on the positive and negative consequences of emerging donors for recipients, researchers have dedicated considerable attention and time to studying the differences between South-South cooperation and traditional aid relationships. This body of research is important for the following study because potential differences in aid giving could lead to one group adapting to the other (or distinguishing itself even more).

There seems to be a consensus that emerging donors’ aid differs significantly from that of traditional donors. But assessments vary in their views of how important these differences really are and what elements are the most different between the two groups. We will begin with the authors that emphasise the fact that emerging donors promulgate a radically different aid system.

Joshua Ramo (2004) famously spoke of a “Beijing Consensus”, a distinct Chinese model of economic development that presents an alternative to market-led economic growth. The Beijing Consensus, then, is a model not just for China itself, but one that could be applied to many other developing countries – much like its rival, the Washington Consensus. The idea of peaceful, high-quality growth that avoids privatization and free trade, Ramo argues (2004, 60), “offers hope for the world” should other countries adapt a similar attitude to development. While Ramo does not mention China’s foreign aid, many people have adapted his concept of a Beijing Consensus – a consensus that is arguably also intensified and enhanced through Chinese aid. Moreover, authors often claim that other emerging donors also abide by the rules of this distinct Beijing Consensus. Emerging donors are then presented as a rival group that follow a different model to the one offered by Western donors led by American ideology. What characterises and unites providers in South-South cooperation?

The Beijing Consensus arguably follows a different rationale which emphasises a different developmental model to traditional aid. Development can be achieved, following the Beijing Consensus, through infrastructure and investments, non-interference and mutual benefit, whereby traditional aid – or the Washington Consensus – still puts the emphasis on the direct effective impact of development assistance, if it is coupled with neoliberal reforms (Brautigam 2011a, 762; Klingebiel 2014, 20). South-South cooperation brings mutual growth to recipients and donors, without the administrative burden of monitoring (Chaturvedi 2012b; Glennie, October 28, 2011; Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011; Ying 2007).

Another point distinguishing traditional donors from emerging donors is that the latter follow a more “holistic approach” and implement a “broader and deeper concept” of development, whereas Western donors pursue a rather narrowly defined approach to foreign aid (African Economic Outlook 2011, 111–12; The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010, 2). Moreover, it is often argued that the relationship between emerging donors is more horizontal than the hierarchical relationship between a Western donor and its aid recipient (Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Humphrey 2011; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Rowlands January 2008; Paulo and Reisen 2009a, 2009b; Stuenkel 2010). Note however that some studies point towards a rising inequality and asymmetries in South-South cooperation “in a relationship that has so far been seen from both sides as one of equals” which could lead to rising tensions.

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9 This difference is also emphasised in Chinese official documents and opinions as interviews within the study of Yanbing Zhang, Jing Gu and Yunnan Chen (February 2015) illustrate.
Nevertheless, the opinion that emerging donors’ provisions are made on a more equal level are wider spread than these critical views. Moreover, the equal partnership often leads to the assumption that, overall, Southern contributions distinguish themselves from traditional aid flows through their emphasis on mutual benefit (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 148; Fues, Chaturvedi, and Sidiropoulos 2012) and a more openly expressed self-interest in aid affairs (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Six 2009).

The difference in the quality of the relationship is often explained by the differing origins of Southern and Northern aid patterns. While many Northern countries started out as former colonial powers, the South can look back on a long history of solidarity between itself and developing nations, struggling together against the dominance of the powerful industrialised countries (Alden June 2013b; Alden and C. Alves 2008; Besharati 2013a). Thereby, emerging donors have their own experiences to share when it comes to standing up against industrial powers but also when it comes to fostering economic development (Robledo 2014; Saravia 2012).

What makes the comparison between the two donor groups more challenging, and what also distinguishes their aid, is the language that they use to define their contributions. While traditional donors refer to the definition of Official Development Assistance as put forward by the OECD, emerging donors do not see why they should stick to this limiting concept and include tied aid, turn-key projects, fees, administrative expenses and sometimes loans that have a concessional element of less than 25 percent (Brautigam 2011a, 754–56, 2010; M. Davies 2008; A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008; A. Johnson 2009; Brautigam 2010; Agrawal 2007).

More concrete differences can be found when looking at the kind of aid emerging donors offer. A first difference that is often emphasised is the focus on different sectors. Emerging donors arguably focus more on infrastructural and economic projects while traditional donors concentrate principally on poverty reduction, health, education, and good governance enhancing projects; that is, traditional donors focus more on soft policies; emerging donors on hard policies (African Economic Outlook 2011, 15; Kragelund 2008; Foster et al. 2009; Pehnelt and Abel 2007; Rampa and Bilal 2011). This also points to the fact that emerging donors’ aid tends to be less fragmented and less changeable than that of Western donors as it follows a broader concept of development (Woods 2011; Brautigam 2009, 11). This broader economic focus from emerging donors often does not distinguish clearly between aid and trade activities; a separation that is strictly observed by traditional donors (Wissenbach 2011a, 28–29). This is also linked to the fact that non-DAC aid is mostly tied to the provision of their goods while DAC aid at least aims to be untied (Kragelund 2008, 567–79; Brautigam 2011a; Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014). Similarly, some studies show that in recent years, traditional aid has tended to focus on the neediest countries whereas emerging donors do not follow such tendencies but tend to invest in resource-rich recipients (Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013). The overall argument, then, is that emerging donors follow a more economically oriented development model, intended to maximise their own self-interest (Gieg 2010; Alden and A. Christina Alves 2009). Some authors however argue that this strong focus on economic benefit on the part of emerging donors might be an exaggeration. Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele (2011), for example, are more cautious when assessing the stronger focus of emerging donors on economic gain, though their figures do not include China or India.

The distinction between traditional and emerging aid that is emphasised most in academic research is the differing approach to conditionality. Most authors agree that emerging donors
follow a strictly non-interventionist approach which refrains from any kind of conditionality whereas traditional donors still tend to intervene in the recipient countries through their conditional directives (Brautigam 2009, 135; F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 10–11; Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 148; Sautman and Hairong 2007; Walshe Roussel 2013; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011; Brautigam 2011a; Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011; Dyer, January 24, 2008; Fues, Chaturvedi, and Sidropoulos 2012; Holsag and Xiaotong Zhang 2008; Roche, July 01, 2012; Rowlands 2012; A. Johnson, Versailles, and Martin 2008; Brautigam 2010; African Economic Outlook 2011; Power and Mohan 2011; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Pehnelt and Abel 2007). Non conditionality and non-interference, then, is often seen as part of the identity of Southern providers as Jörg Faust and Christian Wagner (2010) illustrate for the case of India. While there is a strong consensus that this is the major difference between the two donor groups, it is important to note that many studies also point to the fact that many of the conditions requested by traditional donors are not followed through by themselves or by the recipients (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2011; Woods 2008). Moreover, Marcus Power and Giles Mohan (2011) argue that the non-interference rule from emerging donors might be more flexible than often thought. As such, research has shown that some conditions apply, for instance in Chinese aid when it comes to choosing the recipients. China only provides aid to countries following its own One-China principle, thereby negating any kind of representativeness to the government of Taiwan (Brautigam 2010; M. Huang and Ren 2012). Moreover, Sven Grimm et al. (2010) reveal in their case study on Rwanda that China might be applying strict economic conditions. What China – and other emerging donors – seem to refrain from fully is the application of conditions regarding environmental or social as well as governmental standards upon their aid recipients (Brautigam 2010). As the following chapters argue, this difference – especially regarding political conditionality – will play a major role in the response of traditional donors.

Other studies also find similarities between the different donor groups (Rowlands 2012; Sato et al. 2011). For instance, many argue that any kind of foreign aid always follows a self-interested rationale. Thereby, all donors seek commercial benefit and pursue strategic diplomatic goals when providing funds to third governments (Brautigam 2009, 15; Mawdsley 2012; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010; Soyeun Kim and Lightfoot 2011). The self-proclaimed rhetoric of South-South Cooperation insists on a shared identity for developing countries which embraces expertise in appropriate development, the rejection of hierarchical donor-recipient relations, and emphasises mutual opportunities (Mawdsley 2012, 264), but this often remains on a purely rhetoric level, much like the claims from traditional donors that they are sharing their wealth with less fortunate countries. Some therefore compare especially Chinese aid with that of former colonial powers, such as France, or with high interventionist powers such as the United States (Adebajo 2008; Granier 2011; Mawdsley 2012; Yates 2008). Similarly, Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2011) argue that all donors – from both groups – do not seem to allocate their aid to the countries that might deserve it most on merit (less corrupt or very poor countries, for example). Similarly, Andreas Fuchs and Krishna Vadlamannati (2013) argue that India’s aid focuses as little on recipient’s need as that of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Norway. The real intentions behind foreign aid from both groups might lie in the preservation of the existing hierarchy (for DAC-donors) or on mounting a challenge to that order (for emerging donors) (Mawdsley 2012, 265; similar argument that Chinese aid follows the purpose of reducing Western dominance in the world, see Fues and Ye 2014). Moreover, both donor groups might suffer similar problems such as increasing fragmentation in their aid implementation
While some therefore argue that a similar rationale behind aid applies to both established and emerging donors, others argue that many differences exist even within the individual groups, themselves. Some maintain, for instance, that China’s or India’s conception of aid is more distinct from that of the West than South Africa’s, which is much closer to the Western understanding of foreign assistance (F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 11; Besharati 2013b; Chidaushe 2010) and that, generally, common aspects should not be emphasised too much as there exists a strong heterogeneity within the group of emerging donors (Rowlands 2012; Sato et al. 2011). One has to note, however, that studies which argue that the group of emerging donors is too heterogeneous to make common statements about them often include a wide range of actors in their definition such as South Korea (Sato et al. 2011) or Russia (Rowlands 2012).

In summary, this section has shown that many studies have investigated the differences between emerging and traditional donors and that most agree that the main difference lies in the application of political conditions. What, then, has the academic literature had to say about the consequences of emerging donors’ aid for traditional donors?

1.3.3 What consequences for traditional donors?

As the first two sections illustrated, many studies look at the effects of emerging donors on recipients and on the differences between their aid and that of traditionally established donors. It might be expected that there would also be an equally high academic interest in the consequences of emerging donors on the aid policies of traditional donors. However, this field remains highly understudied. The following section will show that most studies remain very vague and tentative on the topic of concrete consequences, though they often concede that it is highly likely that some consequences will arise.

What has been said, albeit cautiously, about the implications of emerging donors for traditional donors can be divided into four types of arguments;

First, some studies argue that the result of the arrival of new donors within the international aid game will lead to an increased competition for resources (Wallis and Burgis, June 14, 2010; Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Hackenesch and Ling, June 01, 2009). This could extend to a competition over the work force in recipient countries, or over access to valued natural resources, for instance in African countries (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 48–49; Alden and A. Christina Alves 2009; Blas and Green, January 24, 2008; Bracho 2015, 27–29; Burgis, June 14, 2010a; Fues 2013; Kappel 2014; Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Lätt 2010; Pehnelt 2007; Rachman, April 24, 2010; Tierney et al. 2011; Volman 2009; Wu 2012; Habib 2008). Hartmut Sangmeister and Alexa Schönstedt (2010) argue that this could even lead to an excess of aid in highly desirable recipient countries. The scenario of increased competitiveness is often linked to studies focussing on China’s policies in Africa. As such, Christine Hackenesch (2013, 10)

Note that James Lebovic (2005) argues that it plays a decisive role for donors which other donors are present in potential recipients. His study only investigates the competition between traditional donors, but can surely be generalised to competitive forces from emerging donors as well.
30) concludes in a study on the relationship between the European Union and China in Africa that “China constitutes a considerable competitive pressure on the European aid regime”. Similarly, Sanjukta Bhattacharya (2010) argues that the situation will lead to an increased competition between China and the United States over African oil, a phenomenon that as Christina Stolte and Dana La Fontaine (2012) argue could also apply to other emerging donors and other traditional forces.

Altogether more positively, some studies state that emerging donors are largely “complementary” to Western aid efforts (Klingebiel 2014, 18) and that the existing modalities of aid can persist and will not be challenged by emerging donors (Thede 2013; for a study arguing that China will not challenge the EU’s aid distribution, see Xinghui Zhang 2011). For instance, Pedro Morazán et al. (2012, 37) argue that “emerging donors are not necessarily in competition with […] the DAC’s aid model”. Other studies emphasise that the real threat for the international aid architecture might come from non-integrated new European donors (Lundsgaarde 2011c).

This element of mutual congruence is often pointed to by studies which argue that the differences in aid distribution (especially in sectoral preferences) could prove beneficial for recipients. From this perspective, emerging donors only fill an existing gap and don’t challenge traditional donors (Marchal 2008).

Next to the emphasis on the competitiveness (or, indeed, congruence) of emerging and traditional donors, other academics argue that there is indeed a need to integrate the former into existing international structures in order to avoid negative consequences, such as an increased competition over resources or the over-aiding of particular countries. Some studies indicate for instance that while a certain weariness exists on the part of Western government and especially from the United States, other traditional donors, such as the United Kingdom, work strongly for an integration of emerging donors into existing structures (Alden 2007, 107–8; Chaturvedi 2012b). Nevertheless, many academics are sceptical about the likelihood of a successful integration into existing structures. Many argue that the international aid architecture – within the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the Development Assistance Committee from the OECD and the G20 – are all inadequately equipped to handle the integration of emerging donors even though integration is highly desirable in order to guarantee positive side effects (Homi Kharas 2011; Paulo and Reisen 2009b, 2010; Tull 2005; Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 22–23; Besharati 2013a; Martin 2010). It is feared that the aid of emerging donors – existing outside of the DAC structure – will undermine OECD standards (Klingebiel 2014, 91–93; Stähle 2008a; Klingebiel 2015). Some argue that the OECD could use two mechanisms at its disposal (peer review mechanisms and peer pressure) to include new Asian donors in its aid discussions (Paulo and Reisen 2009b). This dialogue between the DAC and emerging donors is seen as even more important since the financial crisis further reduced the weight of traditional powers (Paulo and Reisen 2010; for a similarly positive outlook on the future, see F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011; Hackenesch and H. Zhang 2013). The fact that South Korea (and to a certain extent Mexico, which obtained observer status) have already been successfully integrated into that structure is seen as a positive indicator for the projects’ feasibility (Chun, Munyi, and H. Lee 2010). Nonetheless, in more recent years, many have pointed to the extreme selectiveness of DAC membership and argued that a wider international forum is needed to

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11 Note that this study was conducted before the accession to the DAC of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia in 2013.
include emerging donors more directly into the debates without making them conform to restrictive DAC standards. The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum, inaugurated in 2005, is often seen as the most comprehensive option (Mahn and Weinlich 2012; Hammad and B. Morton July 2009). Since its creation in 2011, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is also often referred to as being able to bridge the differences between the two donor groups (Klingebiel 2015). Higher integration is desired as increased fragmentation between the two groups could lead to increased competition and thereby undermine mutual understanding. Moreover, this increased fragmentation of the aid community could further undermine the effectiveness of development assistance altogether (Hackenesch and Janus 2014, 2013; Kragelund 2008; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Betz 2015; Bürcky 2011; Janus, Klingebiel, and Paulo 2013; Lundsgaarde 2011b; Rosengren, de Roquefeuil, and Bilal 2013). For instance, Sven Grimm et al. argue that increased donor fragmentation in Rwanda undermines the aid efforts of all groups and has harmful consequences for recipients (Grimm et al. 2010). Overall, this point of view argues that an increased coordination and cooperation could lead to the full benefit of all parties involved as the donor groups learn from each other (A. Berger and Grimm 2010; Manning 2006; Men and Barton 2011b).

The majority of studies, however, agree that “[a] single paradigm for international cooperation is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future” (African Economic Outlook 2011, 113) and argue that the entry of emerging donors into the aid equation largely leads to a “paradigm shift” within the “dominant construction of foreign aid” diminishing the influence of traditional donors (Mawdsley, Savage, and Sung-Mi Kim 2014, 27; Mawdsley 2015). Some argue modestly that while the overall amount of aid from emerging donors is not yet significant enough to “overshadow the dominance of traditional Western donors, […] the impact of its aid is disproportionate to its size and is likely to grow” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 530). Others put it more bluntly and state, for instance, that China’s involvement in Africa could be seen as “another indicator of the West’s putative marginalization on the continent” (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 23; similar argument, Halper 2010b; Aguilar and A. E. Goldstein 2009) or argue that China is so present in many recent studies because it challenges the existing aid paradigm (Dent 2011a). Similarly, many conclude that the United States is clearly challenged by the aid activities of its rival China, particularly in its backyard South America (N. Phillips 2010; Noesselt and Soliz Landivar 2013; Nolte 2013). This declining influence is further confirmed for the European Union as an influential donor (Grimm et al. 2008; Grimm 2008a, 2008b; Hackenesch 2010; B. Berger 2006) or of Western donors and the G8 countries more generally (Brautigam 2009, 13; Stähle 2008a; N. Phillips 2010; Stolte and La Fontaine 2012; Kappel and Pohl 2013; Kappel and Schneidenbach 2006). Similarly, Stephan Klingebiel (2014, 73; Klingebiel 2013a) argues that emerging donors “reduce the weight carried by the old OECD donor group appreciably” and others prophesy the “end of the DAC monopoly on aid” (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 151) or the reduction of traditional donors into “negotiated existence” (Chin and Quadir 2012, 501). The Economist writes that “in this world Europeans and Americans no longer dominate aid” and that the “rules of aid are being turned inside-out and long-standing donors must change, too” (The Economist 2011a). Similarly, Ngaire Woods (2008) talked already in 2008 about a “silent revolution” of emerging donors surreptitiously challenging the established development policies. She states that “[t]he world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game” (Woods 2008, 1205). This “challenge to the international aid architecture” (Cabral and Weinstock 2010a, 1), this “Bedeutungsverlust des traditionellen Geber-Nehmer-Verhältnisses” (Krempin 2014, 16) would then
inevitably lead to an adaptation of traditional donors’ aid policies as emerging donors perceivably “redefine development theories and practices” (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 529). The fourth branch of arguments summarises the stand of literature on this particular point.

How, then, are the rules of the game altered? Some studies argue that traditional donors need to adapt their aid policies in a way that is more “attuned” with that of Southern providers (Kragelund 2010b, 24). The argument here is that, generally, traditional donors’ aid will become more and more like that of emerging donors (A. E. Goldstein et al. 2006; Walshe Roussel 2013). Others argue that emerging donors are undergoing a process of adapting their policies to Western standards (Wissenbach 2012; Urbina-Ferrejans and Surender 2013; B. Berger and Wissenbach 2007) or simply, that both sides are simultaneously adapting their aid to the other’s model, as Christine Hackenesch argues in her study on China and the European Union (Hackenesch 2009). Peter Baker (July 30, 2015) argues for instance that the West will attempt to increasingly sell its aid product as the better alternative to recipients, while others contend that it might increase the interest of traditional donors in neglected recipient areas (Tull 2008a) or that traditional donors will attempt a better coordination within their own group in order to remain competitive with emerging donors (Carbone 2011b, 119). When it comes to concrete examples of this adaptation, most studies remain silent.

One potential consequence that the literature has addressed is a shift in sectoral selection from traditional donors. The argument is that donors might think twice before choosing a particular sector that they support. The underlying question is whether traditional donors shift their focus again towards infrastructure or whether they focus their aid on soft sectors and leave the hard policies to emerging donors. These questions are highly interesting but are only raised occasionally (Brautigam 2009, 134–35; Kragelund 2010b; Brautigam 2015a). However, the following two consequences that are envisioned by research seem to be more interesting to investigate.

The reaction that is most predicted, and where some empirical evidence is available, investigates the likely increase within trilateral projects – projects between a Northern donor, a Southern provider and a recipient country. Most studies simply state that an increase thereof is likely as a result of emerging donors (African Economic Outlook 2011, 114; Langendorf 2012, 21; Abdenur and Fonseca 2013; Grimm and Fues 2007; Kragelund 2010b; Mawdsley 2010; Morazán et al. 2012; F. Müller and Ziai 2015, 10–13; Stähle 2008a; Task Team on South South Cooperation 2010; Brautigam 2011a; Chaturvedi 2012b; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Grimm et al. 2010; Hackenesch 2013; Six 2009; Ashoff 2010; Cotterrell and Harmer 2005; Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Li and Bonschab 2012; Rosengren, de Roquefeuil, and Bilal 2013; Sidiropoulos 2011; Wissenbach 2009; Costa Vaz and Aoki Inoue 2007; Wischmeyer and KAS 2008). Some studies exist that look at specific trilateral cooperation projects, notably the book from Julia Langendorf et al. (2012). Trilateral cooperation is then often seen as a way for Northern donors to maintain a certain influence on recipients, but also on emerging donors (P. Davies 2007, 97–99, P. Davies 2010; Morazán et al. 2012; Stuenkel 2010). Adriana Abdenur and João da Fonseca (2013, 1488) argue that trilateral cooperation is therefore thought to be embedded in the general struggle “over political, economic and security spaces”. Trilateral cooperation might also lead to “developing the full potentials of South-South Cooperation” (Morazán et al. 2012, 37). Trilateral projects could be more likely between traditional donors and emerging donors that share certain values, such as democracy. The Economist (2010a) argues that there is a disparity in the treatment of Brazilian development cooperation (largely favourable) and that of Chinese development cooperation (largely repellent). Similar
enthusiasts claim that trilateral cooperation might overall improve the transparency of aid projects for both groups and thereby increase aid effectiveness (Chandy and Homi Kharas 2011, 748–50). While many state that this cooperation is desirable (L. Curtis and Cheng 2011; Farrell 2012; Lancaster June 2007; Men and Barton 2011c), others point to potential problems within trilateral cooperation – for instance, Maurizio Carbone (2011a) points at problems between China and the European Union because of a different understanding of the terms of triangular cooperation (for an analysis of the general problems emerging from trilateral projects, see Altenburg and Weikert 2006, 2007). Moreover, Hackenesch (2013) notices that while on the rhetorical level of governments many talk about trilateral projects, very rarely are such projects implemented in practice.

The second consequence involves possibly the most dramatic alteration in Western aid policy – the field of conditionality. As the previous section demonstrated, the field of (especially political) conditionality is considered to be the most striking distinction between emerging and traditional donors. The logical conclusion that is then often drawn by the literature is that this particular field will also be most profoundly affected when it comes to changes in traditional donors’ aid. Most studies limit themselves to stating that traditional donors, such as the World Bank and the IMF, fear that their conditionality might be undermined by emerging donors (H. Campbell 2008). Similarly, Deborah Brautigam (2008a, 31) argues that emerging donors challenge the concept of conditionality and that implicitly the West seems to agree that the concept is outdated. Further studies state that, for now, aid levels of emerging donors might still be too low to truly change the concept of conditionality, but that this might be the case if funds further increase (Kragelund 2010b, 19–20; Brautigam 2015a, 2011b).

Some very limited reactions have been studied empirically regarding conditionality: first, some have argued that the Chinese presence in Africa has compromised the ability of the European Union and of the United States to push for good governance projects in Africa (Huliaras and Magliveras 2008; Jakobson 2009; Hackenesch 2009; Humphrey and Messner 2006; Wallis, January 24, 2008; Wissenbach 2011a, 2011b, 2009; Wu 2012). Some general studies argue that through the emergence of new donors, the power of aid conditionality overall has been diminished (Carbonnier and Sumner 2012, 4; Ssenyange 2010; Lyman 2006). Most of these studies are however rather short policy directing papers or devote only a small number of pages to the question of the consequences and only tentatively point towards this possible result. No study has so far truly assessed the empirical consequences in the field of conditionality. Peter Baker, in an article of the New York Times, argued that the tone in Obama’s Africa visit in 2010 was less confrontational because of the Chinese presence there (Baker, July 30, 2015). Nevertheless, his empirical evidence is restricted to a few statements in Obama’s official speech. Uwe Wissenbach (2012, 171–74) looks at the reaction from the European Union and comes to the conclusion that its attitude towards conditionality has softened (from imposing to rewarding conditionality), coupled with an increased focus on ownership which is not dissimilar to the Chinese rhetoric. He argues that the EU attempts to engage with China in order to avoid direct competition. But again, the empirical analysis is rather limited when it comes to analysing the real consequences of emerging donors for traditional donor conditionality.

In conclusion, then, while some studies address the question of the consequences for traditional donors in their research, most are content to simply state that emerging donors are a relevant challenge to the existing aid regime. Very few, however, actually attempt to offer detailed answers to the question of what these consequences are, focusing instead on other aspects of their
empirical findings (see for instance, Mawdsley 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Lundsgaarde 2011a; Rowlands 2012; Six 2009; Stuenkel 2010; Woods 2008; Hammad and B. Morton July 2009; Kragelund 2011; Carbonnier 2012; Bracho 2015; Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson 2012; Klingebiel 2014, 69; Ssenyange 2010; Sumner and Mallett 2012; Hackenesch 2009; Manning 2006; Men and Barton 2011a). Lauren Walshe Roussel, for instance, argues that it is most important to study the impact of emerging donors on the existing aid system but claims that the subject is still “poorly understood and the subject of much contention” (Walshe Roussel 2013, 802). Dane Rowlands (2012, 645) argues that if emerging donors don’t challenge traditional donors as a cohesive bloc, “their presence and collective weight still have important implications for the architecture of development assistance”, especially in terms of the aid effectiveness debate. Hackenesch (2013, 15) argues that there is no study on the real implications of differences in rhetoric of Chinese and European officials in the practice of aid delivery. Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson (2012) look at which donors will be most vulnerable to challenges by new actors and come to the conclusion that those donors focusing on social welfare (UK) and on middle income countries (Norway, USA) are the most vulnerable. Anna Rosengreen, Quentin de Roquefeuil and Sanoussi Bilal (2013) look at the strategy within the UK, Germany, Portugal, France and Denmark to deal with emerging donors (trilateral projects), but only assess the reactions within each of these cases in up to three pages which do not offer great insight into the empirical reality, but rather read like policy counselling pamphlets. Fahimul Quadir (2013) looks at the question of whether rising donors establish a rival regime to traditional donors and talks about the potential emergence of a “new aid paradigm that focuses more on the strategic needs of the partner countries than on advancing the ideological interests of donor countries“ (Quadir 2013, 321). Unfortunately, just like the other studies, he never develops what this new paradigm looks like in practice except that it is not based on conditionality.

The aim of this study is therefore clear: to shed some light on the empirical consequences caused by emerging donors upon the three selected countries and on their development assistance policies. It takes a closer look at those two areas identified by the literature as the main points of difference between emerging and traditional donors, and the areas that will see the greatest potential consequences - the fields of conditionality and trilateral cooperation. This study is therefore a much needed contribution to recent debates and gives some empirically driven answers to questions that are often posed but equally often left unanswered.

1.4 Structure of this thesis

In order to answer the research questions, this study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 sets the theoretical frame. This study uses a discursive institutionalist prism to look at highly complex empirical findings. As such the theoretical chapter explains how the individual development policy of each of the three traditional donors is treated as an institution composed of narratives, rules and practices. Moreover, the role of ideas as a trigger to change is explained in detail in chapter 2. The chapter further develops hypotheses on whether and how institutional change occurs in the three development institutions as a reaction to the policies of emerging donors.

Chapter 3 develops the methodological approach and clarifies the selection of the three traditional donors. Moreover, it illustrates what kind of material has been studied and how the material has been analysed. Next to an extensive primary document analysis of each of the three
selected countries, expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the traditional donor countries. This empirical data complements the primary documents together with an extensive analysis of their aid statistics. The primary documents and the expert interviews were analysed through qualitative content analysis, while a descriptive approach and simple correlations were used for the quantitative material.

Chapter 4 clarifies the empirical puzzle surrounding emerging donors and gives a short insight into their aid activities and motives while contrasting their activities to those of the chosen three traditional donors. This is a first empirical introduction into the field that enables the reader to contextualise the complex changes within the two fields of conditionality and trilateral later on in the empirical chapters.

Chapter 5 to 7 analyse the reactions of the three traditional donors. Chapter 5 assesses the most important ideas defining the perception of emerging donors within the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom. This chapter follows the assumption that ideas are the key explanatory factor in triggering change in the development policy of each individual donor. Chapter 6 and 7 are the main empirical chapters of this work. They focus on two fields that are most likely to be affected by emerging donors: the field of conditionality (chapter 6) and the field of trilateral cooperation (chapter 7).

Chapter 8 concludes and gives an insight into the potential impact of emerging donors on foreign aid policies of individual countries and assesses both the common and differing aspects within the reactions of the three traditional donors. Moreover, the concluding chapter discusses the empirical and theoretical findings of this work and draws lessons for future studies.
2 Theoretical reflections

The previous chapter gave an introduction into the research puzzle, the framework of this thesis and elaborated on the research question of this work: how have traditional donors reacted toward emerging donors? This chapter clarifies the theoretical background against which this question is posed in the three empirical chapters. The first section explains why, out of the multitude of theoretical approaches in international relations, a discursive institutionalist approach has been chosen for this study. The second section provides more detail on the definition of an institution and of its diverse components. This part contributes to the understanding of the structure of the empirical chapters and indicates how institutions can be studied up close. The remaining part of this chapter clarifies how institutional change can be tracked and how mechanisms for change can be identified. This part also elaborates on the importance of ideas as the main carriers for institutional change. The chapter concludes with the main hypotheses guiding this research which were tested in the three empirical chapters in order to answer whether institutional change has taken place within traditional donors’ policies in reaction to emerging donors?

2.1 The usefulness of discursive institutionalism

Throughout this thesis, I want to ask how emerging donors affect traditional donors’ policies. The study therefore looks at the effects on the development policies of several countries as a reaction to a group of emerging donors. In order to address this question, an institutionalist reasoning is applied with a focus on ideas as the drivers of change.

The use of this framework suggests itself for the following reasons. Realist and other power-related approaches frequently fail to explain most of the effects related to issues in foreign aid. Realist and neorealist theories paint too grim a picture for the potential of an extended cooperation between different donors. Moreover, realist theories incline to look at individual states as identical black boxes, negating differences in national reactions and policies. While this approach is appealing for producing generalising hypotheses, many other facets of the reaction cannot be analysed through this framework. Power does indeed explain some of the engagements in development assistance (and indeed in this study) but the field of development assistance is not necessarily the most relevant one for realist theories, which focuses more effectively on security issues and other so-called high politics (for a similar argument, see Lancaster 2007, 3).

Some important theories of international relations agree that other factors might be more decisive for explaining the relations between states and thereby depart from the black box thinking of realist approaches (see Schimmelfennig 2011). Indeed, many other theories give a more optimistic view for explaining relations between states and envision cooperative reasons next to power-related rationales. As such, transnational and liberal perspectives might be considered suited to this study. There are, however, for the purpose of this study severe limitations to both approaches. First, transnational perspectives extend the theoretical view toward the influence of transnational actors, such as transnational networks or, in the case of this study, developmental NGOs. The main argument of transnationalism is that the state has to some extent lost its grip on international affairs at the expense of new non-state actors (Schimmelfennig 2011,
This reasoning is interesting when it comes to explaining certain aspects of development cooperation such as the aid effort of international or local NGOs as well as the rise in private public partnerships. However, for the purpose of this study’s research question, the influence of transnational actors is minimal. States together with international institutions still largely dominate the field of development assistance (Nelson 2008, 321). Moreover, while the addition of a new layer of actors is surely an interesting insight into international relations, the transnational perspective lacks further concrete theoretical assumptions.

Liberal perspectives seek to explain the interaction between the national and the international spheres. This perspective is better suited to this study, but it does not greatly help us to understand domestic changes as a result of another group of international players (Nölke et al. 2015; Lancaster 2007). Moreover, while liberal perspectives explain the influence of national actors and procedures on international affairs, they give little insight into the opposite direction; the influence of other states on national policies (Moravcsik 1997).

Critical theories, such as neogramscianist and world system theory approaches, shed some light on hegemonic power dimensions and the (im)possibility of change emerging from disadvantaged actors (Nölke 2010; Bieler and A. David Morton 2010). This perspective is insightful especially when analysing how successful emerging donors are in making their voices heard in international development institutions, but it is less helpful in analysing the reaction of privileged traditional donor policies to them.

Finally, two metatheories remain: institutionalism and constructivism. This thesis aims at combining both approaches. Constructivist analysts have challenged most of the paradigms in international relations theory, including the assumption that actors (largely states) operate purely according to their own self-interest (A. Wendt 2010, A. Wendt 1992). Their focus is on social values and norms that influence a constructed international system based on the perceptions of others. However, whereas norms and values play a crucial role in development aid and also in the cooperation between donors, self-interest still remains a non-negligible factor in the explanation of donor engagement in developing countries (Hook 2008a, 86). It is therefore necessary to work within a framework that combines rational-choice factors with norm-driven motivations. Combining two metatheories builds upon the works on analytical eclecticism of Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein (2010).

The following paragraphs make a case for the choice of combining institutionalism with constructivist elements in order to find satisfying answers for the research question of this study.

First, institutionalism (and to a certain degree constructivism) allows for an identification of states as the prominent actors for explaining the research puzzle. Following those meta-theories implies that the rationale for actors’ behaviour is a mix between self-interest and norm-driven behaviour — a very convenient combination for explaining foreign aid rationales (Lumsdaine 1993; Hook and Rumsey 2015). Second, institutionalism holds that international cooperation might be in the interests of actors as absolute gains for both sides are possible. This

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12 Note that the perspective of institutionalism often focuses on the influence of international organisations on states, but equally focuses on the creation of such organisations because of the desire of states to cooperate on certain issue areas (Dingwerth, Kerwer, and Nölke 2009).
prism is helpful as it does not negate the possibility for cooperation and adaption of one’s policies to trends emerging from international institutions or other individual countries (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b). Third, the institutionalist prism assumes that states act in an environment of controlled anarchy where actors are entangled through interdependence. This interdependence gives an initial answer towards the agency-structure problem that is very prominent in explaining change (Keohane and Nye 2001). Finally, in order to explain change or inertia in foreign aid policies, it is crucial to study the influence of ideas on institutional settings, the biggest contribution of the constructivist prism to this study but also present in recent institutionalist works (Keohane 2002; A. Wendt 1992, A. Wendt 2010; W. Richard Scott 2008; for an overview of institutionalist analysis with an ideational frame, look at Münch 2016, 28–31).

Conveniently, combining two metatheories is not to enter uncharted territory. Many scholars have attempted the combination of institutionalist and constructivist prisms (for instance, Zangl and Zürn 1996; Rosert 2012). From the point of view of this work, the most influential example is the body of thought that is framed under the terminology of discursive institutionalism, which makes a plea for the increasing impact of ideas and norms to explain policies. The terminology was framed by Vivien Schmidt recently (2008), but her work builds upon the research of many other institutionalists (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b; Judith Goldstein and Keohane 1995a; J. L. Campbell 2004). Discursive institutionalism positions itself in between positivism and constructivism and assumes a rather dynamic behaviour of institutions (Schmidt 2011, 63). How does discursive institutionalism help us in addressing the research question of this study? The following paragraphs make a case for the choice of this middle-range theory.

To assess the influence of a group of states on another group of states in a particular area, discursive institutionalism allows us to conceptualise each individual national donor policy as an institution and to conceive of them as embedded in a bigger, but less concrete international institution, such as an international regime. This study only focuses on the reaction of three traditional donor countries. Generalisations towards the trend of the international institution of foreign aid can only be made tentatively in the conclusion as many more actors would need to be studied to come to concrete findings. Therefore, the first contribution of the theory is to allow us to conceptualise each individual donor policy as an institution.

Defining an institution is a complex task. In an effort, to combine the diverse streams of institutionalism (historical, sociological and rational-choice), Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts define institutions as political entities that “constrain or shape actors’ behaviour” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 49). In their useful definition, this happens through three layers that are easily identified in the field: the layers of narratives, rules, and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 13).

Regimes are here understood in the original definition of Stephen Krasner as a “set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner 1982b, 186). Many others have conceived of traditional international foreign aid to be embedded in such an international regime with the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD as its “institutional home” (Hook and Rumsey 2015; Hook 2008a; Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp 2013; Lumsdaine 1993, 127–29). Nevertheless, regime theory has faced many criticisms, especially because of an epistemological lack of clarity (Ruggie 2006; Strange 1982). Moreover, most of regime analysis concentrates on regime creation rather than regime change. When addressing regime change, most authors argue that change is due to external factors, going in the same direction as punctured equilibrium rationale in other institutionalist thinking (Cohen 1982; Haas 1982; Little 2014; Jervis 1982). Note that the definition of an international regime is very close to the understanding of an international institution from Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001b, 762) with the distinction that the international institutions also “prescribe, proscribe and/or authorise behaviour.”
Moreover, discursive institutionalism looks at the inherent position of ideas within the institutional framework (Schmidt 2008). Section 3.2 further develops on the nature of these layers and what they mean within development assistance. This division allows for a more detailed understanding of what is going on in national policies and what the decisive factors for inertia or change might be and constitutes the second big contribution of the theory towards my thesis. It also serves as a blueprint for looking at data in the three empirical chapters – where, in turn, the individual development policies of the three identified traditional donors were analysed through institutionalist lenses.

The issue at stake is a complex one that does not allow for the discrimination between self-interested rationales and norm-driven behaviour. Discursive institutionalism looks at the influences of ideas and norms without negating the role of self-interested patterns (Schmidt 2010).

Fourth, discursive institutionalism gives us an indication of how free individual, national actors are in adapting their policies. Within the theoretical approach, actors come back into the set-up of institutions mainly through their ideas and the narrative that they produce in defending these ideas (Schmidt 2008; J. L. Campbell 2004). Other institutionalist thinkers conceptualise the dimension between rule-takers and rule-makers (Streeck and Thelen 2005) or in terms of power – following Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts, actors must have the capacity to act in their own right and be able to impose their will on other actors (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 79–81). The theoretical prism therefore allows us to identify which actors are powerful agents to adapt or constrain institutional change, an element that is further elaborated upon in the section on institutional change (3.3).

The most important function that the theoretical framework must fulfil is to conceptualise the change that is taking place within traditional donor policies as a result of the aid policies of emerging donors. Ideas are necessary to arrive at satisfying hypotheses of how institutional change can be identified and how likely it is to happen. Ideas are conceptualised through discursive institutionalist lenses as the main driver of, or barrier to, change (Schmidt 2011). The long history of institutionalism in dealing with change and inertia further provides useful tools to make that change more graphic and tangible (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b). Similar to the issue of agency and structure, this is further discussed in section 3.3 on institutional change.

But first, a closer look at the theoretical understanding of the institutional set-up and its components is necessary, as these serve as the analytical categories for studying institutional change.

### 2.2 How to study an institution and its components

In order to analyse the reaction of traditional donors’ policies to the emergence of new players in the field, each donor policy is conceptualised as an institution composed of three layers: rules, narratives and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Before understanding in full the benefits of this conceptualisation, let us first turn to a more general definition of institutions.

The definition of an institution is a core problem of the theoretical prism of institutionalism. As Guy Peters (2005, 160) points out, there are three main distinctive approaches on how to define an institution, each of which is linked to a particular school of institutionalism. First, normative
or sociological institutionalism sees an institution not necessarily as a formal structure but understands institutions as an “enduring collection of rules and organised practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of [...] changing circumstances” (March and Olsen 2008a, 3; Peters 2005, 29). More precisely, institutions are defined as “constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behaviour” (March and Olsen 2008a, 3). Importantly, for normative institutionalists, institutions prescribe appropriate behaviour rather than consequential behaviour (March and Olsen 2008b; Peters 2005, 30).

The second approach towards institutionalism, historical institutionalism, differs slightly in defining its principle subject. The definition here seems more vague than in other approaches, often combining elements from March and Olsen with others used in rational choice approaches (Peters 2005, 74). Generally, the understanding of an institution is largely constructivist in the perspective of historical institutionalism, as the interests of actors are seen to be shaped by norms (W. Richard Scott 2008, 32). In an international perspective, it is emphasised that institutions themselves also shape the preferences of actors and power relations (Keohane 1989, 382).

A third perspective on the definition of institutions comes from the rational choice approach. The focus here lies on the formal rules of an institution, which in turn constrain the possible range of actions from actors involved in a given institution (Peters 2005, 160; W. Richard Scott 2008, 32–34). In an international perspective, institutions exist only when they are in the (rational) interests of the relevant actors and if there is some kind of incentive (such as lower transaction costs) for their creation (W. Richard Scott 2008, 34; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2004).

Finally, many have stressed in recent years that focussing on the differences of these approaches makes little sense and that there are more common aspects than diverging ones (Mahoney and Thelen 2010b; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Lowndes and Roberts 2013; P. A. Hall 2010). In their book, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) attempt to bridge the apparent gap between the diverse institutionalisms calling for a “third phase” institutionalism. Similarly, Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2011) and John Campbell (2004) attempt to merge diverse institutionalist approaches and add the layer of ideas to the study that is already inherent in most approaches, appending the title “discursive institutionalism” to this “newer new institutionalism” (Schmidt 2011, 47; Rayner 2015). As Brainard Peters (2005, 164) points out, “the fundamental issue holding these various approaches [...] together is simply that they consider institutions the central component of political life.” What is therefore necessary is to find a large encompassing definition of institutions that can be easily adapted to the empirical case of development policy. Particularly easy to apply are definitions that identify several distinct features of the institution in question. Richard Scott (2008, 48) defines institutions as being “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” The main three pillars of institutions that he defines are therefore regulative

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14 For a similar pledge to focus more research on norms, see Rosert (2012).

15 Such definitions are very common among institutionalists. For scholars of international relations, the definition of an international regime will spring to mind, with the hierarchical separation into principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Note, however, that the distinction between these is often blurred (Levy, Young, and Zürn 1995, 273; Krasner 1982b; H. Müller 1993).
(through regulative rules), normative (through expectations) and cultural-cognitive (shared understanding and common beliefs) (W. Richard Scott 2008, 51). Moreover, Scott adds the layer of “associated activities and resources.” Others simply make a distinction between informal and formal institutions (Orren and Skowronek 1994).

Similar to this slightly complex definition is another provided by Lowndes and Roberts. They define an institution as “shaping the opportunities that all of us have as citizens to make our voices heard, to participate in decision-making, and to access public services” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 4). Moreover, they state that “political behaviour and political outcomes are best understood by studying the rules and practices that characterise institutions” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 7). Similar to the definition of Scott, they combine the defining elements of most institutionalist approaches as they refer to rules (satisfying rational-choice based approaches), but also look at practices, as well as at narratives, which are discussed later (satisfying historical, normative and new discursive forms of institutionalism). This division into several easily distinguished layers makes it easier to study institutions – to visualise their tangible shape and change as like “watching a movie” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 134). Development assistance, as any other policy field of a government, can be easily conceptualised in this way. As these different layers of an institution shaped the empirical focus, the next paragraphs concentrate in more detail on what the individual layers mean:

The first layer consists of rules. Rules are “formally constructed and written down” for instance as “clauses in a constitution, terms of references for an assembly, national and international laws” and so forth (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 53). This is the same layer as Scott’s regulative pillar of institutions and would be the main layer of focus for rational-choice institutionalists (W. Richard Scott 2008, 52–54). In the field of development policies, these can be found in national laws, official governmental directives, code of conduct of aid agencies and so forth. Rules are constantly interpreted by actors and do not need to be adhered to in order to exist (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 54). For the case of foreign aid, this can also contain international rules, such as the OECD rule that all traditional donor countries have agreed to give at least 0.7 percent of their GDP as foreign aid. Without studying the legal frame of each country’s foreign aid, it is hard to understand how that policy can or cannot change because of the influence of external actors.

The second layer – narratives – is closely connected to rules. Narratives are “semi-formal and spoken” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 63); they can be found in “speeches, mission statements, logos, design or style” (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 63). The layer of narrative is reminiscent of normative or sociological institutionalism, but it is obviously a very important layer for discursive institutionalism as well (March and Olsen 2008b; Schmidt 2008, 2011). Narratives often serve to justify the existence of rules. Within development policy, these can be found mainly in the speeches of officials related to development assistance. For instance, when the head of state makes a comment about how aid should be given or not and which countries should be rewarded, this is part of the narrative of the institution of development assistance of that country.

Note that Lowndes and Roberts decisively exclude the studying of political ideas in their institutionalist approach. Nevertheless, it becomes obvious that one cannot ignore ideas when studying practices, but particularly narratives of institutions (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 10).
Ideas are highly influential on the layer of narratives but was differentiated whenever possible in order to maintain theoretical clarity.

The final layer is that of practices which are “demonstrated through conduct” and consists of what actors actually do (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 57). Taken together with the layer of narratives, this is what Scott meant when he included associated resources and activities in his definition (W. Richard Scott 2008, 51). In the field of development policy, this is the flow of money, the relationships between donors and recipients, the sanctioning of certain behaviours and so on. Many other authors refer to the layer of practices as being decisive to understanding the institutional set-up (March and Olsen 2008a, 4; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b).

The following figure summarises the layers of the institution of development assistance. The first box indicates the theoretical definition of the layer, the second box below gives some examples from the field of development assistance.

The division into layers helps us to conceptualise empirical data when studying the individual donor policies and their reaction towards emerging donors. Moreover, the different layers facilitate the study of potential changes within these institutions as some attempts for change might stay within softer parts of the institution, such as narratives. Before conceptualising institutional change, the following section addresses the question of the inherent or external position of ideas to the institutional set-up.

17 Note that the two other pillars of Scott’s definition – cultural-cognitive and normative are also both closely linked to ideas, but ideas that shape the understanding of the institution in the background of actors’ consciousness. While it is more difficult to lay bare these pillars, they become transparent through the study of the three layers of rules, narrative and practices.

18 Note that when studying several national institutions that all show similar patterns in their rules, narratives and practices, one might be able to make assumptions upon an international reaction towards emerging donors. As only three donors are studied here, these assumptions can only be tentative though.
2.2.1 The role of ideas within the institution

Within discursive institutionalism, ideas play a constitutive role for the initial institution and especially for explaining change. Nevertheless, all other institutionalist prisms have developed a certain susceptibility to the explanatory power of ideas. Even rational choice institutionalists – where, one could argue, the main variable of the studied object is interests – have started referring to the significance of ideas to explain world politics (Keohane 2002, 5). Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1995b), for instance, distinguish between three different type of ideas which in turn influences actors’ interests: worldviews (such as religion), principled beliefs (such as human rights doctrines) and causal beliefs (for instance monetarist theories of macroeconomics). In their work, these ideas shape policies in three different casual pathways: as roadmaps, as focal points and as embedded elements of the institution itself (Judith Goldstein and Keohane 1995b; Gofas and Hay 2012, 23–27). This last division is instructive, as it links ideas to institutional change as external pressures (as roadmaps or focal points), but allows for incremental change as well (as ideas can also be embedded in the institution).

Ideas have been quite prominent to the theoretical prism of historical institutionalism since its initial beginning (Schmidt 2011, 53). The importance of ideas is especially prominent when it comes to explaining institutional change (P. A. Hall 2010). Within normative (or sociological) institutionalism, there was no prober turn towards ideas as they were always considered important in shaping the institutional outcome. Nevertheless, Vivien Schmidt divides them into analysts who merely consider the importance of ideas in shaping actors’ interests and those who consider the importance of the context in which ideas are communicated (Schmidt 2011, 54).

All of the above are mostly concerned to define the relationship between ideas and interests. While rational-choice analysts go only as far as stating that interests are influenced by ideas, discursive institutionalists talk about the construction of interests through ideas, thereby equating the two concepts (Schmidt 2008, 317; Béland and Cox 2011, 10). This constructivist perspective, whereby interests are the reflection of ideas, is perceptible in many other studies (Hay 2011; Guzzini and Leander 2006; A. Wendt 2010).

It is important to clarify where – within the theoretical division into three layers of the institution – ideas come to play a role. It is not hard to find numerous typologies of ideas. Most divide ideas into two axes, one of which focuses on the level of consciousness where the actor is influenced by the idea: John Campbell, for instance, divides ideas into those that lie on the background or on the foreground of the mind of the actor. For Campbell, ideas that lie on the background are deeply enrooted within the institution and therefore rarely contested whereas ideas that lie on the foreground are on the edge of institutional life and are highly contested as they are publicly debated (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93–100). Similarly, in an attempt to find answers which fit with all institutionalist approaches, Jal Mehta distinguishes between three kinds of ideas, developing from the most visible kind of ideas to the least visible and most hidden: first, the narrowest conception as policy solutions, second as problem definitions and finally as public philosophies (Mehta 2011, 27).¹⁹ Public philosophies in Metha’s understanding are very close to

¹⁹ Particularly interesting for this study are ideas as problem definitions as they address the question of “how political problems get defined” (Mehta 2011, 33).
Campbell’s background ideas. Vivien Schmidt comes up with a similar division into “background ideational” and “foreground discursive abilities” (Schmidt 2011).

Before combining these types of ideas with the institutional set-up discussed earlier, another layer of complexity is added to the theoretical framework. Campbell discusses another axis to distinguish ideas – in his conception of ideas, they can either be cognitive and thereby outcome-oriented and focused on cause-and-effect thinking or normative ideas that contain values, attitudes and identities (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93). Campbell thus ends up with four types of ideas that are briefly described here: the first two, paradigms and public sentiment, lie in the background of the consciousness of actors. Paradigms are cognitive whereas public sentiment is normative in nature. Both constrain change as they are not openly discussed. The other two, programmes and frames lie in the foreground of actors’ consciousness and are publicly debated. Programmes are cognitive ideas whereas frames are normative. As both are publicly discussed, they facilitate change (J. L. Campbell 2004, 94–100). How do these types of ideas relate to previously explained institutional set-up of rules, narratives and practices? Consider figure 2.2 that now includes the position of ideas into the institutional set-up composed of rules, narratives and practices. The first distinction needs to be made between what is discussed at the foreground and what is handled in the background. While all layers have elements of both – some aspects of them being discussed openly, it seems natural that the layer of narratives (that is semi-formal and spoken) relates best to ideas being discussed at the forefront. Both types of ideas – normative and cognitive – are to be found here. The layer of practices is the one that is least discussed openly and where the most influential ideas are the ones lying on the background. With rules, the division is more complex: while some of the rules are openly discussed before they become rules of the institution, they are soon influenced by and influence ideas that lie on the background. Thereby a slightly different set-up presents itself to us for understanding the layers of the institution,

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20 Note that the background ideational abilities relate to the Metha’s concept of public philosophies and to Campbell’s background ideas mentioned above, whereas both, policy solutions and problem definitions are negotiated on the level of foreground discursive abilities.

21 Some selected aid practices are openly discussed in the media and also in academic literature, nevertheless, this is rarely done by the actors themselves that are the only focus of this study. The layer of practices often refers to selected ideas in order to justify them but rarely the whole layer of practices is discussed in public.
indicating the ideas most represented in each layer – evolving from the ideas lying most on the foreground (narratives) to the ones lying most on the background (practices).

It is interesting to note that not all ideas about development policies find expression within the institutional set-up of development policy. Especially within the narrative, new innovative ideas help to shape the institutional set-up. New ideas are less influential when it comes to the layer of rules and least influential when it comes to practices. Moreover, it is obviously easier to track ideas that lie on the foreground and are publicly discussed than ideas that lie in the background in the sub-consciousness of actors involved in the institution. One example for a normative background idea (a public sentiment in Campbell’s terminology) is the feeling shared by traditional donors that it is their moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poorer, less fortunate countries. Similar to this is the (cognitive background) idea that foreign aid should also satisfy the interests of the donor country. Both background ideas shape the institution of development assistance significantly, especially in practice (Hook 2008b, 154–56).

One main aspect of the theoretical setting has been clarified so far: how this work conceptualises an institution and what role ideas play within that institutional set-up. So far, the theoretical reflections make it possible to describe the national development policies as institutions and to identify the relevant ideas that shape these institutions. However, this does not help us to explain

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22 Vivien Schmidt’s foreground discursive abilities are located within the narratives whereas her background ideational abilities are located within the rules and practices (Schmidt 2010).

23 Many authors emphasise the role of ideas or ideologies for the giving of foreign aid (Hook 2008b).
how change occurs in these development institutions in response to emerging donors. The following section therefore develops a theoretical framework of how to identify institutional change and how to make sense of it.

2.3 Explaining institutional change

Historically, institutional change has been understudied in all institutionalist approaches (Peters 2005, 161–62; Barnett and Coleman). Institutionalist analysis goes beyond the prominent argument in power-related theories that change is simply a result of changing power structures (Levy, Young, and Zürn 1995, 318; Peters 2005, 151), which makes the study of change within the institutional framework more interesting but also more challenging. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 112–16) claim that the first phase of institutionalism (until the 1950s) focused on the stability of institutions. The second phase (from the 1980s on) saw the division of the theory into diverse schools of sociological, historical and rational choice institutionalism. Each school of thought conceived change in different terms, but always either through path dependency approaches or through the analysis of a punctuated equilibrium (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 112–16).

Following Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 202), second phase institutionalism thereby followed a concept of institutional change in “stop and go” terms.

However, a recent development has stipulated specific categories for explaining the exogenous and endogenous dimensions that are necessary for a satisfying analysis of change (for a similar argument about a new phase in the study of institutional change, see J. L. Campbell 2004; Helfer 2006; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; Schmidt 2008, 2010, 2011). This third phase institutionalism tries to overcome the division into different schools of thought and makes an attempt at harmonisation. The claim for harmonisation is that all three schools of thought face similar problems when it comes to studying institutional change (J. L. Campbell 2004). Empirical studies combining diverse institutional approaches exist. For instance, Helfer’s (2006) study on change and innovation within the International Labour Organisation directly combines the approaches of historical and organisational institutionalism. Helfer combines both approaches because he claims that they both share the common assumption that “political action is shaped and constrained by historically constructed institutions that exhibit surprising durability notwithstanding changes in their economic and political environment or shifts in the preferences of actors” (Helfer 2006: 649). Similarly, in their article on endogenous institutional change, Greif and Laitin (2004) combine game theory approaches (and hence rational-choice approaches) with theoretical insights from historical institutionalism. They apply their theoretical setting to the case studies of formal governing institutions in early modern Europe and to the informal institution of cleavage structure in the contemporary world. These empirical cases show that combinations of the different schools of thought have been successfully attempted for years. But what does this third phase institutionalism imply for studying institutional change?

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24 The study of Koremenos, Lispon and Snidal (2001a, 1078) for instance argues that the equilibrium analysis can give an indication of how likely change is to occur as “change can be understood as shortcomings of existing equilibria.” Similarly, Krasner (1982a) argues that regimes are most likely to change through external shocks but admits that regimes might be able to become interactive variables, altering causal variables and thereby influencing change more directly.
Theoretical reflections

The next section gives an overview of the existing literature of this third phase of the theory of institutional change and the common problems that all institutional approaches face. Campbell (2004, 2–10) asserts that all institutional theoretical approaches face three major problems when it comes to studying institutional change: the problems of defining change, defining the mechanisms that are responsible for understanding institutional change and finally, the role ideas and actors play in the process of institutional change. While the next section largely deals with institutional change in a larger institutional setting, I draw conclusions from the institutional set-up composed of the three layers (narratives, rules, practices) at the end of each section in order to arrive at a conclusion on what categories are crucial for this research in order to understand change within development aid policies of each individual donor. The section also addresses the problems with studying institutional change for this research setting and indicates solutions that are used to overcome these issues.

2.3.1 How can one identify change?

Campbell argues that one has to define the dimensions of the institution in question in order to identify two main aspects: first, whether change has taken place at all, and second, whether the observation is indicative of evolutionary or revolutionary change. This alters, in turn, the way an institution and its change mechanisms are conceptualised (J. L. Campbell 2004, 35–41). The previous section (3.2) has defined the institution as being composed of three layers; narratives, rules and practices (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 246–76). Moreover, it has clarified how ideas play a constitutive role in the institutional set-up. Lowndes and Roberts state that the institution is always a work in progress and the layers don’t necessarily have to be congruent, but change in one layer might trigger change in the other layers (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 69–75). They divide analysists of institutional change into two axes, depending on the role of agency attributed by the analysists and whether change is considered to be largely incremental or punctuated (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 116).

This analysis lends itself to a study of incremental rather than punctuated change. Punctuated change could be identified if all three layers of the institution change at once in a short period of time. Incremental change would be visible if one or two layers of the institution change. Moreover, through the prominent role of ideas, agents come back into the focus. At the centre of the analysis stands the change on the three layers within the institution, but without neglecting the role of the environment and of actors.

The second aspect that Campbell urges us to clarify concerning the definition of change is the time frame that one seeks to study (J. L. Campbell 2004, 41-17). This might be more difficult than it first appears as all social processes follow a different rhythm that is hard to assess for an outsider. Campbell offers several options for identifying a time frame: first, the use of a particular theoretical orientation to limit the time frame. A rational choice framework would for instance focus on decision makers and therefore use a shorter time frame than a study focusing on long term change. Another solution is a pragmatic methodological consideration where the researcher limits the time frame to the availability of empirical data. A third option is to focus on critical events that are crucial for explaining change. However, Streek and Thelen argue that critical events are not always indicative of the real, slower change process underway (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19).
When it comes to the definition of the time frame that is studied, empirical data indicates that a shift of the perceived importance of emerging donors has taken place roughly since the year 2004 (see literature review in Chapter 1). This work studies the period from 2004 until the end of 2014, focusing on several crucial moments within the evolution of development policies. These are marked by the Paris Declaration of 2005, as well as the follow-up processes (Accra 2008, Busan 2011). Moreover, the emergence of the Development Cooperation Forum within the framework of the United Nations in 2005 and its biennial meetings are characterised as critical moments as they embody a different and more inclusive approach to the debate in international development assistance. This rationale combines certain of the possibilities that Campbell mentions on how to identify a time frame. It refutes the argumentation of Streek and Thelen (2005) that change often needs longer periods of time. This is due to the topicality of the subject and due to the perceivably sudden emergence of new heavyweights in foreign aid. Changes within the traditional donors’ policies towards emerging donors can logically only appear after the impact of emerging donors had been registered in the international arena. This is only possible once those emerging donors had enough money to spend on foreign aid to have an impact on the international institutions.

This focus on the layers of the institution and a rather limited time frame provides an overview of what kind of change occurred (revolutionary or incremental) and whether change occurred at all.

2.3.2 The problem of mechanisms: how does change occur?

When we can identify that change has occurred, we are still no wiser as to how and why that change took place. Campbell refers to this common issue as the problem of mechanisms. Two concepts are well known for this problem: the processes of path dependency and of diffusion (for path dependency, look for instance at Pierson 2000; regarding diffusion look for instance at Strang and Meyer 1993; or Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007). Both approaches face problems, however. Path dependency starts from the assumption that the historical and social context of an institution matter and enable or prevent potential change. In a path dependent setting, change therefore always comes from inside and is very infrequent. Change emerging from a new set of ideas cannot be explained through path dependent approaches. Diffusion on the other hand makes the assumption that institutional principles or practises are adapted or spread to other institutions with little or no modification (J. L. Campbell 2004, 77–79). Hence, in a process of diffusion, change is rather abrupt and requires external involvement to trigger change. In this study’s setting, this would imply that traditional donors start simply mimicking the behaviours of emerging donors. This is, at best, highly unlikely.

To illustrate the processes of institutional change, a different explanation is needed, one which can deliver satisfying answers to the questions of how and why change occurs in an incremental way and allows for external and internal factors to trigger change. Several authors have recently

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25 The chapter on methodology further elaborates on the selection of the time frame.
26 Other models for explaining change exist. For instance, Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein argue that within international organisations, change happens through norms that undergo a cycle: norm contestation triggered by policy failure or external shocks which leads to norm emergence which then is institutionalised and eventually leads to norm stabilisation, externalisation and objectification (Park and Vetterlein 2010, 240).
ventured into finding new models to explain change. Most prominently, Kathleen Thelen has worked with other historical institutionalists on mechanisms of change (see Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; Thelen 2004). Streek and Thelen’s analysis of institutional change in advanced political economies has gathered a total of five types that categorise gradual but transforming change in institutions. These five mechanisms have been further refined in the recent publication of Mahoney and Thelen (2010b). They introduce a theory of institutional change that explains change processes through the interaction between features of the political contexts and the properties of the institution itself (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 31): In order to do this, they first differentiate between institutions with a low level of discretion in interpretation and/or enforcement and institutions with a high level of discretion. That means that some institutions make the reinterpretation of their content difficult (low level of discretion) whereas the reinterpretation is easier in others. Change in institutions where contending interpretations meet little resistance does not require the introduction of new rules to trigger change whereas an institution that does not allow for a new interpretation of existing rules, needs to introduce new rules to the institution in order to trigger change. This division is combined with the characteristics of the political context. Here, Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 18–22) ask if the political context provides contestants with weak or strong veto opportunities. The veto possibilities are high when actors have access to means of blocking institutional change. Change is easier if the opposition towards change is weak.

This is a very useful distinction for identifying how change affects the institution depending on its features. Nevertheless, it is not easy to position the phenomenon of development aid on these axes. Generally, the field of foreign aid is one where the reinterpretation of the institution is rather difficult (as with any foreign policy). Therefore, foreign aid is considered to be an institution positioned on the left-hand side of figure 2.3 below. Moreover, the notion of path dependency comes back into play: it argues that change is significantly more difficult in parts of the institution (rules, narratives and practices) that have existed for a long period of time whereas it is easier when it comes to newer policies. Regarding the veto players, the history of the policy at stake regarding change is crucial to explaining whether high or low veto opportunities exist. It is argued that within well-established rules, narratives and practices – such as conditionality – there is a strong opposition and mobilisation against change whereas there is less opposition and mobilisation in relatively new fields – such as trilateral cooperation. Therefore, the next section describes the two mechanisms that deal with the context of an institution where the reinterpretation of rules is generally difficult (left-hand side of the figure) – *layering* and *displacement*. The other two mechanisms are only briefly touched upon as they are not relevant for the empirical chapters. For better illustration, the following table sums up the mechanisms again.

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27 Kathleen Thelen developed the mechanisms in her book from 2004. However, the mechanisms in that analysis are still rather unspecified as Gary Herrigel (2006) points out in his review.

28 In his review of the book Jeroen van der Heijden (2010) argues that adding the layer of the institutional context is the main contribution of Mahoney and Thelen’s new book as it clarifies the conditions for institutional change.
Figure 2-3: Table illustrating the mechanisms and actors for institutional change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political context (veto possibilities against change)</th>
<th>Characteristics of the institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong opposition against change</td>
<td><strong>Mechanism: Layering</strong>&lt;br&gt;New rules introduced, old rules remain&lt;br&gt;Likely to be found within older well-established rules, narratives and practices&lt;br&gt;Example: Conditionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak opposition against change</td>
<td><strong>Mechanism: Displacement</strong>&lt;br&gt;Existing rules are replaced by new ones&lt;br&gt;Likely to be found within newer less well-established rules, narratives and practices&lt;br&gt;Example: Trilateral cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table adapted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 28) and Streeck und Thelen (2005).

First, the relevant two mechanisms that might occur in institutions such as development assistance are explained on the left side of the figure – where the reinterpretation of rules is difficult. Other authors have equally focussed on this kind of environment where new rules need to be introduced to trigger change. As such, Campbell follows a similar logic and introduces the concept of *translation*. This concept allows for a certain adaptation process of institutional practises through local entrepreneurs from outside. This inevitably implies the acceptance of new rules (Campbell 2004, 80). Campbell’s translation process is therefore similar to the two mechanisms described under this category by Mahoney and Thelen, *layering* and *displacement*. Both are rather loosely linked to the concept of diffusion.

The mechanism of *layering* was first introduced by Eric Schickler (2001) and further developed by Streek and Thelen (2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010b). Layering is defined as a process in which “new elements [are] attached to existing institutions gradually changing their status and structure” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). Layering introduces new elements or rules while existing rules remain in place because their reinterpretation is difficult. This means that old rules remain, are not neglected, and their meaning or interpretation does not change in impact. Layering can happen due to internal or external pressures and leads to incremental change. However, Mahoney and Thelen also clarify that as new elements are introduced, a constant process of layering might lead to a more dramatic change over the long run (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a).

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29 Jeroen van der Heijden (2011) discusses the origins of the concept of layering in detail and argues that the concept initially derived from the works of Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (1994).
Change occurs in the layering process through the mechanism of differential growth. This mechanism implies that two similar processes of change occur simultaneously and influence each other mutually. Within this study’s setting, layering could happen simultaneously on all three layers – rules, narratives and practices – or on individual layers. Layering works within the political context of a strong veto against change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010a, 29) identify a specific type of actor to trigger the layering process; *subversives*. Subversives seek to displace the institution but do not break rules (largely because the institutional context does not allow for this to happen). In order to achieve their goal of replacing the institution (or its content), they must work within the system to achieve change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 25–26). Actors of change in this mechanism might therefore appear at first to be supporters of the institution. This mechanism is likely to be more present in older policy areas – such as conditionality – as veto players play a big role and change, generally, is less likely to happen.

Similar to layering, Streek and Thelen’s second mechanism *displacement*, works in an institutional setting that does not allow for a contending interpretation of existing rules. Displacement consists of a “slowly rising salience of subordinate relative to dominant institutions” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). This mechanism comes from the shift in the societal balance of power and results often in more abrupt change than layering. Three options can trigger this mechanism: first, change can be a result of the rediscovery of alternatives that coexisted next to the institution in question. Second, displacement can be triggered through the invasion or cultivation of foreign institutions or practices or finally, through an invasion that is due to external pressure (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 19–22). Existing old rules are simply replaced by new ones in a fast and obvious or in a slow, hidden change process (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 15–16). New rules are introduced because the contending interpretation of existing rules is impossible. The political context is more in favour of change and actors actively advocate for change. These actors are referred to as *insurrectionaries*. While insurrectionaries can appear in any change mechanism, they are best suited for the process of displacement because they seek to displace the existing institution with a new one. Insurrectionaries do not accept the status quo and do not follow rules (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 23–24). The impact of displacement on the development aid institution depends on which components are replaced by new ones. For a fundamental change, all three layers would have to be replaced, whereas if only individual layers of the institution change, then change is less radical. As veto players should not be too prominent for this mechanism to work, this can only happen in areas where no long-established traditions are at work – such as the field of trilateral cooperation.

Within the right-hand side of figure 2.3, Mahoney and Thelen describe mechanisms that work in an environment that allows for contesting interpretation and enforcement of existing rules. Change therefore can come entirely from inside through the adaptation of existing rules. Again, Campbell has a similar mechanism that he attaches to the idea of path dependency. He defines the mechanisms of *bricolage* as “the process whereby actors recombine locally available institutional principles and practices in ways that yield change” (Campbell 2004, 65). This process of change from within fits the picture that Mahoney and Thelen paint for the mechanisms *conversion*, *drift* and *exhaustion*. These mechanisms are unlikely to appear within the empirical data of this study as the foreign aid institution has been characterised as resistant to the reinterpretation of its content. Nevertheless, in order to give a complete picture of the available mechanisms, they are very briefly described here. *Conversion* is defined as “the redeployment of old institutions to new purposes” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). The rules of the institution themselves do not
change, but their meaning and interpretation do (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 17). The political context in which this mechanism is at work is one of weak opposition towards change.

Finally, the last two mechanisms take place in an environment of relative liberty when it comes to the possibilities for the reinterpretation of existing rules but in an environment of strong veto options. Both the mechanisms of drift and exhaustion describe developments where the rules of an institution lose their impact and meaning. 30 Streek and Thelen (2005, 31) define drift as a “neglect of institutional maintenance in spite of external change resulting in slipping in institutional practice on the ground”. Old rules are neglected and change in impact or are simply no longer enforced, but no new rules are introduced (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 16). This process can remain undetected through an apparent external stability. The loss of influence of an institution can be caused through either a failure to adapt policies despite evolving external conditions or through voluntary inaction of actors (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 24–26; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a, 17). Because this process could inevitably lead to a complete loss of meaning for the institution, resistance towards this change is high. The process of drift would happen if foreign aid were to be made redundant.

This section has identified two relevant mechanisms that might also be perceptible in the empirical chapters. So far, this work is based on the following assumptions: change is likely to occur faster in newer areas of institutional life than in well-established ones. Moreover, both mechanisms – layering and displacement – can occur simultaneously on all three layers of the institution or on selected ones. Regarding the likelihood of adaptation, it is easy to assume that the narrative is most volatile towards change, whereas rules and practices are likely to take longer to adapt and change – being subject to path-dependent behaviour. What remains unaddressed are two elements concerning change: the role of agency and the role of ideas within change. The next section deals with these two final aspects.

2.3.3 The problems of ideas and agency: why does institutional change occur?

Rational choice analysis encounters boundaries when attempting to study institutional change. Change, according to this theory, can only arise if the preferences (interests) of actors change. Change, therefore, only comes through a punctured equilibrium and is always abrupt (P. A. Hall 2010, 205–7). Such theories then often turn to the explanatory power of ideas to explain institutional change that diverges from their model (P. A. Hall 2010, 211; Schmidt 2008, 317–19). Goldstein and Keohane, for instance, accord ideas with the capacity to work as switches or mental modes to trigger or slow down change (Judith Goldstein and Keohane 1995b). Campbell also notes that the role of ideas in explaining institutional change is important, but warns us that such ideas need to be carefully defined (see above). For him, ideas are most influential towards institutional change under the conditions of uncertainty when interests are not clearly defined (J. L. Campbell 2004, 114–19). In order to affect institutional change, ideas have to be available, credible and effective. Moreover, they have to be perceived as legitimate (J. L. Campbell 2004, 119). Ideas are seen as crucial in explaining the changing interests of actors which in turn then

30 Streek and Thelen include the end of an institution through the mechanism of exhaustion as a separate mechanism, defined as the “gradual breakdown of an institution over time” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 29–30). The 2010 publication of Mahoney and Thelen does not mention exhaustion separately as it is seen as the logical consequence of drift occurring over time.
changes the institutions they create (Béland and Cox 2011, 11; Hogan and Howlett 2015; Hogan and O'Rourke 2015; Weible 2015).

While some ideas might facilitate change, others might slow it down. As such, many ideas constrain institutional change because they determine what actors perceive as reasonable and/or appropriate. In Campbell’s definition, ideas lying in the background slow change down whereas ideas that are openly discussed and lie in the foreground are more likely to facilitate change. The longer an idea has been integrated within the institutional set-up, the more likely it is to hinder new change because it attempts to maintain its own validity (J. L. Campbell 2004, 93–100). Structural factors other than the awareness that actors have about the idea’s content, and of their history, might be important and “can constrain the production and the dissemination of ideas” which in turn affects institutional change (Béland and Cox 2011, 15). Tracking down ideas and their impact on institutions is not an easy task. Béland and Cox regret in their study that often, the focus is placed on single country studies with the focus on the spread of one particular idea (Béland and Cox 2011, 16). As this study investigates the prevalence of prominent ideas about emerging donors among three traditional donors, it might contribute to further insights into the explanatory power of ideas.

Whereas many factors can therefore indicate when ideas are slowing down change, the most important aspect is when they foster change. As such, ideas only work for or against institutional change when actors take it upon themselves to advocate for them. The agent-structure problem arises again: how much are the actors dependent on the structure and/or how much do they act freely of the structure but influence the structure through their actions? In this respect, Campbell (2004) as well as Mahoney and Thelen (2010b) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) place a heavy emphasis on the role of actors or entrepreneurs. Moreover, Vivien Schmidt, in her discursive institutionalism puts an emphasis on the way ideas are put forward through discourse – which inevitably focuses on actors again (2008, 2010, 2011; Carstensen 2015). Actors might influence the dimensions of institutions, they might facilitate or slow down change mechanisms and they might influence the relationship of ideas within the institutions (J. L. Campbell 2004, 90–123). Campbell (2004, 101–2) states that decision-makers – defined as politicians, bureaucrats or corporate managers – are considered to be the most immediate carriers of ideas affecting institutional change.

Whereas Campbell states that decision-makers are the most prominent actors when it comes to institutional change, Lowndes and Roberts argue that any kind of actor needs to fulfil two criteria to be successful in the implementation of institutional change: first, the actor needs to have

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31 Note that this further confirms the assumption above that the layer of narrative is the easiest to change whereas rules and practices change with more difficulty. As background ideas have been identified as playing a constituent role in rules and practices, those two layers are more likely to be resistant to change.

32 Other studies have adapted a similar framework even in the complex field of international relations, for instance the work of Craig Parsons explaining the role of ideas in the construction of the European Union (Parsons 2011; A. Wendt 2010; Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

33 S. Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (2012) argue that any kind of foreign policy research ends upon discussing this problem.

34 Less relevant for this study are the other four types of actors that Campbell identifies: constituents, public voters and political elites, working on normative background ideas; theorists, academics, working on cognitive background ideas, framers, the spin doctors, working on normative foreground ideas, and brokers, media and public relations experts, working on all type of ideas. The most relevant actors within this study are decision-makers, but the influence of theorists, constituents, framers and brokers are also considered (J. L. Campbell 2004, 100–107).
the capacity to act in her/his own right and, second, the actor must be able to impose her/his will on the environment and on other actors. Through that second quality, the actor shapes the content of the institution (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 79–81). Similarly, Streeck and Thelen (2005, 14–16) argue that there is an ambiguous relationship between rule-makers and rule-takers that is responsible for institutional change. Even if the initial meaning of a rule can be re-interpreted through time, it could also be that the initial meaning of the rule was not self-evident. There is a cycle of feedback where rule-takers give a positive or negative feedback to the rules. This process could lead to the changing of the rule. Moreover, rule-takers have the option of non-compliance with rules which could also lead to a change in the meaning of the rule.\footnote{Lowndes and Roberts further developed this ambiguous relationship between power and agency through the introduction of five types of agency (collective, cumulative, combine, constrained, combinative) (2013, 104-110).}

Focussing on ideas and actors to explain institutional change carries the risk of presenting institutions as highly volatile. Nevertheless, Vivien Schmidt (2011, 60–61) stresses that the main task remains the same: identifying whether ideas are the causal mechanisms triggering a change in the institution or not and thereby whether ideas can be considered to be the explanatory variable. This can only be investigated by focussing on ideas as the explanatory variable.

This thesis therefore works with a theoretical framework that emphasises the explanatory power of ideas—whether these ideas are situated within or outside of the existing institution. Moreover, it looks at how these ideas are communicated among actors (mostly decision-makers). It is important to consider that the position of ideas (as they are also inherent within the institutional set-up but might still explain institutional change) might trigger problems in the causality of the argument. Nevertheless, this study follows Lars Tønder’s (2012) advice to look for more imminent causality between variables as cause and effect might be very closely related to each other, when involving ideas.

The following section summarises this chapter by putting the underlying hypotheses of this work together.

### 2.4 Hypotheses guiding this study

One main hypothesis can be generated from the above theoretical framework: Looking through the institutionalist framework, development policies of each country are conceptualised as single institutions, constituted by common rules, narratives and practices. In order to assess whether change takes place in these individual institutions, one therefore needs to identify potential causes for change. This study seeks to substantiate the argument that ideas about the potential of emerging donors are the driving mechanism for explaining institutional change. These ideas can be conceptualised into foreground and background ideas. Foreground ideas trigger change whereas background ideas make institutional change slower. As such, the following hypotheses arise:

**H0**: Ideas play a decisive role in explaining institutional change within development policy. More precisely, the way emerging donors are perceived plays a decisive role for
explaining change or the lack of change. Foreground ideas play a main role in triggering change whereas background ideas might hinder initiatives towards change.

The institutional framework allows us to identify changes on several layers. It is argued here that changes within the narrative of an institution are easiest whereas rules and especially practices tend more towards path-dependent (and change resistant) behaviour.

**H1**: Change is more likely to occur on the layer of narratives than it is on the layer of rules or practices.

The next hypothesis further refines this framework as change is less or more likely depending on the nature of the policy field it targets. As such, this theoretical chapter clarified that diverse policy fields are more or less susceptible to institutional change. Expressed in the terminology of discursive institutionalism, it depends on the prevalence of ideas fostering or slowing down institutional change. Fields that have a long tradition in implementation are more likely to be based on background ideas slowing down change whereas newer policy fields with less tradition are more likely to be based on foreground ideas. Within one single institution (development policy), several different settings exist that make change more or less likely within those policy fields. This depends on the history of the particular policy field in question – a long established policy field tends towards path-dependent inertia whereas newer policy fields are more susceptible to change. Within development assistance, these older routines (such as the policy field of conditionality) are more likely to have many veto players and to make the reinterpretation of rules difficult. Change, therefore, can only emerge within that field through the mechanisms of layering, but is overall less likely than for newer policy fields. For newer policy fields – such as trilateral cooperation – fewer veto players exist while the institutional setting remains the same. The change mechanism that might be at play here is the one of displacement.

**H2**: Long established policy fields are more likely to be susceptible to path dependent behaviour and less influenced by reformative ideas than newer established policy fields.

The following model (figure 2.4) clarifies the links that are established through these hypotheses and was applied to the three empirical chapters. It indicates that the level of analysis happens on two different axes: first, it is hypothesised that narratives are more susceptible towards change than the layers of practices and rules (vertical squares). Second, it follows that change emerges more readily in newer policy fields than in older, well established ones (horizontal squares). On the left-hand side you can see the explanatory variable of this thesis, foreground ideas as triggering institutional change. Finally, the four squares in the intersection of both indicate the likelihood of institutional change where easy indicates that change is very likely whereas very slow indicates that change is unlikely to be triggered by ideas or very slow.
To exemplify this figure, here is one example of how this theoretical setting could be applied: a foreground idea fostering change emerges, targeting a newer policy field (such as triangular development cooperation) within the institution of development cooperation of Norway. The potential impact of ideas is stronger on the layer of the narratives than on the layers of practices and rules as a reaction towards emerging donors.

In order to reduce complexity in the figure, the mechanisms that are likely to explain institutional change were omitted from the figure. Note, however, that within the older policy field, I hypothesise that the mechanism of *layering* is likely to be at play whereas *displacement* can explain the change mechanism in the newer policy field. Through layering, new elements are added to the existing issue area while the old rules, narratives and practices remain. In the older issue area, this would allow for the introduction of new rules despite a high resistance from the veto players in the field that are accustomed to the way the institution has worked for a long time. In the newer issue area (such as trilateral cooperation), new rules are likely to replace existing ones through the mechanism of displacement as the changes are confronted by fewer veto players (as the issue area does not yet have many veto players).

The three empirical chapters can now clarify whether institutional change has taken place as a reaction towards emerging donors or not. For this purpose, chapter 5 addresses the question of what kind of ideas traditional donors have towards emerging donors, chapter 6 and 7 target two issue areas, one of which is older and another one newer, but which are both likely to be affected by emerging donors: the field of conditionality and that of trilateral cooperation. The concluding section of each empirical chapter makes reference to the theoretical hypotheses elaborated here. Moreover, the concluding chapter 8 furthers the implications of the empirical findings for the theoretical framework.

The next chapter briefly describes the case study selection and the analytical approach towards the empirical chapters. It clarifies how the underlying changes that have been described here theoretically can be uncovered empirically in the development policies of the three traditional donors.
3 Methodological approach

The research question of this project focuses on the influence of emerging donors on the policies of traditional donors. This chapter clarifies the methodological approach to this thesis in four steps: first, it puts the theoretical hypotheses into a usable framework that can be applied to empirical data; second, it justifies the selection of the three traditional donor countries; third, it identifies the appropriate empirical data to uncover the three theoretical layers (narratives, rules and practices), and finally, it addresses the question of how this empirical data is analysed.

3.1 Operationalizing theoretical hypotheses

The previous chapter elaborated on the different layers that were analysed in order to explore the institutional framework of each traditional donor. Hence, the dependent variable that I seek to explain is the potential change (or lack thereof) within the traditional donors’ policies on the three levels of narratives, rules and practices. The main hypothesis of this work is that the independent variable (explaining change or lack thereof) can be found in ideas. The way emerging donors are perceived plays a decisive role in my theoretical understanding for explaining whether or not the individual donor aid institutions change. Moreover, the theoretical chapter argued that foreground ideas play a decisive role in triggering change whereas background ideas might slow it down. Moreover, the previous chapter has argued that this change is likelier to affect the layer of narratives than the layer of rules and practices and that it is easier to trigger change in relatively new fields rather than in long established ones. The aim is therefore to find relevant ideas that trigger change and others that slow it down. Other intervening variables might explain the outcome – this is why an open approach towards the empirical data is required for this research process. The following figure summarises the explanatory, possibly intervening and explained variables.

![Figure 3-1: Operationalizing variables](source: Own compilation)
3.2 Explication of case study selection

The selection of specific cases is crucial for the validity and quality of any research design (Burnham et al. 2008, 58; Lauth, G. Pickel, and S. Pickel 2009, 77–78). Generally, case studies have been criticized for their limitation to particular cases and their inability to provide generalizable conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 2012). But case studies have the advantage of providing hidden information on special cases and exposing causal links that remain undiscovered through more formal methods (Burnham et al. 2008, 53–55). Moreover, Lauth, Pickel and Pickel (2009, 75–78) highlight the possibility of conducting a bottom-up design where studies with limited case numbers can be enriched through other studies with more numerous cases. While I am aware of the limits of this study’s generalizability, similar enquiries could profit from this research outline as many researchers are concerned with the integration (or lack thereof) of emerging countries into existing international governance structures.

In order to address my research question, I had to focus on a selected number of emerging donors as well as on a sample of traditional donors. Studying the reaction of all traditional donors simply goes beyond the scope of this work. The selection of the representatives for the two donor groups – emerging and traditional – has to follow similar criteria that are further expanded upon here.

First, all selected countries had to be relatively big providers of development assistance in terms of overall quantity and in relation to their national income within their own group. Moreover, they should be the masterminds behind the agenda-setting on the international scale for their relevant group. For that, I considered their commitment to international organisations and structures dealing with development assistance. These criteria apply to the selection of donors from both groups – emerging and traditional.

The selection of emerging donors is relatively straightforward; the literature review already singled out four emerging donors as being the most representative of the group – especially in the perception of traditional donors. This study therefore assesses the policies of China, India, Brazil and South Africa and their effect on traditional donors’ policies (see literature review in chapter 1 and chapter 4 for detailed arguments why these four are selected). As chapter 4 illustrates in further detail, all four satisfy the criteria given above.

However, the selection of the traditional donors is a more complex process as a huge variety of choices presents itself. For the traditional donors I aim for a most different case design (MDCD), trying to select traditional donors that have the biggest possible variance in the framework variables that I assume are fixed. This variance will help me to identify whether ideas have a potential influence on the development institutions of different donors despite their different initial disposition.

Why then study the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom? Some studies justify their case selection because donors are particularly relevant for a particular region or field of development assistance (see for instance, Schraeder, Hook, and B. Taylor 1998, 296). This selectivity

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Schraeder, Hook, and B. Taylor (1998, 301) apply that criticism specifically to the qualitative case study approach towards aid policies when introducing their quantitative study on the policies of Sweden, France, the United States and Japan.
could lead to bias in the findings as donors concentrating on one particular area might be differently affected to donors having a rather broad profile. Therefore, for the most different case design, it is most relevant that the framework variables differ greatly.

As qualitative research enables us to explore the independent variables in more detail through the interpretation of data, I do not have to specify these. However, when it comes to the framework variables, one has to fix them as early as possible (Burnham et al. 2008, 62–67). I have selected the following framework variables that should vary most in all of my cases so that I will be able to get a huge variance in the selection of traditional donors:

A first set of framework variables looks at the national set-up of aid: who is responsible for giving aid? How is the aid giving administered and on which level of government does it play a role? Is the system fragmented or centralised? And what are their motives in giving aid?

As chapter 4 shows in detail, all three donors have a very different set-up regarding the dispensation of aid: Norway has integrated the duties of development cooperation into its foreign ministry, the United States divides the responsibility between the foreign ministry and two specialised agencies for implementation and the UK has a separate ministry for development cooperation (and arguably the most centralised aid system) (Lundsgaarde 2013). The second framework variable that might play a role is the particular form of self-interest that donors follow in their development cooperation. Arguably, the United States follows a strong security incentive, whereas the United Kingdom follows a mix between altruistic motives and commercial purposes. Norway, on the other hand, is considered to be a more altruistic donor than the other two37. Table 3.1 below summarises these findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative distinctions</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional set-up</td>
<td>Highly fragmented, several ministries, 2 implementing agencies</td>
<td>Most centralised, aid at ministry level, simultaneously implementing agency</td>
<td>Integration of aid into foreign ministry; 1 implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major interests in aid giving</td>
<td>Strong security purpose; also commercial and altruistic</td>
<td>Altruistic and commercial; cultural incentives</td>
<td>Altruistic purposes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second set of quantitative variables concerns the actual aid giving policies. Which country gives the most aid? In nominal terms and in terms of GDP? Which spends most on multilateral aid? The following table summarises the quantitative framework variables for the three selected donors. My cases consist of three donors that fulfil the two general criteria that I equally addressed to emerging donors (being a big provider in relative or absolute terms and playing a significant role internationally) and vary greatly on the framework variables. Table 3.2 summarises the data on the framework variables of the selected cases.

37 Note that purposes in all three cases are always mixed, but the prominence of individual motives varies.
Table 3-2: Framework variables (intervening or spurious) from traditional donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantitative values</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual ODA average (in constant USD)(^38)</td>
<td>29.4 billion</td>
<td>12.9 billion</td>
<td>4.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio ODA/GNI</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral share</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral focus(^19)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Social infrastructure &amp; services (education, health, government &amp; civil society)</td>
<td>49.39</td>
<td>42.19</td>
<td>40.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Economic infrastructure (transport, banking, energy, communication)</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>9.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Production sectors (agriculture, industry, mining, construction, trade policies, tourism)</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Multisector (environment protection, other)</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>11.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Commodity aid</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Debt relief</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>15.59</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>11.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional focus(^40)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to Africa</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>42.38</td>
<td>30.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to Asia</td>
<td>36.27</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>21.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to America</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to Europe</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income focus</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to least developed countries</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to other low income countries</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to lower middle-income countries</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to upper middle-income</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

\(^{38}\) All data is the average from 2004 to 2014 (OECD Stat 2015a, 2015c, 2015f).

\(^{19}\) The remaining percentage is unallocated in the statistics. This also applies to regional and income focus.

\(^{40}\) The percentage to Oceania has been omitted as it was below 1 percent for all three donors.
The two tables illustrate that the framework variables vary considerably between the three donors, even though some similarities cannot be excluded (for instance, all give the highest share of their aid to least developed countries, but a huge variance can be found in the allocation to the upper middle-income countries). This choice of donors then represents a huge variety in the selection while placing the emphasis on powerful countries that are agenda-setters in their own right.

The logic for the selection of the time frame derives from the theoretical reflections and from the findings of the literature review. Therefore, this study focuses on the period from 2004 to 2014. Moreover, the literature review also identified two policy fields on which this study concentrates (conditionality and trilateral cooperation). The chapter on conditionality focuses on aid policies regarding specific recipient countries where the three traditional donors share an interest with emerging donors. In order to avoid duplications, the selection of the recipients is explained in detail in chapter 6 although this, too, is a methodological decision.

What kind of empirical data will be studied in order to uncover the changes within the donor institutions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway? The next section provides an answer to this question.

3.3 Explication of data collection

This study aims to uncover the potential changes arising within the development institutions of traditional donors as a reaction to emerging donors. In order to do this, the theoretical chapter has identified two main aspects that are of high relevance for the empirical data that has to be examined: first, ideas are arguably the driving force of change in my theoretical setting; this suggests a qualitative approach where huge amounts of data had to be tracked in order to identify the most relevant ideas that could trigger change (or slow it down). Second, the theoretical framework sets the stage for exploring the development institutions in question on three different layers: narratives, rules and practices. The question, then, is how can these layers be represented and made visible through empirical data?

Before we divide the collected material into these categories, here is a first overview of what kind of empirical material was studied for this research:

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41 Homi J. Kharas and Rogerson (2012) argue that all three donors mentioned here (and Germany) focus their aid on countries with high growth rates, but equally find that they contribute their biggest share to differing purposes: for instance, the United Kingdom gives most aid for achieving the Millennium Development Goals whereas the United States was the biggest player in their study on providing global public goods.

42 The United States is simply very prominent because it is the largest nominal donor, while the United Kingdom plays an agenda-setting role in many international institutions, for instance the World Bank. Norway, on the other hand is a huge defender of multilateral initiatives, most of all of the United Nations and has one of the highest shares in relative terms.
Table 3-3: Empirical data for this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Material detail</th>
<th>Useful for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary documents from relevant institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Parliament; Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviews/ Public hearings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Public hearings from U.S. Congress</td>
<td>Interview with DFID delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Interviews with Norwegian delegate from Norad and NHO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>U.S. aid statistics</td>
<td>UK aid statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norwegian aid statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The biggest corpus of material consists of primary documents of the three donor countries. In order not to miss any important documents, the relevant ministries have been looked through in detail. Moreover, the search function on the website of the relevant institutions was used with the following key terms: “emerging”; “China/ Chinese”, “Brazil/Brazilian”, “South Africa/South African”; “India/Indian”; “BRIC/BRICS”; “development/development assistance/development aid”; “cooperation/triangular/trilateral cooperation”; “conditions/conditionality”; “democracy/democracy promotion”; “good governance”; “human rights”. A list of all the documents analysed for this study can be found in appendix 9.2. In total, 169 documents were analysed for Norway, 211 documents for the United Kingdom and 546 from the United States. Moreover, interviews were conducted with delegates from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and from the Norwegian implementing agency (Norad) as well as with the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise. Other interviews were conducted with delegates from the OECD Development Assistance Committee, from the UN Unit on South-South cooperation as well as with delegates from the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Germany’s implementing agency GIZ. In the end, these interviews served as background information to gather a thorough understanding of the issues at stake. Similarly, a participatory observation took place in July 2012 at the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum in New York. Unfortunately, no interview was conducted with representatives from the United States. Following several interview requests, no answer could be gathered in the end. This is also why this study relies heavily on the analysis of primary documents and compensates the lack of interview material for the USA with extensive material on public hearings.

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43 For the relevant ministries, see chapter introducing the donor policies.
44 Other interviews were conducted with delegates from the OECD Development Assistance Committee, from the UN Unit on South-South cooperation as well as with delegates from the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Germany’s implementing agency GIZ. In the end, these interviews served as background information to gather a thorough understanding of the issues at stake. Similarly, a participatory observation took place in July 2012 at the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum in New York. Unfortunately, no interview was conducted with representatives from the United States. Following several interview requests, no answer could be gathered in the end. This is also why this study relies heavily on the analysis of primary documents and compensates the lack of interview material for the USA with extensive material on public hearings.
experts are seen as the “bearers of important information” and greatly influence decision-making processes (Meuser and Nagel 2009, 470), for the transcribed interviews, see appendix 9.5.

The purpose is for the first empirical chapter (chapter 5) to uncover the relevant foreground and background ideas that might influence institutional change in the policy fields that are studied in chapters 6 and 7. The following table illustrates how these dominant ideas about emerging donors can be collected and analysed.

Table 3-4: Uncovering the relevant data for the independent variable: Ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Foreground ideas (driving change)</th>
<th>Background ideas (slowing change down)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: the main ideas about emerging donors</td>
<td>Within the layer of narratives (public hearings, meetings, official publications, speeches, etc.)</td>
<td>Interview material, literature review on driving motives in aid, relevant lobby groups within the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 indicates how the independent variable can be studied in empirical data. In order to uncover the dominant ideas harboured by traditional donors with respect to emerging donors, a two-fold approach has been taken. First, as the foreground and openly discussed ideas are the most relevant to trigger and explain change, the first layer was uncovered through an intensive study of materials containing these discussions within development assistance of the three relevant donor countries. Ideas can be found within the layer of narratives: within public hearings, minutes of meetings of relevant organisations, public speeches, etc. Second, in order to identify background ideas – ideas that might slow down institutional change, a different kind of material needs to be taken into account as background ideas are not openly discussed. Therefore, background ideas were identified through the literature review on motives behind development cooperation (what is commonly alleged to lie behind the individual donor countries development assistance), as well as upon the results of interviews conducted with experts.

The next table illustrates what kind of empirical data was used to explain the institutional change process within the individual donor institutions with respect to the different layers of narratives, rules and practices.

Table 3-5: Relevant data for the dependent variable: change within the development institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable (change in)</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Conditionality</td>
<td>Public speeches, official documents, interviews, etc.</td>
<td>Legal texts shaping aid; aid contracts, etc.</td>
<td>Aid statistics of 11 relevant recipient countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Trilateral cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aid statistics about trilateral projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 3.5 indicates, a similar material basis was used for uncovering the layers of narratives and rules as for uncovering ideas. Nevertheless, as we see in the section below, the textual corpus was interrogated with different questions for each of the empirical chapters. Moreover, to uncover the practices, the approach towards conditionality and trilateral cooperation differed slightly: conditionality was analysed in eleven recipient countries for all three donors (on the selection process of these recipients, see chapter 6) because it is impossible to cover a broader range of recipients for the purpose of this thesis. For chapter 7 (trilateral cooperation), all trilateral projects that have been reported by the national aid statistic services have been identified, classified according to the cooperation partner (China, India, Brazil, or South Africa) and transferred into constant U.S. dollars to allow for comparable results.

This section has identified the pool of empirical data that was analysed in order to arrive at conclusions about the impact of emerging donors upon traditional donors. The last section of this methodological chapter clarifies how this pool of data was analysed.

3.4 Explication of analytical approach

Both qualitative data – the transcribed interviews as well as the official documents – are subjected to a qualitative content analysis (following the influential work in this field of Mayring 1997, 2002; complemented by the more praxis-oriented approach of Margit Schreier 2006, 2012). First, I selected relevant passages of the extensive text material through the simple method of building headlines for each section. Then, in a second step, both authors advocate a further reduction of text data through the enriching of codes that are deduced from theory (see also previous chapter). Coffey and Atkinson (2008, 26-53) propose a similar reduction of data through the search for commonalities, differences, patterns and structures in the text materials. Mayring refers to this step as the third step in his analytical scheme where the text material is clustered. He emphasises that this step already implies a certain level of interpretation and construction of codes. These codes then build the basis for the further analysis of the data (Mayring 2002, 96).

In order to make the results of my analysis as transparent as possible, the following passages explain in detail how the empirical data was approached. After identifying the essential documents for the traditional donor in question (see appendix 9.2), all documents were searched for a number of key words so that no mention of the emerging donors or their activities was overlooked (see table 3.6 below). With the help of the coding programme MaxQDA, all these passages were in a first instance codified with the country in question (for instance, search word “China” in U.S. documents were all saved in a provisional code “U.S.”). These coded segments were then looked through and relevant passages were classified under more specific codes that looked at the structure of the empirical chapters. Moreover, the initial search hits were recorded (for instance, within U.S. documents, China was mentioned 7608 times), as were the resulting codes (for the above example, 153 codes for chapter 5 on perception, 2 for the general narrative on conditionality, 3 for narrative on IMF/conditionality, 20 for narrative on human rights/conditionality; 6 for good governance/conditionality; 1 for budget support/conditionality; 6 for general narrative on trilateral narrative, 1 for practice/trilateral cooperation). The tables with the hits of the search for key words as well as the resulting codes can be found in appendix 9.3. The following table illustrates the key words that were looked for as well as the link with the empirical chapters:
### Table 3-6: Key word search for coding qualitative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key words</th>
<th>Relevant for chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“emerging donors”; “emerging country/countries”; “emerging power”; “emerging economy/ economies”; “emerging market/markets”; “emerging”</td>
<td>Chapters 5 (ideas), chapter 7 (trilateral cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“BRIC”; “BRICS”; “South-South”</td>
<td>Chapters 5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“power shift”/“power”</td>
<td>Chapter 5 (ideas about a power shift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Brazil”/ “Brazilian”/ “Brazil’s”</td>
<td>Chapters 5 (ideas about Brazil); chapter 7 (trilateral projects with Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“China”/ “Chinese”/ “China’s”/ “China-Africa”</td>
<td>Chapters 5 (ideas about China); chapter 7 (trilateral projects with China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“India”/ “Indian”/ “India’s”/ “India-Africa”</td>
<td>Chapters 5 (ideas about India); chapter 7 (trilateral projects with India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“South Africa”/ “South African”/ “South Africa’s”</td>
<td>Chapters 5 (ideas about South Africa); chapter 7 (trilateral projects with South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“conditional”/ “condition”/ “conditionality”/ “conditionally”, “unconditional”; “unconditionally”/ “ownership”</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (general narrative on conditionality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“democracy”/ “democratic”; “good governance”/ “bad governance”; “civil society”; “grassroots”</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (political conditionality/good governance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“human rights”/ “human dignity”</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (political conditionality/ human rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“budget support”/ “budget”</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (political conditionality/ budget support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“economic governance”; “debt sustainability”; “unsustainable debt”; “macroeconomic stability”</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (economic conditionality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“IMF”/ “International Monetary Fund”; “WB”/ “World Bank”;</td>
<td>Chapter 6 (economic conditionality/ IMF and World Bank conditionality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>„trilateral”/„triangular”/„tripartite”; „cooperation“</td>
<td>Chapter 7 (trilateral projects)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All hits were examined in detail and unnecessary references that did not express perceptive statements eliminated. In a second step, the coded segments were examined again and similar arguments were taken together in sub-codes which eventually led to the structure of the empirical chapters. Thereby, the empirical qualitative material was highly relevant to find in order to enrich the arguments made here about the change within traditional donors’ aid policies. Nevertheless, some additional legal documents or other primary documents that did not figure in
the initial search were added if they seemed relevant or other primary documents made reference to them.

For the layer of practices, statistical data was used and analysed. As the empirical data from the qualitative research was already extensive, the quantitative data was simply used to confirm or contradict the findings of the other two layers (narratives and rules). For chapter 6 (conditionality), a slightly more selective approach had to be taken than for chapter 7, simply due to the sheer mass of data on conditionality. Taken into account in chapter 6 was the amount spent by each individual donor country on 11 selected recipient countries (where all three donors share an interest with at least two emerging donors). The section then investigated whether the conditional approach has intensified or lessened with respect to these countries. In order to evaluate whether a conditional narrative has been pushed through in practice, the section looked at indicators from the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators) and at the spending of the donor country (in the relevant sectors and generally).

The first three chapters have identified the research gap, the guiding theoretical hypotheses of this work and the methodological framework. The next chapter gives a short introduction into the development policies of all (emerging and traditional) donors concerned in this study. This next chapter allows us to contextualise the changes that are analysed in the following three empirical chapters that attempt to find answers to the research question of this study: how do traditional donors adapt their development policy in terms of conditionality and trilateral cooperation as a reaction towards emerging donors?

45 In order to establish whether conditionality has increased or lowered in practice, the general trend within the five selected Worldwide Governance Indicators was calculated and matched with the trend of the percentage that the donor country in question gave to the recipient, see chapter 6 for further details.
4 The empirical puzzle: Overview of aid from relevant donors

Before assessing the impact of emerging donors on traditional donors, the following chapter briefly examine the character of, first, emerging donors’ aid activities and, second, traditional donors’ aid activities. Section 4.3 then addresses the international structures in which both groups navigate. Only with this background in place can we assess the change that has occurred as a reaction to emerging donors.

In order to comprehensively depict the development policies of emerging and traditional donors, each section will refer to the same categories in order to maintain a comparative overview of these diverse approaches to foreign aid. The following chapter, then, offers a mixture of two different structures that have been used in the literature; (I) that of Sven Grimm et al. (2009), in which the authors review the differences in the approaches of emerging donors to that of the European Union, and (II) that of Carol Lancaster (2007, 18–24) when introducing her case studies on five traditional donors. Each section reviews the following four categories: (1) the relevant actors in governmental foreign aid, the institutional set-up, and their level of fragmentation, (2) the amount of aid disbursed by the actors, (3) the main destinations of aid (a) geographically and (b) in terms of sectoral support and finally (4) the rationale underpinning aid activities; that is, the major ideas (or worldviews in Lancaster’s vocabulary) which shape each country’s development assistance. As the literature review indicated, this exercise has been undertaken by many researchers. Consequently, this chapter will be rather brief; its only aim is to give an up-to-date review of the current development policies of the actors touched upon in the rest of this study.

4.1 Introducing the policies of emerging donors

As Michelle Knodt and Nadine Piefer (2012, 38–39) argue, it is rather difficult to clearly define who belongs in the group of emerging donors and who does not. Their study includes China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa because their common goal is to prove the role of these countries in international relations and to expand their role regionally. Others use the grouping of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as a valuable category for analysing their donor activities (Armijo 2007; Panda 2013; Rowlands 2012; Rampa and Bilal 2011; Mora-zán et al. 2012; Chin 2012), while Klingebiel (2014, 35–54) simply draws attention to the huge variety of Southern actors. In Peter Kragelund’s (2008) study on non-DAC donors, those countries which are neither a member of the European Union nor of the OECD most closely resemble the definition of emerging donors given in the introductory chapter. Nevertheless, this group then still includes a variety of donors, such as Arab donors, other OPEC donors, but also the group which is targeted here: a group of countries which have – in the last twenty years – increased their own development tremendously through economic growth and have started to share this growth with other third countries. Three years after his initial study, Kragelund (2012, 2011) focused on the impact of four donors within this group: China, India, Brazil and South

46 Note that many other studies focus a similar structure, see for instance (Sangmeister and Schönstedt 2010, 39–43).
Africa, the BASIC countries. In fact, many studies talk about these four Southern providers when they do extend their focus beyond China (Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012; Carbonnier 2012; Saidi and Wolf July 2011). The justification for studying this specific group is that they share a distinctive form of aid. Other countries, such as Mexico and Indonesia, might be recent additions to the group. Nevertheless, as this study investigates the influence of emerging donors over the last ten years, it makes sense to limit the group to the four emerging donors that were already present ten years ago. The next section thus begins with a brief discussion of China’s development assistance.

4.1.1 China’s development assistance

Prominent actors in Chinese development assistance are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), and the Ministry of Finance. Most important, however, is the Ministry of Commerce with its department of foreign aid as well as the Economic Councillors based in Chinese embassies (Alden 2007, 23–27; Brautigam 2009; Kragelund 2010b, 18; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; M. Huang and Ren 2012).

The Chinese Communist Party exercises considerable influence over China’s foreign aid, with the Politburo and its standing committee particularly prominent (Zhao 2008). Moreover, the Foreign Ministry has to seek input from the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) when reviewing large aid proposals and has to stick to the Five Year Plan as well as the yearly national development plans (Chin 2012, 589–93).

Two other actors play an important role in Chinese aid. The first consists of a group of (partly) state-owned firms which are considered to be highly influential (Alden 2007, 37–58; Baumgartner and Godehardt 2012; Moreira 2013). The second has emerged from the institutionalisation of meetings between Chinese officials and African heads of states under the auspices of FOCAC – the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. These meetings began in the year 2000, take place every three years and have often resulted in huge pledges for aid. The first meeting that triggered worldwide attention took place in November 2006 when Beijing welcomed 35 African heads of state (Chin 2012, 584; Zhou 2012, 153–55; Chun June 2013; Eisenman 2007).

Generally, Chinese aid emerges from a very fragmented system, which is not dissimilar to that of the United States (Brautigam 2009, 116). Despite the strong diversity of actors involved in aid (I. Taylor 2009, 3–9; Fijalkowski 2011; Zhao 2008), Dane Rowlands argues that within the group of the emerging donors studied here, it is the most centralised aid system (Rowlands 2012, 639). Despite this contention, however, it is important to acknowledge that the Chinese aid system consists of many diverse actors, much like its foreign policy (Godehardt 2011).

Overall, China is a “modest, mid-sized donor” (Brautigam 2011b, 211). Exact amounts are, however, “elusive” (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 17–19) and estimates range from USD 1.4 billion to 25 billion per year. The highest estimate emerged from a study of the New York University Wagner School and was used for a Congressional Research Paper that caused much controversy (Lum et al. 25.02.2009, 3). Most studies refer to roughly USD 2 billion

Note that Chaturvedi et al. also includes Mexico, Carbonnier et al. does not include India and Saidi and Wolf does not include South Africa.
per year\textsuperscript{48} which amounts to the aid of Switzerland or Finland. Gregory Chin (2012, 581) states that the real amount lies somewhere in between the conservative estimates of about USD 2 billion and that of 25 billion.

Many studies point out that transparency is a big issue in Chinese aid (Brautigam 2009, 163–68). The China Statistical Yearbook – the official figures of Chinese budget – “grossly underestimates” the real amounts of aid which, for instance, it pegged at USD 866 million for 2009 (Chin 2012, 581–83). Through its increasing involvement in aid, China might develop an interest in the “systemic functioning of global development financing” which could, in turn, further increase its transparency (Xu and R. Carey 2015). The financial crisis has enhanced China’s share of global aid (Cook and Gu 2009; Schüler-Zhou, Schüller, and Brod 2010).

Chinese development assistance was long believed to follow the “Angola mode”, implying huge investments in infrastructural programmes in exchange for access to crude or other resources, frequently after exhaustive negotiations between states (Burgis, June 14, 2010b). Nowadays, the private sector and private companies play an increasing role. Moreover, the recipients have become much more diversified beyond resource-rich African states. Today, aid goes everywhere where China nurtures diplomatic ties (Brautigam 2011b). In total, about 161 countries receive assistance from China, which indicates the scale of Chinese aid (Chin 2012, 582).

A large proportion (between 30 and 50 percent) of that aid goes to Africa, but neighbouring countries like Cambodia and Pakistan also get significant shares.\textsuperscript{49} The share directed to Latin America and the Caribbean is negligible but increasing (China’s Information Office of the State Council 2014; Soliz Landivar and Scholvin 2011). Major partners for aid projects are Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Brazil, and Venezuela (Morazán et al. 2012, 17), but also South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ethiopia (Chun June 2013, 15). Nor is China alone among emerging donors in concentrating its aid efforts mostly on Africa. Brazil, for instance, dedicates about 30 percent of its aid to the continent, South Africa even 95 percent (though India only gives about 3 percent to Africa) (Chun June 2013).

Similar to the range of recipients, China has also recently diversified the range of sectors it invests in. Whereas investments in the oil sector (and generally the hard sectors of infrastructure, textile manufacturing) still receive conceivable attention, other sectors such as soft, social sectors (for instance in health and education) have also received growing attention (Chin 2012, 582; Chun June 2013; Dyer, January 24, 2008; Alden 2007, 8–36; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Foster et al. 2009; Kragelund 2010b, 18; Grimm et al. 2010, 61–69). Significantly, China imports about 46 percent of its oil from Africa (note however that India imports 70 percent) (Obi 2010).

\textsuperscript{48} USD 1.9 billion or USD 2 billion (Morazán et al. 2012, 17; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 728; Carbonnier 2012, 201; Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23), up to USD 2.5 billion (OECD DAC 2014a), USD 3 billion (P. Davies 2010, 5–6; Kragelund 2012, 705), estimates of up to USD 10 billion (Rowlands January 2008). Deborah Brautigam (2010) estimates that in 2008, USD 1.4 billion went to Africa alone. In comparison, in the same year the United States spent USD 7.2 billion on Africa in ODA and the UK USD 2.6 billion (Brautigam 2009, 172).

\textsuperscript{49} Note that numbers vary again. Peter Kragelund (2010b, 5–9) puts the percentage at 44 points whereas the Chinese White Paper from 2014 claims that 51.8 percent go to Africa (China’s Information Office of the State Council 2014). Data from the new aid platform aiddata.org suggests that most projects take place in Cambodia (307), Pakistan (381) and Zimbabwe (334), whereas Angola, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia all have more than 200 projects (AidData).
What, then, are the main drivers of Chinese development assistance? First, it is important to remember that this is not new; it builds upon a long tradition of anti-colonialism and support for other Southern developing countries during the Cold War (Alden 2007, 8–36; Yu 2010; Dittmer 2010; Zhou 2012). Titles like “China returns to Africa” emphasise the importance of the historic ties that began with the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008a; Haifang 2010). One symbolic example for the relationship between China and Africa is the construction of the Tazara railway track in Tanzania that started in 1965 (Monson 2008; Yu 1988) or a similar dam project in Egypt in 1956 (Chun June 2013, 10–12). Since that time, China’s assistance is built upon the Eight principles for China’s aid to third world countries, first mentioned by Zhou Enlai in 1961. They were reiterated in the first Chinese white paper on foreign aid in 2011 (Information Office of the State Council 2011).

The close historical ties cannot negate the fact that solidarity might no longer be the main motivator for Chinese assistance. While it is important not to overemphasise the importance of the economic dimension (a common flaw of the research, which has often failed to strictly separate ODA from other economic flows), the quest for new energy resources and new markets for products is clearly one of the driving factors (Brautigam 2011b, 216–17; Baumgartner and Godehardt 2012). Next to this economic dimension is the political desire to further isolate Taiwan and to increase support for Beijing’s One China policy (Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008b, 6–10; Kragelund 2010b, 18; Stähle 2008a). Moreover, evidence from aid.data suggests that China strongly supports those countries that vote with it in the UN Security Council, implying a significant diplomatic counterpart to Chinese aid policy (The Economist 2016a). What is often overlooked is that China was the biggest recipient of aid during the second half of the 1990s and into the mid-2000s, implying that it might also be eager to share this experience with other developing countries (Chin 2012, 593). But this depiction as a benevolent Southern provider is increasingly compromised by reality (Chin 2012, 586–89). What ultimately defines Chinese aid, and what distinguishes it most clearly from traditional donors, is that it openly follows its self-interests (Zhou 2012).

4.1.2 India’s development assistance

Emma Mawdsley (2010) argues that DAC donors (in Kenya, the example she uses) should not limit their attention to Chinese aid efforts but should also consider India’s contributions. India itself is eager to uphold the distinction between its own development cooperation and that of China and largely benefits from this lack of attention (Sidiropoulos 2011; Mokry and Destradi 2011; Destradi and Küßner 2013). Whereas India is often neglected as a case study, some recent very good empirical articles exist (Mawdsley and McCann 2010; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013).

Similar to China (and the other two cases that we will see), India has a very fragmented aid system (Kragelund 2010b, 9–13; Agrawal 2007; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Stuenkel...}

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50 The eight principles foresee the following: (1) to emphasise equality and mutual benefit, (2) to respect sovereignty, (3) to provide interest-free or low-interest loans, (4) to help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance, (5) to build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly, (6) to provide quality equipment and material at market prices, (7) to ensure effective technical assistance, and (8) to pay experts according to local standards (Chin and Frolic 2007; Chin 2012, 590).
The empirical puzzle: Overview of aid from relevant donors

The main actor is the Ministry of External Affairs (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Chaturvedi 2012c; Morazán et al. 2012). Moreover, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, and Ministry of Commerce and Industry have become increasingly important with the Ministry of Commerce and the Exim Bank nearly replacing the Ministry of External Affairs as the main actor (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Large June 2013, 34–35). Similarly, business and trade lobbies have become more prominent in Indian foreign policy (Malik and Medcalf; Vines 2010).

Overall, India is less well organised than China, but better than Brazil or South Africa (Rowlands 2012, 639). Despite the lack of a conclusive or comprehensive approach towards aid, aid policies are important for India (Chaturvedi 2012c, 2012d). Several smaller initiatives are worth mentioning: first, ITEC – Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation – which started in 1964 and consists of tied grants and technical assistance. The funds are mostly directed toward neighbouring countries with a strong focus on training in the areas of rural development and health projects (Chaturvedi 2012c). Second, SCAAP – Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme – also began in 1964 with similar aims and modalities than ITEC, but this was directed at 19 African Commonwealth countries. Third, the Focus Africa Programme, initiated in 2002, focuses on internet and communication technology, infrastructure and agriculture. Fourth, the TEAM 9 initiative – Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement – started in 2004 and consists of credit lines to promote trade and investment; this goes to 9 selected African countries (Kragelund 2010b, 9–10; Mawdsley 2010; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Mawdsley and McCann 2010).

Finally, modelled on the success of the Chinese FOCAC meetings, from 2008 India has engaged in institutionalized India-Africa summits (Price 2011). Additional to these myriad structures, in January 2012 India set up (after a long period of negotiation) an aid agency under the umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs, called Development Partnership Administration (Chaturvedi 2012c; Ministry of External Affairs 2016).

As with China, it is difficult to find an exact amount of Indian development assistance. The figure is mostly estimated to be around USD 0.5 and 1 billion. This is equivalent to the aid volume of Luxembourg and Kuwait and clearly lower than the amount for China (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 724).

The financial crisis that triggered a slowing down of traditional aid does not seem to have meaningfully affected Indian aid (Economic Advisory Council 2011; The Economist 2010c; Bartsch, Gupta, and M. Sharma 2010). On the contrary, it seems that India has gained momentum during

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51 The nine countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal and India.

52 Among the negotiations was also the setting on a particular name for the agency, for instance, for a long time the agency was supposed to be called Indian Agency for Partnership in Development (Taneja, July 01, 2012). Other delays occurred because it was unclear whether the agency should be under the umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs or that of the Ministry of Commerce (Mitra, June 08, 2010; Patel, July 26, 2011).

53 For instance, USD 0.75 billion per year, estimate for 2009 flows (Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23; Morazán et al. 2012, 17), USD 0.5 to USD 1 billion (P. Davies 2010; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; OECD DAC 2014a), strict ODA for 2007 USD 547 million (Kragelund 2012, 705); estimates of aid figures from 2006 range up to USD 1.4 billion (Kragelund 2010b, 18), aid volume for 2009/2010 at about 488 USD million (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011).
the financial crisis (Okonjo-Iweala 2011). Nevertheless, India continues to struggle with considerable poverty issues at home (Ramachandran 5.10.2010).

Through its own economic growth, India has rediscovered its interest in Africa, (Chaturvedi and Mohanty 2007; Aiyar 2011). Nevertheless, most of its aid focusses on neighbouring countries, with South Asian countries receiving the lion’s share of its aid (Morazán et al. 2012; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Agrawal 2007; Humphrey 2011; Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009; Government of the United Progressive Alliance 2011; Bijoy 2010). A smaller percentage is distributed to African countries (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Humphrey 2011; Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Bijoy 2010). The picture is very different when we look at lines of credits, which are mostly extended to Sub-Saharan Africa (Humphrey 2011; Chaturvedi 2012c, 2012d, 567–68).

The principal recipients are Bhutan, Afghanistan (where India is one of the top five donors, (Bijoy 2010, 69)), Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 729; Ghose 2014, 72). This focus on neighbouring countries is explained by Nitin Pai (April 2011) as a “paradox of proximity”; India has a complex relationship with its neighbours because it is highly dependent on their stability, but intervening in neighbouring states is hard to sell – which makes development assistance a perfect combination of helping and intervening.

India’s growth rates are highly dependent on the import of oil – as we have already seen, India imports 70 percent of its oil from Africa (Obi 2010). Are economic sectors thus the major focus of its aid projects? Again, it is useful to distinguish aid from lines of credit. Whereas aid projects largely focus on India’s own strength – technological advances – and therefore promote science and technology, education and health and lines of credit tend to focus on the power sector, on infrastructural projects (railways, engineering and construction) as well as on some agricultural projects (sugar production and irrigation projects) (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Mawdsley 2010, 368–69; Agrawal 2007; Chaturvedi 2012d, 568; Bijoy 2010; Morazán et al. 2012; Price 2011). Moreover, India has an increasing role in humanitarian projects, which it (arguably) uses to increase its soft power potential (Meier and Murthy 2011; Price 2005).

India can look back on a long tradition of cooperating with and supporting developing countries. As head of the non-alignment movement during the Cold War, India has strong historic ties with many nations and has a huge diaspora living on the African continent (Chaturvedi 2012d; Large June 2013; A. Sharma 2007). The beginning of Indian aid activities took place in 1964, not long after China’s (Sinha 2010). The Panscheel and the Bandung principles guide Indian development cooperation up to the present day. 2003 is often seen as a turning point for India to engage more strongly in development projects (Stuenkel 2010).

The main drivers for Indian development cooperation are manifold. First, there is a desire to increase India’s geopolitical influence in relation to China. Second, there is a need to find new energy resources, and finally, there is a desire to generally increase India’s bargaining position,

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54 Note that Andreas Fuchs and Krishna Vadlamannati (2013) challenge that with their data, arguing that still 45 percent of Indian aid goes to commercial sectors which is indicative of a strong economic interest in aid. Nevertheless, they also show that 15 percent go to water and sanitation.

55 These principles are (1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, (3) equality and mutual benefit, and (4) peaceful co-existence (Katti, Chahoud, and Kaushik 2009).

56 There are also some cooperative projects between India and China in the African oil sector (Obi 2010).
The empirical puzzle: Overview of aid from relevant donors

most obvious in the ambition to aim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Agrawal 2007; Naidu 2008b; Sinha 2010; Kragelund 2010a; Naidu 2010; Sahni 2007; D. Sharma and Mahajan 2007; Vines and Oruitemeka 2008; Bhattacharya 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2010, 86–88; Ghose 2014). The strong economic drive can maybe also explain the paradox that India often gives aid to countries that are wealthier in terms of income per capita than itself (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013, 116–19; Ghose 2013; Large June 2013).

Overall, India is very careful to distinguish itself from traditional donors – for instance through the refusal to be referred to as a donor or through the insistence that it does not wish to promote democracy because that is seen as interfering in internal affairs (Sahni 2007; Taneja, July 01, 2012). As a result, India is much more confrontational in international debates (for instance within the debate surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals) with other traditional donors than the other emerging donors presented here (Jiao 2014). By contrast, the next two cases presented here are not, in fact, averse to close co-operation with traditional donors.

4.1.3 Brazil’s development assistance

Brazil’s foreign aid is closely linked to its foreign policy. Aid was enhanced during the Presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or Lula), who aimed at making Brazil a relevant international player. This ambition also included spending significantly more on development projects in third countries (Beaudet, Haslam, and Schafer 2012, 530; Kragelund 2010b, 13–15; ONE 2010, 210; Muggah and Passarelli Hamann 2012; Costa Vaz and Aoki Inoue 2007; Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014).

Within the realm of Southern providers, Brazil had one of the first agencies for managing foreign aid – the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC – Brazilian Agency for Cooperation), which was founded in 1987 (admittedly to deal largely with the receipt of foreign aid). The ABC is subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and played an increasing role in Lula’s presidency but has become less prominent in the wake of Dilma Rousseff’s budget cuts (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Saravia 2012; Burges 2014; Inoue and Vaz 2012; Burges 2014; White 2013). Despite this institutionalisation, Brazil still does not have the legal framework to officially provide aid, while monitoring and evaluation remain underdeveloped (Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014; Sousa 2010). Overall, its system is therefore considered to be more diffuse than that of India or China (Rowlands 2012, 640) and to be highly fragmented (Cabral and Weinstock 2010b). To illustrate this point, it is sufficient to look into the structure within the ABC which has a total of seven not clearly distinguishable sub-departments.\footnote{These are: (1) technical cooperation between developing countries; (2) bilateral received technical cooperation; (3) multilateral received technical cooperation; (4) cooperation in health, social development, education and professional training; (5) donor cooperation in agriculture, energy, biofuels, and environment; (6) general coordination of donor cooperation in information technology, e-government, civil defence, urban planning and transportation; (7) general coordination of donor or recipient TCDC (Saravia 2012, 118–19).}

Next to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ABC, other influential players are the National Bank for Economic and Social Development which provides export financing (a mechanism redirecting trade from imports from the industrialised North to the South), largely state controlled Brazilian multinationals (such as Petrobras for oil, Odebrecht for construction and Vale
The empirical puzzle: Overview of aid from relevant donors

for mining)\textsuperscript{58} and international financial mechanism (IBSA, BRICS Bank – see below for more details) (Burges 2014, 359–60; A. Christina Alves June 2013; Stolte 2012). Moreover, EM-BRAPA – the Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation – is a powerful actor in promoting the use of biofuels and SENAI (the National Service for Industrial Training) also provides considerable amounts for improving the social welfare of people working in industries (White 2013). Overall, some commentators fear that Brazil might have overstretched its capacity, especially institutionally (A. Christina Alves June 2013).

Despite the central agency, it is rather difficult to put a clear figure on Brazilian aid. Estimates range from USD 85 to 1275 million, but most agree that Brazil spends roughly USD 400 million annually.\textsuperscript{59} With that amount, Brazil gives approximately as much as New Zealand or Poland and slightly less than India (F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 724). Sean Burges argues, however, that most amounts are highly unrepresentative because many of the actual costs are integrated by individual ministries and not accounted for as development assistance. Therefore, he claims that instead of the often claimed 0.02% of Brazil’s income, a 0.10% or even 0.15% is likely to be spent in aid (Burges 2014, 358).

Unlike India, Brazil spends most of its aid on African countries and gives smaller shares to its neighbours. About 57 percent goes to Africa, whereas Latin American countries receive 37 percent. Moreover, funds directed to Africa seem to be increasing (Burges 2014; White 2013). Priority recipients are Portuguese speaking countries in Africa (PALOP community); most projects are directed towards Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique (Kragelund 2010b, 14; ONE 2010, 210). Within Latin America, Mercosur countries (especially Paraguay and Bolivia), the Andeans and Haiti are the biggest recipients (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Stuenkel 2010; Saravia 2012, 129; Inoue and Vaz 2012). Recently, Brazilian initiatives also go beyond the Portuguese speaking community in Africa (Inoue and Vaz 2012).

Generally, Brazilian aid is highly demand driven, which owes partly to the difficult institutional structure of its foreign aid (Saravia 2012). Sectors in which it invests most are agriculture, energy and especially health care, education and technology (Cabral and Weinstock 2010b, 6; White 2013; Niu 2014; Kragelund 2010b, 13–15; Morazán et al. 2012; Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock 2014). These are also the fields where Brazil believes it has a valuable experience to share (Stolte 2012; Inoue and Vaz 2012). The values within Brazilian development cooperation are often considered to be rather congruent with European donors (Sousa 2010), a fact which might also explain why Brazil is particularly interested in cooperation with traditional donors in trilateral projects (Muggah and Passarelli Hamann 2012, 110–12; Rowlands 2012; Sousa 2010; Chaturvedi 2012a; Saravia 2012, 130–31).

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\textsuperscript{58} Note that the support that these multinationals receive from the Brazilian government is to be considered moderate, if compared to China, argues Lyal White (2013).

\textsuperscript{59} The lowest estimate of USD 85 million comes from (P. Davies 2010, 5–6). Kragelund (2012, 705) and (2010b, 18) estimates USD 356 million, a figure that is also close to that of Zimmermann and Smith (2011, 724), Adugna et al. (2011, 17–23). The OECD DAC estimates up to USD 500 million (OECD DAC 2014a). Higher estimates of about USD 1 billion are considered by Carbonnier (2012, 201), Morazán et al. (2012, 17), and Cabral and Weinstock (2010a). The highest estimate of USD 1.3 billion comes from Sousa (2010).
Brazil, like China and India, can also look back on a long history of South-South cooperation since its first initiative in 1950 within the National Commission for Technical Assistance (Saravia 2012, 118–19). Partly due to its own colonial past and the history of the slave trade, Brazil also has close links to Africa (A. Christina Alves June 2013).

Next to this ostensibly idealistic desire, other more rational explanations can be found for Brazil’s interest in foreign aid. Brazil, like India, is aiming to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, an ambition which could be satisfied more easily if it enlists the sympathies of other countries (Cabral and Weinstock 2010a; Seibert 2009). Moreover, Brazil is eager to limit the influence of the United States in Latin America (A. Christina Alves June 2013). Sean Burges (2014, 370) also argues that through aid, Brazil is learning to create its own international capacity (through domestic development plans and through attempts to internationalise firms). This economic drive is also fuelled by the fact that 90 percent of Brazil’s imports come from Africa – though Brazil has plenty of resources and is therefore less dependent on these imports than China or India (Stolte 2012). Much as in the Chinese or Indian cases, then, Brazilian motives combine self-interest with altruism (Inoue and Vaz 2012).

4.1.4 South Africa’s development assistance

South Africa is the last country from the group of emerging donors that this study will focus on. Though it is arguably a late-comer in international aid, South Africa has the advantage of its location. As a pivotal power in Africa, its interest in aid is therefore no less pronounced than that of the three previous countries.

Traditionally, the African Renaissance and Development Fund (ARF) was considered to be one of the main institutions of South African development assistance. Nevertheless, the ARF only constituted roughly 3 to 4 percent of the total of South African ODA and urgently needed reform because it was considered highly inefficient (Kragelund 2010b, 18; Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012, 537–40). The ARF, itself established in 2000, works under the Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO – previously Department of Foreign Affairs) and provides untied grant financing (Vickers 2012, 537–40). Finally, in 2010 South Africa created a new agency – the South African Development Partnership – SADPA, as a separate arm of government but under the policy directives of DIRCO (Vickers 2012, 551). This new agency, it is hoped, could help South Africa to place a “niche role” in trilateral partnerships as a “development broker” and as a “gateway to Africa” (Vickers 2012, 537; Alden and Schoeman 2013, 124).\(^{60}\)

Next to SADPA, another fund was created – the Partnership for Development Fund, under the shared control of DIRCO, the Finance Ministry, and the management of SADPA (Vickers 2012). Moreover, South Africa transfers considerable sums of money through the South African Custom Union (SACU) to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland within the world’s very similar to the creation of the Indian development agency, the creation of SADPA did not come without huge controversies, starting with its name which was changed from SAIDA – South African International Development Agency, but also asking uncomfortable questions whether South Africa should not be dealing with its own problems first (Besharati 2013b; Tapula, Kock, and Sturman, October 21, 2011). Moreover, there were lengthy debates whether or not SADPA should be integrated within the Department for International Relations and Cooperation or not. The hope still is that the creation of SADPA will also trigger many funds for trilateral projects (Morazán et al. 2012, 17; Sidropoulos 2012a; Grimm 2010). Even though SADPA was officially created in 2010, it took much longer to actually start functioning in April 2013 (Alden and Schoeman 2013; Vickers 2012, 536).
oldest custom union, even though its future is uncertain (Vickers 2012; Grimm 2010). Before
the creation of SADPA, the aid system within South Africa was considered to be highly frag-
mented. There is little to suggest that this has changed considerably since SADPA’s creation
(Sidiropoulos 2012b); hence South African aid, much like Brazil’s, can be considered fairly dis-
organised (Rowlands 2012, 644; Braude, Thandrayan, and Sidiropoulos).

The estimated amounts of aid given by South Africa are considerably lower than those of the
other three emerging donors, with similar problems in accounting. Estimates range between
USD 61 million to 475 million (P. Davies 2010, 5–6).64 In terms of the ratio of development
assistance in relation to the gross national income, this amounts to a considerable 0.7 percent –
the target set for DAC donors that Western donors barely reach (Vickers 2012, 536–38).65

The main recipients of South African aid are its African neighbours (Beaudet, Haslam, and
About 70 percent of its aid goes to members of the South African Development Community
(SADC) and overall 95 percent remains on the African continent (ONE 2010, 208; Grimm
2011).66 The biggest recipients are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Comoros and
Zimbabwe (Morazán et al. 2012, 17).

The sectoral focus is where South Africa distinguishes itself most from its fellow emerging do-
nors. In fact, as we shall see shortly, South African aid looks much more like the sectoral focus
of a traditional donor. The main sectors are democratisation, post-conflict resolution, peace-
building and generally humanitarian assistance, but also infrastructure (Kragelund 2010b, 18;
Morazán et al. 2012; Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012; Alden and Schoeman 2013). Moreover,
South Africa seems to be alone among the four emerging donors in preferring multilateral chan-
nels to bilateral aid (Grimm 2011; Sidiropoulos 2012a). Similar to Brazil, South Africa shows a
strong interest in trilateral cooperation because it needs increasing funds (Sidiropoulos 2012a).

What characterises the tradition within which South Africa has started to become a regional
donor? One of the main drivers of South Africa is the feeling that they have to repair a debt to
their African neighbours because of the atrocities committed under the name of Apartheid. This
“Apartheid guilt” (Sidiropoulos 2012a, 100) or “guilt complex” (Grimm 2010, 2011) is often
considered to be highly significant and to explain South Africa’s eagerness to present a new
image. Nevertheless, this difficult relationship often makes South Africa extremely cautious in
order not to appear too interventionist (Sidiropoulos 2011; Vickers 2012, 548–50; Besharati
2013b). The normative drivers behind aid – focusing on democracy promotion, good govern-
ance and conflict prevention – indicate that South Africa also needs stable surroundings in order
to continue to grow (Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012; Grimm 2011; Sidiropoulos 2012b). More-
over, it could be indicative of South Africa’s ambitions to become a regional power (Kragelund
2010b, 15–17) and to become generally more visible (Alden and Schoeman 2013).

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64 Most estimate the amount to be around USD 100 million (Adugna et al. 2011, 17–23; Morazán et al. 2012, 17;
Kragelund 2012, 705; F. Zimmermann and K. Smith 2011, 729). Considerably lower is the estimate of 57 USD
million (Carbonnier 2012, 201), whereas the highest estimates is USD 433 million annually (Besharati 2013b, 32).
65 Sven Grimm (2011) even puts the figure at about 1 percent.
66 Members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.
While economic motives and commercial expansion should not be cast aside as a rationale for explaining aid (Besharati 2013b; Vickers 2012), South Africa is also particularly eager to share its own experience of transition from racial capitalism towards a growing democracy. Moreover, just like the other countries, South Africa can look back on a long history as a recipient of aid (even though most funds were received by NGOs as the Apartheid government was often avoided by Western donors (Besharati 2013b).

Next to the individual donor initiatives, two multilateral initiatives also deserve to be mentioned. IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum) is an initiative which since 2003 has focused on increasing trade relations between the three countries, but also on South-South cooperation and its coordination (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum 2011; Lai 15.3.2006; P. Alves 2007; Mokoena 2007). All participants share a commitment in their national policies to democracy and human rights and to supporting international law, peace and stability, indicating the “democratic ethos” of the group (Saravia 2012, 127; Panda 2013, 299). Jagannath Panda (2013, 299–300) argues that the creation of the BRICS group could have been China’s reaction to IBSA, as China plays a leading role in the former while being excluded from the latter. The BRICS have recently agreed upon the creation of the New Development Bank, potentially as a rival to the World Bank and the IMF (Rowlands 2012).

In conclusion – despite huge varieties in their constitutional political system – all emerging donors give increasing amounts of aid to an increasing number of recipients. Moreover, what matters most is the fact that they represent a different model to traditional donors (Kragelund 2010b, 18–22). All four emerging donors seem to give some money to their neighbouring countries (although to differing degrees), focus on technical assistance and economic growth as the key to development while aiming at a non-interventionist approach to the politics of recipients (Morazán et al. 2012, 10–17). All are characterised by a diversity of actors involved in the aid-giving process, all share considerable institutional challenges and all use project-related aid (Chaturvedi, Fues, and Sidiropoulos 2012, 8–9). Moreover, even though the sectoral focus is fairly diversified, all still emphasise projects on infrastructure, mostly resource-rich countries, technical cooperation, and stress the fact that their aid is mutually beneficial (Walz and Ramachandran 2011, 14–20).

But with this profile of emerging donors in mind, a new question arises; what characterises the three traditional donors that this study investigates? The next sections deal with this question.

4.2 Introducing the policies of traditional donors

As the three traditional donors – the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom – are the main focus of this study’s investigation, the methods chapter further explains the selection of these particular cases.

Many studies have investigated the motives in aid giving of the group of traditional donors. As we saw with emerging donors, aid giving fulfils a variety of purposes also for traditional donors (Lancaster 2007; seems to be further confirmed by Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014; Lancaster 2008, 2009; Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Thiele 2013). In her study of the domestic factors which drive the foreign aid policies of five traditional donors, Carol Lancaster (2007) identifies five purposes, two of them altruistic (developmental and humanitarian purposes) and...
three of them linked to donor self-interest (diplomatic, commercial, cultural purposes) (for instance, S. Brown 2012, 147–48; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Sogge 2002; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Berthelemy 2006b, 2006a). Stephan Klingebiel argues that in recent years, aid has become more altruistic and mainly aims at the eradication of poverty (Klingebiel 2014, 9–11).64

The domestic setting is important and can explain aid volatility (Tingley 2010; Travis 2010; Kleibl 2013). Jörg Faust (2008, 2011) argues, for instance, that countries with a high domestic commitment to accountability, democracy and transparency are likely to spend more on aid. While Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) argue that aid is sensitive to democratisation, other factors are more relevant for explaining aid patterns in the past, such as colonial history or the recipient country’s relationship to the UN. Other studies also argue that UN Security Council membership dramatically increases aid flows which in the end harm the recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and A. Smith 2010), while others contradict this assertion (Bashir and Lim 2013). The following sections on the United States, Norway and the UK therefore follow an identical structure to that used on emerging donors, focusing on the domestic setting of aid, on the amounts spent, the main recipients and sectors and, finally, the official rationale behind aid.

4.2.1 United States of America: the biggest nominal contributor of aid

The United States is often considered to be the founder of recent foreign aid initiatives; the Marshall fund after the Second World War was the first big scaled aid policy (Lancaster 2007, 212–15; Wood 1986; North and Foote North 2008). During the period under investigation, George W. Bush’s two terms in office lasted from 2001 under Republican rule until 2009 when Barack Obama’s democrats took over until 2016.65

Several positions are important within the U.S. system: the U.S. Secretary of State’s is crucial for understanding foreign aid. The position was held by Colin Powell from 2001 to 2005, followed by Condoleezza Rice from 2005 to 2008, while under Obama it was occupied by Hilary Clinton in the first administration and John Kerry in the second. The position of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs was held by Paula Dobriansky under the two terms of George W. Bush and by Mario Otero under Obama’s first administration. During his second term, the post changed into Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and is currently held by Sarah Sewall. Within the U.S. State department, since 2006 there has been a post within the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources which supervises U.S. aid activities. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for approximately 17 percent of U.S. foreign aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4).

64 Other studies indicate that grants do not necessarily go to the neediest countries, slightly contradicting Klingebiel’s findings (Johansson 2011).

65 An interesting study argues that it does not matter which political party is in charge of the US government, but what matters is whether Congress and Presidency are occupied by the same party – in which case aid will increase (M. P. Goldstein and Moss 2005). For the studied period, this was the case for 108th - 109th Congress (both Republicans, 2003-2007), and 111th Congress (both Democrats, 2009-2011), but not for the 110th Congress (2007-2009), when Democrats held complete Congress, but Republicans the Presidency or from 112th to 114th Congress (2011-2017) when Republicans held the House of Republicans or the complete Congress, but the Democrats the Presidency.
Next to the State Department, two other institutions are highly relevant for delivering U.S. aid: First, the United States Agency for International Development – USAID. The most prominent post within this agency is held by its administrator – currently, Gayle Smith (since April 2015) after Rajiv Shah, who served during Obama’s first time in office, resigned. Under George W. Bush, Andrew Natsios (2001-2006), Randall Tobias (2006-2007) and Henrietta Fore (2007-2009) served in this position. USAID is responsible for implementing about 50 percent of U.S. foreign aid (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4). Despite that high percentage, USAID has recently faced a lot of criticism which also led to the creation of a new relevant institution for disbursing aid (Picard and Groesema 2008).

This new relevant institution is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), formally created in January 2004 by the U.S. Congress. The programme is additional to the undertakings of USAID and has the clear mission to reward good performers with a clear set of indicators that candidates need to pass in order to be eligible for receiving support from the MCC (Buss 2008). The first CEO of the MCC was Paul Applegarth until John Danilovich took over from 2005 to 2009. Under Obama, Daniel W. Yohannes served until 2014 when Dana Hyde took the office. Other ministries which play a role in U.S. aid are the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense as well as the Office of Management of Budget (Lancaster 2007, 100–105).

Moreover the Presidency itself can use its power to exploit room for interpretation left by Congress for deciding upon the distribution of aid (Höse 2012). Other than the official governmental agencies and the Congress, lobby groups and business play an increasingly important role in U.S. aid (S. Hall 2011; Milner and Tingley 2009). Overall, the United States has a highly fragmented system (Lancaster 2007, 92–109; Hook 2008a, 96–98; OECD DAC 2006b; Epstein 2011; Klingebiel 2014, 221; Kevenhörster 2014, 221).

On average, the United States has spent USD 29.4 billion annually over the last ten years and is the biggest nominal donor in the world. In terms of GNI, however, the U.S. fares rather badly, with on average of 0.19 percent, very far off the 0.7 target (OECD DAC 2006b; OECD Stat 2015f). A high percentage of over 80 percent is spent on bilateral aid and only a minor share on multilateral aid (a fact that is lamented by the peer review of DAC, OECD DAC 2006b; Milner and Tingley 2013).

Top recipients from the United States are the two countries where its soldiers were (or still are) fighting the war on terror: Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Kenya, West Bank and Palestine, Jordan, and Colombia (OECD Stat 2015b). This statistic gives some credibility to the argument that the United States generally does not focus strongly on African countries (Schraeder 2001). Together with Norway, the United States has a strong proliferation

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66 The Department of Treasury is responsible for multilateral aid whereas the Department of Defense is in charge of military assistance (Breuning and Linebarger 2012, 347).

67 Such presidential initiatives are quite popular and can, at times, be highly influential. Under Bush’s presidency, two main initiatives started: the most famous one is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Moreover, Bush’s initiative started the Millennium Challenge Account. Under Obama’s presidency, three big initiatives started: the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative concentrating on the promotion of a comprehensive approach to food security; the Global Health Initiative (GHI), building on Bush’s PEPFAR initiative; and the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) aiming at integrating sustainable development in its aid projects (The White House 22.09.2010).

68 After the financial crisis, foreign policy and especially foreign aid were severely hit by budget cuts (Myers, October 03, 2011).

69 Multilateral aid is not always considered to be less donor interested as there are possibilities to earmark multilateral funds which makes the donor recognisable (Klingebiel 2013b).
of aid recipients. Only the United Kingdom seems to pursue a more targeted approach in the choice of its recipients (Birdsall 2008).

In the last ten years, the United States has spent nearly 50 percent on social infrastructure and sectors (with the highest share within this on government and civil society and on reproductive health), 10 percent on economic infrastructure and sectors, 6 percent on productive sectors, nearly 5 percent on cross-cutting and multisector, 15.5 percent on humanitarian aid, and 2.6 percent on debt relief (OECD Stat 2015a).

The U.S. pursues several goals through its aid: first, it is concerned with security issues and thereby aid follows a diplomatic rationale (S. Brown 2012, 152; Hook 2008b, 2008a; J. Wendt 2004; Winters 2013; Woods 2005; Korb 2008; Natsios 2006; Patrick and K. Brown 2006; Younas 2008), but equally important are developmental concerns (Lancaster 2007, 62–109; Breuning and Linebarger 2012). Others argue that, independent of who is in charge of the White House, trade and security issues dominate foreign aid decisions (Nuscheler 2005, 489–99). This seems to be confirmed by a recent ranking (commitment to Development Index from 2009, published by the Center for Global Development), in which the United States was placed only 18th – whereas the UK (9th) and Norway (3rd) both seem to be better committed to development purposes (S. Brown 2012, 153). Moreover, public opinion in the U.S. is considered ill informed about aid levels and is highly critical of foreign aid (Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 2005, 76–79; Gieg 2010).

The 2002 Foreign Assistance Act enshrined the following five principles in order to guide U.S. foreign assistance: (1) alleviation of the worst poverty, 2) promotion of conditions for economic growth, 3) encouragement of civic and political rights, integration of DCs into equitable international economic system and (5) the promotion of good governance through combating corruption and improving transparency and accountability (U.S. Government 1961; amended 2002, 19). While the promotion of good governance and human rights is also strongly advocated by American academics (Diamond 2008), a study investigating the sensitivity of the U.S. to reactions towards human rights improvements shows that the U.S. tends to react by lowering its aid commitments by four percent if there is no improvement or a deterioration, but increases its aid by two percent if democracy improves (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 246–48).

As an indication for spending aid for diplomatic purposes, Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele (2008) argue that the US uses its aid to put pressure on recipients to vote alongside its own interests within the United Nations General Assembly. Moreover, many argue that since 9/11 the focus is more on security issues, which leads to an increase, for instance, of aid for fragile states (Harbeson 2008). Other studies indicate that the US tends to support the neighbours of its rivals or attempt to promote democracy through its aid (Rudloff, J. M. Scott, and Blew 2013; Windsor 2008).

Generally, the US performs worse than the UK or Norway when evaluating whether its aid policies respond to neediness of recipients which could be an argument against a strong developmental purpose in aid (Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006).
4.2.2 Norway: the good donor?

Norway – and more broadly the group of Scandinavian countries – is often considered to be a “good donor” (Lumsdaine 1993, 135; Stokke 1989a). For instance, Alesina and Weder (2002) illustrate that Scandinavian countries tend to give less money to corrupt governments.\(^\text{71}\)

From 2004 till 2014, three governments have led Norway: first, a conservative coalition under Kjell Magne Bondevik from 2001 till 2005 which incorporated the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Conservatives. This was followed by a left-wing coalition (Labour party, Socialist Left, and the Centre Party) led by Jens Stoltenberg from October 2005 till October 2013. The elections from October 2013 led to a minority government under Erna Solberg, on top of a coalition encapsulating the Conservatives and the Progress Party.

For many years, Norway had a ministry for international development, but this was abolished in 2013 and its responsibilities have since been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – a reversal of the process normally to be found among the emerging donors.\(^\text{72}\) For the period under study, three ministers held the post: first, Hilde F. Johnson from the Christian Democratic party from 2001 till 2005, followed by Erik Solheim from October 2005 till March 2012 and then, in the year before its abolition, Heikki Holmas, both from the Socialist Left. Other ministries relevant for this study are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^\text{73}\), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.

An interesting programme that brings Norway directly into contact with China is its Oil for Development initiative, a programme aiming to transfer the knowledge of Norway in the petroleum sector to other oil producing developing countries.

Over the last ten years, Norway spent USD 4.8 billion annually on bilateral and multilateral assistance, considerably less in nominal terms than the United States. In terms of total income, however, Norway fares much better with a score of nearly 1 percent of its income – way above the 0.7 target and the best among our group and the DAC, where it is the top donor in qualitative terms (OECD DAC 2004, 2008, 2013). The share of multilateral aid is at 25 percent, higher than for the United States, but still relatively low.

Norway’s main recipients are Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Tanzania, Sudan, Brazil, Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia and Somalia (OECD Stat 2015b).

On average, Norway has spent most of its aid in the social sectors with about 40 percent (with the highest share going to civil society and government with almost 20 percent, slightly above the United States), about 10 percent on economic infrastructure and services, about 8 percent on production sectors, about 12 percent on cross-cutting multisector aid, and 11 percent on

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\(^\text{71}\) Interestingly, Norway itself looks back on a colonial history: it gained its independence from Denmark in 1814, only to be under Swedish rule until 1905 (Förster, Schmid, and Trick 2014).

\(^\text{72}\) This process was gradual: at first, the Ministry was put under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the institutional reform in 2004 (OECD DAC 2008).

\(^\text{73}\) The position as Minister of Foreign Affairs was occupied by Jan Petersen (Conservative) from 2001 to 2005, by Jonas Gahr Store (Labour) from 2005 until 2012, in 2012 as an interim by Espen Barth Eide (Labour) and since October by Børge Brende (Conservative).
humanitarian aid (a much bigger percentage than the United States) (OECD Stat 2015a; Gates and Hoeffler 2004).

Similar to the United States, Norway is committed to a value driven foreign policy because its own society and experience are value driven (Stokke 1989b). Hence, Norway claims that its development policies are “first and foremost motivated by altruism” and by Norwegian social principles (NMFA 2009d, 112). The values of human rights, good governance and the rule of law are seen as policies that ensure growth and prosperity for Norway but equally for the development countries it targets (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2; Brende 25.03.2014, 4; Norad 2008b, 24). The study of Stephen Brown (2012) seems to confirm this value-driven policy. Nevertheless, commercial and political motives also play a role, even though a smaller one than for the other two donors considered here (Stokke 1995b) and some studies indicate that Norway does not seem to distribute its money to the poorest countries (Claessens, Cassimon, and van Campenhout 2009).

Moreover, Norway repeatedly points out that, as a small country, its capacity to change the world remains limited. The logical consequence is that it should direct its efforts to selected countries and to areas where Norway has a special expertise. The fields in which Norway considers itself to have expertise are climate change, environment and sustainable development; peace-building, human rights and humanitarian assistance; oil and energy; women and gender equality and, finally, good governance and the fight against corruption. Over time, the focus on human rights and good governance has become stronger and more heavily emphasised (NMFA 2008b, 23, 2009a, 8, 2009d, 113–15, 08.10.2014a, 2014b). But Norway also maintains that its development cooperation should safeguard Norwegian interests at home and abroad (NMFA 2009d, 113–15). Norway’s development aid therefore aims to be efficient, interest based and value driven.

4.2.3 United Kingdom: the European donor?

The period under study saw four British governments: Tony Blair held the post of Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007 under the leadership of the Labour party. His successor Gordon Brown, also from Labour, held office from June 2007 till May 2010, whereupon Labour lost its majority to a coalition government led by the Conservative David Cameron and the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg. Since May 2015, Cameron’s Conservative party has formed a majority government.74

The UK government is composed of several ministerial departments that are relevant for this study: with the Department for International Development (DFID) the UK pushes the issue of development onto the ministerial level (again since 1997, beforehand integrated into Foreign Office under Thatcher)75. Relevant ministers (within the UK they are referred to as Secretary of State for International Development) for our period are Hilary Benn from 2003 until June 2007,

74 Until Cameron resigned after he lost the referendum to the Brexit decision in June 2016. Despite the change in governments from Labour-led to Conservative-Liberal Coalition to Conservative-led, there was remarkable stability in UK aid policies (Kevenhörster 2014, 117–22).
75 Interestingly, Ian Hall (2013) shows that every Labour government created a ministry whereas every consecutive Conservative government degraded it again. David Cameron is the first who has not followed this pattern.
followed by Douglas Alexander from 2007 until May 2010 (both Labour party). Under Cameron, Andrew Mitchell held the post from 2010 till 2012, followed by Justine Greening (both Conservatives) who took over in September 2012 until 2016. DFID is seen as the agenda setter in aid, next to the World Bank (Nuscheler 2005, 496–97). DFID is responsible for implementing 86 percent of British ODA, (Lundsgaarde 2013, 4).

Other important positions within DFID are the office of Permanent Secretary, which is a non-political civil position. This position was held by Dame Nemat Shafik from 2008 until March 2011, and finally by Marc Lowcock who took over in June 2011.

Other relevant departments are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (around 3 percent of ODA), the Treasury (below 1 percent of ODA), and the Department of Energy and Climate (around 2 percent of ODA) (DFID 2014e). Moreover, at the time of writing, the UK is still a member of the European Union, which has consistently shaped its development policy (Gänzle, Grimm, and Makhan 2012; Hoebink 2010a, 2010b; Hoebink and Stokke 2005). Generally, the UK has the most centralised structure of the traditional three donors and has a “strong unified voice” (Brombacher 2009, 14–15).

On average, the UK has spent USD 12.9 billion on aid in the last ten years. This puts the UK on the second rank, somewhere between the United States and Norway in nominal terms (OECD DAC 2014b, 108). In terms of aid in relation to its income, the UK has an average of 0.52 points with a strong increasing tendency. Since 2013, the UK has reached the 0.7 DAC target and significantly improved its position (OECD Stat 2015b; OECD DAC 2006a). With nearly 40 percent, the UK also has the highest multilateral share of all three donors.

The main recipients of UK aid are Nigeria, India, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Pakistan, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (OECD Stat 2015b).

The United Kingdom spends approximately 42 percent on social infrastructure and services (within which the highest percentage with 14.29 percent goes toward government and civil society), 9.5 percent on economic infrastructure and services, 4 percent on production sectors, 8.5 percent on multi-sector and cross-cutting, high percentage related to debt relief (about 9.8 percent), 9.5 percent on humanitarian aid (OECD Stat 2015a).

The United Kingdom is the only country studied here with a relatively recent colonial past (Degnbol-Martinussen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Bille 2005, 86–88; Austin 2010). This past has influenced British development policies considerably. Still today, most British development aid goes to its former colonies (Pacquement 2010). The tradition of giving aid therefore follows a certain rationale of a cosmopolitan duty issuing from the times of the Empire with some communitarian foundations (Gaskarth 2013).

Since 1997, the UK pursues a single purpose in development aid: to reduce poverty (Hook 2008a; Ireton 2013, 36–98; Morrissey 2009; DFID 1997). This purpose was further embedded

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76 Note however, that the policies regarding aid (and for instance conditionality) differ highly within EU member states (Steingaß 2015).

77 Its share improved significantly since 2008 where it spent only 0.43 % of its GNI on ODA and ranked 10th, and was third in overall aid in absolute terms, behind the United States and Germany (OECD DAC 2010, 103).
into the 2002 International Development Act which made the reduction of poverty a necessary element of any British development policy and was further cemented in other government papers: 2006 with Making governance work for the poor and in 2009 with Building our common future (DFID 2006b, 2009d). In the last 10 years, approximately 32 percent of the UK’s bilateral aid was dedicated to the least developed countries, and another 13 percent went to other low income countries. 21 percent went to lower-middle income countries and only 5 percent to upper-middle income countries (OECD DAC 2010, 99, 2014b, 104; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). A quantitative study illustrates that the UK reacts towards improvements in human rights (with a five percent increase in aid), towards an improvement in economic growth with plus five percent, towards democracy improvements with an increase of 29 percent (Hoeffler and Outram 2011). Similarly, a critical data report from ONE, a development NGO, hails the UK as the “indisputable overall leader amongst the G7 countries in delivering on its ODA commitments” (ONE 2010, 14; Kevenhörster 2014, 332; OECD DAC 2010). Therefore, at first glance, there seems to be a congruence between rhetoric and action in British aid (Breuning 1995). Other influential ideas are those behind the Washington Consensus, good governance and a strong support for debt relief (Ireton 2013, 67–99). Moreover, despite regular changes of governments, the British seem to have a rather consistent policy regarding aid independent of who rules in Westminster (Chaney 2012). While there is therefore a certain tendency to separate aid from national interest (for instance by untying), other commercial interests still play a role even though a decoupling between aid and trade has largely succeeded (Morrissey 2009). For instance, since the financial crisis, there is an increasing rationale in Britain that aid should bring “some tangible benefit to British citizens” (Gaskarth 2013, 117).

In summary, a number of different motives and purposes lie behind the aid policies of the three traditional donors, while all are members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and therefore publish their aid records publicly. Moreover, as Deborah Brautigam (2010) puts it, they all follow certain rules that are characteristic for traditional donors, which could define them as a regime. The following section looks very briefly at the international context and regulations, within which the aid of traditional (and to a certain extent emerging) donors positions itself.

4.3 The international setting for both emerging and traditional donors

Deborah Brautigam (2010) argues that the rules and standards of traditional aid are characterised by an attempt to be transparent, untying, to protect social and environmental standards and to combat corruption and improve governance and make debt manageable. Moreover, she defines the institutions and actors (all have an agency or even ministry dealing with aid), all follow

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78 Note that the DAC calculation excludes from the percentage the amount that is not income-related. My figures include that number in the percentage as they are deduced from the overall spending on bilateral aid.

79 Moreover, some point out that in 2014 the general role of aid was discussed altogether in the UK despite the relative good and stable character in the policies in the last ten years (Klingebiel 2015).

80 Corruption, for instance, is often seen to cause aid fatigue among the electorate (Bauhr, Charron, and Nasiritousi 2013). Others argue that what is relevant to explain the support of national constituencies for aid lies in the satisfaction with their own government and the relative income of the population rather than with recipients’ merits (Chong and Gradstein 2008).
the OECD DAC definition of ODA, and all use a range of instruments and modalities (technical assistance, budget support, projects, programmes, debt relief, etc.).

The OECD Development Assistance Committee is the “institutional home” of the traditional donors (Hook and Rumsey 2015, 2). Approximately every four years, traditional donors undergo a review of their development assistance by other members of the DAC in order to effect further improvements and to increase donor coordination. Moreover, since 2005, several meetings have taken place to further improve aid effectiveness. In 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed by all members of the DAC and by all four emerging donors (as recipients). The Paris Declaration follows five main principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization of donor activities, management for results, and mutual accountability. The Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 and the Busan Declaration of 2011 followed the Paris Declaration (OECD 2008b). Moreover, in 2014, a further step was taken to include emerging donors into the aid effectiveness debate. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation took place in April 2014 and was the first dialogue where the OECD shared the responsibility with the UNDP in order to increase representativeness of the meeting (Langendorf 2012, 23).

The DAC also has initiated in 2004 specific efforts for attempting to further integrate non-DAC donors and to learn from their experiences in development, for instance initiating the China-DAC Study Groups since 2009 (OECD DAC November 2005).

Next to the DAC and the efficiency debate within the Global Partnership, the United Nations has its own distinct forum in which it investigates the aid of all of its members. The UN Development Cooperation Forum, inaugurated in 2005, holds biannual meetings and hosts discussions about the best way to spend aid. This forum is arguably more inclusive but suffers from a large membership (Mahn and Weinlich 2012). The United Nations Development Program also influences aid policies as it receives large amounts of multilateral shares (Stokke 2009, 510; Jolly 2005).

Moreover, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have largely informed the policies of the three traditional donors. The follow-up Sustainable Development Goals are less important for this study. Another initiative that we will sometimes come across is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), of which Norway is a member and the United States and

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81 DAC can be classified as a regime composed by principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures: principle: market driven policies lead to economic growth, norms: concern for welfare of poor states, rules (ODA/GNI 0.7%; aid to LDCs, grant element vs loans (at about 86%), proportion of untied aid at about 60%), decision-making procedures within DAC secretariat, peer reviews, etc. (Hook and Rumsey 2015, 2–6).

82 Coordination between donors remains difficult as diverging self-interests and high coordination costs often delay efforts (Lawson 2013).

83 From these five principles, the most influential one for this study is ownership. Ownership can be defined as “the expression of self-determination, which enables the recipient country to face cooperation partners on equal terms” (U. Müller and Langendorf 2012, 84) or as a balance between complete and no participation from the recipient country (Leutner and U. Müller 2011). While the impetus put on ownership has recently increased, the idea is not new and was previously referred to as “commitment” (Frenken et al. 2011, 13). Ownership is also seen as a principle that is shared by both groups – emerging and traditional donors (Tortora 2011).

84 The MDGs were (1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) to achieve universal primary education, (3) to promote gender equality and empower women, (4) to reduce child mortality, (5) to improve maternal health, (6) to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, (7) to ensure environmental sustainability and (8) to create a global partnership for development until 2015. Since September 2015, these eight goals have been replaced with the 17 SDGs (Manning Febr. 2009).
the United Kingdom are candidate countries. This initiative aims at making extractive industries more transparent (Rich and Moberg 2015).

Finally, some general trends are worth mentioning; there is a growing commitment in ODA flows, and a slow shift towards low income countries whereby middle income countries still receive about 40 percent of the aid (Adugna et al. 2011, 7–10). While these international institutions inform the three traditional donors, their impact on national aid policies might, as Ngaire Woods argues, be increasingly limited (Woods 2010; Naim 2009).85

4.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has briefly introduced the diverse approaches of the four emerging and the three traditional donors. The empirical facts illustrate that the approaches towards development cooperation are to a certain degree different, when it comes to the two groups. Especially in the field of conditionality, significant differences exist. Moreover, the three traditional donors all have differing institutional set-ups (for instance regarding fragmentation) that are decisive for their selection as most different cases (as the methods chapter explained). We are now equipped with the necessary empirical, theoretical and methodological knowledge to turn towards the main body of this work: the three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter clarifies the independent variable of this study, as well as both the apparent and underlying ideas that predominate within traditional donors about the aid policies of their potential rivals – emerging donors.

85 The influence of international institutions on emerging donors is not studied yet. Nevertheless, Anderas Nölke (2015a) argues that international financial institutions exert a limited influence on Chinese policies.
5 Traditional donors’ ideas about emerging donors

The previous chapters identified the research gap and developed the theoretical and methodological approach of this work. Most importantly for the following analysis, the theoretical chapter elaborated several hypotheses that were tested in the three empirical chapters. To reiterate the main underlying hypothesis of this thesis: I argue that ideas play a decisive role in explaining institutional change within development policy. Therefore, it is most important to collect in a first step of the analysis the existing ideas that prevail among traditional donors about the activities of emerging donors. The next two empirical chapters then trace the role of these ideas in the two identified relevant issue areas: conditionality and trilateral cooperation.

Before we study how ideas play a decisive role in shaping and possibly altering traditional donors’ development cooperation, we first need to analyse what traditional donors think about emerging donors. Remember also that foreground (discursive) ideas play a more decisive role in shaping institutional change than background (ideational) abilities. This chapter therefore lays an emphasis on foreground ideas as they are not only easier to track but also more decisive in triggering change. Background ideas, however, are also briefly be discussed, as these might slow change down (Schmidt 2011; J. L. Campbell 2004, 94–100).

How can one analyse the way a country assesses the potential challenge emanating from another country’s policy? The emergence of new donors is embedded in the debate about the rise of new economic rivals. The chapter therefore examines how this debate is absorbed within the national debates of traditional donors, largely on the level of ministerial (or similar) discussions, speeches from representatives of development cooperation as well as on the level of implementing agencies. In a second step, this chapter focuses on the perceived differences that traditional donors identify between their own development policy and that of emerging donors. Lastly, the chapter analyses the consequences that derive from traditional donor perceptions of emerging donors: what are the main ideas that characterise the conception traditional donors have about emerging donors and what consequences do they draw for their own policies?

This first empirical chapter portrays the findings from the analysis of primary documents and expert interviews of the three traditional donors from 2004 until 2014 (for details on time and case study selection, see methodological chapter). Each section exposes the ideas on the activities of emerging donors from the point of view of a traditional donor, starting with the United States. Section 5.4 concludes and summarises the findings in order to identify common and differing ideas that are decisive for looking at the two thematic fields later on.

5.1 United States of America: a giant threatened by a new rival?

Chapter 4 illustrated that the United States of America is the biggest contributor to foreign aid in nominal terms, but fares much worse when it comes to the ratio of contributions in relation to its gross national income. The following section looks at the ideas that constituted the United

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86 Theoretically speaking, this chapter therefore focusses on the layer of narratives, touching upon the layer of rules, but only looking at practices to a very limited degree.
States’ perception of emerging donors. The first section gives an account of a shift in global politics, the second looks at the perceived advantages and challenges emanating from emerging donors for the United States, and finally addresses the consequences that the USA draws for their own development policies.

5.1.1 The increasing importance of emerging economies

Many documents of the United States recognise an increased importance of emerging economies, especially after the financial turmoil that hit the country in 2007 and 2008, which is often described as having led to a “catastrophic recession” (U.S. Government 2010b, 8; similar references in USDS 2010d, 13, 2010f, 13, 2011d, 181). But already in 2006, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice\(^87\) recognised the importance of emerging countries and the need for increased American personnel in these countries rather than focusing on old allies, like European countries (Rice 18.01.2006, 1). The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report, a publication reviewing the successes, but equally the failures of U.S. foreign policy, stated in 2010 that “the 21\(^{st}\) century centers of global and regional influence, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey, define today’s geopolitical landscape” (USDS 2010f, 13). All four emerging donors considered in this study are “strategic partners” of the United States and seen as “key developing country leaders” (USDS 2012d, 48, 2011f, 24). The United States pledges to work for a closer cooperation with all four emerging economies (USDS 2009a, 24, 2010a, 20; USDS and USAID 2009c, 39).

Similarly, the U.S. has voiced a willingness to accept a reform of international financial institutions in order to reflect the increasing economic weight of emerging economies (for instance Clinton 28.07.2009, 2). However, the USA is equally wary of losing influence due to their increased weight, for instance in the International Monetary Fund where emerging donors gained quotas after the financial crisis. To delay reforms of the IMF or the World Bank is seen as dangerous as the U.S. could lose more of its influence when reacting too late:

“As the United States has delayed approving the 2010 reforms, other countries have sought to increase their influence in the institution bilaterally, outside of the IMF’s quota-based financial and governance structures in which the United States exercises its leadership role. In 2012, due to the U.S. delay, the IMF secured bilateral borrowing agreements with countries such as China ($43 billion), Korea ($15 billion), Brazil ($10 billion), India ($10 billion), Mexico ($10 billion), and Russia ($10 billion), enhancing these countries’ standing and eroding U.S. influence. Congressional approval of the 2010 reforms is necessary to reaffirm the U.S. leadership position and reinforce the IMF’s central position in the global financial system, at a time when emerging economies explore establishing new and parallel financial institutions” (USDOT 2014, 2).\(^88\)

\(^{87}\) Note that most of the functionaries mentioned in this study no longer work in the position that is indicated. Nevertheless, in order to increase readability, this is not distinguishable from the text. As the year of the statement is always referred to, it is easy to assume when their duties ended. Moreover, appendix 9.1 provides a list with all of the functionaries mentioned, including their years of service.

\(^{88}\) Note that within quotes from U.S. publications, the American spelling is kept whereas the rest of this work is written in British English.
A similar reasoning applies to the U.S. commitment to the World Bank, where the U.S. argues that “[i]f the United States Congress does not authorize and appropriate funds […], the relative U.S. shareholding in the MDB will become diluted” which could lead to a situation where China has “more power over the governance of these institutions” (Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 2).

The above suggests that the U.S. clearly recognises a shift in power and draws two conclusions: first, that cooperation with these countries needs to be increased (in strategic partnership – a cognitive idea) and second, a certain fear of losing influence (normative idea). The second normative idea is strongly tied to China’s rise. Already in 2005, when Condoleezza Rice was asked about whether China’s rise was a “serious threat” to U.S. interests, she stated that the relationship with China is a “complex one” and that the intensity of the rivalry depends on “what kind of force [China] will be” (Rice 10.07.2005, 2). Equally on a normative level, it is possible to identify a certain uneasiness in public documents when it comes to the increased weight of emerging economies as their values might not be congruent to those of the United States:

“All emerging powers including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa will continue to expand their activities and influence on the global stage, and their priorities, actions, and preferred outcomes will not always be in accord with those of the United States” (USDS 2014d, 133).

The main ideas within the United States regarding the economic rise of emerging powers are, therefore, a cognitive recognition of their increasing weight coupled with a willingness to cooperate more closely with them, as well as a normative fear attached to the loss of influence of the United States in favour of China, and other countries that might not represent American values. The next section addresses the U.S. portrayal of emerging economies in the realm of development assistance.

5.1.2 Differing ideas about China’s aid in comparison to other democratic emerging donors

References to Bob Dylan’s ‘the times are a changing’ are very common in politics. The Vice President of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation, Patrick C. Fine, invoked Dylan’s exact words in 2012 when referring to the “landscape for development and humanitarian work” where “a group of new world powers, led by China, is exerting increasing influence both economically and politically” (Fine 06.06.2012, 2). Compared to the other two traditional donors, the United States has repeatedly made use of the term “emerging donors” or “non-traditional donors”. The term was first used in 2009 (USDS and USAID 2009d, 2) and continuously since (see for instance USDS 2012d, 288; U.S. Government 2010c, 1–2). A statement of Hillary Clinton, at the time Secretary of State, in a keynote speech during the summit on aid effectiveness in Busan equally welcomed the efforts of some emerging donors (specifically those of Brazil and Mexico), but similarly called for a greater commitment to international aid standards from all donors:

“All of us must live up to the international standards that the global community has committed to […]. That means, for example, helping countries with natural resources

89 The United States refers to emerging donors in total 34 times in all of the documents, the UK twice, Norway just once.
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escape the so-called ‘resource-curse’ that leaves them rich in oil, gold, or other commodities but poor by many other measures. And while national sovereignty is an important principle, it cannot become an excuse for avoiding scrutiny of development efforts, not if we want results. Transparency helps reveal our weaknesses so we can improve our work” (Clinton 30.11.2011, 1–2).

The reference to national sovereignty and to transparency (or lack thereof) is a hidden criticism of some of the activities of emerging donors, mostly of China. Like all traditional donors studied here, the United States focuses its attention on the undertakings of China in Africa. China is seen as an “influential development actor”, “outbidding and outperforming India”, portraying itself as an appreciative power of developing nations and thereby playing the “third world card” (USAID 2010a, 1; Genser 03.08.2006, 153; Watson 03.08.2006, 74). Some hold a rather positive opinion of China’s influence in Africa and Latin America and consider its engagement as a normal consequence of a rising power (Watson 03.08.2006; Brill Olcott 04.08.2006). At times, China’s objectives are seen as not “inherently incompatible with U.S. priorities”, a situation of no “zero-sum competition with China for influence in Africa”, “[n]or do [they] see evidence that China’s commercial or diplomatic activities in Africa are aimed at diminishing U.S. influence on the continent” (Christensen 05.06.2008, 1; similar line of argument Wilson 03.08.2006, 82; Brill Olcott 04.08.2006, 250; Russel 25.06.2014, 1; Clinton 30.11.2011, 2; Kerry 04.11.2014, 2).

Nevertheless, while moderate voices exist, it is more common to identify the challenges arising from China to the U.S. in Africa (Reeves 03.08.2006, 190; 194; Ratliff 03.08.2006, 166). For instance, Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs claims in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2012 “there are major areas where our interests do not align” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 7–8). Hence, the general opinion within U.S. publications about the consequences of Chinese development projects for recipient countries is rather bleak.90 First of all, the U.S. criticises a lack of transparency (USDS 2010e, 1–2). Further allegations vary from criticising the use of mainly Chinese labour force and to the general fear that there is little positive spill-over effect for recipient economies (Wilson 03.08.2006, 45–46; C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 2). To illustrate these negative effects on recipient countries, U.S. documents often refer to the Chinese-led construction of the headquarters of the African Union:

“The $200 million building was […] designed by Chinese architects, built of material mostly imported from China, built primarily by Chinese labourers, and will be maintained by Chinese workers. It is very difficult not to think of all of the lost opportunities in the way this project was carried out” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 32).

Another concern regularly expressed is the unsustainable exploitation of natural African resources and the flooding of African markets with a “tsunami” of cheap Chinese exports, and the feeding of an unsustainable debt (for the first, see USAID 2006, 6; Wessel 04.08.2006, 199; Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 5; Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 5; for the second

90 To illustrate the importance attached to China’s activities as an emerging donor, it is sufficient to say that two congressional hearings have taken place in the observed period on that particular topic. One in 2006 on China’s role in the world and one in 2012 on China’s influence in Africa.
point, see Wilson 03.08.2006, 51; on debt, see Christensen 27.03.2007, 1; C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 1).

The strongest concern is expressed about China’s support for rogue regimes, most of all the “destructive relationship” between China and Sudan (Reeves 03.08.2006, 155–56; Bartholomew 03.08.2006, 6; Christensen 03.08.2006, 22; USDS 2006d, 1; Rice 27.09.2006, 2; Christensen 27.03.2007, 1; Jackson Lee 29.03.2012, 6).\(^9\) The USA recognises however that China evolved from a country undermining international efforts for peace to one essential to the peace talks between Sudan and South Sudan (C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 47). The case of China’s involvement to Sudan is therefore often used in U.S. publications to illustrate that China can take the role of a more “responsible stakeholder”, a term initiated by Bob Zoellick (Hill 07.06.2005, 2; Christensen 03.08.2006, 24–25; Natsios 11.04.2007, 6; Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 47; Christensen 18.03.2008, 1; Office of the spokesperson 24.06.2015, 3). The need for China to assume its role as a “responsible stakeholder” is regularly repeated in U.S. publications and pushed for in dialogues, like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China and the Dialogue on Global Development (Shear 10.09.2009, 1; Kritenbrink 13.04.2011, 1; Clinton 2010, 4; Rice 12.05.2005, 2; Negroponte 15.05.2008, 1; Office of the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 4, 24.06.2015, 4; USDS 2014f, 1).

In order to address these challenges, the U.S. government foresees a closer relationship in development cooperation with China. For this purpose, a development counsellor is based in the U.S. embassy in Beijing to better understand Chinese foreign assistance and to “encourage China to adopt internationally agreed standards on good donorship” (USAID 2010a, 1; equally Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8). Close cooperation in development assistance is confirmed over the years (USDS and USAID 2009a, 1, 2011a, 1). Therefore, the United States is careful to strike a balance between criticising China on certain issues (like human rights and Taiwan), but without allowing these differences “to preclude cooperation when [they] agree” with China (USDS and USAID 2003, 7; USDS 2013f, 1, 2015g, 1; similar argument U.S. Government 2010b, 43). Nevertheless, the initiatives for cooperating with China are hesitant at best.

While most of the attention is focused on China’s endeavours in Africa, a testimony during a hearing on China’s role and influence in Africa before the Committee on Foreign Affairs stresses:

“it is clear that other rising or emerging powers, above all, the other BRIC countries—India, Brazil and Russia—are also busy renewing old ties and forging new links with Africa, relations which will undoubtedly alter the strategic context of the continent” (Pham 29.03.2012, 52).

The United States places much importance on like-minded donors which anchor their development cooperation in a similar drive to spread the benefits of democracy.\(^9\) However, the importance paid to those three donors – Brazil, India and South Africa – is still negligible when compared to China. The USA pledges to support Indian development programmes, as USAID

\(^9\) Other “rogue states” are also in the focus of US attention (for instance Burma, Laos, Zimbabwe, Venezuela) as China is seen to give these states “implicit security guarantees”, thereby undermining U.S. goals to promote human rights and democracy (Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 12; Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 6).

\(^9\) This confirms the research of Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (2011) who argue that ideological factors play an influential role in the allocation of US aid.
recognises that a new approach for working with emerging economies is needed (USAID 2012b, 15). America recognises that India is an “indispensable partner” and that USAID is “transforming its relationship with India from a donor-recipient relationship to a peer-to-peer partnership” (USAID 2012b, 7; Rollins 30.04.2014, 2; USDS 2013b, 530–31). Moreover, the U.S. recognises that India’s contributions to development cooperation are very likely to increase (USAID 2010c, 2). India is considered to be a good investment for projects that “have strong potential for development impact in other countries” (USAID 2012b, 3). Early on, the good relationship with “the world’s largest democracy” is considered to be in the national interest of the United States and India a “strategic partner” (K. M. Campbell 31.03.2011, 2; Burns 08.09.2005, 1; USDS 2004a, 452, 2005a, 81, 2006a, 498, 2010b, 576, 2015b, 271). Repeatedly, the publications pinpoint the importance of “shared values of democracy, diversity, and free markets”, and to the fact that India is a “rising global power and partner, one whose interests converge in important respects with those of the United States” (USDS 2006c, 1, 2007, 584, 2008b, 607, 2010d, 211; Clinton 19.07.2011). India, as a “good and strong emerging multi-ethnic democracy” is considered to be the perfect partner for the U.S., as “there will not be differences about what we are trying to achieve: a world that is freer, a world that is more prosperous, and a world that is more just” (Rice 27.07.2007, 2; similar line of arguments U.S. Government 2015, 24–25).

In 2011, India is also declared to be a “U.S. global development partner” (USDS 2011b, 627). The narrative is followed by an increasing dialogue between the “the world’s two largest democracies”, for instance where the strategic dialogue, launched in 2009, was expanded in 2015 to become U.S.-India strategic and commercial dialogue (U.S. Government 2010b, 43–44; USDS 2015h, 1; Clinton 04.06.2010, 1). The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also envisions a strategic partnership with India (USMCC 2015c, 2). Moreover, the United States repeatedly pledges to support Indian ambitions for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (Rice 14.04.2005, 2; Kerry 22.09.2015, 2).

Similar to the positive image of India’s aid activities, public documents refer to Brazil and South Africa as “large multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracies”; nations with whom cooperation is easy and natural (Rice 27.07.2007, 2). Brazil is seen as a potential partner in the “promotion of democratic values in the region” and as a “leader in the hemisphere” (USDS 2003, 452, 2004a, 472, 2005a, 504; Rice 26.04.2005, 1; U.S. Government 2010b, 44–45, 2015, 27). As in the case of India and China, the United States recognises that Brazil has “emerged as [a] significant bilateral donor” (USDS 2010f, 79). Similarly, Condoleezza Rice has expressed approval for Brazil’s help to Haiti, which is considered a “model” for engagement and “where [the USA] could not have done what [it] did […] without Brazil’s leadership of the UN forces there” (Rice 26.04.2005, 1, 13.03.2008, 1). Moreover, the U.S. pays tribute to the work of Brazil in Mozambique where Brazil cooperates with Japan (Clinton 30.11.2011, 2). As in the case of their commitment to India, the U.S. supports Brazil’s pledge for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Rice 13.03.2008, 1). The relationship with Brazil seems to be slightly more difficult than that with India, as Maria Otero, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, openly admits that “we may not always agree”, but overall, the need for more cooperation is stressed (Otero 26.03.2010, 2).

The United States also sees potential in the cooperation with South Africa. It aims at “[l]everaging South Africa’s public and private sectors to advance development on a regional and continental scale” which “will position South Africa to be a more effective development partner to address shared foreign policy priorities in Africa” (USAID 2013a, 7). The U.S. also pledges to
support the new South African Development Partnership Agency (USAID 2013a, 4; 7; 16, 2015c, 2). Although supportive, the U.S. is careful to stress that tremendous challenges remain in South Africa, which also explains why it continues to dispense aid to the country (USAID 2011d, 1). As early as 2004 was South Africa considered to be an “anchor for stability and prosperity in the Southern African region” (USDS 2004a, 482). Similar to the relationship with India, South Africa has become a strategic partner of the USA, conducting a strategic dialogue and therefore evolved out of the donor-recipient relationship and now serves as a “bridge between the West and emerging power” (USDS 2007, 274, 2008a, 310, 2010b, 170, 2013b, 148, 2014b, 148, 2015d, 484, 2015i, 1; USDS and USAID 2011b, 26). John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, considers the partnership to be “true” and “honest” (John Kerry, remarks on global health event with partner countries on the side-lines of the UN GA, 25.9.2013; quoted in USMCC 2013, 23).

Overall, a lot of attention has been paid to the rise of emerging donors. Generally, a certain disquiet is expressed at China’s activities while other (democratic) emerging donors are seen as valuable partners. The next section summarises the main ideas that characterise the United States’ narrative regarding the rise of emerging donors. Moreover, it elaborates on the consequences that the United States seems to draw within its narrative for its own development co-operation.

5.1.3 Consequences for U.S. aid policies

The previous section illustrates that the U.S. pays attention to emerging donors. Nevertheless, the above section also shows that the United States has varying concerns regarding the aid activities of China and that of other, more like-minded emerging donors. This split in the perception is mirrored in the main consequences the USA draws for its own development assistance: First, the documents conclude that the United States needs to increase their own visibility in foreign aid projects as China is supposedly much more successful in this regard. In a hearing in 2006, the U.S. Senator for Oklahoma, James M. Inhofe states:

“China's growing global influence and the impact it has on our national security […] the threat continues to grow. […] I have a reason to be in Africa quite often […] Everywhere I go where there are really big oil reserves, whether it's the Sea of Guinea, or Nigeria, or Benin, everything that is new and shiny is built by the Chinese. I have to say what they are doing is smart. They're smarter than we are because they go in there, and I don't care where it is, where you go, you'll see that they are building things. Now, we watch this take place over a period of time and it's really disconcerting. […] I mentioned Africa because the saying in Africa is 'the United States tells us what we need and China gives us what we want.' And that's true” […] (Inhofe 03.08.2006, 11–12).

Similarly, Hillary Clinton in the position as Secretary of State stated in a 2010 speech that

“we [the USA] have to be smarter about the story we tell about America’s development efforts. It’s discouraging to travel around the world and meet people […] who say ‘I don’t know what you spend money on. I never see it. Nobody ever tells us’ […] And then what’s deeply discouraging is they say, ‘We know what the Chinese do. We know what the Japanese do. We can point to the buildings they build and the roads they’ve
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The idea of making aid more visible might lead to an increased branding of U.S. aid policy and might directly affect policies regarding conditionality. Linked to the idea of making aid more visible is the belief that the USA should closely engage with private sectors and needs to extend its influence in Africa (Pham 29.03.2012, 52; Hayes 29.03.2012, 66).

The second main idea that is derived from the perception of Chinese aid activities is that the U.S. seems to be convinced that they need to stick more closely to their own principles, such as transparency, the promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights – all attributes that Chinese aid activities are (perceivably) lacking. Commissioner Carolyn Bartholomew reminds the public in 2006 that it is illogical to expect the Chinese government to be interested in “promoting transparency, accountability, and open governments elsewhere when it itself is not transparent, open or accountable” (Bartholomew 03.08.2006, 42; Donnelly 03.08.2006, 40). A frequently invoked example is Angola, which declined a loan from the IMF (attached to conditions regarding transparency and accountability) in favour of a Chinese loan with no strings attached (Christensen 03.08.2006, 35). In order to forestall the possibility that “Africa is becoming a lost continent” for the United States because of the attractiveness of China, the USA needs to defend these values even more (Fortenberry 29.03.2012, 24–25). Bartholomew states in 2006 that the Millennium Challenge Corporation has been created precisely for this reason (Bartholomew 03.08.2006, 16–17). Similarly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Thomas J. Christensen, argues in 2008 that it is important to uphold American values:

“We are concerned that by giving aid without conditions and without coordination with the international community, China’s programs could run counter to the efforts by these other actors to use targeted and sustainable aid to promote transparency and good governance. We believe that such conditional aid programs are the best way to guarantee long-term growth and stability in the developing world” (Christensen 18.03.2008, 1).

Comparable opinions about U.S. goals being “undermined” by China regarding good governance initiatives and the protection of human rights are expressed throughout the period under study here (for instance Weston, C. Campbell, and Koleski 01.09.2011, 2; Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8; Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 30). The idea that the USA should stick more to its own standards might be influential in the field of aid conditionality as this is mainly where values are attached to development policies.

A third consequence for the United States is that it tries to socialise emerging donors to conform to American standards. A great deal of importance is attached to finding some kind of “consensus on development policy issues among traditional and emerging donors” (USDS 2009c, 213). Optimistic voices state that “China has even modelled many of its engagement programs after very successful U.S. exchanges on the continent”, indicating, that a convergence of policy is not impossible (Christensen 05.06.2008, 1). As China’s policies are seen to be less beneficial for recipient countries and in greatest need of adjustment, a lot of attention is paid to the need to influence China to take a path of good development policies, “including transparency and democracy” (Wilson 03.08.2006, 47; Christensen 27.03.2007, 1; USDS 2010e, 5; Desai Biswal 15.11.2011, 3). During the Busan meeting of the OECD effectiveness agenda in 2011, the United States emphasised that its “leadership in Busan was critical to increasing the commitment of emerging economies – such as India, China and Brazil – to implement effectiveness principles
like transparency in their investments” (USAID 2012a, 2012a, 28). U.S. publications emphasise that “only the United States can provide” this kind of leadership (USDS 2010f, 96).

Next to the pledge of wanting to commit emerging donors to more transparency, the U.S. also repeatedly states that emerging donors should apply other principles derived from OECD’s “best practices”, like accountability, and good governance standards, principles that might otherwise be “watered down” (USDS 2010d, 600; Clinton 28.11.2011, 4; USDS 2012c, 639, 2013d, 552, 2014d, 551; Clinton 14.012011, 3). Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, states in 2008:

“In general, we believe that China’s economic engagement with the developing world is a net positive for China and for the recipient countries, which need assistance, investment, trade opportunities, and expertise. Instead of trying to undercut China’s efforts, we are trying to steer them in the same direction as the efforts by the United States, the European Union, Japan and international organizations like the IMF/World Bank so that our combined efforts can be most effective (Christensen 18.03.2008, 1; see also Christensen 27.03.2007, 1).

Other issues that are mentioned regularly are the need for untying aid, and an increase in the predictability of flows of emerging donors (Clinton 28.11.2011, 5–6, 13.07.2012, 1). The USA also insists that not only governmental actors but also firms should stick to global values, like social corporate responsibility and transparency (Jaffe 04.08.2006, 269; Reeves 03.08.2006, 176; Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 31; Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8). The idea that emerging donors should stick to international (and mainly U.S.) standards might be an influential driving force for change in both policy fields: in conditionality as the USA equally pledges that it needs to stick to its own values more and in trilateral cooperation as this might be seen as a tool to influence the policies of emerging donors more directly.

In order to achieve a more coherent participation from governmental and private actors in development cooperation in emerging economies, the USA pledges to increase resources for more collaboration with emerging donors, for instance financing the OECD-led China study group to facilitate the cooperation with their biggest rival (USDS and USAID 2009d, 2).

Whenever values are congruent, the United States shows a willingness to strengthen their relationship with such countries. As stated in the section 5.1.1, the USA favours collaboration with emerging democracies over China. Hillary Clinton justifies this increased relationship with like-minded countries as follows: “The strategic fundamentals of these relationships – shared democratic values, common economic and security priorities – are pushing our interests into closer convergence” (Clinton 29.11.2012, 3; similar argument USDS 2013e, 312). Even though this cooperation is thought to be easier than that with China, some issues remain also in the cooperation with like-minded emerging donors. In order to engage emerging donors efficiently, the United States stresses that it needs to “strategic[ally] engage in major multilateral and bilateral meetings and international fora” (USDS 2014e, 332). In their annual report in 2014, the U.S. pledged to build “more meaningful relationships with emerging or ‘pivotal’ donors such as the

93 Emma Mawdsley (2015, 3–4) argues that several OECD donors emphasised the importance of having especially China at the table of negotiations and made “considerable concessions” to achieve the agreement.
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Arab states, Brazil, China, India, Korea and Turkey (USDS 2014e, 332; similar ambitions expressed in USDS 2010f, 116). More specifically the U.S. envisions cooperation with Brazil in research on agriculture, with India in extending food security and with South Africa in training partners to participate more directly in development processes (U.S. Government 2008, 22). The idea of increasing cooperation with like-minded emerging donors might be an influential force for driving an increased involvement of the United States in trilateral cooperation.

So far, we have established the foreground ideas that might play a role in facilitating institutional change. What about the background ideas that might slow change down? As the chapter on theory has shown, it is harder to track background ideas as they are not openly discussed. Therefore, the motives underlying U.S. aid that were studied and analysed by many researchers was used here to exemplify the most important background ideas characterising this aid. As chapter 4 has argued, most agree that the United States pursue several different goals through their aid: commercial motives as well as diplomatic (and strong security) concerns might be factors that slow down change considerably (S. Brown 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015). Another factor that might be influential when talking about conditionality is the strong conviction within the United States that it needs to spread its democratic values.

This section illustrated that the U.S. is very aware of the efforts undertaken by emerging donors, mostly by China. Moreover, its foreground ideas can be categorised into two main types: the first is linked to the idea that emerging donors (and mostly China) are a concurrent force in development cooperation which makes it necessary for the USA to increase its visibility and to stick to its own principles, promoting political values, such as good governance, transparency, human rights and democracy. Whenever possible, the United States should also attempt to socialise the group of emerging donors to internationally agreed standards, congruent with its own values. Both forms of ideas might lead to a change within the field of conditionality. The second type is characterised by the willingness to support emerging donors whenever such like-mindedness is apparent. Only at this point does the United States envision increased cooperation with emerging donors – an aspect that influences their attitude towards trilateral cooperation. Change within both fields might be slowed down by background ideas (such as the incentive to spread the democratic ideal as well as commercial and diplomatic motives in aid). The next section looks at the example of Norway and asks what ideas characterise a much smaller country’s perception of emerging donors.

5.2 Norway: a small country’s perception of global power shifts

The overview on Norway’s development cooperation in chapter 4 shows that it provides the smallest amount in terms of overall ODA between the three donor countries, but the highest ratio in terms of its gross national income. The following section first gives an account of Norway’s perception of a general power shift, then outlines the differences Norway’s officials per-

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94 This background idea was underlying the main arguments within the discussion of preferring democratic emerging donors to China.
ceive between their aid and that of emerging donors, and finally elaborates on three main foreground ideas that characterise Norway’s reaction to emerging donors in its own development cooperation.

5.2.1 Perception of a general power shift

The financial crises since 2007 altered the perception of emerging countries, who came to be seen as a real challenge in all three traditional donors. However, the extent to which Norwegians talk about that power shift is more extreme than in the other two countries. Exemplifying this perception is the statement of an apparently somewhat demoralised Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre after the collapse of the WTO Doha talks in 2008, saying that he might have been present “at the collapse of a world order” because the United States and the EU are no longer in a position to impose their interests on other countries. Now, he argues, “Brazil, India can no longer be ignored” and China entered the “circle of major countries that call the shots” (Gahr Støre, July 30, 2008, 2). Similarly, a 2011 white paper notes that the “global landscape [is now] shaped by a complex, multipolar lack of order” (NMFA 2011b, 19).

As a logical response to the perceived decline of Western power, Norway plans a more extensive cooperation with all four emerging countries (Gahr Støre 10.02.2009, 2, 23.03.2010, 2, 10.02.2011, 5–6; NMFA 2011c, 14, 2012a, 19–21; Barth Eide 08.02.2012, 2; NMFA 29.11.2013, 1). Norway has developed individual strategies for all four major emerging powers, first with China (2007), then India (2009), Brazil (2011) and finally South Africa (2013) while recognising that the BRICS group is very heterogeneous (NMFA 2009d, 35, 2012a, 14; Barth Eide 08.02.2012, 1). Another indicator of an increased attention paid to emerging countries is the increase in diplomatic presences in Brazil, India, and China. In order to liberate resources for these new diplomatic agencies, others that were considered to be less important had to be closed down; for instance East Timor, Slovenia, Cote d’Ivoire, Nicaragua, Colombia (NMFA 05.10.2007, 1, 05.10.2010, 1, 02.12.2012, 1).

A white paper from Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the rise of China and India as “new geopolitical centres of gravity” poses both “an opportunity and a challenge for Norway” (NMFA 2009d, 36). The four countries are identified as countries in which Norway has “real interests” and which should be given priority in Norway’s foreign relations (NMFA 2009d, 126; 191). Interestingly, from the 19 priority countries with which Norway entertained a closer relationship in 2009, the BRICS are the only ones that are not neighbouring or Western countries (NMFA 2009d, 191).

Among the four emerging countries, China is considered the most important partner for Norway’s institutions dealing with the issue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry; Norwegian government) and the greatest influence on Norway’s policies (NMFA 14.08.2007, 17; Gahr Store 07.05.2009, 1, 25.01.2010, 1, 14.04.2008, 2; NMFA 19.01.2010, 1, 21.05.2010, 1). Norway’s Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Store, considers in 2010 that China’s power is rising in “every aspect of international relations” and Norway insists that China “must take responsibility” and “show its hand” (Gahr Store 23.03.2010, 3). India seems to be second in importance (NMFA 2009f, 15; Gahr Store 23.03.2010, 3; Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 12). South Africa and Brazil are considered in the papers to be less crucial but nonetheless important players in international relations (NMFA 2009d, 38, 2011a, 4–6, 26; Gahr Store 31.03.2011, 1).
The annual foreign policy address of 2013 summarises Norway’s attitude towards a perceived power shift “from the traditional major powers to new, emerging powers”. This “time of transition”, is seen in the address as a challenge for Norway because “a better organised world” is in “Norway’s self-interest” (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 1). This indicates that Norway is more dependent on a functioning multilateral order than the United States, which can largely rely on itself.

5.2.2 Recognition of the activities of emerging donors

Norway’s foreign policy institutions clearly see emerging powers as international game changers. But how does this translate into ideas about their activities as donors? Are they considered fundamentally different? Is their engagement feared or praised? The next sections elaborate on these questions.

In the beginning of the period under scrutiny emerging donors and powers are not mentioned at all in the annual foreign policy address to parliament from the Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen (Petersen 15.02.2005). Interestingly, in 2006, it is not the global power shift that is mentioned, but rather the fact that China and India are increasingly involved in the energy sector in Africa (Gahr Støre 08.02.2006, 7). Similarly, in 2006 the Minister of International Development, Erik Solheim, refers in a speech to parliament to the donor activities of India and China and notes that “[y]ou cannot travel far in Africa today without coming across Chinese investments or development projects” (Solheim 16.05.2006, 4). Norway therefore recognised the potential of emerging donors earlier than the United States. Even more surprising, Norway talks about the potential of emerging donors even before the financial crisis which made the underlying power shift more openly observable for all.

For Norad, the Norwegian development implementing agency, one of the five most important changes in the international aid system in the last 20 years is that new actors, such as China and India, play a “significant role” (Norad 2009c, 5). These new stakeholders are then seen to challenge the aid system because they are “eager to establish their own programmes” in development cooperation (Norad 2009c, 5). A certain discomfort is expressed when it comes to the opacity of projects in general and the amounts of aid that are distributed in particular, but it states that “there is little doubt that these countries are of considerable and growing importance” (NMFA 2009a, 83; similar argument Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 2).

Just like in the United States, China’s aid activities in Africa dominate the reporting in Norway. In a speech about cooperating with China in the petroleum sector in Nigeria in 2008, the Foreign Minister Gahr Store stated that China’s rise presents “both opportunities and challenges for Norway” and claims that the Forum on China Africa Cooperation in 2006 marked a “new and historic juncture” (Gahr Store 30.01.2008, 1). Similarly, a white paper from 2009 on the adaptation of Norwegian development policy displays a picture portraying small African children, all busy waving Chinese flags. The white paper states next to the picture that “China is playing an increasingly dominant role as a development partner in a number of African countries” (NMFA 2009a, 12). China’s engagement in Africa is seen as a “vivid illustration of a new way of building foreign and development policy alliances” (Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 4). Norway recognises the fact that some developing countries welcome China’s engagement “partly as a counterweight to years of American and European domination, but also as an important player at the international level and in connection with its own poverty reduction” (NMFA 2009a, 12).
To a lesser extent, Norway recognises India’s increasing role in development cooperation and considers it a “leading actor in [Africa]” (NMFA 2009a, 12). Similarly, South Africa’s and Brazil’s engagements are mentioned sporadically but clearly not to the extent of China, or even India because their contributions in development cooperation are still considered to be quite low (NMFA 2009a, 12). A press release from 2011 celebrates the fact that emerging donors are involved in the coordinating efforts of the OECD and endorsed the Busan declaration (NMFA 01.12.2011, 1). Unlike the United States, Norway does not celebrate its own involvement in achieving that result.

Within Norway’s official narrative, the recognition of an increased involvement of emerging donors is often mentioned next to another important recent change within development cooperation: the fact that it is becoming increasingly hard to distinguish development policies clearly from other fields of foreign policy, such as economic and security policy issues (NMFA 2009a, 92, 2011b, 20–21, 2012b, 13). Foreign aid is therefore considered to be part of a more global scheme, involving especially environmental and energy politics, fields in which Norway has traditionally had a keen interest.

5.2.3 Three consequences for Norwegian development cooperation

This section looks in detail at the foreground ideas that characterise the consequences that Norway draws for its own development policies. It results from the recognition that emerging donors, above all China, are influential players in development cooperation:

“Norwegian aid efforts are being challenged by an increasingly complex range of actors in the countries in which we are involved […]. Certain Asian countries (China in particular), a number of Gulf states, major private funds and a growing number of NGOs have now joined the traditional bilateral and multilateral actors. Partner countries thus have more choices open to them. This has many advantages, but can also increase the administrative burden and reduce the opportunities for a donor country such as Norway to exert an influence. In any case, it makes us think along new lines about both where and how we focus our efforts in various parts of the world” (NMFA 2009d, 115).

This quote conveniently illustrates that Norway’s Foreign Ministry is wary of the increased involvement of emerging donors because it reduces Norway’s ability to “exert an influence” in the developing world. Therefore, Norway not only recognises the potential of the rise of emerging economies and their donor activities (as the previous two sections illustrated), but it equally draws conclusions from this for its own development policies regarding the choice of recipients and fields of investment.

Norway’s political actors identify three main challenges rising from the emergence of new donors: first, the need to further integrate emerging countries into existing international institutions regulating development assistance. Second, the concern that the unconditional support of emerging donors to developing countries will lead to the undermining of aid conditionality. And third, a certain unease that the involvement of emerging donors will lead to an unsustainable use of natural resources, especially oil, and produce further economic problems for recipients. All three concerns show an ambivalent position towards emerging donors ranging from welcoming them to the expression of real concerns about the implications of their policies – for Norway and recipient countries.
First, the documents show a repeated call for a better integration of emerging donors into existing international institutions. This need for integration is generally coupled with a welcoming of their aid activities (Solheim 16.05.2006, 4; Fagertun Stenhammer 16.05.2007, 1, 04.06.2007, 2). The following quote illustrates the link between the perceived power shift and the need for integration:

“The influence of the traditional donors in the North will inevitably be reduced by geopolitical shifts. Norway should continue to encourage the BRICS countries and other rising economies to clarify their interests and policies towards global multilateral cooperation. Over time, we should urge them also to take on larger global responsibilities through multilateral commitments” (NMFA 2011c, 18).

However, Norway’s official documents remain ambivalent as to the successes of this integration, hinting at suspicions that emerging economies are likely to create their own, rival development institutions. If emerging economies show a preference for minilateral forums, other rival informal groupings or bilateral cooperation over established multilateral forums, they would marginalise the UN as a global institution, a result that the strongly pro-UN Norway wants to avoid (NMFA 2012a, 15, 80, 2009d, 35–36, 45, 2009a, 34, 2011c, 16.09.2011, 3; Brende 09.04.2014, 3; Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 2–3). Similarly, in the annual address to the Norwegian parliament in 2013, the Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, stated that emerging actors are gaining influence, but that it is “still unclear whether or not they will fill the power vacuum that will arise as the importance of the traditional powers declines” (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 1). Norway pledges therefore to “work to ensure that emerging powers find their place in the existing world order, rather than creating a new one” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6). This idea of further integrating emerging donors into existing international structures is reminiscent of the United States’ call to socialise emerging donors to international standards. However, there is a significant difference: while Norway calls for greater integration into existing multilateral structures, the United States attempts to influence emerging donors by transforming their policy in a way that they are more compliant with U.S. standards and values. The difference is indicative of Norway’s differing level of dependency on multilateral institutions when compared with the United States.

Within Norway, a fragmented international development cooperation in which emerging donors do not participate in structures established by traditional donors, like the OECD Development Assistance Committee, is generally seen as a “risk” and as “a challenge for traditional development assistance” (Norad 2014b, 20). Norwegian officials are however even more concerned about the need to integrate China in particular (NMFA 2009d, 35). A 2009 white paper states that China’s foreign policy “has been based on the principles of regional stability and non-interference” and that China’s engagement in Africa is a “key element of its foreign policy expansion” (NMFA 2009d, 35). But equally, it states that the intention to become a “responsible major power” could “come into conflict with the non-interference principle of its foreign policy” (NMFA 2009d, 35). This statement illustrates Norwegian fears that China could develop into a great non-interventionist power. The need for further integration is therefore coupled with serious misgivings as to the intentions of emerging donors, particularly that of China. The chapter on trilateral cooperation mainly deals with a particular tool for Norway to integrate emerging donors into its own policies and can therefore be seen as one Norwegian reply to the challenge.
The urge to integrate emerging donors into existing structures is symptomatic of the idea that the aid activities of emerging donors differ from those of established donors. Hence, the two following points illustrate the content of these perceived differences. On the one hand there is a concern that the unconditional support of emerging donors to developing countries will lead to the undermining of traditional political aid conditionality, and on the other hand, Norway is apprehensive of the fact that the involvement of emerging donors will lead to an unsustainable use of natural resources, especially oil.

The emerging donors’ approach towards aid is defined as “different from that of traditional development partners, for example in that it focuses far less on the recipient country’s internal affairs, such as human rights” (Gahr Støre 23.03.2010, 4). The second major issue raised is therefore that of conditionality. In one of the expert interviews conducted, a Norad employee referred to their non-interference approach as “unorthodox or a bit of a stretch” that differed from Norway’s development cooperation (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 10’01). A good illustration of Norway’s position towards this issue is Sudan. In 2004 at a meeting to find a solution to the conflict in Sudan the Minister of International Development, Hilde F. Johnson, claimed to be hopeful that China’s presence in the talks would be a positive “sign that change [for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach towards Sudan] is underway” (H. F. Johnson 27.09.2004, 1–2). Four years later, the tone was considerably sharper when it came to China’s and India’s involvement in Sudan. A policy paper stated that the sanctions of the West made cooperation with the local oil companies impossible, opening “a space that China and India have exploited for economic gain without regard to human rights issues” (NMFA 2008c, 21). The paper continued by saying that “while there are signs that China may be re-considering its position, the international community must pay attention to securing international consensus on the role and use of sanctions if these are to be effective” (NMFA 2008c, 21). The same paper stated that

“[c]onditionality simply cannot work if large developing countries are not on-board – as China’s actions in Sudan […] demonstrate clearly” (NMFA 2008c, 28).

The issue of undermining the West’s conditionality or sanctions goes beyond the situation in Sudan. Another white paper illustrates that Norway is wary about the undermining of Western conditionality when it comes to China’s engagement in Africa, especially because it threatens standards of good governance and human rights:

“China is outcompeting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund by offering loans and agreements with few requirements regarding reform, good governance or human rights” (NMFA 2009a, 12).

During a conference about a shared petroleum project with the Chinese in Nigeria, Norway’s Foreign Minister Gahr Støre, states that “as a traditional donor, Norway welcomes [China’s increased aid activities]” but emphasises that

“Chinese aid is sometimes a source of concern to traditional donors. The question is raised whether the apparent lack of political strings attached will delay needed economic and political reform in African countries” (Gahr Støre 30.01.2008, 1).

The lack of political conditionality is coupled with an awareness of unbridgeable differences about political views as “[Norwegians] cannot take it for granted that emerging economies share
all our political views” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6) and that this difference could even further increase if they are not integrated into the existing system” (Gahr Store 03.09.2008, 3). This difference in the concept of conditionality, in turn, has direct consequences on the “lines about both where and how we focus our efforts” (NMFA 2009d, 115). This concern about the undermining of (especially political) conditionality could be a decisive force for a change in the policy of conditionality as we see in the next chapter.

Alongside the perceived difference concerning political conditionality, Norwegian institutions identify a third issue related to emerging donors’ hunger for natural resources, especially in Africa (see for instance NMFA 2009d, 37; Brende 09.04.2014, 1). Because of its own natural resources, Norway has a keen interest in the petroleum sector and its exploitation. The development is not only seen negatively, but clearly portrayed as a challenge for Norway’s approach to the oil sector that is largely determined by its Oil for Development initiative. This is based upon principles of political conditionality, investing and supporting African oil exploiting countries if they follow certain criteria. Interestingly, the initiative started in 2005, the starting point of this inquiry. In 2006, the Foreign Minister Gahr Store talked about China and India’s strong involvement in the energy sector, stating that this is leading to “a new security situation both for Africa as a whole and for the African countries that are producers of raw materials” (Gahr Store 08.02.2006, 7). The International Development Minister Solheim, stated six days later that he has hopes to amplify the positive consequences of these new investments in the oil sector through the Oil for Development initiative (Solheim 14.02.2006).

However, a less positive view is expressed in a subsequent speech by Mr Gahr Store who refers to China’s involvement in Africa, Latin America and in Asia as a “conquest” or as an “unsustainable exploitation of natural resources” (Gahr Store 25.01.2010, 2; NMFA 2011b, 20–21). One of the oil producing countries where China is present is Nigeria. Norway’s publications blames China for being active in Nigeria with “no activity on good governance and democratisation in the country” (Norad 2010c, 38). While recognising that

“China’s role is highly important, however, but rather in terms of oil purchases, sometimes in return for soft credit used to purchase Chinese goods, services, and infrastructure projects” (Norad 2010c, 53).

China’s engagement in the petrol sector of development countries is in Norway’s perception closely linked to its exporting activities. The misgivings around cheap Chinese goods is also expressed in an article about the new world order where the foreign minister says that what is feared most in Asian countries is the “Chinese export juggernaut” and that European car exporters might be “swept off the market by Chinese exports” (Gahr Store, July 30, 2008, 2). A similar unease is expressed in a report on policy coherence, in which it is also held that foreign labour often implements the projects and that there is no spill-over effect for local communities (NMFA 2012c, 26; similar argument in interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 24’39). Therefore, China’s activities in the oil sector are seen as a challenge for recipient countries but also for Norway as it will be increasingly difficult to retain a certain influence while also maintaining certain conditions (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 24’22).

This last idea is also closely linked to a general background idea present in Norway that might – following the theoretical hypotheses – slow down institutional change; Norway is eager to maintain a certain influence and fears that it might lose this to other powers. Other background
ideas derive from the motives discussed in chapter 4: Norway’s development assistance is value-driven (which might slow down change in the field of conditionality) and is strongly committed to values, such as human rights and democracy, but Norway is also eager to stress that it follows its own interest and that development assistance has to – in some respect at least – serve these interests.

In conclusion, the main ideas that might foster change (foreground ideas) are the following: Norway perceives emerging donors as a challenge and as a source of competition to its own development policies. It fears a loss of influence, especially in the field of human rights and good governance, but also in oil producing countries. The main foreground ideas that might induce a change in the fields of trilateral cooperation and conditionality are twofold: first, the idea that further integration into multilateral forums is needed, even though this may be difficult (a factor which could be decisive for the field of trilateral cooperation), and second, the idea that Western standards are under threat (regarding human rights and good governance and sustainable use of resources) through emerging donors’ activities which might lead to a change in Norway’s policy regarding conditionality.

5.3 United Kingdom: trying to maintain global power status despite shifts

What ideas predominate within the last case study, the United Kingdom, regarding emerging donors? Chapter 4 located British development aid somewhere in between the United States and Norway in terms of overall amounts and of ODA/GNI ratio. Moreover, the UK is known for its strong support of multilateral cooperation; from our targeted group, it spends the highest overall amount on multilateral aid. What does this imply about the United Kingdom’s perception of emerging donors? To find answers to this question, the subsequent sections are structured as follows: the first section addresses the sensitivity of the UK regarding the increased economic weight of emerging countries. The second section illustrates the British perception of emerging donors as a group as well as individual countries. The third section briefly enumerates the perceived benefits and challenges, analysing the direct consequences for British development cooperation that the UK perceive to result from the rise of emerging donors. These ideas, in turn, are argued to be the driving force for triggering change within the British institution of development assistance.

5.3.1 Increased pressure through economic competition with emerging powers

The UK, like the other two donors assessed here, embeds the phenomenon of emerging donors principally within the general debate about their increased economic and political power. Especially China’s economy coupled with its astonishing growth rates receives a lot of attention in the British government’s publications (for instance DFID 2009d, 131; Greening 27.01.2014, 5). However, emerging economies are not reduced to their economic impact alone. Beside the factor of their growing populations their political weight is perceived to have risen considerably (Browne 24.04.2012, 2; A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2). The shift in global power balances is considered by the Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Jeremy Browne, to be a “revolution” in international affairs (Browne 24.04.2012, 2).
The United Kingdom acknowledges that it is affected by this “revolution”. Very much like the United States and Norway, the UK has to concede, especially after the financial crises of 2007 and 2008, that “in a networked world of rising economies and shifts in power, the traditional means of influence we have enjoyed in world affairs are eroding” (FCO 2010, 70). Similarly, Mr Browne states that ignoring the recent power shift would be “a catastrophic historical mistake” (Browne 24.04.2012, 6). Three main consequences result from this for the United Kingdom: First, a general need to increase the links with “key emerging countries” (DFID 2007a, 179, 2008c, 2). The increased cooperation is seen in several areas, of which trade (DFID 2007a, 194; UK Government 2012, 1; Browne 24.04.2012, 4), development cooperation (DFID 2007a, 179, 2009a, 118), and sustainable development (DFID 2008a, 25) are the most important areas. To meet that challenge the UK has developed a “BRICS strategy” which is “very much a cross government strategy” involving the work of several departments (DFID 2009a, 70, 2008a, 359, 2013d, 2, 2014b, 121). The second consequence is a repeated call from the government to adapt international institutions so that they reflect the new power structures (DFID 2009d, 104). Only through a more collaborative approach towards emerging powers and through “grittier, more inclusive alliances” can “the consensus the world so badly needs” be achieved (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). The last consequence is that all four emerging countries no longer receive support through British aid. China and Brazil have “graduated from UK aid” in 2011 (DFID 2011e, 6), while the programmes for South Africa and India are said to run out by 2015 (DFID 2013a, 71; Greening 09.11.2012, 1).

5.3.2 Perception of emerging donors as a group and as individual partners

The first time the UK documents mention “emerging donors” is in 2007, a year after Norway (DFID 2007a, 192). In 2008, the UK first refers to the aid activities of Brazil, China and India (DFID 2008a, 66, 2008c, 16). It was February 2011 before the topic of emerging donors was put on top of the agenda in a speech entitled “emerging powers” by the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell. The speech gives valuable clues about the UK’s perception of emerging economies, and clearly recognises their potential as donors:

“Historically, the global debate on poverty was dominated by the rich, OECD donors. Today, it’s an issue that’s often championed by emerging powers. Take China. According to the Financial Times, China’s Development Bank and its Export Import Bank committed more loans to developing countries over the last two years than the World Bank” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2–3).

The speech equally elaborates on the “significant” aid contributions made by Brazil, India and South Africa (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). Other statements confirm the importance that the UK attributes to emerging donors: A press release calls for higher integration of emerging donors into international structures as they are “major investors in Africa and the developing world” (DFID 01.12.2011, 1–2, 29.06.2012, 2). The Permanent Secretary of the Department for International Development (DFID), Mark Lowcock, stated in an October 2012 speech about the future of international development that the

“new global age brings with it a new global order. An order which no longer follows the tired old rules of the rich and the poor; the donor and the recipient; the first world and the third. It is a world in which countries like India, China and Brazil are reasserting their presence at the forefront of global progress” (Lowcock 16.10.2012, 6).
Therefore, throughout the observed period, but increasingly since 2011, emerging donors’ involvement in “development assistance, trade and investment” is seen as “making an impact in developing countries” and emerging donors considered valuable partners in development cooperation (DFID 2013a, 119, 2014b, 128).

Each of the four emerging donors receives differentiated attention from the UK. Not surprisingly, the greatest part of that attention is given yet again to China, principally to its activities in Africa. Very early on, in the annual report of 2006, a box is dedicated to “Development diplomacy in China”. It recognises the Chinese potential to play a significant role in shaping the Millennium Development Goals debate because of its “leadership’s push for an increasing presence on the international stage”. As a consequence, the UK aims to “integrate a development perspective into the policy dialogue between China and the UK” and to

“work with Chinese government on a limited number of areas of direct relevance to the achievement of the MDGs globally. These include China’s aid programme and engagement with Africa, […] and engagement with China on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” (DFID 2006a, 72).

In the 2008 annual report, another special box is dedicated to China, this time to its activities in Africa, confirming the insights from 2006: it states that China is “expanding its economic and political links with Africa very rapidly” and that the DFID pledges to work closely with China “so that both our efforts support the African vision of development” (DFID 2008a, 37). For that purpose, a high-level dialogue with China on Africa has taken place every six months since 2008, and the first summit in January 2008 was claimed to have “allowed leaders to discuss the development relationship and China’s role in tackling global poverty” (DFID 2008a, 66). The aim is to “maximise the development benefits of China’s economic relations with Africa” and to benefit from the Chinese experience (DFID 2008a, 37, 2009d, 131–32, 2014b, 128–29). Secretary of State for International Development Mitchell’s speech on emerging powers highlights the positive impact of Chinese funded infrastructure projects in Africa (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). A speech from the more recent Secretary of State for International Development, Justine Greening, indicates stability within the UK’s perception of Chinese activities. She considers the UK partnership with China to be “ground breaking”:

“The UK and China have both been giving assistance to countries in need for more than 50 years. There are differences in our approach to development but there are also important similarities. And there is a lot we can learn from each other” (Greening 02.04.2014, 1).

But another country’s aid activities receive almost as much attention as China’s; namely, Brazil, which is more prominent in the UK’s reporting than in the USA’s or Norway’s. The annual report from 2007 refers to “Brazil’s capacity to provide effective technical assistance to Latin American countries on HIV/AIDS prevention and control” (DFID 2007a, 192). Similarly, a 2008 report mentions the evolution of the relationship between Brazil and the UK from bilateral aid to a partnership in which the UK aims to strengthen Brazil’s capacity for sharing its manifold development experiences (ranging from social protection to climate change) (DFID 2008a, 79). Several other documents refer to multiple Brazilian projects (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). The aid efforts of Brazil receive direct encouragement through a call to better finance research on how to use Brazilian experiences for further poverty reduction in other countries outside of South America (DFID 24.08.2012, 1). The relationship between Brazil and Africa is portrayed by the
Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, William Hague, as a natural partnership:

“Brazil’s ties with Africa reflect [their] long historical and cultural links. I know that Brazilians of African heritage and African culture play a vital role in [Brazil’s] society, that linguistic ties are a special bond with a number of countries in Africa. […] [Brazil’s] remarkable record of poverty reduction, growth and development of thriving democracy makes you an extremely strong partner for African countries set on the same path” (Hague 19.02.2014, 2).

Alongside this positive portrayal of Brazil’s relationship with the African continent, the UK congratulates itself on the continued work with Brazil “on climate-smart agriculture and nutrition in Africa” (DFID 2014b, 129).

The aid activities of India and South Africa are given less attention. However, just as the United States spoke of like-minded countries, both India and South Africa are praised for the fact that they share political values with the UK. South Africa is seen as a model for other countries, especially because of its democratic ideals and human rights standards. The UK sees itself next to South Africa as “members of the world’s community of fellow democracies” (Hague 14.02.2012, 2). South Africa ranges in the ranks of emerging economies, especially because of its “leading role in Africa and for Africa” (FCO 2006, 298; Hague 14.02.2012, 1–3). A report from 2013 vouches to support South Africa’s efforts “to deliver effective development results both regionally and globally” and a press release claims that the UK will support “South Africa’s growing role as a development partner of countries across the continent” (DFID 2014b, 129, 30.04.2013, 1). South Africa’s aid policies are acclaimed in the realms of wealth creation, UN peacekeeping missions, climate change and on health planning (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6; DFID 2012a, 64, 2014b, 128).

For India, a report states that “nowhere will our partnership be more multi-dimensional than India […]. The world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s great civilisations, India is now at the top table in world affairs” and that India shares the values of “democracy, pluralism and tolerance” with the UK (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 4; DFID 2013e, 1). The UK emphasises the fact that the relationship with India evolved from an aid relationship to a trade partnership (Lunn 2011; Greening 09.11.2012, 1; DFID 09.11.2012, 1). Moreover, the UK envisions further cooperation with India’s Development Partnership Administration on development issues, for instance to promote India’s model on health financing (DFID 2014b, 128–29).

5.3.3 Consequences for UK development cooperation

As the previous sections have shown, the UK paints a rather positive picture of the aid efforts of emerging donors. Particular benefits that are perceived are the fact that emerging donors share similar experiences with their recipients and therefore might have appropriate ideas on how to get countries out of poverty (DFID 2011e, 6; A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3–4). However, as the area of cooperating with emerging donors is rather new, some caution is expressed:

“And working with them to share, to identify what those lessons might be, and to help transfer them, is, you know, a good thing. There are a lot of hypothetical benefits, I guess, and that we need to test” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 13’07).
The UK shows a marked reluctance to judge emerging donors too quickly. However, some critical comments about the consequences of their activities could be found. One concern is reminiscent of a reservation expressed by Norway; that emerging donors could attempt to form a rival world order, distancing themselves from what they consider to be “Euro-centric values” (Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Human rights are such values, where Great Britain maintains that they “are not just Western preoccupations” but “universal” (Browne 24.04.2012, 7). The partnership that the UK envisions with emerging donors should not lead to the abandonment of those “core British values” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8). However, the UK equally states that in “cases where our disagreement is rooted in detail rather than fundamental values we will be pragmatic – a peaceful and prosperous world is in all of our interests” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8). Therefore, while it is seen as a challenge that sometimes the partnership will be based on opposing value systems, the overall conclusion is that the UK should cooperate with emerging powers as much as it can (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3). This is a clear difference from the ideas of the United States and Norway, both of which seemed more convinced that cooperation is only possible when values are congruent. This idea has consequences in the areas of conditionality and in trilateral cooperation.

Another challenge that is perceived to emanate from the increased activities of emerging donors is that international development as a field has become “more complex and more crowded”, often to the detriment of transparency (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 2). This uncertainty is linked to the relative novelty of the partnership with emerging donors, as confirmed by a statement from an interviewee (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 7'49). One aspect that many traditional donors criticise about emerging donors is their thirst for raw materials in Africa, but the UK disagrees with this judgement. At the very end of his speech on emerging powers, the Secretary of State for International Development Mitchell, stated:

“And to those who are waiting for me to address the issue of raw materials in Africa, I say that engagement is surely sensible and logical. When we work with people, we promote openness and, in a modern world, we all learn very quickly that everyone benefits from transparency and accountability” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7–8).

Generally, this indicates a rather balanced (some might say cynical) view from the UK on the aid activities of emerging donors, whereby the UK sees more potential for cooperation than for competition. Despite diverging values, the main thread seems to be to cooperate more with emerging donors. This has two consequences for British development cooperation: first, the UK considers itself capable to increase the cooperation between the two groups of traditional and emerging donors. Second, the UK sees itself in a helping position to guide emerging donors within the complex field of development cooperation where the United Kingdom has learned from a long history.

The UK has developed a Global Partnership Department in 2010. Its main goal is to “maintain the UK at the heart of the ever evolving international architecture by helping to shape and bring coherence to DFID’s international objectives” while cooperating with “development partners, old and new” (DFID 2011d, 3). This policy decision illustrates the UK’s aim for actively shaping the emerging development discourse through close engagement with them and international institutions. The aim to enter and shape new alliances is stressed in many documents (for instance DFID 15.02.2011, 1). The speech by the Secretary of State for International Development Mitchell from 2011 illustrates that the UK itself has been at the forefront of integrating
emerging powers into existing institutional structures surrounding development cooperation (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 1; similar argument A. Mitchell 09.06.2012, 3). The following quote illustrates the urgency with which the UK pursues its involvement in the integration process:

“Because the defining characteristic of these emerging partners is that they’re not just talking about changing our world, they’re actually doing it. I want Britain to be part of that change, to be a beacon of influence for rich and poor alike” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 8).

One instructive example where the UK is proud of pursuing this policy of integration is the Busan High level meeting on aid effectiveness. One of the UK’s priorities for the Busan talks – and which the press release announces to be reflected in the agreement – is the increased cooperation with new aid donors as

“[e]merging powers like China, Mexico, Brazil and India are becoming increasingly influential providers of support and assistance to poorer countries. Richer nations must collaborate with emerging powers to share experience” (DFID 01.12.2011, 2).

Much like the United States, the UK claims to have positively influenced Chinese policies to be part of the Busan agreement as a speech after the conference indicates:

“[The signing of Busan] followed significant work by the UK to ensure China joined the partnership, including discussions I held with Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming in Beijing immediately ahead of Busan” (A. Mitchell 07.12.2011, 1; similar representation of the event DFID 01.12.2011, 1–2).

The UK therefore attributes to itself a “key role in encouraging emerging economies to participate in the new Global Partnership” (DFID 2012a, 87). The meeting of Busan therefore represents a success of British attempts to push for a higher integration of emerging donors (DFID 2012c, 5, 2013a, 119). This policy of pushing for a higher integration of emerging doors into multilateral structures is very similar to the strategy of Norway. Nevertheless, the UK seems to be more successful. And, as in the case of Norway, this idea plays a decisive role when it comes to trilateral cooperation.

This need to play an active role in the partnership with emerging donors and in their integration process is closely linked to a second strategy that the UK pursues regarding emerging donors. This strategy consists of the idea that the UK could “help” emerging donors in their development aid policies. Already in 2007, the UK was aiming to “help [emerging donors] to increase the impact of their work on poverty reduction” (DFID 2007a, 192). Similar references to “helping emerging economies” in their aid policies can be found throughout the observed period (for instance DFID 2008c, 16, 35). Furthermore, the UK intends to “help” individual emerging donors like China, where “DFID has offered support and help to China in reviewing their aid management arrangements” and to Brazil where the UK wants to “help [them] join the fight against international poverty” (DFID 2008a, 37, 15.02.2011, 1). The UK follows this policy as it believes itself to possess valuable and “proven experience in giving aid in the developing world” (DFID 15.02.2011, 1). The strategy ranges from offering help and encouragement, to direct assistance, to working together to “increase [emerging donors’] effectiveness through sharing best practice and disseminating innovations” (DFID 2014b, 128). In 2014, the UK even openly admitted that it is trying “to help shape [emerging donors’] impact on development in
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poorer countries” (DFID 2014c, 16). This effort of helping emerging donors in their aid effort is similar to the attempt of the U.S. to socialise emerging donors to their preferences and again plays a decisive role in the field of trilateral cooperation, but equally in the chapter on conditionality, because the UK, by “helping” emerging donors, might reproduce its own conditional model.

The last consequence that the UK draws for its own development cooperation policies is to adapt its own development cooperation towards a more results-based and effective approach. This consequence results from the perception that because new players have entered the field, competition in the field of development cooperation has risen. Secretary of State for International Development Mitchell states that

“This [time of new engaging partnerships with emerging countries] is also the perfect time for us here in the UK to reconfigure our development efforts. One of the themes of our new narrative will be a relentless focus on results. […] I believe that these new partnerships that I have described today can drive a change throughout DFID and throughout Whitehall. […] Aid will be about delivery not doctrine” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3, 8).

The UK also claims that its partnership with emerging donors increases UK aid effectiveness as the UK learns from the new partners “who have recent domestic experience of poverty reduction” (DFID 2013a, 119). The emergence of new donors has also triggered an internal institutional reform whereby the National Security Council has been increased through an Emerging Powers Sub-Committee that oversees the UK’s strategy “for creating deeper relationship with emerging powers across UK policy and programmes” (DFID 2014b, 128). Similarly, the need for increasing the effectiveness of aid also results from the fact that some kind of aid might no longer be appropriate due to the emergence of new donors. As such, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) states that the “rise of emerging donors in Africa, who provide assistance without the complex processes associated with UK budget support, might create circumstances in which budget support is no longer appropriate” (ICAI 2012, 20). Similarly, some countries will become less dependent on British aid “as a result of improved domestic revenues and new investment flows from emerging economic powers like China and India” (DFID 2014b, 26). Therefore, the UK recognises that its aid needs to adapt and change due to the pressure from emerging donors, a phenomenon that is also discussed within the G8 (DFID 2014b, 123). This idea is comparable to the one in the United States, where a more visible aid was requested and influences the issue area of conditionality.

Next to these foreground ideas that might trigger change within the British development assistance, several background ideas must be mentioned as they might aim at preventing that change. Again, they mostly derive from the motives summarised in chapter 4. Since 1997, the UK has had a strong developmental focus in its aid which might constrain other forces that want to trigger changes within development assistance. Nevertheless, chapter 4 also showed that the UK also follows a value-driven development policy, comparable to the ones of the United States and Norway, and that its aid is considered to fulfil certain interests, such as commercial and diplomatic motives.

The consequences that arise mainly from the foreground ideas for British policies are threefold and might influence the institution of British assistance as follows: first, the UK aims at playing
Traditional donors’ ideas about emerging donors

a major role in the integration of emerging donors into existing international forums; second, it plans to help emerging donors to adapt their policies to increase aid efficiency and poverty reduction; and finally, it adapts its aid policies towards a more results-based and efficient aid approach as some of its existing policies are seen to be increasingly redundant because of emerging donors. The first and second challenges are addressed in chapter 7 when we look at the UK’s efforts on engaging in trilateral cooperation with emerging donors. The second and third challenges could indicate that the UK attempts to find common ground with emerging countries when it comes to aid conditionality. This is further discussed in chapter 6. The following section compares the results of this first empirical chapter and sets the stage for the following two empirical chapters.

5.4 Concluding remarks: common and diverging ideas about emerging donors

The main purpose of this chapter was to elaborate on the dominating foreground (and some background) ideas that obtain within the narrative of traditional donors regarding the activities of emerging donors. This section found common themes and ideas of the three traditional donors but equally stressed the differences within their perception of emerging donors, as these differences are the main basis for explaining a differing pattern in the reaction towards emerging donors in the two issue areas – conditionality and trilateral cooperation.

Let’s begin with the common ideas that all three donors share about emerging economies. All three recognise the increasing economic relevance of emerging countries and all of them recognise the relevance of emerging economies as donors. Moreover, all three pay more attention to the activities of China than to the other three emerging donors. Nevertheless, within the individual appraisal of emerging countries, some differences can be divined; the United States focuses most of its attention on China and distinguishes their activities from those of like-minded countries. Similarly, Norway puts most emphasis on Chinese activities in Africa but also recognises Indian efforts, and talks to a limited extent about South Africa’s and Brazil’s development cooperation. The United Kingdom also acknowledges the bigger importance of China but equally stresses the significance of Brazil’s development cooperation. South Africa and India receive less attention. These differences in the focus of attention might explain a varying readiness to engage with some emerging donors in trilateral projects rather than with others.

Moreover, what could be influential for explaining change in the field of trilateral cooperation is the stated willingness to cooperate more closely with emerging donors that the United States and the United Kingdom have both expressed – though to a stronger degree from the United Kingdom than the United States. Moreover, both donors share the foreground idea that they would like to socialise or help emerging donors in order to “improve” their development assistance. Norway, on the other hand, has also expressed a desire to cooperate more closely with emerging donors, but has especially focused on the need to integrate emerging donors better into existing multilateral structures. In the case of all three donors, the background ideas that might slow down change within trilateral cooperation are the commitment to democratic values, which could hinder cooperation especially with China. Moreover, all follow self-interest through their aid (with commercial and diplomatic goals paramount, though the United States arguably has a stronger focus on security objectives than the other donors).
What are the main foreground ideas that could influence the field of conditionality that we discuss in detail in chapter 6? All three traditional donors state that the values underlying their aid might be undermined by the competition of emerging donors. Nevertheless, the degree to which they emphasise this varies immensely, which are decisive for explaining differing reactions within conditionality.

First of all, the same background ideas that we saw in the field of trilateral co-operation are in play here, and they might slow down change considerably. Diplomatic and commercial motives might again play a role in explaining a relative inertia of the development assistance institutions. Even more importantly, the fact that all three donors pursue a value-driven development policy could be very influential when talking about conditionality, as these values are perceived to be under threat by some donors of our group. This is especially true for the United States, where especially political values are seen to be under threat, mostly be China. Similarly, Norway sees important political values, such as good governance and human rights, threatened by emerging donors. This is less true for the United Kingdom where there is only an urge for more transparent aid policies by all donors involved. On the contrary, the United Kingdom (as well as Norway to a certain degree) welcomes all emerging donors and their activities which could be indicative of the desire to adapt their own policies towards the non-conditional model. The United States, on the contrary is strongly committed to political values and only welcomes like-minded countries. Similarly, the United States and the United Kingdom emphasise in their statements that there is a need to adapt the policies of emerging donors to their own (or similar) standards. Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom stress the importance of making their aid more results-based (for the UK) and more visible (for the U.S.) – two factors that could also be important in explaining institutional change within conditionality of those two donors. Finally, Norway sees the sustainable use of natural resources under threat – another element that could influence its decision-making process concerning its conditional approach. The following table summarises the findings.
Table 5-1: Summarizing the main ideas influential for conditionality and trilateral cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of idea</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreground ideas relevant for conditionality</td>
<td>Strong perceived threat of political values (especially from China)</td>
<td>Especially political values under threat</td>
<td>Undermining some values (like transparency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welcoming of like-minded donors</td>
<td>Welcoming of emerging donors</td>
<td>Welcoming of emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to socialise donors to American values</td>
<td>Unsustainable use of resources</td>
<td>Idea to help them, attempts to socialise emerging donors to British values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to make American aid more visible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Need for stronger results-based aid as a result of emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreground ideas relevant for trilateral cooperation</td>
<td>Incentive to increase cooperation with like-minded countries</td>
<td>Incentive to increase cooperation with all emerging donors</td>
<td>Strong need to increase cooperation with emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialising emerging donors to American values</td>
<td>Need for better integration in multilateral aid structures</td>
<td>“help them” to improve their development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background ideas (slowing down change)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic, especially security)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; developmental)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; also developmental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation

This chapter has laid bare the main ideas that the three traditional donors have about emerging donors. The next chapter now looks closely at the first thematic field – that of conditionality – and verifies if the above mentioned ideas triggered the expected change, or if (and why) not.
6 Changes in conditionality?

The following two chapters track the influence of the ideas identified in the previous chapter on the development cooperation of the three traditional donors. I conceptualise each development cooperation as an institutional set-up, composed of narratives, rules and practices. As it is impossible to look at governmental development assistance in its entirety, the following two chapters look at two thematic fields that are most likely to be affected by the aid activities of emerging donors: conditionality and trilateral cooperation.

Olav Stokke defines conditionality as “the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (Stokke 1995a, 12). Several distinctions are useful for understanding conditionality in full: first, conditions can be imposed by the donor before (ex ante) or after (ex post) the disbursement of funds. Second, conditions can derive from political objectives or from economic considerations. The literature review and the previous chapter discussed in detail that traditional donors consider their aid to be largely different to that of emerging donors in regard to political conditions. Therefore, this chapter places a particular emphasis on political conditions and only touches on economic conditions. When discussing political conditions, this chapter focuses on human rights, good governance and budget support as a means to ensure that political conditions are fulfilled. Economic conditions, on the other hand, are discussed through the position of traditional donors towards the IMF and the World Bank (as their aid is often highly conditional on economic achievements, such as free trade, and market liberalization) and on the level of the regulatory quality of the recipient governments. Conditionality is expected to be swayed by the emergence of new donors because emerging donors do not make use of conditionality (or are perceived to refrain from conditionality), which conceivably challenges this regime. Theoretically, conditionality is a well-established, traditional field of development cooperation. Following hypothesis 2, conditionality is therefore more prone to path-dependent behaviour and is unlikely to change abruptly.

The theory chapter argued that the explanatory power for explaining institutional change lies in the ideas that traditional donors have about emerging donors. While the previous chapter identified the general ideas influencing traditional donors’ policies, the section on the narratives gives further insight into how these ideas influence the narrative within the particular thematic field of conditionality. Therefore, each section devoted to a particular country first discusses the main narratives on (political and economic) conditionality and later identifies whether these official

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95 Note that this chapter does not have the purpose of discussing whether any kind of conditionality is useful for the process of development. There seems to be a significant debate going on in the literature about that topic (see for instance, Öhler, Nunnemann, and Dreher 2012; Börzel and Hackensch 2013; Sorensen 1995; Dietrich 2013; Vanheukelom 2012). Similarly, many argue that conditionality on good governance does not work (Brett 2011; Hout 2002) or that conditionality generally should be aimed at improving the situation of the poor (Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor 2004).

96 This increasing focus on political conditions is also confirmed by the literature (see for instance, Dollar and Levin 2006; Carbone 2010; S. C. Carey 2007, 449–50). Oliver Morrissey (2009, 710) similarly argues that because previous conditions (such as the economic conditionality of the World Bank) have faced much criticism, there is an increasing trend towards using more selectivity or “conditionality with a light touch”. Moreover, a study by Gabriella Montinola (2010) finds that the economic conditions of the World Bank and the IMF were only successful in democratic countries, attributing even more importance to democracy for triggering development.
narratives have been implemented in the rules and practices of the individual institutions of development cooperation.\(^97\)

To study the narrative on conditionality, a similar method to the previous chapter has been used. Next to the analysis of selected primary documents and expert interviews, aid statistics and legal documents further enriched the method to study rules and practices (for further information, see methods chapter). Especially for studying the practices on conditionality, a more selective approach was needed. Therefore, the practices are looked at in 11 selected countries where traditional donors share an interest with at least three emerging donors. This selection consists of countries where all three donors were active over the last ten years (the first three columns indicating the rank each recipient reached on average over the period from 2004 to 2014). All recipients are at least in the top 20 of recipients, with the exception of Malawi and Nigeria.\(^98\) While the involvement of emerging donors varies considerably more than that of traditional donors, what is important for this analysis is whether their presence is significant for traditional donors. Another finding can be drawn from the table: all but one of the recipients are located in Africa indicating the strong regional focus of all considered donors – emerging or traditional.

### Table 6-1: Selection of case studies to illustrate practices of traditional donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South Sudan(^99)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD stats and sources for emerging donors (see literature review for details)\(^100\)

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\(^97\) This division is due to the hypothesis from the theoretical chapter that the layer of narratives is more likely to change than the layers of rules and practices.

\(^98\) Nigeria was selected because of its importance for one traditional donor (Nigeria being the UK’s top recipient); Malawi was selected because of a considerable involvement of all emerging donors as well as of two traditional donors (Malawi).

\(^99\) Note that the rankings are only for Sudan before the separation into Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.

\(^100\) Good indications for China, Brazil and India come for instance from (African Economic Outlook 2011; Krage-lund 2010b; Morazán et al. 2012, 17; for information about Chinese projects in Africa, see Paulo and Reisen 2010, 542; Brautigam 2011b; AidData). Note that statements in brackets indicate a modest engagement. See appendix 9.6 for details on the amount spent by the traditional donors in the 11 selected cases.
The chapter addresses the following questions: (1) what is each country’s approach towards conditionality during the observed period, (2) does a change regarding conditionality take place within the narratives, rules and practices of the aid institutions and (3) to what extent is this change related to the emergence of new donors. Section 6.4 compares the results of the three cases in order to draw apposite conclusions about the individual national donor policies and the role of ideas in explaining the individual changes or inertia. The section also identifies what kind of institutional change has taken place in each individual country.

6.1 United States: Approach towards conditionality

The last chapter elaborated on the ideas that characterise the official stand of the United States regarding emerging donors. Moreover, it identified which ideas are likely to play a role in the thematic field of conditionality. From the perception of increased competition, the United States drew two main consequences for its own development cooperation: it argued that its aid needed to become more visible and to stick more to political, American, values. Moreover, the idea of socialising emerging donors towards a more politically motivated aid was expressed. This need for socialising donors was felt most keenly in relation to China, which was considered furthest away from American values in development cooperation.

The following analysis takes a closer look, first at the narratives within the United States surrounding conditionality in general, then at political conditionality, before finally touching on issues related to economic conditionality. This part gives us an indication of whether the general ideas (as mentioned above) take root in the narratives on conditionality. The second part confronts these narratives with the implementation in rules and practices. The following section questions whether a change has taken place in the U.S. policy regarding conditionality – narrative and practice – and attempts to link that change to the emergence of new donors.

6.1.1 Narratives on conditionality

Position on conditionality in the light of the rise of emerging donors

In all three donor countries, the issue of conditionality is subject to controversy. This can be partly explained by the international debate that largely focuses on the important issue of ownership – the idea that recipients need to “exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” for aid to be most effective (OECD 2008b, 3). While the principle of ownership is referred to in all three donor countries, the interpretation of ownership differs strongly. The United States show an early commitment to ownership but does not use the concept (like other countries that we look at) as contradicting conditional approaches. On the contrary, in the official narrative of the United States, ownership is seen as complementary to necessary conditions attached to development assistance (USAID 2004, 6; USDS 2010f, 94, 2015e, 36; Rice 21.10.2008, 1; Clinton 06.01.2010, 2, 30.11.2011, 1–2; Fine 06.06.2012, 5; USMCC 2008b, 28, 2008a, 18; U.S. Government 2010e, 1, 2010d, 2). For instance, a fact sheet evaluates policy conditionality next to ownership as an effective combination (USAID 2008, 2). The following quote illustrates that ownership is often grouped together with conditions:
“While we emphasize country ownership and the responsibility of the country […], we don’t leave them on their own. We let the countries take the lead but we don’t passively sit by” (USMCC 2004, 5).

During the ten years that this study observes, the idea that certain conditions lead to better growth rates has found support in the United States official narrative, which can be traced back to the idea that the United States is thought to stick more closely to its own values and to make its aid more visible (or effective) (for instance USAID 2002, 49; USMCC 2004, 5, 2008b, 2; USDS and USAID 2014, 31; USDS 2015a, 19).

Next to a general support for conditional approaches, a shift has taken place from _ex-post_-conditions towards a stronger selectivity in the choice of recipients (_ex-ante_ conditionality). The strategy for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), proclaimed already in 2002 that “[t]o be successful, international engagement must shift from conditionality to selectivity in foreign assistance” (USAID 2002, 49). To attach conditions to aid payments in the hope that recipients fulfil them afterwards is judged to be unrealistic (Shah 20.06.2011, 4). Stronger conditions attached to the selection process of candidates is seen, on the contrary, as enhancing the development process and potentially even benefiting the ownership process as seen above (USAID 2004, 17).

The institution best illustrating this shift towards stronger selection is the Millennium Challenge Cooperation, founded in 2003, which rewards worthy recipients for efforts to comply with good governance standards and sound economic policies. The preselection process is clearly introducing strong (political and economic) conditions on potential candidates, but the MCC administrators are eager to stress that after the selection process has taken place, country ownership stands as the most important principle when countries need to develop their own development strategies (USMCC 2007a, 3, 2008b, 1). Therefore, ownership is seen to accompany the increased selectivity process (USMCC 2011b, 3–4). The following quote illustrates this complex relationship between preselection and ownership:

“[W]e recognize that country ownership does not mean government ownership and control in all circumstances, especially in countries whose governments show little commitment to or interest in development or democracy. But it does mean working much more closely with and through committed governments and, as much as possible and appropriate, consultation with and ownership by those most affected by our programs. […] We will promote mutual accountability by prioritizing investments where partner nations have demonstrated high standards of transparency, good governance, and accountability – and where they make their own financial contributions to development” (USDS 2010f, 95).

MCC official documents demonstrate that countries are very eager to comply to MCC selective criteria as, for instance, in 2007 73 percent of all conditions were met on time (USMCC 2007a, 54; similarly in USMCC 2008a, 13). In 2013, Raj Shah, the USAID Administrator, stressed that the MCC’s “emphasis on the conditionality of aid” belongs to the best practices in American aid (Shah 20.03.2013, 1–2). The selective process is considered to be a success and labelled the “MCC effect”, as it creates an “incentive […] for candidate countries to adopt legal, policy, regulatory and institutional reforms” (USMCC 2006b, 30) and is “a catalyst for reforms” (US-
MCC 2006a, 44; similar argument in USMCC 2007a, 6), implying that MCC practices and standards start influencing other U.S. institutions. This, again, is closely related to the driving idea that American aid should be more visible and effective.

The other consequence that the United States draws as a reaction to emerging donors is that it needs to stick to its own, mainly political values, which calls for a greater emphasis on conditional approaches (as the previous chapter showed). Emerging donors – principally China – are seen to be undermining efforts to encourage recipients to reform (whether through ex-post or ex-ante conditions). During a congressional testimony in 2012, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, Christopher Smith, stated that Chinese aid undermines incentives to promote good governance models (C. H. Smith 29.03.2012, 3). Similarly, Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated in 2008 that “on occasion, it appears that China’s policies serve to undercut the efforts of others to use investment and development assistance to produce improved governance” (Christensen 05.06.2008, 1). While the tone of the narrative indicates an increase in the selectivity of potential candidates, there seems to be a certain wariness that especially in political conditions, China could undermine U.S. efforts. The next sections look closer into that argument and illustrate how successful the idea of making aid more politically conditional has been.

Political conditionality

The documents of the United States indicate that the country is very proud of its own achievements in terms of political development, referring to itself as a “beacon of freedom” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 42–43). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the U.S. vouches to “share the U.S. democratic experience” (USDS and USAID 2014, 19; similar arguments in USDS and USAID 2005, 98; USDS 2013e, 460, 2015a, 19; Rice 08.03.2006, 1; Clinton 06.01.2010, 4). Governing justly and democratically is considered to be one of the seven central pillars of America’s development cooperation and is also seen as being successful (USDS and USAID 2010, 90; USDS 2015e, 10-11, 30-31). Similar to the other two donors, democracy is seen for the United States as a factor for increasing the chances for development, for a more peaceful world which, in the end, should benefit the United States itself (Christensen 03.08.2006, 21; USDS 2005d, 200, 2010f, 10; USDS and USAID 2003, 19–20). Moreover, the narrative hints at a potential threat from emerging donors, mostly China, as it is feared that their support for rogue dictators might undermine the leverage the U.S. has on them:

“China makes few, if any, demands in terms of democratic norms and is certainly less inquisitive about how African leaders actually use agreed-upon credits – a stance which conflicts with the pro-democracy, good governance ethos that we and our traditional European partners promote” (Pham 29.03.2012, 51).

The next sections look in more details at three fields where the U.S. could implement the idea of sticking more to its values – first human rights, second good governance, and finally budget support.
Human rights

The promotion of human rights is seen as an “integral component of foreign policy” and thus by extension as a “key tool” of development cooperation (USDS 2009d, 1–2; Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 2). Human rights are considered to be an “American tradition” and the U.S. sees its own responsibility as a democracy to promote the protection of these rights anywhere in the world (Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 1; USDS 2012f, 1). Protecting human rights is seen as protecting U.S. national security and embedded in the National Security Strategy since 2002 (USDS 2004b, 1, 2011g, 6; U.S. Government 2010b, 5). Human rights-friendly countries are considered to be better cooperation partners, more stable and more peaceful (USDS 2005c, 2). The United States is seen in the leading position in “upholding and protecting the values that define America” (USDS 2010f, 10). While the United States is careful to stress that it is not “imposing [its] values on other countries by force”, it maintains the belief that the values are “cherished by people in every nation” (USDS 2010f, 10). Hence, human rights are considered to be core values of American society and a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Are these seen as endangered by emerging donors?

Within the United States government, a lot of effort has been put into the analysis of the effect China’s support of other nations might have on their human rights record (USDS 2012d, 393; Christensen 03.08.2006, 42; Kerry 04.11.2014, 2). In 2008, the U.S. resumed the human rights dialogue with China (USDS 2010a, 27). While the USA criticises the human rights abuses that are taking place in China, they are also wary of the potential impact China’s approach towards human rights could have on their own promotion of human rights (Shear 13.01.2010, 2). Ms Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, states in 2012:

“...My former boss, Ms. Pelosi, used to always say she was the skunk at the garden party when she would meet with foreign leaders because she would be raising concerns about human rights abuses. So I believe that we would continue to do that. I believe that the Chinese Government is not doing that. But I think we need to step up our game in terms of reaching out and hosting delegations” (Bartholomew 29.03.2012, 46).

This indicates that the U.S. plans to strengthen their human rights initiatives, even if it anticipates that “African countries can depend on China to avoid raising controversial human rights issues in the U.N. Human Rights Council, and on occasion, to even support them when they are criticized by Western countries” (Shinn 29.03.2012, 73). It seems therefore that the intention to strengthen human rights in the selective criteria is closely linked to the assumption that China might work in the opposite direction. The U.S. therefore attempts – through a more conditional approach – to balance the “Chinese pragmatism” which is thought to imply that countries no longer intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, a policy which is considered to be “immoral” (Blumenthal 03.08.2006, 272–73).

Good governance

Next to human rights, democracy is a value symbolic American value. Good governance – next to fair and free election process and a robust civil society – is seen as one of the “three core components of a working democracy” which explains why the U.S. puts a lot of effort into the
support of good governance in their development cooperation (USDS 2008d, 1). The U.S. documents define good governance as “including political pluralism and the rule of law, respect for human and civil rights of all citizens, protection of private property rights, commitment to transparency and accountability of governance, and fighting against corruption” (USMCC 2015a, 8). The underlying principle in promoting good governance policies through aid policies is that good governance leads to more peaceful countries that develop more robustly. It is seen as “perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development” (USAID 2002, 5). This explains why the U.S. often makes its aid conditional on good governance. It argues that good governance and democracy promotion is “central to U.S. national security and the global war on terror” (USDS and USAID 2007, 18; similar argument already in USAID 2002, 9) and forms a “cornerstone of a broader development agenda” (USDS 2011e, 366).

The United States sees itself as the leader worldwide in promoting democracy and good governance and wants to keep that position (USDS 2006b, 3). The emphasis on the need to encourage good governance and also to condition aid on successful implementation of good governance is strong throughout the observed period, and throughout all institutions of U.S. development assistance (for instance Rice 21.10.2008, 1; USMCC 2010, 9; Yun 21.03.2013, 1; Shah 20.06.2011, 2; Higginbottom 04.03.2014, 1).

The selective approach regarding good governance policies and especially the fight against corruption – pioneered by the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation – has been adopted in other institutions as well. Furthermore, the selective approach, even though it was present early on, has expanded over the time. Already in 2002, USAID’s foreign aid strategy advocated to tie aid closer to “demonstrations of political will for reform and good governance” (USAID 2002, 10). In 2003, USAID and the State department stated that

“USAID will embrace MCA principles of rewarding good governance and performance in our priorities for development resources. Our primary focus will be to provide targeted assistance to those countries creating a sound economic environment, embracing democratic governance, and investing in their people” (USDS and USAID 2003, vii).

Similarly, a 2004 USAID publication claims to give “substantial funding” for “top performers” (USAID 2004, 18). Equally, in 2005, the then Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, stated that the “MCC’s approach spreads a message that good governance and reform minded leaders will be rewarded” (Dobriansky 05.05.2005, 2; similar argument in USDS 2005a, 71). A fact sheet from the White House claims that the President has “charted a new era in development, predicating American aid on results and accountability” (U.S. Government 2010c, 1). The MCC effect, in turn, seems to be appreciated throughout U.S. official documents, claiming that the selective criteria of MCC have “motivated good governance and reforms” (USMCC 2008b, 5). In 2010, President Obama’s directive on global development policy took on the narrative of his predecessor by claiming that the United States “will give greater attention to pursuing policy reforms essential for development, including through [its] diplomatic engagement, as well as through the use of conditionality and performance-based mechanisms, wherever appropriate” (U.S. Government 2010f, 6). The directive also states that this “new approach to global development will focus [the] government on the critical task of helping to create a world with more prosperous and democratic states” (U.S. Government 2010f, 4). The launch of the Quadrennial report in 2010 – a report evaluating U.S. foreign policy – further emphasised
the need to concentrate U.S. efforts on worthy recipients (USDS 2010f). This principle is further confirmed by the annual letter of USAID which stated in 2011 “to deliver results more quickly, President Obama stressed that [American] foreign assistance must increasingly be directed toward countries committed to good governance” (USAID 2011a, 3). The MCC’s approach is praised again in 2011 where it is stated that even the willingness to say “no” to partnering with countries that do not meet the criteria fosters good governance (USMCC 2011a, 5). Sometimes, good governance seems to be the only indicator of MCC that is emphasised:

“As an innovative and independent United States foreign aid agency that is fighting global poverty through economic growth, MCC optimizes the effectiveness of limited development resources by partnering only with countries committed to good governance, designing and leading their own projects, and delivering tangible and sustainable results to benefit the poor” (USMCC 2012a, 3).

While the U.S. selects and rewards countries that it deems to have a good governance record, U.S. documents equally stress that when a country does not fulfil the obligations of upholding that standard after receiving money, the U.S. needs to respond quickly — by withdrawing money from corrupt leaders (for instance USAID 2002, 10). Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, says in 2010 that “the American taxpayer cannot pick up the tab for those who are able but unwilling to help themselves” (Clinton 06.01.2010, 2–3). An example where the U.S. withdrew money was Mali after a military government seized control in March 2012 (USMCC 2011a, 21). Similarly, the MCC board discussed the possibility of suspending the contract for Malawi because of failures in good governance standards (USMCC 2012d, 3).

It is obvious that the U.S. attempts to portray itself as sticking very closely to its own principles and selective criteria and conditions. However, it also becomes clear from the U.S. publications that its actions might not have an impact on the recipients if it acts alone. In 2002, the USAID foreign aid strategy stated that “reductions in U.S. assistance will not do much to change the behaviour of political leaders if their governments continue to receive significant aid from other donors” (USAID 2002, 11, 44). This thought that only international sanctions and standards can lead to significant changes in recipients’ behaviour is the most important link to emerging donors. A particularly blunt testimony from Donald Yamamoto, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S. State Department is taken here as an example to illustrate the doubts that the United States have regarding China’s influence on good governance policies. China is often blamed for

“undermin[ing] international efforts to promote good governance, revenue transparency, and responsible natural resource management. Corrupt activities by Chinese firms result in poor-quality goods and services. We are pushing China to accede to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Chinese foreign assistance is a trade tool favouring Chinese businesspeople in project bidding and undercutting transparency and fairness. Chinese labour practices and lack of technology transfer and advance training also does not help Africa” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 8).

This quote is telling in many ways: first, one sees that the U.S. attempts to socialise China to international standards (like the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). Second, China is blamed for “corrupt activities” of its firms, for bad labour practices and for a lack of technology transfer. Basically, the statement criticises the whole concept of Chinese aid to Africa. Further on, Yamamoto points out that there are major differences between Chinese and American approaches...
towards good governance and democratic values (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 22–23). When asked by a member of the Commission to give an example of how China undermines American standards, Yamamoto stated “that [Chinese] do not share a lot of the areas that we have advocated” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 22–23). The conclusion for Yamamoto, exemplifying here the approach of the United States as a whole, is to advocate greater commitment to its standards, most importantly to “good governance and democratic values” (Yamamoto 29.03.2012, 28).

Generally, then, the United States advocates a stronger selectivity, rewarding recipients with good governance policies and thereby increasing political conditionality. The general idea of sticking more to American values is therefore manifested in the narrative in the field of good governance. Moreover, the idea of socialising emerging donors (especially China) is present in some of the political areas.

**Budget support**

Budget support – the disbursement of aid funds directly to a recipient government’s budget – serves here as an illustration for the political conditions that are required in this tool and to support the arguments that were brought forward so far. It can also be argued that through budget support donors lose a certain control over the money as the aid is – after disbursement – fully in the hands of the recipient government. Therefore a strong support of budget support might be indicative of a lessening of conditions attached to aid. However, the selection process for recipients of budget support might again introduce selective criteria that could be classified as *ex-ante* conditions.

In early publications of the period under study, the use of budget support is generally endorsed. For instance, the U.S. government consistently supported the budgets of the governments of Pakistan, Jordan and Lebanon. It is, however, interesting to look at the actual terminology of that support. Regarding Pakistan, budget support is used to “support continued reforms in the education, economic governance, and health sectors” (USDS 2003, 437; similar in USDS 2004a, 45). In 2005, the reform towards a more “participatory democratic governance” is envisioned (U.S. Government 2005, 8; similar in USDS 2006b, 8, 2007, 566). Similarly, for Jordan’s budget support, the U.S. pledges that the money is aimed to support “democratisation, accessibility of education and health care, and judicial reform” (USDS 2007, 48). Often, therefore, the attribution of budget support is tied to *ex-post* conditions, implying that once the money is transferred, several initiatives are requested from the recipient (USDS 2007, 128–29).

Generally, though, budget support is seen in U.S. publications as an ambiguous tool. Especially in more recent years, budget support has been used simply to cancel a government’s debt (USDS 2013b, 493, 2014b, 498). Moreover, statements like the following support the argument that the success of budget support in terms of results (for instance regarding reforms) is limited:

\[\text{For a similar understanding of budget support as being a tool that enhances ownership and limits conditionality, see Klingebiel (2014, 55–65).}\]
“And when we do partner with developing country ministries, it’s critical that we do so with great care. Many donors simply write big checks to poor countries and call it development” (USAID 2012a, 28).

Similarly, budget support is thought of to be a tool with “non tangible results” (USAID 2008, 4). While the unconditional support of another country’s budget is seen as highly problematic, it is often referred to as something that might attract recipients to emerging donors, such as China. In a hearing assessing China’s role in Africa, J. Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council made the following telling comment in a testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

“Mr. Chairman, before coming to this hearing, I hosted an luncheon for an African head of state who you brought up earlier, and I actually posed to him the question of what would he say if he were in my seat here. If you permit me, this is a quote from him: ‘Why can’t we find a formula where America makes investments with Africa without complicated packaging? We are tired of people asking questions which no answers will ever satisfy them.’ […] That China may be doing it for self-interested commercial reasons, but it does give an out for certain people who prefer not to have questions raised” (Pham 29.03.2012, 86).

This quote convincingly illustrates the worries that are attached to the policy of insisting on the attachment of conditions to budget support or aid more generally. But it equally shows that the United States is very committed to attaching political conditions – regarding good governance and human rights – to its aid because it arguably results in better aid. Next to requesting political reforms, the U.S. stresses the importance of sound macroeconomic policies before supporting a country with budget support. They are referring to the lending policies of the international development bank which published guidelines in 2005, stating that budget support is only given after “assessments of the applicants’ public financial management systems and identification” (USDOT 2012c, 14). These criteria that the USA seems to adapt from international financial institutions refer to criteria linked to economic conditionality, that the following section addresses in more detail.

### Economic conditionality

The difference between traditional and emerging donors when it comes to political conditions is very obvious to any observer. But differences also exist in the realm of economic conditionality. While emerging donors refrain from imposing any kind of conditions, there are stronger differences when it comes to economic conditionality within the group of traditional donors. In order to illustrate the potential changes within economic conditionality towards emerging donors, the following two sections concentrate on the vision of the United States on the economic conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank, as those two international institutions are often referred to when it comes to economic conditions. The second section focuses on imposing macroeconomic conditions that are specific to the United States. Like the section on political conditions, the main question addressed here is whether the general ideas about emerging donors (the need to stick to its own values, the call for more visibility and the idea of socialising emerging donors) have an influence on the narrative on economic conditionality.
Position towards the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

The U.S. is often thought of as the strongest supporter of, or maybe even the gatekeeper to, the Bretton Woods institutions. This support is perceptible in publications which mention the two sister institutions throughout the ten years observed here. The International Monetary Fund is referred to as the “foremost international institution for promoting global financial stability” (USDOT 2014, 1; similar statement of support USDOT 2010b, 3, 2011b, 2, 2013b, 2). Similarly, the World Bank is seen as a very important institution internationally and the U.S. commitment as its “largest shareholder” as essential to maintaining “strong leadership” that provides “significant leverage – both in financial resources from other donors for development assistance, and in adoption of policy and institutional reforms in line with U.S. development goals” (USDOT 2010b, 15). Within the World Bank, the USA maintains a very high share of the funds (16.4% in the IBRD, USDOT 2010b, 16).

Investments and memberships in these two institutions are seen as “a cost-effective way to promote U.S. national security, support broad-based and sustainable economic growth, and address key global challenges like environmental degradation, while fostering private sector development and entrepreneurship” (USDS 2014a, 123; U.S. Government 2006, 30).

In the following sections on the United Kingdom and on Norway, we see a prominent criticism of the lending activities, and especially the conditional approach of the IMF and the World Bank. Within the United States, such criticism is very subdued. On the contrary, throughout the last ten years, the United States has remained one of the defenders of IMF and World Bank’s economic conditionality. The United States “has been an advocate of conditionality on IMF loans and has supported the Fund’s increased focus on results-oriented lending”, while the United States, because of its veto power within the IMF, has the possibility to intervene at any time (USDOT 2004, 13, 2005, 14, 2009, 19, 2010a, 22, 2011a, 24, 2012a, 22). Several conditional approaches have long been endorsed and supported by the United States. For instance, the USA supports the conditionality of IMF lending that recipients strengthen the independence of their monetary authorities (USDOT 2004, 4, 2007, 3, 2009, 3, 2011a, 4, 2012a, 5, 2013a, 4). Similarly, the United States backs the IMF in making its aid conditional on certain good governance performance indicators and request for reforms in various countries (for instance in 2004 in Malawi, USDOT 2004, 9; in Kenya and Nigeria in 2005 USDOT 2005, 9; in Ghana in 2011 USDOT 2009, 17; in Tunisia in 2012 USDOT 2012a, 15; and others, USDOT 2007, 9–10, 2009, 12–13, 2010a, 17, 2012a, 15, 2013a, 13–14). When the requests of reforms remain unfulfilled the USA is a strong advocate for sanctions or the suspension of funds (USAID 2002, 50, 10-11).

Another conditional approach that the U.S. supports is the request of the IMF for privatization (cases involve many countries, for instance, Cameroon in 2004 USDOT 2004, 3; Egypt in 2004 USDOT 2005, 3–4; Burundi USDOT 2009, 4; Nigeria USDOT 2011a, 5–6; and Tanzania USDOT 2012a, 5–6).

Further on, the United States supports the IMF in requesting poverty reduction strategy papers from recipients and that countries undergo reform in favour of macroeconomic stability (USDOT 2004, 10, 2005, 10, 2007, 11, 2009, 14, 2010a, 17, 2011a, 18, 2012a, 17, 2013a, 15). Regarding markets and liberalization, the United States first endorses the demands of the Fund (for instance for Nigeria, USDOT 2005, 14), but equally pushed for a change within the Fund to review its work on trade policy, beginning in 2014. While the plan “deemphasizes” trade
policy as an element of programme conditionality, it still stresses the need for trade liberalization where necessary (USDOT 2011a, 25). In summary, the United States supports and directs the Fund’s policy on conditionality but supports strongly the “modernized IMF conditionality”, that leads to “more focused” and “tailored” loan disbursements (USDOT 2010b, 7).

Very similar to this support for the IMF is U.S. support for the World Bank. The United States endorsed the review of the Bank’s practices on conditionality in 2005 and 2006, congratulating the Bank in 2009 that it has made “significant progress in streamlining conditionality in its development policy operations” and “reduced the number of legally binding conditions” (USDS 2012g, 36). Comparable to the development within U.S. development policy, the Bank endorsed pre-selective criteria and thresholds, copying in effect the set-up of the MCC. The U.S. proudly stated that “the World Bank designed its new Program-for-Results financing instrument in part on MCC’s model” (USMCC 2012b, 25). Similarly, the U.S. has made constant use of the World Bank’s indicators, for instance to measure policy reforms, or corruption (USMCC 2012c, 4). Moreover, the World Bank reports back that because of the selective criteria of MCC, many candidates have queried the Bank on how to improve their scores; for instance, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania (USMCC 2007b, 73), or Ghana and Indonesia (USMCC 2013, 20) or Togo in 2014 (USMCC 2014, 4).

The link to emerging donors is twofold: first, the United States advocates reforms within both institutions in order to reflect the changes in economic realities, amplified through the financial crisis of 2008. The U.S. especially advocates for a greater representativeness of China (Clinton 28.07.2009, 2). A quota reform within the IMF is strongly supported by the U.S. government “[t]o better reflect today’s global economic realities” (USDOT 2010b, 5, 8). While it argues for a higher share of emerging economies, the USA also fights to maintain a share high enough to retain its veto power over the Fund’s policies. The first quota change left the U.S. share “virtually unchanged at 17.4 percent” (USDOT 2011b, 6, 2012b, 8). Even if the government seems to approve of the quota reforms within the IMF, they have not been ratified by Congress, despite government publications urging Congress to ratify them in order to “preserve that leadership” of the IMF and not to “jeopardize it” (USDOT 2013b, 6–7, 2014, 3; USDS 2013c, 130, 2013e, 189; Kerry 19.09.2014, 5). While emphasising the strong position within the IMF, the U.S. is equally keen to promote the role of the World Bank, especially “in contrast to bilateral investments from China, which is often the only alternative available”, indicating that the alternative is nothing the U.S. should support or encourage (USDOT 2011b, 11).

This section argued that the U.S. support for economic conditionality is strong, that America shapes the lending policies and the conditions attached to their lending policies of the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, it argued that the U.S. is eager to maintain the two multilateral institutions under its leadership, also against an increasingly threatening Chinese rival.

*Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies*

As the previous section has already demonstrated, the fact that the United States promotes a neoliberal version of capitalism is well documented and influential in development aid.

The promotion of economic growth and prosperity is linked to the belief that a free and competitive economy works best for the needs of a developing country and is one of seven pillars of American development cooperation (USDS and USAID 2010, 4; similar argument in USDS
and USAID 2007, 10). Raj Shah, Administrator of USAID, stated in 2013 that “aid should be conditional on real commitment to reform – including […] making market-oriented policies” (Shah 20.03.2013, 3). John Kerry claimed in 2014 that any foreign policy is inevitably an economic policy (USDS 2015e, 11). These statements confirm research on the influential rejection of welfare policies or any kind of involvement of the state in the economy (Lancaster 2007, 93–99).

The above sections have shown that the general idea of sticking more to American values clearly influences the narrative on political and economic aid conditionality. Moreover, it showed that the American fear of a powerful China might be the driving force for increased selectivity in the choice of good, worthy recipients. The following section now asks whether this increasing narrative for a stronger selectivity is also evident in rules and practices.

6.1.2 Rules and practices on conditionality

The following sections investigate whether the ideas prevalent within the United States narrative – the general idea of sticking more to its values, of more visibility for its aid efforts, and the idea of socialising emerging donors – are influential in the two layers of rules and practices regarding conditionality. The theoretical chapter argued that idea-driven change within these two layers would be less likely to happen and generally more difficult in is a well-established, traditional thematic field, such as conditionality.

Identifying the rules of the institution of American development cooperation is not difficult. It suffices to look into the legal framework within which the United States gives foreign aid. Generally, not much has changed in the legal framework between 2002 and 2014, with one, significant, exception: the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004.

The legal set-up of MCC selective criteria with which potential candidates for receiving grants are rated gives an indication of what kind of selective criteria the USA deems important for aid to be successful. In 2004, at the first MCC selection process, 16 indicators were used to determine whether a country is electable for MCC support. Generally, the indicators are separated into three broad categories: (1) ruling justly; (2) investing in people; and (3) encouraging economic freedom. The overall trend consists in an increasing number of indicators that a candidate needs to fulfil in order to access MCC funds: while 16 indicators were used in 2004, 21 were used to decide whether a country gets MCC support in 2015 (USMCC 2004, 9–10, 2015b, 1–11). Generally, then, an increase in selectivity can be noted within the rules of the MCC. While the ruling justly category remained stable throughout the years with 6 indicators, the category investing in people increased from 4 indicators in 2004 to 7 in 2015. Similarly, the category encouraging economic freedom increased from 6 to 8 indicators. Moreover, in the small print, it is stated in 2004 that in order to pass the selective test, a country needed to score above the median in relation to its peers on at least half of the indicators in each of the three policy categories and above the median on the corruption indicators (USMCC 2004, 9–10). In 2012, however, while these requirements were upheld, countries also needed to score above average in

102 I refer here to 2002 (even if it is not in the observed period) because this year marked a significant shift in U.S. foreign aid policy with the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act which restored development assistance to a more significant area of foreign policy which influenced all of the following years.
either the civil liberties or the political rights indicators, further increasing political conditions (USMCC 2012c, 20).

So far, then, everything indicates that a strengthening of conditionality has taken place – on the layers of narratives and that of the general rules. More detailed analysis of the specific rules related to each issue are further discussed below. Moreover, the next pages bring clarity to the question of whether these changes also show results in the third layer – practices.

As stated in the introduction, 11 countries were selected to look at practices. For the United States, the selection consists of their top 2, 3, and 4 recipients. Its top recipient, Iraq, is not included in this study because emerging donors are not sufficiently involved here. The following table gives an idea of how much aid the U.S. distributed to the selected country in the last year that this study takes into consideration – 2014. The overall bilateral aid disbursed by the United States in 2014 was USD 27 billion.\(^{103}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD stats, figures for U.S. from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013)

The following paragraphs investigate the disbursements to these 11 selected case studies over the period of ten years and ask whether the increase in conditionality that was noticeable in the layers of narratives and general rules is also present in the layer of practices.

\(^{103}\) Note that from the selected 11 countries, only 5 receive assistance through the MCC: Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia whereas Uganda only received threshold funding. This is already an indication that not all countries fulfil the selective criteria (D. Johnson, Goldstein-Pless, and Zajong 2014, 15).
Political conditionality

The narrative surrounding political conditionality suggests a strong increase in political conditionality, especially in terms of preselection. The next section addresses the question of how strongly this commitment is implemented in reality. The next sections look first at the overall amount spent by the United States in the field, and then at particular case studies where a rivalry with emerging donors exists.

Human rights

The narrative surrounding human rights treated the promotion of human rights as an integral aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The following section asks if this commitment has been accompanied by a relevant shift in the rules and in the funding and whether or not the selective criteria are applied in U.S. development cooperation.

Formally, U.S. development cooperation of any institution – USAID or the MCC or any other – is required to abstain from distributing money to “any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights” (U.S. Government 1961; amended 2002, 59–60). Within the selective criteria of the MCC, political and civil rights are indicators to rate potential candidates. Many of the indicators assessing the suitability of candidates for MCC funds relate to human rights. Especially in the first category, many indicators look at the respect of political rights (indicators for political and civil rights, but also indicator of the rule of law or of freedom of information). The second and third category strongly emphasise the importance of economic, social and cultural rights (access to health, education, gender equality). Moreover, since 2012, each successful candidate must pass either the threshold in political or in civil rights. Therefore, the importance attached to the respect of civil and political rights has increased in the last ten years (USMCC 2012c, 20, 2015b). Similarly, in 2010, the U.S. State Department changed the position of Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs to the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human rights, as human rights are seen as “a key priority that reflects American values” (USDS 2010f, 42–43). Overall, the rules have born growing testament to the conditionality of foreign aid even though the initial importance of human rights was already present in 2002. What, then, about the practices?

Within the U.S. budget on foreign aid, the section democracy, human rights and governance is particularly relevant here. Within that category, one indicator is dedicated to human rights and the rule of law alone. Over the last ten years, significant amounts have been transferred through this account. A steady increase took place until 2013 (up to USD 1 billion) with a slight decrease in 2014 (USD 636 million) (USDS 2008c, 2009b, 2010c, 2011c, 2012a, 2013a, 2014c). In percentage terms this amounts to an average of 2.4 percent spent on the promotion of human rights and the rule of law within the foreign aid budget with peaks in relative terms of 3 percent in 2012 and 2013. This amounts to a decent share within the budget and is comparable to the amounts spent by the UK and Norway. Moreover, with the increasing share within the budget, first general figures seem to confirm the increasing narrative on the importance of human rights policies.

In order to assess whether the U.S. also applies its narrative when it comes to being more selective with its aid recipients in terms of respect for human rights, two indicators are used here:
first, we look at the main destinations of U.S. aid and compare those with the ratification of the most important human rights treaties. Second, we focus on the indicator for rule of law within the 11 selected recipients and whether U.S. spending on these countries is consistent with the positive or negative trends of their rule of law indicator.

The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights rates countries depending on their ratification of the most important human rights treaties (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015). The scale is divided into four groups whereby the lowest section is for countries that have ratified below four treaties, the highest category is for countries that have ratified more than 15 human rights treaties. The United States, arguing in its narrative strongly for the defence of human rights, scores itself only in the second category for countries that have ratified in between five and nine human rights treaties. It is thereby in the lowest category of our three donors as Norway and the United Kingdom are both in the third category (having ratified 10 to 14 human rights treaties). Moreover, the United States is in the same category as India and most interestingly China which it criticises highly for human rights violations. It equally scores below South Africa (10 to 14 ratifications) and Brazil (the only country represented here with more than 15 ratifications).

What about the biggest recipients of U.S. aid? Iraq and Afghanistan (first and second biggest recipients) score both above the United States with 10 to 14 ratifications. Similarly, Nigeria (tenth biggest recipient), the Democratic Republic of Congo (11th biggest recipient), Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique (respectively 14th, 15th and 16th biggest recipient) as well as Malawi (33rd biggest recipient) have all ratified 10 to 14 human rights treaties and thereby more than the United States itself. From the selected cases above, Sudan, Ethiopia (third and fourth biggest recipients) as well as Zambia (18th biggest recipients) as well as Nigeria (tenth biggest recipients) are in a similarly low position than the United States with 5 to 9 ratifications (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015). Moreover, the United States funds substantial amounts to South Sudan that has (so far) only up to four human rights treaties ratifications and scores in the lowest category. This first indication seems to contradict a higher preselection in U.S. aid.

Another relevant way to measure the commitment to implementing the human rights condition in aid distributions is to look at the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank (World Bank Group 2015). The indicator rule of law assesses the human rights situation in recipient countries. This indicator “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the policy, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (World Bank Group 2015). The indicator varies on a scale from 0 points to 100 (top performers). When looking at the Worldwide Governance Indicators for the rule of law, one notices that increased levels of the rule of law indicator do not necessarily indicate a higher spending of U.S. aid. Top U.S. recipients, like for instance Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all have a rule of law score of below 10 points. Nigeria scores slightly better with an average of 11.56 points, but still presides over a dire human rights record. All these countries receive funding to improve their human rights records. In Afghanistan, for instance, the percentage spent on the promotion of human rights increased from 3 percent in

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104 Other top recipients also are in this low category of 5 to 9 ratifications: Pakistan (fifth biggest recipient), Kenya (sixth biggest recipient), Palestine (seventh biggest recipient) and Jordan (eighth biggest recipient). Moreover, Colombia (ninth biggest recipient) is in the category above the United States itself (10 to 14 ratifications).
2006 of the overall amount spent to nearly 14 percent in 2010. For the Democratic Republic of Congo, only 2 percent is spent on average for improving the rule of law, which is similarly low in the case of South Sudan which receives 2.2 percent for the rule of law. The cases of Sudan and Nigeria are even lower with an average spending of 0.10 (Sudan) and 0.16 percent (Nigeria). Countries that fare rather well on the rule of law indicator are Ethiopia (average of 29.58 points, increasing trend since 2009), Uganda (with 41.82 points on average, increasing trend overall) and Zambia (average of slightly above 39 points, increasing trend since 2010). These improving records on the rule of law indicator are not necessarily matched with increasing amounts of aid spending as the case of Ethiopia shows: its rule of law indicator improved from 23.7 points in 2009 to 38.9 points in 2014, while spending decreased from 3.1 percent in 2010 to 2.42 percent in 2014. Sometimes, an increase in the rule of law indicator is matched with an increase in funds. This is the case for Zambia where a slight increase has taken place in the last four years. Similarly, Uganda’s increase in the rule of law indicator are met with an increasing of funds from 1.28 percent in 2004 and 1.71 percent in 2014.

Another group of countries equally has comparably high scores for the rule of law indicator but with slightly decreasing tendencies (Malawi with an average of 49.63 points and a slightly decreasing trend since 2009, Mozambique with 31.95 points on average and a decreasing tendency since 2010, and Tanzania (average of 40.60 points, slightly decreasing tendencies since 2004). The aid practices illustrate that these decreasing trends are not met with aid cuts but on the contrary with increasing funds (an increase for Malawi from receiving 0.37 percent of U.S. aid in 2008 to 0.76 percent in 2013, for Mozambique a doubling of aid percentage from roughly 1 percent in 2008 to 2 percent in 2013). Similarly, funding for Tanzania has almost quadrupled despite from 2004 to 2014 (from 0.55 percent to 1.85 percent) despite its decreasing scores in the rule of law indicator.

The human rights situation in Sudan was critical during the Darfur crisis. In 2005, the United States claimed that it attempted to influence the Sudanese government and militia leaders through diplomatic pressure, media interviews and multilateral engagement (USDS 2005b, 1). The rule of law indicator for Sudan is therefore unsurprisingly low for the whole period with the lowest points in 2005 but generally with an increase in the indicators (even though they remain at a low 9.48 points in 2014. U.S. funding to Sudan was highest during the time when the rule of law indicator was lowest (from 2005 till 2010) with above 3.5 percent of U.S. aid. Since then the aid to Sudan has decreased to 0.93 percent (in 2014) despite rising levels in the rule of law indicator. This decrease was however met by the funding to the newly founded South Sudan that received increasing funding from an initial 0.21 percent in 2011 to 2.89 percent in 2014. Again, this increase in funding to South Sudan cannot be explained by an improvement in the human rights situation as the rule of law indicator has constantly decreased (from an initial 5.63 points in 2011 to 1.00 points in 2014) (World Bank Group 2015).

From the eleven countries studied here, only two (Zambia and Uganda) show a consistency between the rhetoric and the practices while all the others indicate a deviation from the practices.105 The idea of sticking to and defending U.S.-American values has only very limited consequences in the practices. This section has illustrated that despite a vocal rhetoric on supporting

105 Shannon Blanton and David Cingranelli (2012) also argue that the United States has a very ambiguous relationship towards the role of human rights in their aid allocation (for a similar argument, see Breuning and Linebarger...
countries that foster human rights, the practices indicate that other factors play a significant role in the distribution of aid and that strict pre-selective criteria that were advocated for in the narratives and in the rules are not strictly implemented in practice.

**Good governance**

Similar to the set-up of rules regarding human rights, the fostering of good governance is not a completely new policy. Since 2002, good governance is anchored as one of the five principal goals of U.S. development cooperation policy (U.S. Government 1961; amended 2002, 19). In order to implement conditionality on good governance, the U.S. uses several tools: A first important indicator for selecting countries is the control of corruption (USAID 2002, 9). The control of corruption was the only threshold that potential candidates for MCC needed to pass to be selected (USMCC 2007b, 74–75, 2008b, 30, 2009, 12). The MCC not only insists on the passing of the corruption indicators, potential candidates must also score better than their peers in other categories that are related to good governance: for instance the government effectiveness indicator assesses the quality of public services, and the quality of the government’s responses to internal and external challenges (USMCC 2015b), while the category investing in people assesses the government’s involvement in providing necessary services to the public (for instance by measuring how much of the GDP is spent on health services, primary education, etc.). The third category of encouraging economic freedom also assesses the ruling quality of a government as well as its trade policy (USMCC 2015b). When the MCC was created, it was thought to fulfil a “mission to reward good performers”, and good performers in good governance in particular (USMCC 2004, 7, 2006b, 6).

Comparable to the MCC, USAID divides countries into four categories, each of which requires a different approach in order to conduct successful development policies: first electoral democracies with some problems in democratic performance (for instance Bangladesh, Brazil, South Africa). For these countries, USAID foresees a strengthening of governance, but largely by using government channels. The second group are referred to as quasi-democracies with ambiguous regimes (for instance Nigeria). Those countries are thought to need help with the electoral process. The third group consists of countries that are classified as electoral authoritarian regimes (with truly contested elections Georgie, Kenya, Tanzania or not Azerbaijan, Belarus). Here a focus is put on the emphasis of civil society. Lastly, the closed authoritarian regimes (such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo) where USAID needs to work almost exclusively with the civil society and not with the ruling elites (USAID 2002, 9-10, 44-46). Hence, within the rules, the rewarding of good governance was strong from the beginning and remains strong throughout the observed period. No further strengthening has taken place in this regard despite the intensified narrative. What about the last remaining layer – the practices?

In order to evaluate whether the importance attached to good governance in the narratives and in the rules is implemented in practice, it is illuminating to look at the spending on good governance by the United States as a share of its overall aid budget. Overall, the United States

2012; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Easterly and Williamson 2011). Other studies find that human rights play a role in development assistance since the end of the Cold War, but without a clear positive relationship between aid and human rights standards (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). Furthermore, Christopher Fariss (2010) finds that countries with human rights abuses receive more food aid from the USA than other states. The U.S. is not alone, however, in this neglect of rewarding or punishing human rights policies, as Richard Nielsen (2013) shows.
spends 17.20 percent of its aid budget on the sector government and civil society of which 14.25 percent is directed at specific government and civil society projects whereas the remaining 3 percent is spent on conflict related governance projects – which are not directly related to good governance projects. The share of projects related to government and civil society in general within the aid budget is rather unsteady, peaking in 2004 with 18.36 percent and again in 2011 with 16.42 percent with low points of spending in 2006 (8.07 percent) and in 2008 and 2014 (with about 13 percent). Overall, compared to the other two donors here, the United States contributes the highest share of its aid budget to government and civil society in general, slightly ahead of Norway (with 13.25 percent on average) and clearly ahead of the United Kingdom (with 10.90 percent on average) (OECD Stat 2015a). While this is congruent with the strong narrative within the United States, the unsteady commitment contradicts the narrative that allows us to assume that the United States would strengthen its support for good governance projects instead of keeping it steady.

In order to see whether the narrative on a stronger pre-selection of worthy recipients does indeed take place in U.S. foreign assistance, this study uses further Worldwide Governance Indicators. These six useful indicators are provided by the World Bank and attempt to quantify what is generally understood by good governance and rates all countries on a scale from 0 (lowest possible rate) to 100 (highest possible rate). The indicator on political stability and the absence of terrorism is less relevant here as the narrative on good governance of all three donors largely refers to the quality of government rather than the security of a country. The rule of law indicator was already taken into account in the sections on human rights; the remaining four indicators are taken into account here106. The following table briefly summarises the content that is measured through each indicator:

Table 6-3: Definition of World Governance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td>Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory quality</td>
<td>Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators

106 Note that the indicator for regulatory quality is discussed in the section on economic conditionality.
The following table gives an indication of the average score over a period from 2004 to 2014 of the 11 selected recipients on all five indicators. Moreover, the arrow next to the number indicates whether the trend regarding the indicator is positive (↑), negative (↓) or stable in the last ten years (→) with the slope of the trendline of the number in brackets. Note that all figures are ranks that range between 0 and 100 points, 100 being the best possible result, 0 the worst.

\[^{107}\] The figures for South Sudan only take the years since its independence (2011) into account.
The next section looks at the tendency in U.S. spending compared to the score on governance indicators and asks whether, the proclaimed selective approach has been implemented in practice. This could be seen if worthy recipients (with high and improving scores in the governance indicators) are rewarded whereas bad performers are punished. Several observations can be made from the analysis:

There is a first group of countries where no clear relationship between the governance indicators and aid spending can be established. One of these cases is Ethiopia. It received considerable shares of U.S. aid in 2008 and in 2010 (both above 3 percent). Since then, the scores had lowered to 2.42 percent by 2014. The record of governance indicators for Ethiopia are mixed: whereas

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Table 6-4: Worldwide Governance Indicators for chosen recipients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>Voice and accountability</th>
<th>Government effectiveness</th>
<th>Regulatory quality</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
<th>Control of corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>12.46 (0.1156)</td>
<td>6.85 (0.3412)</td>
<td>5.82 (0.213)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.19 (0.0902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>8.45 (0.2334)</td>
<td>2.28 (0.134)</td>
<td>6.54 (0.1615)</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>4.43 (0.1563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>13.14 (0.3946)</td>
<td>35.63 (1.3179)</td>
<td>17.10 (0.1149)</td>
<td>29.58</td>
<td>30.48 (1.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>39.56 (0.9786)</td>
<td>32.55 (1.0718)</td>
<td>31.13 (0.7985)</td>
<td>49.63</td>
<td>34.96 (0.4328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>44.66 (-0.847)</td>
<td>33.54 (-1.0437)</td>
<td>34.54 (0.8033)</td>
<td>31.95</td>
<td>35.30 (-0.4525)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>26.95 (0.2496)</td>
<td>14.65 (0.3896)</td>
<td>22.38 (1.1118)</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>12.26 (-0.1616)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>11.50 (-4.289)</td>
<td>2.40 (0.2949)</td>
<td>4.54 (0.2934)</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>2.40 (-0.0156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.47 (-0.1778)</td>
<td>7.24 (-0.5495)</td>
<td>7.78 (-0.4401)</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>4.73 (-0.3919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>41.77 (0.5208)</td>
<td>35.63 (-1.8104)</td>
<td>37.82 (0.2487)</td>
<td>40.60</td>
<td>34.04 (-1.8481)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>31.47 (0.084)</td>
<td>36.96 (-0.6493)</td>
<td>47.23 (-1.0105)</td>
<td>41.82</td>
<td>19.42 (-1.0861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>40.61 (0.8196)</td>
<td>27.05 (1.9325)</td>
<td>32.79 (0.6699)</td>
<td>39.01</td>
<td>35.30 (1.9674)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators, average between 2004 and 2014 (own calculations)

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108 The slope is based on the trendline from the entries from 2004 to 2014 and indicates a positive trend (above 0.5, ↑), a negative trend (below -0.5, ↓), a rather positive trend (between 0.1-0.49, halfway upward arrow), a rather negative trend (between -0.1 and -0.5, halfway downward arrow), or rather stable (between 0.09 and -0.09, →).
its voice and accountability indicator was highest in 2006 (with 15.9 points) and has lowered since, the control of corruption indicator has improved since 2009 to nearly 41 points in 2014, together with the government effectiveness indicator. The relationship between the indicators and the amounts of aid remains unclear (corruption indicator and government effectiveness indicator are rewarded whereas the voice and accountability indicator is ignored).

A second group contains cases where the narrative of rewarding good performers or punishing bad performers is respected in practice: this is the case for Nigeria and Zambia. Nigeria’s governance records are mixed: while the voice and accountability indicator has improved since 2009, the indicator of government effectiveness decreased from 20 points in 2005 to 11.54 points in 2014, but peaked to 16.27 points in 2013, the control of corruption indicator has decreased considerably since 2008 (where it was at a respectable 21 points and ended at a lamentable 7.2 points in 2014). U.S. aid levels peaked in 2013, together with the indicator on government effectiveness, possibly pointing towards some congruence. Nevertheless, the corruption index deteriorated. Another example where good records are rewarded is Zambia: its indicators for voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality as well as the corruption indicator have improved or remained relatively high since 2009. In congruence with this trend, aid levels of the United States peaked in the last three years (2012 to 2014) at 1.2 percent of U.S. ODA.

A third group contains countries that generally have a very low record on governance indicators but still receive significant amounts of aid. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan receive considerable amounts of U.S. funding and generally have a very low score on the governance indicators (for the DRC all below 9 points, receives nevertheless 1.6 percent of U.S. aid and is their 11th biggest recipient; Sudan receives an average of 2.8 percent of U.S. aid and scores below 8 points on average on all indicators; similarly, South Sudan scores below 7 points on all indicators except for voice and accountability (average of 11.5 points) and receives 1.5 percent of U.S. funding; for Afghanistan, indicators for voice and accountability score at 12.46 on average, all other indicators score on average below 10 points while Afghanistan receives an average of 8.4 percent of U.S. aid). Much of the rhetoric regarding the apprehension about China’s involvement in Africa turned around the issue of Sudan. The figures show however, that the United States have never abandoned the support of Sudan completely despite their official narrative.

This group, together with Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania finally forms a last group of countries illustrating that the United States actually acts contrary to its proclaimed rhetoric of rewarding worthy recipients. Aid levels to Afghanistan were highest in 2009 with 11.8 percent of U.S. aid going to that country. Since then, the aid levels have consistently been lowered to 7 percent in 2014. The governance indicators point towards a different trend: all indicators have improved considerably since 2011, despite being still on a very low scale of mostly below 10 points (with the exception of voice and accountability and regulatory quality). This improving behaviour of the Afghan government has not been met with increasing funds from the side of the United States, even though it is still the second biggest recipient of U.S. aid. Another case is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which receives very irregular funding from the United States. Aid levels peaked in 2006 with nearly 4 percent and in 2011 with 4.7 percent. Both peaks were met with considerable drops in aid spending (to 0.7 percent in 2007 and 1.1 percent in 2012). The years prior to the first peak in 2006 show an improvement in indicators for voice and accountability and control of corruption but a lowering in government effectiveness and
regulatory quality. The years prior to the peak in 2011 indicate a decrease in all relevant indicators, therefore not justifying the peak in aid spending. What’s more, since the peak, whereas aid levels dropped dramatically in 2012, most indicators have significantly improved.

The case of the DRC therefore stands in contradiction to the U.S. rhetoric of punishing bad performers and rewarding good ones. Compared to the other two donors, the U.S. gives only a limited share of its aid (average of 0.5 percent) to Malawi (compared to 2.1 percent for Norway and 1.75 percent for the UK). The percentage has increased steadily from 2005 onwards to 0.76 percent in 2013. Is this increasing aid level due to an improvement in governance indicators? When looking at these, we see that with the exception of the voice and accountability indicator, all have deteriorated since 2010. Another case for this category is Mozambique. Aid levels to Mozambique have peaked in 2013 with 2 percent of U.S. aid. Again, this increase seems to be unjustified if we look at the governance indicators which have all decreased since 2010, with the exception of regulatory quality which showed a slight improvement. Similarly, South Sudan’s indicators have deteriorated since its independence in 2011, and yet U.S. aid has been steadily increasing. Two other very similar cases are Tanzania and Uganda, which have shown decreasing records on all indicators since 2010 (note that Tanzania’s records are slightly better than Uganda’s, especially in the control of corruption index). Despite these grim statistics, aid levels from the U.S. peaked in 2013 and 2014 at 1.7 percent for Uganda, and similarly peaked in 2013 with 2.8 percent for Tanzania (World Bank Group 2015). The table below gives an example illustrating that good performers are not necessarily rewarded.

**Figure 6-1: The example of U.S. funding to Afghanistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Governance Indicators</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Overall trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td>13.46</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>-0.1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>-0.4412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>0.0902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume of USA ODA</th>
<th>In absolute terms</th>
<th>As % of USA ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USD 1529 million</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 3155.5 million</td>
<td>11.19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 1898 million</td>
<td>7.01%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation; data based on World Governance Indicators and U.S. Dashboard

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109 The long-term trend indicates the slope of the amount of aid given by the United States over the years. This indicates that despite a lowering trend in the indicators voice and accountability and government effectiveness and only a slight improvement in the control of corruption index, aid levels in percentage have increased.
This section has illustrated that in countries where the United States competes with emerging donors it is very far away from its narrative of applying pre-selective criteria for its aid distribution. The idea of enforcing U.S.-American values more in their development policies is therefore not reflected in the practices. This also confirms several studies arguing that the United States does not reward merit in practice (Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Claessens, Cassimon, and van Campenhout 2009). Conditional approaches rewarding good political behaviour are not thoroughly implemented in practice despite increasing signs within the narratives and the rules.

**Budget support**

The narrative presented budget support as an ambiguous tool that is to be used only in the context of trustful governments. This distrust of the tool can be shown in figures: The United States only spends 1.18 percent on average on budget support over the years, whereas the UK and Norway spend about 4 percent of their aid on the tool. The highest amount of budget support was spent in 2013, but levels have lowered considerably since then. The overall share of sectoral budget support is quite low whereas general budget support seems to score quite high in relation. This could be indicative of a lower conditionality as sectoral budget support requests some kind of steering from the donor whereas general budget support fully supports the recipient and trusts the government to deal with the money as it pleases (OECD Stat 2015a).

When looking at which countries receive the highest share of budget support, it becomes fairly obvious that budget support only makes a minor share of U.S. funds and only a minor share of U.S. recipients (and none of the selected countries here) receive budget support.  

**Economic conditionality**

**Support of IMF and WB conditionality**

The narrative on the IMF and the World Bank indicated a strong commitment from the United States towards both institutions. Moreover, it was clear from the narrative that while the United States support reforms of the institutions and therefore of their narrative, they are in favour of implementing some economic conditions, like macroeconomic stability.

The levels of funding that the World Bank receives are very high and lie about 35 percent on average of all multilateral ODA disbursed by the United States. This percentage lies considerably higher than that of Norway (at about 16 percent) or the UK (at about 26 percent). Over the years, this share has decreased from an initial 51 percent in 2004 to 39 percent in 2014, indicating that the unique focus on the World Bank as an international development actor has vanished.

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110 John Harbeson (2008) argues that since 9/11 democracy promotion has become more difficult for the United States because of its renewed focus on fragile states, where democracy promotion is particularly difficult. Similarly, a study aimed at evaluating the effect of MCC selectivity comes to the conclusion that the results are mixed at best. Nevertheless, the study is often referred to as confirming the “MCC effect”. This is indicative of diverging tendencies between the narratives and the practices in US aid (D. Johnson, Goldstein-Plesser, and Zajong 2014).

111 In the last 10 years, a very limited number of countries has received budget support from the United States: Egypt, Jordan, Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Palau, and the West Bank/ Gaza (USAID 2015a).
Nevertheless, and compared to all other donors, the share of the United States is very high and fully reflective of the strong commitment evident in the narratives (OECD Stat 2015e).

Within the IMF, what is relevant to look at are the quotas. These quotas and the equivalent voting share for IMF governance were changed through several quota and governance reforms that the IMF underwent (largely because of the financial crisis). Today, the United States’ quota is at 17.51 (from a previous 17.68 after the 2008 reforms which had increased the quota share by 0.29 points). Therefore, while being largely stable, the United States lost some influence within the IMF but still maintains its veto right on any major decision (with a voting share after the 2010 reform of 16.58 percent of the votes) (IMF 2016, 2008, 2011). In comparison, the United Kingdom lost in both rounds of reforms: first from 5.03 percent of the quota prior to 2008, down to 4.51 in 2010 and finally down to 4.05 percent of the quota toady (with an equally decreasing share of the votes: from 4.93 percent prior to 2008 down to 4.05 percent) (IMF 2008, 2016, 2011). Norway’s share is considerably lower at 0.79 percent of quotas and 0.78 percent of the votes and remained largely stable throughout the reform (IMF 2016, 2011).

### Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies

The Millennium Challenge Corporation reflects the most recent trends regarding economic conditions in U.S. legislation. Within their selective criteria, one category is devoted to enhancing economic freedom in recipient countries. Within this category, six initial indicators were used to rate the economic quality of potential candidates in 2003. Since then, two further indicators have been added, further enhancing the selective criteria. These indicators measure the government’s general ruling quality, their ability to maintain land and property rights, to facilitate the credit system and business generally, and to liberate the market for free trade agreements, regulate inflation, have sound fiscal policies and finally also to promote gender equality within the economy (USMCC 2015b, 7–11). Thereby, within the MCC, rules regarding economic conditions have strengthened, reflecting the narrative regarding the need to implement sound macroeconomic conditions for achieving development.

In the practices, the indicator that captures the commitment of a government towards macroeconomic stability best is the one on regulatory quality. Afghanistan’s score on regulatory quality is low, but improving since 2010. Aid levels from Afghanistan have however decreased since 2009, indicating that the country is not rewarded for its efforts. The Democratic Republic of Congo receives decreasing shares of U.S. aid since 2011. Its score on the regulatory quality has increased since then. Ethiopia’s and Uganda’s scores have decreased since 2010 and 2009, but the countries received increasing funds from the U.S.. Scores for Malawi show a slight lowering in the indicator since 2010, but the country received increasing funding levels since 2008. Identical cases are Nigeria, and South Sudan, which received increasing funding despite decreasing scores on regulatory quality since 2011. Similarly, continuously improving scores are not necessarily met with higher levels of funding. Tanzania is such a case where the funding decreased dramatically in 2014 despite improving scores on regulatory quality of the Tanzanian government (World Bank Group 2015). All of these cases indicate that there is no clear connection between

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112 Note that the quota reform from 2010 was long blocked by the US Congress which accepted the reform only in December 2015 (IMF 2015).
the indicator of regulatory quality of a government and U.S. funding, despite a strong commitment in the narrative.

Two cases could be found where the narrative is reflected in practice: Mozambique, where improving scores where matched with increasing funding peaking in 2013; and Sudan’s, where a continuously lowering score on regulatory quality was punished with a lowering of aid.

Again two cases indicate that the narrative is implemented in practice, but the other cases show no relation between the amounts of aid and the indicators which depict the economic conformity of recipient governments to “American values”.113

The theoretical framework predicted that changes within practices (especially within a well-established thematic field) will be hardest to realise. Therefore, the idea that the United States has to stick more to its own values in the light of emerging donors has influenced the narratives, partly influenced the rules, but barely influenced the practices which are likely to stick to path dependent behaviour. This confirms some of the theoretical assumptions, but does not explain the complete incongruence between practices and narratives. To explain these patterns, other theoretical prisms might be more helpful. The concluding part of this chapter elaborates more on this issue.

Generally, the cases indicate that the United States often acts contrary to its claimed narrative of rewarding countries with sound macroeconomic policies. In general terms, the reflections on the United States have shown that the proclaimed strong preselection is not implemented in practice – within political or economic factors. The following sections ask the same questions to the other two remaining donors – Norway and the United Kingdom.

6.2 Norway: Approach towards conditionality

The previous chapter argued that Norway’s main idea regarding emerging donors was the need to emphasise its own political values (similar to the position of the United States). Alongside this idea was the desire to prevent the unsustainable use of resources – a topic close to Norway’s national interest as an expert in the petroleum sector. Do these main ideas trigger similar results to the ones observed in the United States in the narratives on conditionality?

The two areas where we might reasonably expect Norway to be wary of the influence of emerging donors are the undermining of political and ecological values. This wariness is expressed in the following statement from an interviewee:

“We are basically willing to cooperate with anybody […] But in practice, I guess, that we are somehow more prone to cooperate with what is called like-minded which is a group of donors which probably […] have had more or less the same approach” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 15'38).

113 Similarly, Christopher Kilby (2009) argues that macroeconomic performance in recipients is not a decisive factor for US aid distribution, especially when the countries in question are allies.
Arguably, then, this could lead to a narrative advocating the use of an increasingly conditional approach, similar to what the section on the United States argued.

6.2.1 Narratives on conditionality

Position on conditionality as such in the light of the rise of emerging donors

Norway has an ambiguous position when it comes to the principle of conditionality: on the one hand it stresses the positive impacts conditionality can have on the development process, on the other hand it also fears the negative consequences conditionality can have on ownership which might in turn undermine a successful development process. This leads to a conflicted but also well-considered approach towards conditionality. This section illustrates this conflict and demonstrates that an intensification of the dilemma has taken place from 2004 to 2014. It seems, therefore, that the idea of sticking more to Norwegian values that was identified in the previous chapter exists in a certain tension with the opposed idea of stimulating increased ownership in the development process.

A policy guideline issued by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2004 illustrates the dilemma between those two ideas: First, it defends a conditional approach by describing the best politician in a recipient country for achieving development to be a person conducting “efforts to improve their administration, be open and transparent, allow room for dialogue and participation, promote democracy and human rights and, not least, combat poor governance and corruption” (NMOFA WP Fighting poverty 2004: 88). This clear set of values is indicative of a conditional approach whereby worthy leaders are rewarded, a view further developed in the following statement from the same guideline:

“development assistance has the greatest impact in countries where the economic policy, system of government and other conditions help to foster good development and poverty reduction. […] The Government therefore supports the work that is being done in the World Bank and other financial institutions to adjust the volume of assistance provided to recipient countries according to the quality of the countries’ development and poverty reduction policies, and their capacity and willingness to implement them” (NMFA 2004, 122–23).

However, the same publication indicates an awareness that development processes are often more successful if they are home-grown, which confirms the need for ownership and the absence of conditions:

“[m]easures to combat corruption (and more generally to promote good governance) […] have little chance of success if they are forced on countries from the outside as a condition for loans or grants if the country’s own political leaders do not really wish to implement them” (NMFA 2004, 160).

Contrary to the approach of the United States, the support for ownership is translated into the need to refrain from imposing external conditions as reforms cannot be “bought […] by donors” (Norad 2005a, 2; NMFA 2004, 15). Other papers similarly evoke the importance of national ownership in the following years (see for instance NMFA 2006a, 14-15, 95). A 2007 publication
Changes in conditionality?

deals with the possible negative effects of conditionality on the poorest within a recipient country (Norad 2007a, 15). Another policy paper deplores the missing link between conditionality and ownership as poverty reduction strategies are seen as

“another aspect of conditionality driven by external consultants rather than national technocrats themselves. To improve ownership, development actors must ‘descend’ and sit with the government at national, regional and local levels to truly understand development priorities to a greater extent than is currently the case” (NMFA 2008c, 2).

But even if conditionality is seen to harm ownership, the idea that development assistance needs to reflect values is not fully abandoned. A 2009 publication mentions conditionality as a way to maintain a certain influence over the recipient country. As such, Norway expresses its fears that if foreign direct investments, largely issued from emerging donors (see previous chapter) increase to the detriment of conditional aid, the influence of the donor will be further undermined:

“However, [an increase of different flows from aid] could also weaken the general political dialogue with countries facing major challenges in relation to human rights, corruption and governance, in addition to extensive poverty problems” (NMFA 2009a, 108).

Following the same idea, the white paper states that “[a]id without conditions is aid without policy and without proper control” while maintaining that “each country should decide themselves which policies […] they wish to implement” (NMFA 2009a, 96). The concept that conditionality might help to improve the political conditions in recipient countries on their way to democratisation is widely observable in other earlier policy papers (see for instance NMFA 2006a, 11–12; Norad 2009c, 1; and see section on political conditionality below).

2011 marks a change in how Norway and others conceive of conditionality after the Busan conference, where the concept of ownership was further celebrated:

“Developing countries are themselves to be responsible for their own development. This means that donor countries should issue fewer guidelines as to how development is to be achieved” (NMFA 01.12.2011, 1).

Even though the principle idea behind conditionality seems to be under increasing scrutiny in Norway, a 2013 paper talks about the introduction of a more selective approach for recipient countries with regard to the Oil for Development (OfD) Programme. The programme states that “donor countries will never be able to force through a policy that goes against the wishes of the partner country” (NMFA 2013b, 64). But it concludes that Norway “will therefore be stricter in its prioritisation when selecting partner countries in the OfD programme” (NMFA 2013b, 64). Therefore, it appears that ex-post conditions seem to be replaced by higher selectivity and therefore stronger ex-ante conditions for aid, just like it was the case for the United States. If anything, the conflicts and tensions within Norway regarding conditionality have only increased during the observed period. A quote from the 2014 white paper on human rights confirms this. One of the requirements for Norwegian foreign policy in the future is to “set […] clear requirements for recipients of Norwegian aid as regards their willingness to take steps to promote
human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (NMFA 2014a, 11). These requirements can be clearly defined as pre-selective conditions.114

What is the relation between the increasing selectivity and ex-ante conditions, the conflicted position regarding conditionality and ownership and the emergence of new donors? A paper lamenting the decrease of conditional aid includes a small text box quoting an African official about how much he likes Chinese investments because it is faster and has “no benchmarks or preconditions or environmental impact assessments” (NMFA 2009a, 108). This contrasting juxtaposition leads to the assumption that while maintaining that conditions can be helpful for Norway, the country is also aware that China’s non-conditionality might pose a direct threat to its sphere of influence (for more details, see chapter 5). Moreover, Norway’s official statements raise concerns that conditionality cannot work if large developing countries or emerging countries are not on board. Similar to the rhetoric emanating from the United States, Norway’s publications refer to the situation in Sudan where China supposedly undermines conditionality (NMFA 2008c, 28). A similar concern is expressed regarding China’s behaviour in the UN Security Council when it comes to sanctioning countries such as Zimbabwe and Burma. The Foreign Office states that China increases the difficulty of achieving international agreements (NMFA 2009d, 43). Similar to the United States, Norway’s official documents put the emphasis on the negative consequences of Chinese aid activities. The impact of other emerging countries is not mentioned in detail but the previous chapter on perceptions has shown that Norway is aware of their influence in the field of development cooperation.

Therefore, while there is an increasing awareness of the possible negative consequences of conditionality on the development process, the idea behind conditionality – that certain conditions are favourable to development and should therefore be strengthened coupled with a policy fostering stronger selectiveness in the choice of recipients – is still present in the observed publications over the covered period of time. The difference from the United States is that Norway has a conflicted position towards conditionality because of the idea that ownership is very important. Moreover, there is a concern that emerging donors might undermine established relationships and the viability of conditions. The next two sections illustrate how this general narrative on conditionality prevails when we take a closer look at political and economic conditions that are in place in Norwegian development assistance.

Political conditionality

The previous chapter has identified challenges that Norwegian politicians associate with emerging donors, one of which is the undermining of certain Norwegian standards, such as human rights and democracy. In the perception, the challenge to political values was seen as more

114 Conditionality equally requires a certain rigor when a country does not fulfil the conditions attached to aid. Norway generally perceives sanctions as not very effective and requires that a “thorough analysis” should be conducted if state authorities fail to perform (NMFA 2004, 144; similar argument Gahr Store 14.04.2008, 1). Moreover, Norway expresses concern that if it boycotts a country, it is possible that other countries will continue their aid and therefore undermine Norway’s position (NMFA 2009c, 47). A 2013 publication states that when a country “chooses solutions that clearly go against Norway’s advice”, revision of Norway’s involvement is necessary. However, the paper equally stresses the importance of long-term involvement and that “a setback in the cooperation is therefore not necessarily an indication that it should be discontinued” (NMFA 2013b, 64). Regarding sanctions, an issue-based approach can be observed over all of the period together with a certain disdain regarding the effectiveness of sanctions again stressing the need for ex-ante conditions rather than ex-post conditions.
prominent than the challenge to economic standards. This section illustrates Norway’s reactions towards this challenge.

**Human rights**

As in the case of both Britain and the United States, human rights are considered an important pillar of Norwegian foreign policy. The commitment to human rights is illustrated by the award of the Norwegian Nobel peace prize, which often goes to defenders of human rights (for instance in 2003 to Shirin Ebadi, in 2010 to Liu Xiaobo, and in 2014 to Malala Yousafzai and Kailash Satyarthi). The 2014 white paper on human rights stated that “Norway’s efforts to promote human rights are integrated in all aspects of its foreign and development policies” (NMFA 2014a, 9). This emphasis on human rights policies in development cooperation is present throughout the observed period (Petersen 15.02.2005, 2; NMFA 2007d, 18, 2007b, 1, 2008b, 15, 2009a, 18, 2009e, 6; Norad 2011b, 3; Brende 09.06.2014, 1; NMFA 08.10.2014b, 1).

What are the reasons for the Norwegian insistence on supporting human rights through its development cooperation? Overall, the documents consulted elucidate three main reasons why development cooperation should be closely linked to respect for human rights: First, Norway claims that the promotion of human rights is in its national interest because cooperation with countries that respect fundamental human rights is easier to achieve. In the long run, the publications argue, more countries respecting human rights will lead to a more stable international order (Gahr Støre 20.05.2008, 8, 11.11.2008, 2, 14.02.2012, 4; NMFA 2009d, 116). Second, official papers defend the point of view that respect for human rights is the only reasonable way out of poverty for developing countries. Therefore, a rights-based approach to development can, it is hoped, push recipients to help themselves out of poverty (NMFA 2004). A third reason for supporting countries that respect human rights is that development cooperation is seen as being more productive when recipient countries share the political view of the donor country. A white paper states that “[Norway] will only achieve results if the human rights issues that [they] promote internationally are in line with [their] bilateral cooperation at country level” (NMFA 2012a, 45). This view implies that a country that wants to receive support from Norway has to share its political vision. A recipient that goes against the principles that Norway defends internationally would therefore compromise the donor’s credibility within the international arena.

Based on the above, we might assume that Norway applies a strong conditional approach to development cooperation, requesting recipients to respect or improve their fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, the section on the general position towards conditionality argued that Norway’s policy narrative towards conditionality is driven by two contradicting ideas: the importance of ownership and that of the defence of its own values. Is the general conflict regarding conditionality and ownership reflected in Norway’s narrative on human rights related development policies and has it changed over time? It becomes obvious that a similar uneasiness exists when we look at the conditions linked to human rights (though to a lesser degree, as human rights values are held up strongly in Norway). Moreover, similar to the United States, the preconditioning of aid regarding the respect of human rights has slightly increased over time but has always been strong.

Throughout the observed period, Norwegian politicians are aware that supporting human rights might be seen as some form of conditionality and “contrary to the fundamental prerequisite of
‘local’ ownership” (NMFA 2009g, 51). But human rights related aid is equally seen as an opportunity to “take part in discussions about developments in individual countries” (NMFA 2009a, 106). Norway’s official narrative tries to portray human rights not as a precondition because “human rights instruments constitute a common, normative framework for donors and recipients alike” (NMFA 2009g, 51–52; similar arguments in NMFA 2009a, 15). Moreover, the terminology of conditionality is often avoided when referring to other international instruments. A 2014 white paper states that

“[w]hen assessing which countries should receive financial support from Norway, importance will be attached to the recipient country’s willingness to govern in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Developments in these areas will be significant in determining whether or not Norway can provide financial support to individual countries, as well as the nature and amount of financial support given” (NMFA 2014a, 10).

Hence promoting human rights is consciously chosen as a direct involvement in the internal affairs of recipients and is seen as an ex-ante-condition:

“[Norwegians] cannot take it for granted that emerging economies share all our political views. It is our duty, therefore, to uphold established rules of cooperation and hard-won universal human rights” (Brende 25.03.2014, 5–6).

This quote by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, argues that it is necessary to uphold human rights in the light of the competition from emerging economies.

Within Norwegian official papers, the influence of emerging donors on Norway’s development cooperation and its resulting focus on human rights for Norway is clearly recognised. As in the case of the United States, China receives the lion’s share of attention. Norway’s white papers comment that China’s involvement, especially in Africa, might weaken the position of Western countries “considerably” (NMFA 2009d, 116). It continues that

“[t]his shift in the international balance of power in the human rights field is one of the most serious challenges to our efforts to promote human rights and democracy. We must have the courage to stand up for our principles at the same time as we respond pragmatically to a new political reality. […] We must continue to work with our traditional partners, but we must also engage new states in cooperation and promotion of human rights. Our response must be to initiate more strategic and focused efforts vis-à-vis new alliances of countries and closer cooperation with non-state partners.” (NMFA 2009d, 116; emphasis added).

Similarly, Norway’s strategy for cooperation with Brazil states that it is essential that countries from the South cooperate with countries from the North to work towards the success of international human rights protection (NMFA 2011a, 20). These documents illustrate that while Norway is aware of China’s influence, it responds by further increasing conditionality in the area of human rights with respect to its development cooperation. However, the quote could also be indicative of a more pragmatic approach in Norwegian development cooperation, engaging with new alliances in order to spread human rights policies.
This section has illustrated that a respect for human rights has always been a precondition of Norwegian aid, but that this has been emphasised even more in recent times. Human rights are considered to be an important part of Norwegian development policies, of which conditionality is thus an essential aspect. If any change has taken place, it was a further increase in the support of human rights, together with an increasing selectivity prior to the attribution of development assistance. Moreover, this increase was directly linked to the threat towards human rights, emanating especially from Chinese aid.

**Good governance**

Another area where Norway might feel threatened by emerging donors is the area of good governance. The support for good governance is closely linked to the previous issue of human rights. Democracy is even seen as a dimension of human rights (Norad 2011b, 13). The general and broad support for democracy yielded in Norway to the support for a broader concept of good governance in 2008/2009 (Norad 2010b, 13). This broader concept includes for Norway’s publications “the rule of law, independent justice systems, transparent and effective institutions, democratic participation and decision-making, property rights and the freedom of expression” (Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2). Similar to the narrative within the U.S., good governance is seen as a “top priority” in Norwegian development cooperation (Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2).

The reasons for supporting good governance policies are very similar to those for human rights: According to the logic of Norwegian politicians, supporting good governance will help to support development and eradicate poverty (NMFA 2005a, 9, 2005b, 3; Norad 2008b, 25, 2009c, 53; Glad Pedersen 24.04.2014, 2). Closely linked to that argument is the idea that governments with a record of good governance will be less corrupt, therefore “[c]hannelling aid to more democratic regimes will result in more development for the money spent” (NMFA 2013b, 32; similar argument NMFA 2009g, 43). To support good governance would, therefore, prevent “major administrative burdens”, especially in highly fragile states (Norad 2010b, xvi). Moreover, states with a good governance system might also have a more transparent and accountable trade system which could benefit Norwegian exports (NMFA 2007a, 15).

Instead of using *ex-post* conditions that have to be fulfilled once the aid is received, Norway claims to make use of an increased selectivity through “[g]ood analyses of the state of democracy” before any money is handed over (NMFA 2013b, 2). “The degree of democracy will therefore be given even more weight in the prioritisation of bilateral aid” (NMFA 2013b, 32).

Contrary to the open support for human rights and the conditionality of aid in this regard, the field of good governance illustrates a more complex attitude, reflecting the conflict that Norway harbours with respect to the concept of conditionality overall. Several issues are raised with the support for good governance structures and the precondition of aid on an existing good governance system. Norway’s publications raise the issue that imposing good governance structures externally might harm processes of local ownership. A 2009 report from Norad states that there is only little one can do if authorities are unwilling to promote good governance from their own initiative (Norad 2009c, 6). The answer to this problem is that Norway should try to support local initiatives instead of government channels (Gahr Store 10.02.2011, 10; Norad 2010b, xiii).

What is the link between Norway’s support for good governance measures and the rise of emerging donors? The previous chapter has illustrated that Norway is apprehensive when it
comes to support from emerging donors for “rogue dictators”. Therefore, their own policies and their increased focus could indicate that they try to counterinfluence that trend. Emerging donors have a clear opposition towards the inclusion of good governance as selective criteria for development assistance, therefore the fronts here appear to be clearly defined.

The support in the narrative for good governance runs throughout all of the observed period and peaked in 2014 (Høglund 22.05.2014, 2–3; Brende 25.03.2014, 6; NMFA 2004, 381, 2009a, 88; Norad 2008b, 17, 2005b, 12, 2011d, 96). So even if there is a recognition that it might be impossible to impose good governance (and democracy) from outside, the support for good governance measures as a goal in development cooperation remains strong and has even increased during the observed period, reflecting the idea that democratic (Norwegian) values have to be protected in the light of increased concurrence from emerging donors.

**Budget support**

Budget support is one particular tool donors use to influence recipients’ policies. The arguments surrounding budget support therefore serve here as an illustration of Norway’s narrative on political conditionality. Norway is eager to state that all countries combine their budget support with the fulfilment of certain *ex-ante* or *ex-post* conditions. It stated in 2004:

> “Before Norway provides further budget support to a partner country, an assessment must be made of the governance situation, the authorities’ willingness to implement their poverty reduction strategy, and the quality of public financial management. […] Such assessments are normally carried out in cooperation with other donors. As a rule, Norway only provides budget support jointly with other donors, one of which is usually the World Bank” (NMFA 2004, 106).

A similar line of argument can be found in a 2008 publication (Norad 2008b, 26). The link between budget support and the specific political situation within a recipient country in 2014 is expressed as follows:

> “The Government will increase budget support to selected partner countries to strengthen their ability to develop well-functioning states with greater capacity to deliver public welfare services. Norway will continue to make significant efforts in developing the dialogue between donors and partners receiving budget support, with a special emphasis on monitoring the development of good governance and improving the underlying conditions for economic development, the business sector and trade” (NMFA 2014b, 5; emphasis added).

Budget support is a useful tool to further illustrate the increasing ambiguity within Norway’s aid institutions regarding conditionality. Many publications try to emphasise that budget support is

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115 One interesting insight in this particular regard is that Norway funds the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) – a group of researchers working on economics whose position allegedly influences the position of African politicians regarding the World Trade Organization, but also Africa’s relationship with emerging donors, and most importantly China. Therefore, through the promotion of this institution, Norway indirectly tries to influence the positioning of African politicians towards China (Norad 2014b, 61) and logically promotes the qualities of Norwegian aid.
a good form of conditionality because it enhances ownership as it “underpins a country’s development strategy” (NMFA 2004, 106). However, the same paper states that “donors monitor the use of budget funds” and illustrates that the involvement from donors is seen as necessary in order to ensure the success of the measure (similar argument in Norad 2005a, 2). Similarly, an interesting quote from 2005 illustrates the awareness that not all “good” conditions will derive from the recipient country, sometimes even when local authorities are involved (Norad 2005a, 14).

The wariness of the conflict between successful conditions and ownership becomes most obvious when budget support includes political conditions. Several publications state that political conditions should not be included in budget support policies and that donors need to maintain a certain flexibility regarding the recipient countries:

“The very nature of political conditionality, which covers issues for instance related to the Human Rights situation and democratization, makes it difficult to formulate clear conditions that leave little margin for interpretation. HR and democratization issues should therefore preferably be handled in the context of the political dialogue between a partner country and its donors. […] If the recipient country fails to meet the conditions connected to the fixed component, it should probably still be an option to delay conclusion (disbursement) in order to allow more time to fully implement the agreed actions or to await the development of the issues in question” (Norad 2005a, 11, 15).

This quote indicates that a more pragmatic approach is seen as useful for Norwegian aid. However, when we look at a 2007 publication, it states that

“democracy and human rights are underlying principles in the budget support agreements signed with all the countries covered by the study, except Vietnam” (Norad 2007a, 16).

In 2009 the conflict between the success of measures and local ownership is even more obvious and budget support becomes increasingly based on ex-ante conditions (requiring recipients’ plans for poverty reduction, anticorruption offices, transparent and robust financial management systems, etc.) (NMFA 2007b, 5, 2009a, 98, 24).

As in the case of the United States, the overall interest in budget support seems to have faded slightly since 2011, as official documents no longer discuss it in detail. However, the previous section has illustrated the general conflict of finding a compromise between useful conditions and local ownership that Norway tries to implement in all of its development cooperation. Moreover, it seems that a more selective approach towards choosing the recipients is adopted over time.

Within political conditionality, the wariness about Norwegian impact on ownership seems to have intensified. However, the determination to include certain political conditions in order to foster development has not diminished. As an interviewee from Norad stated: “I would say that [political conditionality] has increased. That’s why it has become much more complex” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 18'04). Generally, the narrative claims that the support for human rights and good governance policies has increased, together with a claimed increased selectivity of recipients. Therefore, during the observed period, while the conflict between the support of ownership and conditionality has intensified, overall an increase in the support can
be noted in Norway’s official narrative that is clearly linked to emerging donors’ non-conditionality. Nevertheless, the support for an increasing (political) conditionality is less pronounced than in the U.S., largely because of the conflicting idea of supporting ownership that plays a dominant role in the narrative in Norway.

Economic conditionality

Similar to the section on economic conditionality within the United States, this section first looks at Norway’s official position towards conditionality within the IMF and the World Bank, and then looks at a specific project, the *Oil for Development* initiative and its conditionality.

*Norway’s position towards IMF and World Bank conditionality*

In contrast to the United States, Norway has a highly critical position towards the international lending institutions. In 2005 the newly elected Norwegian government stated in the so-called Soria Moria Declaration that its aid should not have privatization and liberalization of markets as a (*ex-ante* or *ex-post*) condition. This position is partly in conflict with IMF and World Bank policies (similar arguments in NMFA 2009b, 4, 2008b, 19, 2011b, 44–45; H. F. Johnson 24.09.2005, 2). In order to discuss the compatibility of Norway’s position with World Bank and IMF conditionalities, the government organised a conference in 2006. The Norwegian contributions to the conference illustrate that, in their view the importance of institutional issues and governance has increased within the World Bank while the IMF focuses more on economic management (NMFA 2006c, 15). Overall, Norwegian politicians maintained throughout the conference a highly critical position towards the IMF and the World Bank (NMFA 2006c, 17). A 2007 action plan confirms this criticism stating that “poor countries must not be deprived of the right to choose their own strategies” (NMFA 2007a, 9). The idea that ownership is essential for local development seems to explain the criticism towards economic conditionality, whereas privatization and liberalization seem not to be considered Norwegian values that need to be upheld and exported.

However, the conference report comes to the conclusion that conditionality might be important with respect to making the powerful accountable (in the sense of good governance), but should not be used to influence policy making as such (NMFA 2006c, 46–47). During a conference in 2008 on a similar topic the Norwegian State Secretary Roger Schjerva recommended a threefold bundle of reforms: first, to streamline conditionality, second, to put a cap on conditions (so that fewer conditions are better enforced), and finally, to put the recipients in charge of coming up with any conditions (Schjerva 10.01.2008, 1–2).

The need to further reduce IMF and World Bank conditionalities (mostly their economic conditions) is expressed throughout the observed period with a similar enthusiasm (Gulbrandsen 25.06.2009, 1; NMFA 2009a, 95, 2013b, 87). Therefore, there is no change regarding World Bank and IMF policies, but a highly critical position in favour of ownership. Emerging donors similarly criticise IMF and World Bank’s conditional policies. In this regard, this policy field will not be one of conflict between Norway and the group of emerging donors. Practice should indicate a low and lowering engagement for IMF and World Bank funds and projects.
A special Norwegian programme – the *Oil for Development* (OfD) initiative – neatly illustrates the narrative on political and economic conditionality. Moreover, the OfD initiative works in a field that is directly linked to Norway’s competition with emerging donors. Moreover, the previous chapter argued that Norway is particularly apprehensive when it comes to the unsustainable use of natural resources which – in their view – emerging donors might increase. The OfD initiative might also be an attempt to counter the perceived negative effects of emerging donors and is therefore highly relevant.

The aim of the OfD initiative is to support countries with oil resources to build a stable political, economic and ecological environment for oil extraction (Norad 2009b, 3). Norway wants to play a “clear and key role in the international debate on oil and development” because of their own experience, their expertise and the globalization of the Norwegian oil industry (Solheim 14.02.2006, 3; similar argument in NMFA 2009a, 53). It therefore pledged in 2006 to increase bilateral assistance to countries that want to share their experience in the petroleum sector (Solheim 16.05.2006, 14.02.2006). In a 2007 publication, Norad stressed that “petroleum-related assistance needs to correspond with Norwegian Development Assistance in general” (Norad 2007a, 11).

The programme refers to principles of political conditionality. Norwegian support in the OfD is closely linked to good governance principles, following the claim that if a country is well governed, its oil resources will benefit all of its society instead of just a few corrupt leaders (Norad 2007b, 8, 2009b, 42, 2010d, 1–5, 2011c, 8; NMFA 2009a, 28; Brende 09.04.2014, 3). A 2012 annual report emphasises that principles of good governance are “cross-cutting in all assistance provided” (Norad 2013b, 3).

It seems, however, that cooperation with oil rich countries is more important than upholding certain human rights standards. A quote from 2008 showed that Norway is willing to uphold its cooperation with states that might not share a similar political vision:

“This means that some of the states that we should and must have dealings with have views on human rights, democracy and political governance that are incompatible with our own. We must maintain a strong value base in our dialogue with such states” (Gahr Støre 20.05.2008, 9).

Later on the above emphasis on ex-post conditions (achieved through reforms after dialogue) seems to be replaced with the focus on greater selectivity for the benefits of ownership:

“Donor countries will never be able to force through a policy that goes against the wishes of the partner country. The government will therefore be stricter in its prioritisation when selecting partner countries in the OfD programme” (NMFA 2013b, 64).

The narrative surrounding Norway’s *Oil for Development* initiative illustrates vividly the main debates surrounding Norway’s issues with conditionality, including the focus on political conditionality and a shift from *ex-post* to *ex-ante* conditionality and thereby towards stronger selectivity. Oil is a sector where China in particular is a direct competitor to Norway. The programme was launched in 2005, when China started its “charm offensive” with most African oil producing countries (Kurlantzick 2007). Moreover, this policy might be the direct result of the idea that
emerging donors make unsustainable use of resources that was discussed in the previous chapter.

How much attention is given to the conditions attached to the programme (especially the selectivity criteria) and that of other – especially political – conditions is discussed in the following sections on Norway’s aid rules and practices.

6.2.2 Rules and practices on conditionality

The previous section illustrated the Norwegian narrative on general, political and economic conditionality. As in the case of the United States, it showed an increase in pre-conditions regarding political conventions, like human rights and good governance, while it equally demonstrated that Norway – contrary to the United States – maintains a critical attitude regarding economic conditions attached to aid. In order to evaluate whether the narrative is implemented in the rules and practices, the following sections explores two separate areas; (1) the spending on, and potential variation in, funding of the particular sectors, and (2) the claimed increased selection of recipients according to political indicators. Moreover, regarding economic conditionality, we look at support for the heavily criticised international financial institutions and on the spending within the Oil for Development initiative. The same recipients are used to illustrate the practices and to simplify comparisons between the donor countries. The following table illustrates the spending of Norwegian development cooperation in the eleven selected countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South Sudan</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD stats, figures for Norway from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013)

For Norway, this selection includes its top first, third and fourth highest recipients, but excludes its second biggest recipient (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and its fifth biggest recipient (Brazil) because emerging donors are not very present in these two countries. To evaluate the spending on specific sectors of development aid, one has to take into account the general trend of the aid
budget during the observed period. The budget of Norwegian development assistance has increased steadily during this period from USD 3.9 billion in 2004 to USD 5.4 billion in 2014 (constant prices 2013). The biggest increases took place from 2004 to 2005, 2006 to 2007, 2008 to 2009 and 2012 to 2013. Stagnation and reductions of the aid budget took place in 2006, 2008, and from 2010 to 2012. These stagnations can be regarded as reactions to the financial crises.

Political conditionality

Human rights

The narrative on using human rights as pre- and post-conditions was strong and intensified over time. What about the legal framework that represents the rules of the institution?

Legally, Norway claims to use the implementation of human rights treaties as an *ex-ante* condition to enter into aid negotiations – which makes it very similar to the rules of U.S. assistance. While there should be a link between human rights treaties and development cooperation, the Norwegian government is aware that it has not yet developed a procedure for the implementation of this policy and that further coordinative efforts are necessary (Norad 2011b, 38, 33-34, 95). The general conclusion from the evaluation of the link between aid efforts and human rights is therefore that “the human rights footprint appears limited” (Norad 2011b, xv). Since 2011, many steps have been taken to further improve this human rights footprint as a 2014 publication demonstrates (NMFA 2014a). The precondition of the ratification of human rights treaties is in place “at least since the 2008 budget, where it is stated that ‘[t]he Human Rights Conventions shall be used methodically to identify state obligations towards their population’” (Norad 2011b, 32). As in the case of the United States, since 2008 there has therefore been a rule in place making the respect of human rights a precondition for aid. But is this rule and the overall narrative implemented in practice?

If it were, we might reasonably assume that Norway does not maintain development relations with countries that have a bad human rights record, and that many resources should be spent on maintaining and fostering human rights. First, this section elaborates on the spending of Norway on specific human rights related projects, then asks whether human rights are used as a precondition for Norway’s aid allocation as the narrative and the rules might lead us assume.

A first indication of the real commitment towards human rights can be derived from an examination of spending on the promotion of human rights. The narrative has shown that human rights are seen as a high priority. Unfortunately, human rights are not a separate budget section in Norwegian aid statistics. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate how much is actually spent on the promotion of human rights-related projects annually. Twenty-five percent of projects attributed to the good governance sector were provided in 2004 for projects strengthening the respect for human rights (NMFA 2004, 147–48). Overall, this means that approximately two to five percent of the overall amount spent on development cooperation has a link to human rights (Norad 2011b, xiv, 94). Since 2004, about 10 percent has been spent annually on good governance projects in the category “government and civil society” (Norad 2015). The importance of supporting human rights has increased during the observed period with a first increase in 2007 and 2008 where the amount channelled through the governments and civil society related human rights spending increased to USD 71 million (Norad 2011b, 20, 2015). Another leap in 2010 as well as a budget increase in 2013 confirmed the increasing importance of the policy field
and in 2013 the trend was further confirmed by budget increase to promote human rights and
democracy (Barth Eide 12.02.2013, 2; Brende 25.03.2014, 5; NMFA 28.04.2014, 1, 2014a, 12).
While the amounts of aid disbursed on human rights have increased, then, the spending in terms
of percentage of overall aid has remained stable at about two percent since 2010 (Norad 2015).
Most of the budget within human rights spending goes to civil society (about 44 percent) and
to the promotion of human rights (37 percent) while 13 percent goes to judicial and legal aid.
The amount that goes to civil society has steadily increased since 2004 (Norad 2011b, 21). While
the highest share of human rights related aid is geographically unattributed (28 percent), Asia
comes second with 24 percent, and Africa still receives about 18 percent, whereas the Middle
East and Europe only receive minor amounts (Norad 2015). Therefore, a consistent, but not
increasing share of development aid is attributed to projects related to human rights. The overall
amount of about two percent of Norwegian aid attributed to human rights is slightly below the
three percent that the United States were willing to dedicate to the cause. Moreover, in absolute
terms, the amounts spent by the United States are obviously significantly higher than those
spent by Norway.

The above suggest that a non-negligible, but not a huge part of Norwegian development aid is
attributed to human rights. Identical tools to the ones in the U.S. section are used to analyse
whether the practices comply with the narratives and rules regarding human rights. A first indi-
cation is the giving of aid to countries that have ratified a high or low number of human rights
treaties. The second indication is the tendency to reward or punish countries for an improving
or worsening score in the rule of law indicator within the WGI indicators.

The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ranks Norway, the self-proclaimed
champion of human rights, with 13 ratifications of human rights treaties only in the third best
of four possible categories (similar to the United Kingdom, though better than the United
States) (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).

Of the top ten recipients of Norwegian aid, some countries have only ratified five to nine human
rights treaties: West Bank and Gaza (second biggest recipient), Sudan (fourth biggest recipient),
Zambia (ninth biggest recipient), and Somalia (tenth biggest recipient). Moreover, from the se-
lected cases where emerging donors are also active, Norway supports Ethiopia (eleventh biggest
recipient) which ranks in the same category. Nevertheless, some countries are in an equally high
category than Norway itself (with 10 to 14 ratifications): Afghanistan (first biggest recipient),
Tanzania (third biggest recipient), Mozambique (sixth biggest recipient), Uganda (seventh big-
gest recipient), and Malawi (eighth biggest recipient). Moreover, Brazil, the fifth biggest recipient
of Norwegian aid, scores above the donor country with 15 to 18 ratifications. South Sudan,
which has received 2.3 percent of Norwegian aid since its independence, fares in the lowest
category and has ratified fewer than five human rights treaties. Therefore, Norway does not
strictly impose the ratification of a high number of human rights treaties as a precondition for
its development assistance to Sudan and South Sudan, China, Ethiopia, and India. Moreover,
the ratification of treaties alone might not be indicative of the human rights record of a particular
country (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).

Similar to the analysis of the United States, this section now turns to the evaluation of Norway’s
reaction towards the Worldwide Governance Indicator rule of law. Does Norway punish bad
performers and rewards star pupils?
With respect to some recipients, Norway seems to be true to its narratives and rules and rewards good performers in human rights: As such, Tanzania’s bad record in the rule of law indicator was punished with a decreasing amount of aid spent on that country, as aid levels have dropped since 2008 from 4.15 percent to 1.85 percent in 2014, while its rule of law indicator dropped from 44 points to 39 points. Moreover, the top four performers within the rule of law indicator from our selected group (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda – all with an average of above or close to 40 points) receive relatively high shares of Norwegian aid (all above 2 percent with 3.25 percent for Tanzania). Norway’s aid disbursements have not reacted towards these trends like its narratives proclaimed. The cases in which Norway actually made good on its aid narrative are slightly more numerous than the United States’ but, as the following examples suggest, its record is far from perfect.

Indeed, there are more cases to be found where Norway does not implement its rules and narratives. First of all, there are some countries with a generally very low score in the rule of law indicator: Afghanistan only amounts to on average 0.95 points but is still the largest recipient of Norwegian aid. Nor was its improving trend from 2012 to 2014 (multiplying its score by five) met with rewards; between 2012 and 2014, Norway has decreased its aid since 2009 from 3.6 percent to 3 percent (OECD Stat 2015b; World Bank Group 2015).

Other cases where good performances were not met with increasing amounts of Norwegian aid are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia. The rule of law indicator nearly doubled for the DRC in 2012, but aid levels remained stable. In Ethiopia, while aid levels were lowered (from nearly 2 percent in 2006 to 1.54 percent in 2014), the rule of law indicator increased. Similarly, aid levels for Uganda (since 2008) and Zambia (since 2011) have dropped despite increasing trends in the rule of law indicator.

Moreover, it is easy to find cases where Norway contradicts its narrative by increasing aid levels to bad performers; for example, with respect to Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan. Nigeria receives overall very low contributions from Norway at about 0.26 percent. Nevertheless, this share doubled from 2005 to 0.33 percent in 2014, while from 2008, the rule of law indicator deteriorated but remained stable (if low) overall. South Sudan has received increasing levels since its independence (from 1.69 percent in 2011 to 2.44 percent in 2014) despite a dramatic decrease in the score of the rule of law indicator (from 5.61 points to 1.00 points). Sudan receives relatively high shares despite the human rights violations during the Darfur crisis where at the height of the conflict (with a rule of law indicator of 2.87 points in 2005), Norwegian aid was at its highest at about 5 percent. Moreover, increasing trends in the rule of law indicator since 2009 have not been met with an increase in funding.

The narrative on human rights showed an increased interest in promoting and supporting human rights abroad through a targeted and more selective approach. The rules implemented that narrative to some degree, as Norwegian institutions insist that countries that receive its aid should have ratified certain human rights treaties. The practice, however, illustrates that Norway maintains a fairly widespread human rights portfolio without a clear focus. Moreover, the claim that Norway only supports states that have ratified most human rights treaties has been shown to be only partly true. While the narrative showed an increasing importance attached to human rights, the practices illustrate a relatively strong but steady commitment to human rights efforts.
but, at best, a mixed tendency when it comes to rewarding good and punishing bad performers. Indeed, this was only true in the case of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Good governance}

Similar to the narrative on human rights, Norwegian politicians strongly emphasise their country’s commitment to increasing good governance efforts worldwide. Moreover, the narrative claimed that good governance policies are often a precondition before negotiations for development assistance can begin. This section explores typical good governance projects that receive funding from Norway and confronts the narrative of an increased focus on good governance projects with the reality of aid statistics. If Norway used increased selectivity this would need to be reflected in the aid statistics as well.

Good governance is a separate budgetary item for Norwegian development assistance, illustrating the importance attached to it. Throughout the observed period, about 19.40 percent has been attributed to the sector government and civil society, which is higher than for the United States or the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, this is largely due to the relatively high spending of Norway on conflict, peace and security related aid which amounts to slightly above 6 percent of that 19.40 percent. The remaining 13.25 percent are dedicated to government and civil society projects in general which is slightly lower than that of the United States (with 14.25 percent). The commitment to government and civil society is rather steady throughout the years with late peaks in 2013 and 2014 (with above 14 percent) and low scores in 2006 and 2010 and 2011 (all below 13 percent). While the overall share is significant if compared to other sectors (only humanitarian aid equally receives more than 10 percent of the overall budget), the figures also indicate that there is a slight increase in the spending dedicated to good governance projects. This points towards a slight support of the narratives and rules regarding good governance support (OECD Stat 2015a).

The implementation of the promotion of good governance policies is targeted at specific countries and sectors. It is an \textit{ex-ante} as well as in some cases an \textit{ex-post} condition (support for reforms). Some projects fund specific sectors – like the promotion of good governance in the oil sector, or fisheries (Norad 2010e, 53, 2007b, 8; NMFA 2011b, 33). Many projects are also directed to the promotion of women in political activities (NMFA 2013a, 4, 2012c, 69, 2008a).

Other Norwegian projects seek to strengthen institutions such as “parliaments, judicial systems, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, electoral commissions, the press and media, and civil society” (NMFA 2008b, 15). These projects are either promoted through direct funding or through capacity building. The programmes focusing on supporting democracy in South Africa put a particular emphasis on democratic governance and human rights (Norad 2011b, 79). Similarly, the Norwegian government supports governance projects in Zimbabwe (Gahr Store 10.02.2009, 8), Guatemala, Mozambique, Nepal, Sudan, India and Afghanistan and Malawi (Norad 2010b, xiii, 2006, 8; NMFA 2009f, 21).

\textsuperscript{116} This relatively poor record in rewarding human rights is confirmed by Scott Gates and Anke Hoeffler (2004), but contradicts the DAC Peer review that attributes Norway an increasingly results-based approach (OECD DAC 2013).
Another example of the implementation of good governance policies is the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support. However, this example illustrates how delicate the issue of good governance promotion actually is. The centre was built to support specific political parties which it deemed to promote better governance, but had to close down in spring 2009 as it was judged to have only limited effects and needed further resources to be effective (NMFA 2009g, 43). The Norad evaluation of the centre states that political party assistance should be “delinked from the goal of poverty reduction and recognised as a field of development cooperation in its own right” and that activities in the field of democracy promotion should “not be confined to countries that receive development aid from Norway” (Norad 2010b, xvi). An evaluation report from Norad from 2011 confirms how difficult it is to actually know what good governance in a specific context really consists of (Norad 2011a, 24). The idea that every country has its own norms of democracy is widespread among Norwegian politicians, many of whom advocate more local ownership and a diversity of approaches towards democracy (NMFA 2013b, 32). The link to the idea that ownership is essential for effective development is therefore again very influential in the field of good governance and limits conditionality in this regard.

The remaining question concerns whether or not the pre-selective criteria are really implemented in practice: are good performers rewarded and bad performers punished with the withdrawal of aid? As in the case of the analysis conducted for the U.S., this section uses the World Bank indicators. When comparing the amount of money spent on the major recipients of aid to their governance score, several observations can be made.

First, some countries show mixed results, in which no clear connection between the governance indicators and the aid spending can be established. This group consists of Nigeria, Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nigeria’s figures show decreasing trends in government effectiveness and control of corruption, but increasing trends in voice and accountability. This is generally met with very stable and very low aid disbursements from Norway (at about 0.26 percent of Norwegian aid of all aid disbursements). Malawi shows increasing trends for all good governance indicators (especially for voice and accountability and government effectiveness), but these improvements are not met with an increase in funds but rather with a very stable disbursement. The relatively high percentage of aid disbursed to Malawi (at about 2.09 percent on average) however rewards the generally good scores of the country (all above 30 points). Similarly, the response towards the Democratic Republic of Congo does not confirm or contradict the Norwegian narrative: first of all, the DRC shows unclear trends in its indicators with slightly increasing trends in voice and accountability and control of corruption but with decreasing trends in government effectiveness. Norway spends a rather stable amount of 1 percent of its aid on this country, which overall has very low scores on the indicators (all below 10 points).

Second, there are countries where the percentage of aid spending corresponds to their achievements (or failures) in the governance scores, fulfilling the narrative uncovered in the previous sections. The cases here are Sudan, Mozambique and Uganda (which, overall, is more than for the U.S. where only two cases fulfilled the narrative). All cases indicate that Norway does, at times, punish bad performers: Sudan is the clearest case where the decreasing trends in all three indicators (and especially in government effectiveness) are reflected in strong aid cuts. Similarly, Mozambique’s situation shows severely decreasing trends in the indicators voice and accountability and government effectiveness (and similarly decreasing trends for control of corruption); the country suffered from Norwegian aid cuts from 2.8 percent in 2004 to 0.9 percent in 2013. Finally, Uganda has strong decreasing trends in the indicators for control of corruption and
government effectiveness and a stable trend at voice and accountability. These trends are met with cuts from 2.44 percent in 2008 to 1.85 percent in 2014.

Third, there are five out of the eleven countries where, despite an improvement or failure in the governance indicators, Norway’s aid responds contrary to what the narrative might suggest. This category of country illustrates that Norway neither rewards nor punishes easily. This group is slightly smaller than that of the United states, but is still considerable. Tanzania shows decreasing trends in control of corruption and government effectiveness and a slight improvement in the voice and accountability indicator. Tanzania is the third biggest recipient of Norwegian aid overall and receives 3.25 percent of its aid. Despite the negative trends in two essential indicators, aid flows have actually increased over the ten years. South Sudan has very strong decreasing levels in the voice and accountability indicator and has generally very low scores. Nevertheless, Norway disburses increasing amounts of aid to that country. Similarly, Afghanistan has decreasing trends in voice and accountability and government effectiveness and a stable level of control of corruption. Again, this bad record is met with increasing funds disbursed to Afghanistan, contradicting the narrative of selecting its recipients according to good governance standards (World Bank Group 2015).

Finally, the cases of Ethiopia and Zambia illustrate that Norway is not likelier to be inclined to reward good performers. Ethiopia has strongly improving scores for government effectiveness and the control of corruption, coupled with slightly decreasing scores for voice and accountability. This strong improvement on government effectiveness and control of corruption is met with decreasing aid levels. Moreover, when compared with the United States and the United Kingdom, Norway gives only a limited amount to Ethiopia of 1.41 percent on average – despite having very high scores in all indicators. The case of Zambia is even clearer: Zambia’s figures show a strong improvement in all relevant indicators, that are moreover all relatively high, but these efforts have been met by severe budget cuts from 3 percent in 2006 to 0.78 percent in 2014. The table below illustrates that case nicely.

**Figure 6-2: Example of Norwegian funding of Zambia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Overall trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WB Governance Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td>36.06</td>
<td>42.31</td>
<td>43.40</td>
<td>0.8196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>25.24</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>1.0325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>38.83</td>
<td>41.30</td>
<td>1.9674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume of Norwegian ODA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In absolute terms</td>
<td>USD 66 million</td>
<td>USD 81 million</td>
<td>USD 32 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of Norwegian ODA</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation on data based on Worldwide Governance Indicators and OECD stats
This section has illustrated that good governance remains an important budget post over the years for Norway but does not confirm the strengthening of the narrative on good governance policies as no increased funding has taken place. Moreover, the section showed that the precondition of good governance that was identified in the narrative does not seem to be strictly applied in practice as countries are not rewarded or punished for good or bad governance records, even though the record of Norway fares slightly better than that of the United States.

**Budget support**

Budget support is a policy that could be considered to stimulate ownership as it is often linked to the recipient’s poverty reduction strategies. However, as the narrative section illustrated, Norwegian budget support often includes political conditions. Therefore, it is a field in which Norwegian and emerging donor policies could collide, as the latter provide support without conditions attached.

The spending on budget support was highest in 2008 with USD 204 million; since then a dramatic decrease of general budget support has taken place. In 2013, the amount was a mere USD 84 million (Norad 2015). The share of budget support from overall ODA decreased from 5 percent in 2008 to 1.5 percent in 2013, which mirrors the decreasing emphasis put on that aid tool within the narrative. The share is lower than that of the United States and slightly below that of the UK. Moreover, the share of general budget support is on the decrease, with the slightly lower share spent on sectoral budget support on the increase. This suggests an increasing reluctance on the part of Norway’s government to support governments as a whole, and allows us suggest that an increasing selectivity is at play.

The implementation process of budget support works through flexible and less flexible conditionalities. A 2005 Norad report stated that the lack of predictability of budget support for donors and for recipients alike has triggered a review of the methods implementing conditionality. Even though the lack of predictability is “partly deliberate” to “secure that the budget support is used as intended” (Norad 2005a, 6), it states that a graduated response might be an interesting model. This graduated response foresees a combination between fixed and variable components where the fixed components include broad macroeconomic conditions and are disbursed in an “all or nothing” form (Norad 2005a, 8). The more flexible components concern sectors like health, education and public financial management (Norad 2005a, 8).

The biggest recipients from our selected eleven countries of budget support were Tanzania (25.5 percent), Mozambique (16 percent) and Zambia (12 percent). Malawi and Uganda received about 5 percent of the overall budget support. Tanzania’s share has diminished quite severely since 2011 to USD 14 million in 2013. Malawi received budget support of USD 9 million in 2013, but funds were frozen due to a corruption scandal in mid-2013 (Norad 2015). Similarly, Uganda’s budget support was paused between 2004 and 2013 due to a similar scandal, where Norway relied for its evaluation on the judgement of the IMF (NMFA 2004, 154; Norad 2005a, 18, 2013b, 9, 2015). These countries all have rather high scores in the three indicators (all above at least 30 points). Moreover, Tanzania’s scores have diminished as we have seen above and the cut in budget support seems to punish this deterioration. Nevertheless, as the section above argued, overall funds have not diminished, suggesting that budget support has simply been replaced with other funds. Similarly, budget support diminished after a corruption scandal in Malawi, again suggesting that the tool is flexible and aims to punish bad performers. Overall, the
amount of aid spent on Malawi has remained stable – suggesting again that budget support is a flexible tool, but that the funds simply flow toward other channels.

Overall, budget support seems to confirm a higher use of political conditionality as good performers on the good governance indicators are rewarded and no country with a consistently bad record received any budget support. This is in line with the narrative on good governance. Nevertheless, a decrease in budget support is often met with an increase in other funds, slightly undermining the credibility of the tool.

Generally, this section on political conditionality has argued that while the rules changed in the direction of the narratives and significant amounts were spent on fostering the political situation in recipient countries, the narrative support for a stronger selectivity is not actually reflected in the distribution of funds. Moreover, when applying the tools of selectivity in relation to the performance in countries where Norway shares an interest with emerging donors, no clear relationship could be established, even though the record is slightly better than in the case of the United States. This suggests that the idea of refraining from political conditionality in favour of ownership might explain this relative reserve evident in the practices.

The next sections now look at economic conditionality and ask whether the strong hesitance that was expressed in Norway’s narrative on economic conditions, such as the ones enforced through the IMF and the World Bank, have led to a low funding of those institutions and an absence of implementing economic conditions to Norwegian aid.

Economic conditionality

Norway’s funding to the IMF and the World Bank

The Norwegian narrative on IMF and World Bank conditionality was highly critical, especially with respect to the conditions of privatization and liberalization of markets. This critical attitude should be reflected in the practice, with a decreasing share of support for IMF and World Bank endeavours.

The World Bank is one of Norway’s partners in development cooperation and therefore the accounting of the disbursements to that institution can be easily monitored. The spending through the World Bank is at an average of 16 percent of the overall multilateral spending during the observed period. Slight peaks of funding took place in 2005 and 2012, while a slightly lower commitment can be found in 2007 (with 8.63 percent) and in 2013 (with 8.96 percent). The World Bank is with this share the second most important multilateral institution after the United Nations through which Norway channels its aid. Moreover, the Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization (GAVI) which is coordinated by the World Health Organisation and the World Bank receives an additional share of nearly 2 percent of Norwegian spending. If we look at the amounts disbursed to or through the World Bank, these have steadily increasing from USD 189 million in 2003 to USD 500 million in 2013. In comparison, the United States and the United Kingdom both spent 34 percent and 25 percent respectively on their multilateral aid on the World Bank (OECD Stat 2015e).

The figures for IMF funding are more difficult to obtain. Overall, Norway has spent below 1 percent of its aid on the IMF as an implementing agency. However, these figures do not include
all contributions that Norway made to the institution. If we look at the projects with the IMF as an implementing agency, we find that many projects include IMF conditionality, especially macroeconomic conditions. The funding of an IMF-led programme to create and support a central bank in Malawi is one example. That funding initially took place in 2007 at the time when the conference on IMF conditionality took place. The project continues until today. A slightly higher support for IMF projects can be found if we include all data where the IMF is not the implementing agency but is related to the project. However, the overall share of IMF related funding remains limited which can be explained with respect to the limited quota of 0.79 percent that Norway has in the institution (IMF 2016).

The narrative was equally critical about World Bank and IMF conditionality. The practice has shown that Norway continues to channel relevant amounts of money through the World Bank but is more reluctant to fund IMF related projects. When it does, there seems to be no clear focus on limiting the support to measures that do not include market liberalization or privatization. Compared to the other two donors, the support of Norway is more limited which can be explained by its generally ambivalent attitude towards economic conditionality.

**Rewarding macroeconomic stability**

In order to assess whether economic conditions are truly implemented in practice, the previous section on the United States looked closely at the regulatory quality indicator of the World Bank. What is Norway’s record for rewarding or punishing good or bad performers in this indicator? As in the case of human rights and good governance, the record is mixed at best:

A first group includes countries where Norwegian aid levels correspond to the trend in the indicator of regulatory quality: South Sudan has improved its regulatory quality indicator consistently and was rewarded with more aid by Norway. Similarly, Tanzania (while doing badly on government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption) has improved its regulatory quality and has benefited from aid increases. Moreover, Sudan lowered its regulatory quality and was met by a decrease in aid volumes.

Another group consists of countries with bad, decreasing records that have been met by smaller decreases in aid, often even by stable aid levels. This group consists of Uganda, Malawi and Ethiopia. Similarly, Afghanistan, Nigeria and the DRC have improving records on the regulatory quality indicator that is met by a small increase in aid volumes or by stable aid disbursements.

A last group consists of cases where no consistency exists between the official narrative and the practices: Zambia and Mozambique both have consistently improved their indicator but have received lesser shares of Norwegian aid throughout the last ten years (World Bank Group 2015).

Overall, the trend on the economic variable is therefore slightly better than the ones for political conditions, which is surprising considering the strong reservations Norway supposedly holds towards the application of economic conditions to its aid.
The narrative on the *Oil for Development* initiative illustrates neatly the shift towards a higher selectivity in the choice of recipient countries. Is this narrative implemented in practice? Does most of the money go to states that deserve to be rewarded for their record on good governance and human rights? While Norad proclaims that the number of recipients of the initiative has diminished, the numbers show that they have only decreased from a previous 19 countries in 2006 to 18 countries in 2013, indicating that no greater selectivity is in place (Norad 2013b, 3, 2014a, 61).

The cooperation with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, South Africa, Vietnam and Zambia ended. While the cooperation with these countries ended, new partners have been targeted: Norway started to implement its *Oil for Development* initiative in Cuba in 2010, with Ghana and Lebanon in 2007, with Liberia in 2011, Myanmar and Uruguay in 2013, Nicaragua in 2008. The cooperation with Ecuador lasted from 2007 to 2011, the cooperation with Kenya from 2008 till 2010, the projects with Palestine and Sierra Leone lasted only two years. Therefore, instead of a restriction of recipients, a large number of new recipients have been targeted while other projects have been stopped.

One country where China shares Norway’s interest in the oil sector is Angola where a Norwegian company has a share of production (in 2011) of 10 percent (NMFA 2012c, 38; interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 22’47). Other Norwegian companies are present in Angola (Det Norske Veritas and Aker Solutions together with about 15 other companies) (NMFA 2012d, 39). Angola receives 4 percent of the overall spending from the *Oil for Development* initiative. The spending peaked in 2007 (7.5 percent) and again in 2010 (7 percent), but decreased since to 2.6 percent in 2013, though this still amounts to USD 1.1 million spent on Angola’s oil programme (Norad 2015). Angola has a low record on all governance indicators (below 17 points on voice and accountability, below 9 points in rule of law and even worse for the control of corruption) and has ratified a mere 10 human rights treaties. It does not, therefore, comply with the selective criteria that Norway claimed to employ.

Another country where Norway is in direct contact with China is Nigeria. Nigeria receives overall USD 6.8 million in total through its *Oil for Development* initiative. Similar to Angola, Nigeria has a relatively low score on all governance indicators (with slightly increasing tendencies: voice and accountability (26.95); rule of law (11.56); with slightly decreasing tendencies for government effectiveness (14.65) and control of corruption (12.26), and strongly improving scores on regulatory quality (22.38)) but has ratified 14 international human rights treaties. Norway published a report on promoting good governance in Nigeria despite the fact that Nigeria only receives 0.2 percent of overall aid (Norad 2015, 2010c). The report states that Norway supports the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and that there is an institutional agreement between the Norwegian Oil Directorate and the Department of Petroleum

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117 The initial list of recipients from the *Oil for Development* initiative consisted of 19 countries. The list included Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Iraq, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia (Norad Report OfD 2013: 61).

118 In brackets is the average over the last ten years in points.
Changes in conditionality?

Resources in Nigeria (Gahr Store 30.01.2008, 2; Norad 2010c, 40). Following the report, the OfD cooperation focuses on capacity building (Norad 2010c, 41).

Angola definitely does not fulfil the pre-selective criteria for the programme, while Nigeria only fulfils certain criteria.

Other countries that have continuously received support through the Oil for Development initiative are Sudan and South Sudan (together 11.6 percent of the OfD aid), Uganda (with 11.5 percent of OfD aid), Timor Leste with 7.4 percent, Ghana with 6.5 percent and Mozambique with 6 percent. Sudan and South Sudan have received over the eight years the programme is running a total of USD 33 million. Sudan (and South Sudan) is similar to the cases of Nigeria and Angola a country where China is increasingly involved in the oil sector.

Similar to the good governance support overall, the records for the Oil for Development initiative in terms of selectivity are mixed. Uganda and Sudan are cases where conditions have definitely not played a significant role, whereas Mozambique, Timor Leste and Ghana are cases in which there is some congruence between the narrative (and a proclaimed higher selectivity in recipients) and practice. While Uganda has ratified 12 human rights treaties, its records on the good governance indicators has been deteriorating and the overall share of aid has been decreasing as well (see section on practice/ good governance). However, the share for the support of the Oil for Development initiative has increased from USD 2.1 million in 2009 to USD 8.6 million in 2013. Quite a similar trend can be observed for the cases of Sudan and South Sudan. While the indicators are rather low (for good governance and human rights), the support has been steadily increasing from 5.2 percent in 2009 to 17.4 percent in 2013, therefore contradicting the narrative on a higher selectivity of recipients for this programme. Together with Nigeria and Angola, the cases of Sudan and South Sudan suggest that Norway is very eager to be active in countries where China also has an interest in the oil sector, irrespective of any conditionality (Norad 2015; World Bank Group 2015).

There are cases from the OfD where congruency exists between narrative and practice: While Mozambique has ratified 13 human rights treaties, its governance indicators are deteriorating. The level of support from the OfD programme diminished from an initial 10 percent in 2006 to 1.7 percent in 2012, but an increase in 2013 to 7 percent again. Therefore, there is some congruence between the declining levels of governance and a decrease of money from the OfD programme. Overall, Timor Leste receives well below 1 percent of Norwegian aid. Within the OfD programme, its share is however rather high with 7.4 percent. Timor Leste has ratified 11 human rights treaties and has a high score on voice and accountability (above 50 points but with a decreasing tendency). The score for the rule of law and the control of corruption is however rather low. Moreover, the score for the rule of law is deteriorating from 25 points in 2003 to 9 points in 2013. The share of support from the OfD has decreased from 17 percent in 2006 to 2.3 percent in 2013. Again, there is some compliance between the narrative of higher selectivity and the practice (Norad 2015; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).

Ghana, as one of the “donor darlings”\(^{119}\), has a good record in all categories (voice and accountability increasing to above 60 points in 2013, only short of 60 points in rule of law and control

\(^{119}\) Ghana is indeed often referred to as the most prominent donor darling in aid circles, see for instance (Lawson 2013, 5).
of corruption; ratification of 12 human rights treaties). The support for Ghana in the *Oil for Development* initiative started in 2008 and has increased from 1.7 percent to 7.5 percent in 2013 with a peak of even 12 percent in 2011. Ghana is therefore an example where a pre-selection could have taken place.

A main goal of the *Oil for Development* initiative is to share Norwegian experiences in the exploitation of the oil sector. Next to the selectivity of partner countries, the initiative also stated that it wanted to promote good governance within the oil sector. The spending on good governance itself within the initiative has however decreased to the benefit of environmental and revenue management (Norad 2009b, 72). The *Oil for Development* initiative is therefore a useful example of Norwegian conditionality in which the proclaimed political preconditions are not employed to select recipients but other criteria seem to play a more important role. In summary, even if some countries exist where selective criteria might have played a role (Mozambique, Ghana, Timor Leste) other countries, especially where China is an influential force in the recipient’s oil sector (Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan), are examples where Norway has preferred to increase its engagement to the detriment of conditionality.

Overall, the case of Norway shows a conflicted approach within the narrative towards conditionality, in which the idea of fostering ownership instead of imposing external conditions seemed to play a strong role in countering the idea that increased selectivity is useful. Within the practices, the record of Norway is mixed; while it is slightly more consistent than the United States in the selection of worthy recipients, factors other than conditionality must play a decisive role in explaining which countries are chosen as major aid recipients.

### 6.3 United Kingdom: Approach towards conditionality

The previous chapter argued that the United Kingdom has a rather positive view of emerging donors, seldom expressing even moderate criticism. Nevertheless, the UK perceives the aid effort of emerging donors as substantial, and such aid has two consequences for the UK that are relevant for this chapter; first, the UK aims to help emerging donors adapt their policies and, second, the UK sees a need to make its aid more effective and results-based. Both issues are linked to conditionality. Arguably, both indicate that the UK does not insist on imposing its conditionality policies anymore, but adapts its own policies to those of emerging donors. This section therefore looks at whether these assumptions are true.

#### 6.3.1 Narratives on conditionality

**Position on conditionality as such in the light of the rise of emerging donors**

The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) claims to have significantly changed its approach towards conditionality with 2006 referred to as a turning point for a “new

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120 This finding contradicts a DAC Peer Review (2008, 24) that argues that 93 percent within Norway are in favour of conditionality.

121 These findings are confirmed by the literature (Claessens, Cassimon, and van Campenhout 2009; Easterly and Williamson 2011).
approach” (DFID 2006a, 151). The Under Secretary for International Development, Gareth Thomas, talked at a conference in Norway about “the right kind of conditionality” that no longer requires the implementation of “conservative and neo-liberal” reforms (NMFA 2006c, 2). Even more than Norway, therefore, the UK focuses increasingly on local ownership and considers itself to be quite successful in pursuing this strategy (DFID 2007a, xv, 2007b, 15, 2009c, 6, 39, 2014b, 124). Similar to the United States, DFID accords itself an influential role in shaping the OECD-led Accra conference and its outcome (DFID 2008e, 7; OECD 2008b, 16). Ownership is seen as a principle that is shared between the United Kingdom and emerging donors:

“The idea is that South-South cooperation support is somehow more determined by the priorities of the recipient country government than traditional donors. And I think that’s overstated. I think both are supporting governments to achieve what they want to achieve for the people” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 31’42).

The above suggests that conditionality overall is newly construed in a way that it does not interfere with recipient ownership of aid. However, when we analyse the legal framework, the picture gets more complex. The International Development Act from 2002 required only a commitment to reducing poverty as benchmarks for aid, no other conditions were included in the policy. In 2005, DFID, together with the British Foreign Office and the Treasury, published a new policy paper entitled *Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality* (DFID 2005). This policy foresaw the conclusion of a contract between recipients and the UK before aid is delivered. In this contract, recipients have to commit to three partnership conditions: first, a commitment to poverty reduction and to reaching the Millennium Development Goals; second, a commitment to human rights and upholding other international obligations; and finally the obligation to strengthening financial management and accountability (DFID 2005, iii, 1, 8). Very similar to the tendencies within the U.S. and Norway, one could argue that this approach puts the emphasis on pre-selective criteria rather than conditions that have to be fulfilled once aid is given. This legislation specifically opposes the introduction of specific conditions to measure the individual commitment of partner governments as it is seen to contradict the recipients’ ownership (DFID 2005, 1,4), but benchmarks to measure successes (once the partnership commitments were clarified) are already included. However, already in 2006, specific conditions were reintroduced (DFID 2006c) and further extended in 2009 and 2014 (DFID 2009e, 2014g). The regulation from 2009 stated that if conditions are transparent and well-communicated they should not undermine the ownership of the recipient country (DFID 2009e, 17). 2014 saw the introduction of a fourth partnership commitment, a respect for good governance as a prerequisite for aid. The proclaimed higher support for ownership is therefore more and more accompanied by specific pre-conditions and specific measures that are analysed before the aid disbursement and benchmarks to measure successes after the disbursement of money.

The narrative within the legal framework thus introduces a new, but more complex picture of the British stand on conditionality. Generally, the UK is driven to make aid more results-based and efficient. The narrative claims that aid is more efficient in stable political and economic

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122 This reform process is confirmed by the DAC Peer Review (2006a, 74) which also states that the reform needs clarification.
123 The DAC Peer Review (2010) positively reviews the introduction of the *How to Guidance Notes* as they improved the transparency of UK policies.
surroundings, which explains the strong emphasis on pre-selective conditions within British aid. A statement from an interview with a DFID representative confirms this:

“I think it is an observation to say traditional donor approaches have become over time, over the last twenty or so years more concerned with the policy environment in which aid is provided because basically through experience of realising that small projects won’t have a large effect if they are not supported by the right policy environment” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 33'15).

The pre-selection is not seen as harming ownership of recipients as the policy change has to come first from the recipients before, not after, the aid is even distributed. Moreover, for DFID, this policy is equally applied by traditional and emerging donors:

“So, it’s not as if [the conditions] are imposed, they are just restating the agreement that was reached before the provision of money according to the government’s priorities […]” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 32'41).

In the same vein, DFID’s official publications show an awareness of the important role of economic growth and stability for the effectiveness of aid (DFID 2007a, 16). This includes the “responsible and sustainable use of natural resources” as a central theme. Legally, this idea is embedded in the third partnership commitment which requires a strong financial management and sound accountability. This tendency to encourage a high integration into the international market was confirmed in 2014 (DFID 2014c, 7). This policy could potentially be in contradiction to the aid efforts of emerging donors.

In contrast, the narrative within Norway, therefore, we can see here a strengthening in the narrative surrounding pre-selective conditionality, despite the official ambitions to foster ownership. Conditionality is given a new face – not dissimilar to that shown by the United States – which no longer emphasises the need for neoliberal reforms, but the need for a stable political and economic environment in which human rights and good governance principles (embedded in partnership principles 2 and 4), as well as fiscal stability (partnership principle 3) play an important role (DFID 2014g). All of these conditions are opposed to what emerging donors apply in their aid. Therefore, the previous stated hypothesis that the UK might try to adapt its policies to strengthen the cooperation with emerging donors – as the perception chapter hypothesised – is not confirmed by this first part on the narratives surrounding conditionality in general. On the contrary, we find a strengthening in the conditions that might or might not be related to the emergence of new donors. The following sections, elaborating on political and economic conditionality, shed light on the causal link between a change in conditionality and emerging donors.

Narratives on political conditionality

Similar to the other two traditional donors, the UK supports democratic efforts in development countries. Therefore, we have seen that both other donors are strongly committed (at least in their narratives) to political conditionality, because emerging donors are perceived as a potentially undermining factor in that field. The UK is in favour of supporting politically stable countries as they tend to be friendlier towards Western governments and better trade and investment partners (for instance FCO 2008, 98). On the other hand, Mr Mitchell, the Minister for Development, stated in 2011 that when Great Britain enters into contact with a country in which there
is disagreement on political matters, a pragmatic cooperation should take place as far as possible without “compromising our beliefs” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7). The next three sections show in detail how and whether the narrative about political conditionality changed in the period from 2004 till 2014 and elaborates on the link to emerging donors.

**Human rights**

As in the cases of the United States and Norway, human rights are considered to be an important policy tool for the United Kingdom. The narrative refers to governments that respect human rights as being likelier to observe their international obligations and to be peaceful and secure states (DFID 2005, 8–9; Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Supporting human rights activities is therefore seen to be in the self-interest of the UK (FCO 2011).

Respecting human rights is included in the four partnership commitments that a recipient needs to fulfill before the delivery of British aid. Monitoring and benchmarks increased since the introduction of the policy in 2005 (DFID 2009e; National Audit Office 2008, 5; DFID 2012b, 6, 2014g). The pre-selective mechanism should assure that UK aid does not reach countries where massive human rights violations occur (example of Democratic Republic of Congo where sanctions worked, FCO 2006, 221; for further support of sanctions, see FCO 2011, 135).

Human rights are a topic where the UK largely agrees to disagree with emerging donors. The Foreign Office Minister, Jeremy Browne, insisted in a speech in 2012 that, despite criticism from the BRICS summits, human rights should not be considered a Western product but a universal phenomenon (Browne 24.04.2012, 7). Similarly, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, listed human rights as a challenge in the cooperation with emerging donors:

> “But at the same time these changes [rise of emerging powers] pose challenges that we need to overcome. One of these is a difference of opinion over how we protect human rights in other countries” (Hague 14.02.2012, 3).

While the Foreign Ministry seemed to put a stronger emphasis on the differences between emerging donors and the UK when it comes to human rights, the Minister for Development, Andrew Mitchell, stressed that differences regarding human rights

> “don’t mean we shouldn’t put our global heads together, work for development and, where we agree, cooperate” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3).

The tension has therefore not been resolved in the observed period, but it is clear for both the Ministry for International Development and the Foreign Office that cooperation is easier with “like-minded” countries, such as South Africa or Brazil (FCO 2011, 6-7, 26).

The analysis shows a strengthening in the narrative of human rights related conditions as more and more pre-selective conditions have been attached to British aid since 2004. Moreover, it shows that the UK is very aware of the differences with emerging donors in the understanding

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124 Political and civil rights are included in partnership commitments 2 and 4, whereas economic, social and cultural rights are underlying the partnership commitments 1 and 3.
of human rights, but prefers to uphold the standards while cooperating as much as possible with emerging donors.

**Good governance**

As with the respect of human rights, good governance is seen as an instrument to achieve a working democratic order which is thought to emphasis development. Therefore, the reasoning behind a support for good governance projects through development cooperation is similar to that of supporting human rights and to that of the other two donors. Arguably, a safe political order enshrined in good governance structures lowers the threat of terrorist attacks emanating from these countries and is therefore directly in the UK’s national interest and its security (FCO 2007, 88, 2009, 45, 2010, 9, 2012, 29). The Foreign Office is careful to “support the consolidation of democratic transitions without imposing a particular vision of democracy” (FCO 2011, 26). Democracy is seen as a natural phenomenon “coming from within states”, not a cultural phenomenon unique to the West (FCO 2011, 28).

Logically, then, good governance is seen as an important cornerstone of British development policy. A 2006 white paper focused on “how to make governance work for the poor” (DFID 2006b). Within that publication, good governance was defined as “good politics” and by the Foreign Office as “state capability, responsiveness, and accountability” (DFID 2006b, 23; FCO 2006, 236). In 2007 and 2008, the strengthening of good governance worldwide was put at the centre of British aid commitments and as a strategic goal in 2008 (DFID 2007a, 20, 2009a, 7). In 2011 accountability (close to the concept of good governance) was introduced in the regulations for budget support as a fourth partnership commitment (DFID 08.07.2011). Since 2014, good governance has been embedded fully in development policies as the fourth partnership commitment, therefore introducing a selective element, increasing the support for recipients that respect good governance standards, but punishing those who don’t (DFID 2014g).

Emerging donors have a decidedly mixed record when it comes to good governance policies. Like-minded countries such as Brazil and South Africa are on board to cooperate with the UK to increase good governance worldwide. William Hague claims that there are “exciting opportunities for Britain and Brazil to work in partnership with African countries” (Hague 19.02.2014, 2). China and India are not mentioned when it comes to good governance policies. It is clear, however, that the UK is critical of especially China’s governance record and wary of the implementation of Chinese development cooperation to countries that violate good governance standards. A statement from the Foreign Minister, William Hague, clarifies that the UK would welcome a time when “future African lion economies” supported by the UK rival “Asia’s tigers” (Hague 19.02.2014, 4).

The narrative surrounding good governance strengthened between 2004 and 2014 and the element was put more at the centre of British development policies. Moreover, through the recent introduction of the fourth partnership commitment, a solid good governance record is a prerequisite for receiving British aid. This section also argues that the UK is apprehensive about the good governance records of at least two of the emerging donors, namely India and especially China.
Changes in conditionality?

Budget support

General budget support (or GBS) arguably strengthens a recipient’s ownership if the money is distributed to its budget without any conditions attached. Budget support that is directed at a specific sector (so-called sector budget support, or SBS) is already a stronger steering tool for the donor country. Consequently, the debate surrounding how many conditions should be attached to budget support and whether GBS or SBS is the preferred aid tool offers some insight into the narratives surrounding political conditions.

The UK, and DFID in particular, sees itself as an important provider and a frontrunner in shaping budget support internationally (ICAI 2012, 15–16; National Audit Office 2008, 18; DFID 2007a, 127, 2006a, 34, 2008a, 93). Generally, the UK supports the idea that donors need to align their priorities with recipient countries as much as possible, therefore not imposing conditions (DFID 2006a, 34; also interview with III, 2013, October 9, 31'42).

However, it seems that in many cases, the UK prefers sector budget support to GBS (DFID 2007a, 125, 08.07.2011, 6; National Audit Office 2008, 23). On the other hand, the UK is not shying away from the imposition of economic and political conditions to GBS, as an interviewee from DFID confirmed:

“whether it is budget support happening, there are some clearer requirements of what’s expected from the recipient. Usually in terms of public financial management. And on top of that there is the political activity about human rights” (interview with III, 2013, October 9, 31:42).

Within budget support, conditions have increased in many ways between 2004 and 2014. In 2003, three criteria for budget support existed: high poverty levels of the recipient, commitment of the government to poverty reduction, and acceptable risks (DFID 2003, 107). Since then, a complete catalogue of criteria, as well as graduated response mechanisms, have been added in order to establish whether a country qualifies for budget support or not. Since 2005 the requirement to fulfil the three partnership commitments have been applied to budget support (DFID 2005, 15). 2008 saw the introduction of a full catalogue of questions that needed to be asked to a recipient country before budget support could be delivered; for instance, an inquiry into the likelihood of a good performance from the recipient country on the three partnership commitments (National Audit Office 2008, 35–36; DFID 2008a, 94). Several publications stress the importance of conditions attached to budget support (for instance the need to have successful strategies countering corruption, DFID 2011b, 2, 2010a, 8, 2009d, 126, 2012a, 33). Since 2009, human rights monitoring has increased (see section on human rights) and DFID has begun to use tranche mechanisms to more quickly react to breaches in the partnership commitments (ICAI 2012, 7–8; DFID 2009f, 21, 6). Equally in 2009, the fourth partnership commitment (accountability) is introduced as a necessary pre-condition for receiving budget support (DFID 08.07.2011, 1–2; good governance was already seen as essential in DFID 2006b, 24). Moreover, since 2011, the disbursements are no longer made annually but quarterly in order to ensure higher protection in cases of breaches of partnership principles (DFID 08.07.2011, 8).

This indicates an even stronger pre-selectiveness in budget support than in other UK aid instruments. Moreover, budget support can be quickly withdrawn or lowered if a country breaches a condition. Hence, political (and some economic) conditions, like the respect for human rights and a functioning accountability system are pre-conditions in budget support (DFID 2006b, 24,
Emerging donors generally refrain from using budget support but certainly attach a lower degree of conditionality. A strengthening in the pre-conditionality of budget support could indicate a stronger separation from the UK and emerging donor policies.

This policy, which is considered important in the UK, is under direct threat from emerging economies: because African countries have “substantial increases in natural resource revenues because of the rise of emerging donors in Africa, who provide assistance without the complex processes associated with UK budget support”, there is a fear that UK budget support might become obsolete (ICAI 2012, 20). It is therefore interesting to note that despite this imminent threat to the usefulness of budget support, the UK has increased conditions attached to the policies and seems to be eager to continue to apply the policy – contrary to a diminishing interest that the sections on U.S. and Norwegian budget support showed. The section on practices below analyses whether this narrative around a strengthened conditionality is implemented in practice.

**Economic conditionality**

Private investments and private sector activities are important in order to increase development. This is an argument most British politicians would agree with. In order to support the trend towards private investments, British development cooperation directly encourages these policies (DFID 2014c, 1). However, as previous sections show, stable political conditions are considered a pre-requisite for a stable and growing economy (FCO 2013, 112). What economic conditions are attached to this narrative?

Within economic conditionality, we have seen two very distinct approaches: the United States largely supporting economic conditionality, while Norway strongly opposed the imposition of policy reforms, such as neoliberal reforms, especially free market and trade liberalizations. Norway accompanied its criticism with an strengthening critique of the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. The UK is less prone to voicing such criticisms, as it is a strong supporter of the World Bank and its second biggest contributor (in terms of ODA/GNI); it is therefore likely to argue in a similar vein to the United States.

**The UK’s position towards IMF and World Bank conditionality**

Contrary to the United States, which supported the IMF and the World Bank but did not talk a lot about their reforms, the UK sees itself at the forefront of attempts to reform the Bretton Woods institutions and adapt them to a changed international landscape. This includes support for voting reforms in favour of emerging nations. But the proposed need for reform is also about a reform of IMF and World Bank conditionality and their requirement that recipients need to implement market and trade liberalizations, a policy that the UK no longer endorses.

Moreover, while the UK stresses the need to reform the institutions’ conditionality (for instance, see DFID 2003, 35, 2005, 2, 2006b, 74–76, 2009d, 115, 119), the UK emphasises that reforms are ongoing and that the institutions have made major progress in reforming their conditional approach. The UK does not pass up the opportunity to make a point of how big its own contribution to this reform was (for instance, DFID 2005, 14, 18, 2008f, 20, 2009d, 116, 2008a, 111).
The UK also sees the Bretton Woods institutions as “essential pillars” to the world of development (DFID 2009d, 105), but references to the IMF are becoming less frequent. In contrast, the support for the World Bank is still enthusiastic and the UK is seen to have a central role in fostering that institution’s ability to have an impact on development (DFID 2009a, 43, 2011a, 105).

The proposed founding of the BRICS development bank, first initiated in 2012 but confirmed over the years, has brought the Foreign Office to the conclusion that the BRICS institutions “are more likely to be complements rather than substitutes for the existing IFIs. The initial scale of the proposals is modest. The NDB starts one third the size of the Asian Development Bank. The CRA funds available are small relative to country foreign exchange reserves in all the BRICS (except South Africa) and 70% of funds are tied to compliance in an IMF finance program and its attendant conditionality” (FCO 2014a, 1).

This analysis indicates that the UK does not see the BRICS bank as a significant challenge for established international financial institutions, or their conditional approach. Overall, the UK is supportive of the Bretton Woods institutions, but insists on actively reforming their conditionality.

**UK’s definition of sound financial strengthening**

Previous economic conditions stipulated a willingness on the part of the recipient to undergo neoliberal reforms in terms of market and trade liberalizations (DFID 2009e, 5). Since 2005, the UK has refrained from such policies. However, that does not mean that no economic conditions are attached to its aid.

Since the introduction of the partnership commitments in 2005, countries are required to comply with partnership commitment number 3, requiring that the recipient country strengthen its financial management and accountability while actively fighting against corruption (DFID 2005, 9). This indicates a new set of economic conditions that the UK attaches to its aid.

Within this category of economic accountability, the UK largely refers to indicators developed and maintained by the Bretton Woods institutions, further indicating the trust the United Kingdom has in these institutions (DFID 2007a, 200, 2014g, 16–18). Moreover, each country receiving UK aid has to complete an Annual Statement of Progress on Fiduciary Risk (DFID 2009e, 18). Possible conditions that are suggested in order to guarantee sound macroeconomic policies from the recipient are the expansion of the volume spent on medicines or an audit scrutiny of a particular programme or sector (DFID 2009e, 18). Relevant economic policy conditions are fiscal policies, monetary and trade policies, supply side policies (DFID 2009e, 21), while privatization and trade liberalization policies are officially excluded as conditions because “the use of these two policies as conditions has been particularly contentious” (DFID 2009e, 21). The 2014 legislation expands on the third partnership commitment, indicating a further strengthening of the conditionality attached to it. Indicators of whether or not a particular recipient country has a sound financial accountability (and therefore qualifies for UK aid), are taken from the IMF and the World Bank (such as assessments regarding country financial accountability or debt management performance)(DFID 2014g, 16–19). A comprehensive government budget, pro-
poor strategies within the budget, comprehensive and timely accounting, a credible strategy to strengthen the financial management by the government and many more indicators are all factors thought to indicate sound economic policy and qualify the recipient for British aid. In order to assess whether a country successfully fights corruption, the UK uses the World Bank Control of corruption index, or the compliance with other international standards to tackle corruption (DFID 2014g, 16–19).

Since the introduction of the partnership commitments in 2005, the conditionality within the third partnership commitment has been expanded, making the requirements more tangible but also more complex. Therefore, the UK has strengthened the narrative surrounding economic conditions and introduced more pre-selective criteria for recipients. This stronger focus on pre-selection is closely linked to the idea that British aid needs to increase its effectiveness (see previous chapter).

Overall, the section on the narratives surrounding conditionality indicates that a strengthening of the general narrative, and especially of specific aspects of that narrative such as political and economic conditionality, has taken place from 2004 till 2014. Moreover, this can often be linked to a fear of loss of British influence due to the emergence of new donors. This seems to run in contradiction to the fairly positive narrative surrounding emerging donors in the perception of the UK.

6.3.2 Rules and practice on conditionality

The following section concentrates on the rules and practices of the United Kingdom’s development policies. Some of the main rules were already mentioned earlier, such as the partnership commitments. As these mostly concern political (and to some degree economic) conditionality they are discussed again below. This section thus attempts to answer the following question: how strictly is conditionality applied in the different sectors? How much is spent on proclaimed priorities, such as human rights and good governance? Similar to the practice sections of Norway and the United States, this section focuses on countries where the United Kingdom shares an interest with emerging donors as well as with the other two traditional donors. For the UK, this list includes its top first, third, and fourth recipients, but excludes the second biggest recipient (India). Due to the fact that funds for India will be completely phased out, and India itself is one of the emerging donors studied here, this exclusion is logical. Moreover, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan are excluded because of a lack of involvement of emerging donors.
### Table 6-6: Amount disbursed by the UK in 2014 to selected recipients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>363.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / South Sudan</td>
<td>77 / 256.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD stats, figures for UK from 2014, all in USD millions (constant dollars from 2013)

### Political conditionality

The narrative surrounding political conditionality suggests a strong increase in political conditionality, especially in terms of pre-selective criteria, embedded in the partnership commitments 1, 3 and 4. How strong is this commitment in reality? The next sections look first at the overall amount spent by the UK in the field, and then at particular case studies where a rivalry with emerging donors is conceivable.

### Human rights

The section on narratives already mentioned that partnership commitments include relevant human rights as preconditions to entering into an aid relationship. Simultaneously, since 2004, monitoring has increased to spot and sanction human rights violations. Therefore, the narrative is closely linked to this rule. The question that remains, then, is whether these rules are implemented in practice – are political and civil rights, as well as socio-economic rights a precondition for receiving British aid? The list of what conditions have to be fulfilled in order to apply for UK aid has increased as the narrative section illustrates, including a “Practical guide to assessing and monitoring human rights in country programmes”) (DFID 2011c, 13–17).

Human rights are held up as a “priority area” within British narratives on development aid. Similar to Norway, there is no separated reporting on human rights spending in the UK. DFID explains this through the widespread inclusion of human rights aspects in many of its activities (FCO 2014b, 26). The total amount spent by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on human rights includes spending for staff, project work, and bilateral funds. For 2014, the total amounts to 38.2 million British pounds (roughly 60 million USD) (FCO 2014b, 26–29). This
number has increased dramatically since 2005, when spending amounted to 13.4 million British pounds (FCO 2005, 18).

In the early years of this study, human rights spending was directed through the Global Opportunities Fund, of 3.5 million British pounds went to human rights, democracy and good governance programmes in 2005. A specific human rights fund has been wound down over the years (FCO 2005, 18) and replaced by the human rights and democracy programme which spent 6.5 million British pounds on human rights projects in 2013 and 2014 (FCO 2012, 24, 2013, 24).

Priority countries are either countries of concern or countries that offer opportunities to promote and protect human rights. This overall priority has not changed since 2005 (FCO 2005, 16). In 2014, recipients of UK support that are located within the eleven selected countries are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia – basically all except Uganda, Malawi and Mozambique (FCO 2014b, 26–30).

It does not seem surprising that the UK has an interest in fostering human rights projects in Afghanistan where other emerging donors are also active. The UK supports projects that try to prevent sexual violence in conflict-affected countries (FCO 2014b, 27). The UK also attempts to strengthen civil society and human rights through a project where it currently spends 20 million British pounds (30.5 million USD) since 2010 (Development Tracker 2015a). Most of the sector aid is distributed to social infrastructure and services, indicating a focus on supporting political structures (OECD Stat 2015b). Similarly, the UK supports projects trying to achieve universal primary education in South Sudan. The highest share, in terms of sectors from UK aid is distributed towards humanitarian aid, but social infrastructure and service come second. The same applies to Sudan (OECD Stat 2015b). In Uganda and Tanzania, the highest amounts are spent on social infrastructure and services as well as on energy infrastructure for Uganda (OECD Stat 2015b). In Tanzania, a human rights related project has been at work since 2012, distributing a total of 4.5 million British pounds (around 6.8 million USD). This project concentrates on providing women with legal services and supporting the 2015 election in Tanzania (Development Tracker 2015b).

Moreover, the UK uses various instruments in co-operation with the United Nations Security Council and the European Union to punish human rights abusers worldwide (freezing their assets for instance). In 2014, this policy was applied to individuals in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (both countries where China has strong interests) (FCO 2014b, 84).
The UK itself is in a relatively high category with 10 to 14 ratification (the same category as
Norway and above the United States). From its major 20 aid recipients, 13 countries have rati-
fied an equally high amount of human right treaties[^125]. All remaining seven countries have rati-
fied between 5 and 9 human right treaties, from which India (6.44 percent) and Ethiopia (4.08
percent) are the most important recipients (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015).[^126]

What is the record for the UK in rewarding or punishing good performers in the rule of law
indicator of the World Bank? Similar to the cases of Norway and the United States, the UK still
disburses considerable amounts to countries that have a very low indicator in the rule of law
(like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan). There are
some countries where the UK seems to implement its rhetoric of punishing bad and rewarding
good performers: Ethiopia is a case where positive trends in the rule of law indicator was met
with increased British spending. Similarly, the case of Tanzania indicates that a bad record in
the rule of law indicator is punished with lower amounts of aid.

Similar to the other two donors, there are also cases where the UK shows only a very weak
reaction to supposedly strong trends in their recipients’ indicators: as such, Afghanistan and the
DRC receive a stable amount of money despite slightly improving (and slightly decreasing re-
spectively) records. Similarly, Malawi and Mozambique receive relatively stable funding despite
severe (for Mozambique) and moderate (for Malawi) decreases in the rule of law indicator.
Moreover, Uganda’s improving records are not met with an increase in spending but with a
slight decrease in spending. Finally, there is one group where the UK seems to ignore its narra-
tive on stronger selectivity: this group consists of the cases of Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and
Zambia. In the cases of Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia the increasing records in the rule of law
indicator were met with severe decreases in aid. On the other hand, the bad performer South
Sudan received increased amounts of funding (World Bank Group 2015).

This section indicates that practices on human rights policies have increased since 2004, and
that more money is spent on enforcing these conditions. This is also true in countries where the
UK is a direct rival of emerging donors that do not include human rights in their portfolio.
Nevertheless, the section also showed that the UK is still far away from a totally consistent
application of its pre-selective criteria and of truly rewarding or punishing good or bad human
right performers.

**Good governance**

There is a strong narrative arguing for using conditions requesting good governance policies.
Moreover, since 2014, good governance has been included as one of the partnership commit-
ments that every recipient needs to adhere to (DFID 2014g, 2, 18-20).

[^125]: These are in order of importance: Nigeria (8.33 percent of aid), Afghanistan (3.83 percent), Bangladesh (3.44
percent), Iraq (3.23 percent), Tanzania (3.17 percent), DRC (2.82 percent), Ghana (2.05 percent), Malawi (1.75
percent), Uganda (1.66 percent), Mozambique (1.48 percent), Sierra Leone (1.29 percent), Nepal (1.28 percent) and
Rwanda (1.19 percent).

[^126]: The remaining five countries are, in order of importance Pakistan (3.17 percent), Sudan (2.13 percent), Kenya
(1.58 percent), Zambia (1.52 percent) and Zimbabwe (1.31 percent).
As in the case of human rights, spending on good governance is not indicated separately in the figures. However, what is indicated is the spending on government and civil society. The UK spends on average USD 1.2 billion per year on government and civil society. That amounts to about 15 to 16 percent of its overall spending. From that, approximately 3 percent is spent on conflict, peace and security. The remaining 12 percent are then spent on initiatives related to government and civil society. These figures are most likely to cover many measures related to good governance. Over the ten-year period, the figures have remained largely stable in terms of overall amount and in percentage (roughly 11 percent of overall ODA OECD DAC 2014b, 106; OECD Stat 2015a). However, 2013 and 2014 saw a sharp decrease of spending, amounting only to seven percent of total ODA. Despite the increasing importance of good governance in the narratives, the figures don’t seem to match. In comparison to the other two donors, the UK spends least on the sector government and civil society and spends less than Norway (with 13 percent) and the United States (with 14 percent) in terms of percentages of ODA (OECD Stat 2015a).

The UK pledges to use at least five percent of its aid on accountability projects (DFID 22.03.2013a, 3). How does this pledge hold up when we look at the countries where the UK is most likely to clash with emerging donors, i.e. our selected 11 countries? All receive significant shares, and most often the biggest shares of spending on social infrastructure and services, which also include spending on government and civil society – but also includes various other posts, such as education and water sanitation (OECD Stat 2015a). Moreover, this share has increased over the years. The share in Afghanistan for social infrastructure and services increased from 6 and 7 percent in 2004 and 2005 to 67 percent in 2013. The first figures for South Sudan in 2011 indicate that nearly 99 percent was spent on that category. This share has since decreased to 38 percent. Since the creation of South Sudan, bilateral aid to Sudan has generally decreased quite dramatically. But equally dramatic is the fall of the share spent on social infrastructure and services, which fell from 62 percent in 2004 to 8 percent in 2013. Since 2011, most of the aid has gone toward humanitarian purposes. The share for social services and infrastructure for Tanzania remained largely stable at about 32 percent, but peaked in 2006/07 and 2011/12 to 60 and even nearly 80 percent. Tanzania is another example where the spending on good governance-related sectors increased dramatically from 16 percent in 2005 to 63 percent in 2013. This data shows that the share of aid distributed to good governance purposes in countries where the UK is in direct competition with countries that do not support good governance structures themselves has largely increased (OECD Stat 2015b).

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is a tool that the UK uses to support good governance and democracy world-wide. It is a non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Foreign Office. The overall goal, in its own words, is to strengthen the institutions of democracy and good governance, including respect for human rights (FCO 2013, 37). Throughout the observed period, the FCO founded the WFD with roughly 3.4 million British pounds every year (approximately 5.3 million USD) (FCO 2011, 32). In 2013, the programme focused largely on the MENA region; that is, areas where emerging donors are not very active (FCO 2013, 34). In 2012, the foundation supported programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China is very active (FCO 2012, 34). In the early years of this study, the WFD was involved in Uganda, a country where India and China share the UK’s interest (FCO 2007, 114, 2005, 206).

The UK uses a tool called Country Governance Analysis (CGA) to assess whether a given country fulfils the partnership requirements of good governance. This tool was first introduced in
2007 (FCO 2007, 25). In order to measure good governance, the UK refers to the following indicators: World Bank average CPIA Public sector management and the WB aggregate indicator on voice and accountability (DFID 2010c, 98). From the Worldwide Governance Indicators, those most closely related to public sector management is that of government effectiveness. Therefore, these two indicators receive special attention in the following analysis.¹²⁷

As in the case of the other two donors, four different cases of relationships between the governance indicators and aid levels have been identified. The first category consists of countries where no clear relationship between the governance indicators and the aid levels can be established.

In a first category is South Sudan, which has received increasing amounts of aid (slightly below the increase within the U.S. but above that of Norway). This could be indicative of rewarding the improving indicator of government effectiveness. Nevertheless, the increase is indeed smaller than the increase in aid. Moreover, the control of corruption indicator is stagnating and there is a significant deterioration of the voice and accountability indicator. No clear interpretation is possible here, except that the deterioration within the voice and accountability indicator has apparently been ignored.

There are several countries in the second category, indicating some consistency between the narratives and rules of increased selectivity and the practices. One clear case is Sudan, where a negative trend in all three indicators is met with decreasing aid levels. All the other cases, however, exhibit an incomplete degree of consistency, with at least one indicator going against the trend. Interestingly, this indicator is in most cases the voice and accountability indicator, suggesting that the UK does not react towards a change in this indicator despite claiming to do so in the narrative. These countries are Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania all receive less aid in relative terms than ten years ago. All three countries have deteriorating levels within the indicators of government effectiveness and control of corruption (these deteriorating levels are quite severe for Tanzania and Uganda). On the voice and accountability indicator, however, all three countries show improving tendencies which are not reflected in the distribution of British aid.¹²⁸ On the other hand, Ethiopia’s improving government effectiveness and control of corruption indicators have been met with increasing aid levels while – again – the slightly deteriorating trend within the voice and accountability indicator remained ignored. Another case that could be included in this category is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similar to the cases above, there is one indicator where there is no consistency (in this case government effectiveness) while the other two indicators (voice and accountability and control of corruption) show consistency: aid levels to the DRC have been modestly improving. Similarly modest is the improvement on the scores of voice and accountability and control of corruption. The slightly deteriorating trend of government effectiveness was however ignored.

¹²⁷ Note, however that in order to allow for comparability between this section on the UK and that on the USA and Norway, the part on good governance also includes the control of corruption indicator, even though that one gets repeated attention in the economic conditions, as the UK puts particular emphasis on the fight of corruption when looking at whether a country qualifies for having sound macroeconomic finances.

¹²⁸ Note that the level of improvement varies: while Tanzania has a high score for improvement of the voice and accountability indicator, Nigeria has a modest improvement and Uganda only hints at minor improvements.
The third section consists of countries that receive continuous support from the UK despite having very low scores on average in the governance indicators. Previous sections on Sudan and South Sudan have already commented on their low ratings in all governance indicators. The United Kingdom – in comparison to Norway (average 2.77 percent) and the United States (average 2.88 percent) – spends least on average on Sudan, with 2.13 percent of UK aid, and South Sudan (the UK spends only 0.27 percent whereas the United States spend 1.54 percent and Norway 0.76 percent). For the Democratic Republic of Congo, the situation is reversed: here, the UK is the most generous aid distributor with an average 2.82 percent (compared to 1.6 percent from the USA and 0.96 percent from Norway).

The fourth section consists of cases where narratives and practices clash fundamentally. This category includes Mozambique, Afghanistan (both in the same category for the United States), Malawi, and Zambia (as for Norway). Afghanistan with generally very low indicators make it an improbable candidate for rewarding good governance. But the example of Afghanistan is even more instructive. The aid for Afghanistan peaked in 2011 and 2012 with 5 percent of the overall British aid spent on that country. Since then, aid diminished to 2.9 percent in 2014. The voice and accountability indicator has improved since 2012 from 11.3 points to 15.8 points in 2014. A very similar tendency can be observed for the indicator on government effectiveness that reached an all-time high of 8.2 points in 2014 (which is still a very low score overall). The indicator for regulatory quality peaked in 2012 and remained stable since then at about 11 points. All indicators therefore suggest that the situation in Afghanistan is improving. But the aid levels of the UK have diminished further. Another case where improving indicators have not been rewarded is Zambia: Zambia has strongly improving records in all three indicators but received less British aid than 10 years ago. On the contrary, negative trends in Mozambique have been met by an increase in funds (even though a modest increase). Finally, Mozambique has strongly improving scores in the indicators voice and accountability and government effectiveness, and reasonably improving scores in the control of corruption indicator. Nevertheless, its aid was cut from a previous 2.2 percent in 2007 to a percentage below 1 percent in 2014 (World Bank Group 2015). The following table illustrates the contradiction between the narratives and the practices within British aid:

Figure 6-3: Example of British funding of Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Overall trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WB Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and ac-</td>
<td>33.17</td>
<td>39.91</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>0.9786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ef-</td>
<td>23.41</td>
<td>41.23</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>1.0718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of cor-</td>
<td>23.90</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>1.9674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In absolute</td>
<td>USD 126.56</td>
<td>USD 104.94</td>
<td>USD 93.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terms</td>
<td>million</td>
<td>million</td>
<td>million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of UK ODA</td>
<td>2.23 %</td>
<td>1.23 %</td>
<td>0.89 %</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation on data based on World Governance Indicators and OECD stats
This section illustrated that the narrative of an increasingly selective choice of recipients based on good governance criteria has only partly been shown in the practices of UK aid.\textsuperscript{129}

\textit{Budget support}

The UK sees itself as a “lead General Budget Support donor” and as very influential when it comes to harmonisation of budget support (DFID 2012d, 13). The figures largely confirm this. In comparison to the other two donors considered here, the UK spends the highest share of its ODA on budget support (with an average of 4 percent) while the United States has the lowest share with 1.18 percent (OECD Stat 2015a). In 2004, the UK spent USD 642 million on general budget support. In 2004, that amounted to 11.3 percent of bilateral ODA. The 2013 figures show that the UK spent 924 million USD on budget support, of which 713 USD million went toward sectoral support. While the general share of budget support has slightly decreased to about 8.8 percent for 2013, the share of sector support has steadily increased since 2010 (OECD Stat 2015a). DFID explains the decrease in GBS because it is no longer needed as macroeconomic stability is achieved or it is considered too risky (DFID 2014b, 125). Often, budget support represents a significant share of aid from about 12 percent (in the case of Nepal and 15 percent for Sierra Leone) to above 80 percent in the case of Mozambique (figures for 2010-11, ICAI 2012, 3). Many countries receive more than 50 percent of their UK aid in GBS (among them, Tanzania, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia).

Budget support can be easily withheld or withdrawn if a government no longer complies with the agreed commitments. The UK reports on this transparently. An astonishing amount of countries that were sanctioned by the UK are actively supported by emerging donors, even though mostly through other means than budget support. Budget support to Uganda was withheld because of a corruption scandal in 2007, in 2009-10, in 2012-13, and again in 2013-14 (National Audit Office 2008, 32; DFID 2011a, 96, 2013a, 115, 2014b, 126), Ghana’s budget support was lowered by 10 percent because reforms were not implemented thoroughly enough in 2007, and again in 2010-11 (DFID 2007a, 124, 2011a, 96). In 2008-09, budget support was suspended for Sudan (political situation, again in 2013-14, DFID 2013b, 7) and Tanzania (corruption). Budget support to Afghanistan was withheld in 2010-11 and 2011-12 because the IMF had suspended a programme because of fiscal instability (DFID 2012a, 91). The mechanisms of sanction that are in place indicate that the UK is enforcing its conditionality in budget support, especially when political conditions are not upheld (example Sudan) or when accountability is not respected sufficiently (example Tanzania). This is true in countries where Britain faces a direct competition from emerging countries. But as the section above has indicated, budget support is then frequently replaced by other funds, undermining the effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{129} In their study on whether donors reward merit, Anke Hoeffler and Vertiy Outram (2011) come to the result that the United Kingdom rewards democracy more so than the United States or Norway, but still not to the extent of what its narrative suggests. Similarly, Stijn Claessens, Danny Cassimon and Bjorn Van Campenhout (2009) find that the United Kingdom is the donor of the three selected here that sticks more closely to the CPIA indicators (similar to the WGI used here), and therefore sticks closest to its narrative.
Economic conditionality

UK’s position towards the IMF and the World Bank conditionality

Even though the UK still funds more projects through bilateral rather than multilateral projects (bilateral share in 2014 was at 59 percent, OECD Stat 2015a), it has, on average, the highest share of multilateral aid from the three traditional donors. The share is at 36 percent, with peaks of 42 percent in 2007 and 2014 and lows of 24 and 29 percent in 2005 and 2006. Generally, the trend shows an increase in multilateral shares. The World Bank is one of the main beneficiaries of this trend. From the high spending on multilateral aid, a share of an average 26 percent of its multilateral funding is channelled through the World Bank institutions (lion’s share goes through EU institutions) (OECD Stat 2015a). The IDA figures second in 2012 only after the European Commission as the second biggest recipient of multilateral funds for the UK (DFID 2014e). In 2013, the IDA was the biggest recipient of multilateral contributions (DFID 2014e). While these shares remain behind the share of total ODA that the United States spend on the World Bank, the United Kingdom nonetheless (and unlike the USA) is putting increasing amounts of money into the World Bank, from 13 percent of its multilateral contributions in 2004 to 34 percent in 2014.

The narrative surrounding the Bretton Woods institutions is slightly more positive in the UK than in Norway. The UK ascribes itself a leading role in helping the institutions to reform their conditional approach. This finding on the narrative is confirmed with the high spending that the UK distributes through the World Bank, where the UK remains the leading provider of money in terms of gross ODA that is spent on the World Bank over the years. The financial support has increased from 348 million USD in 2004 to 2.8 billion USD in 2014. In relation to its total ODA, this amounts to 4.2 percent in 2004 and up to a 2014 peak with 15.5 percent (OECD Stat 2015a). Throughout the period under observation, the average was 9.5 percent. With that share, the UK is well above the average of DAC donors, which is at about 6.6 percent. These figures indicate that the UK’s support of the World Bank is unbroken and their faith in the institution has increased strongly over time.

Figures for the IMF are again, much harder to come by. The IMF figures as the 20th biggest multilateral recipient of the UK in 2014, with 32 million British pounds disbursed. Moreover, as has been argued above, the share of funding to the IMF has decreased over the last period because of the quota and governance reforms within the IMF, from 5.03 percent to 4.05 percent, (IMF 2016, 2011).

Rewarding sound macroeconomic policies

Similar to the other two countries, we examine here whether or not the UK rewards countries that score well on the regulatory quality indicator of the World Bank, as it is the closest indicator in terms of measuring macroeconomic stability. Moreover, even though the section on political conditionality has already taken the control of corruption indicator into account, we’ll include this in the analysis again here – as the UK claimed itself that it makes use of the control of corruption index to assess the macroeconomic stability.

The first group again contains cases where no clear link can be established between UK aid and the relevant indicators. Malawi and Mozambique are both examples in which the indicator of
regulatory quality does not match the trend of the control of corruption indicator: while for Malawi the regulatory quality indicator deteriorated, the same was true for Mozambique for the control of corruption while the regulatory quality indicator improved. Both receive a modest decrease in aid from the UK over the period of time.

Five countries show a trend where the narrative seems to have been implemented in practice: Sudan's decreasing levels of regulatory quality and of control of corruption are met with decreasing funds. Similarly, increasing tendencies for South Sudan in both indicators was met with an increase in British funding. Uganda's levels of regulatory quality (and control of corruption) have decreased dramatically over the last ten years. British aid followed suit but to a lower level. Afghanistan and DRC are cases where positive trends have been rewarded with an increase in aid.

Nevertheless, they also appear again, alongside the other usual suspects, in the category with a very low indicator for regulatory quality: Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. Only in the DRC is the UK the highest aid giver from our selected three donors. In all other cases, it comes second (for Afghanistan after the U.S., for South Sudan after Norway) or last (for Sudan). This indicates a certain, if limited, greater selectivity on the part of the United Kingdom.

Finally, there are the cases where the practices completely contradict the stronger preselection that the narratives and rules indicated: Ethiopia showed a negative trend in regulatory quality which was met with an increase in funds (the indicator for control of corruption, however, improved); Nigeria on the other hand had strong positive trends in regulatory quality but slightly decreasing trends in control of corruption and was punished with a severe decrease in British aid. Tanzania and Zambia are both examples where increasing trends in the regulatory quality were met with a decrease in funds (for the case of Zambia, the control of corruption indicator also improved, while for Tanzania this score deteriorated) (World Bank Group 2015).

Generally, the UK is more responsive to changing indicators than, for example, the United States. Nevertheless, there is a no clear tendency to reward or punish bad performers of macroeconomic policies.

The section on the United Kingdom has illustrated that while the narrative pushes for a strong pre-selection process implementing pre-conditions for distribution of aid, the results in the practice are, at best half-satisfying, – as was the case with both the United States and Norway. The next section makes sense of these results and ties them to the theoretical framework.

6.4 Concluding remarks: institutional change within conditionality?

This chapter looked at the policy field of conditionality and asked whether the three traditional donors adapt their policies because of emerging donors. This section summarises the findings of the chapter and asks which common denominators there are between the reaction of the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom.

All three traditional donors were influenced by the idea that their values (especially political values) were under threat by the development aid of emerging donors. This perception was
Changes in conditionality?

The empirical analysis led to interesting and challenging results. As such, the United States showed a strong commitment to increasing the selectivity of its recipients in order to better reward worthy recipients and put the unworthy candidates on the route to reform. This was true in all fields of conditionality that were investigated here: the U.S. claimed to increase its selectivity in human rights, good governance and in economic conditions as well. This was strongly reflected within the narratives and also led to changes within some rules of development institutions (such as the MCC). Nevertheless, the section on the practices showed that these narratives and rules are only partly implemented in the practices in countries where the United States shared an interest with emerging donors.

The United Kingdom is very similar to the picture painted of the United States: the United Kingdom also showed a strong commitment to stronger selectivity (and thereby increasing *ex ante* conditionality) within its narratives and rules. Nevertheless, the results in the practices are equally mixed in the practices as for the United States. Note however that the initial ideas regarding emerging donors were much more positive for the United Kingdom than they were for the United States or Norway. It seems, however, that the UK is equally dedicated to uphold the rhetoric of a strongly normatively driven foreign aid policy – just like the United States and Norway even if the UK equally fails to implement this higher selectivity in its practices.

Finally, Norway holds a special position regarding conditionality. For Norway, the emphasis is led more strongly on ownership which is seen as contradicting the increased conditionality and selectivity championed by the USA and the UK. Nevertheless, especially when it came to political values (such as good governance and human rights), Norway’s decision-makers showed a strong commitment to the cause, but which led to mixed results within the narratives reflecting this conflict between ownership and conditionality. Moreover, within the rules and practices, there is hardly any evidence of a stronger selectivity that is taken place. Therefore, the change within Norway is least pronounced among our three donors studied here.

Theoretically, this chapter has argued that the ideas are most influential on the layers of the narratives, are slightly influential on the layer of rules but barely influence the practices at all. This is true for all three traditional donors. Nevertheless, as the paragraphs above illustrate, the degree of change, is significantly different in all three traditional donors. The relative inertia in the practices could also be explained by the fact that conditionality is a well-established field in development cooperation where any change would be met by huge resistance from veto players (an argument brought forward by the theory chapter). This can partly explain the inconsistency between the changes within the layers of narratives and rules and that of practices – where arguably change would arrive last and be most difficult to achieve. When we refer to the mechanisms that explain change, a process of layering has taken place here with new elements (stronger selectivity) being implemented in the narratives and rules but not yet implemented within the layer of practices. The following table summarises the results of this chapter.
Other explanatory factors might play a role in explaining the inertia within the aid practices: the direct contact of emerging donors might also be able to explain why policy makers decided to maintain aid relationships even in countries where its narratives and rules would no longer allow for the disbursement of aid. Moreover, security or diplomatic reasons could lead to the support of unworthy recipients. This is especially true in fields where there is a direct competition between traditional donor and emerging donor – as the case of Norway’s Oil for Development initiative has conveniently illustrated.

Within the field of conditionality, institutional change has taken place, then, on the layers of narratives and rules, but failed to reach the layer of practices. The theoretical framework argued that the power of ideas is stronger in a relatively new policy field. The question that remains to answer is whether this institutional place truly takes place in the field of trilateral cooperation. The next chapter elaborates on this question.

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### Table 6-7: Summarizing the main empirical findings on conditionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of idea</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreground ideas (fostering change)</td>
<td>Strong perceived threat of political values (especially from China)</td>
<td>Especially political values under threat</td>
<td>Undermining some values (like transparency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to socialise donors to American values</td>
<td>Unsustainable use of resources</td>
<td>Idea to help them, attempts to socialise emerging donors to British values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to make American aid more visible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Need for stronger results-based aid as a result of emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background ideas (slowing down change)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic, especially security)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; strong selectivity)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; also diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results in the narratives</td>
<td>Strong increase in narrative for a more selective approach</td>
<td>Mixed results in narrative (especially because of the emphasis on ownership)</td>
<td>Increase in narrative for a more selective approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results in the rules and practices</td>
<td>Mixed results in practice and rules</td>
<td>Rules and practices: weak response!</td>
<td>Mixed results in practice and rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation
7 Changes in trilateral cooperation?

This chapter focuses on policies – and the changes within these policies – of the three traditional donors in the field of trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation is here defined narrowly as a “partnership between DAC donors and providers of South-South cooperation to implement development projects in beneficiary countries” (Langendorf 2012, 25–26). Arguably, trilateral cooperation on a bigger scale is a recent phenomenon that increased with the scale of aid activities of emerging donors (Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).

The previous two chapters have assessed the principal ideas held by traditional donors on emerging donors, and on one of the possible reactions of traditional donors towards emerging donors: a change within their own approach to conditionality. Another possible reaction is an increasing interest on the part of traditional donors in trilateral activities. Depending on the ideas that traditional donors have about emerging donors, change here is more or less likely. A donor that generally advocated a stronger cooperation with emerging donors is more likely to place more emphasis on trilateral projects than one that is not particularly interested in cooperation.

While the general interest in trilateral cooperation increased for all three donors observed here, there is a huge variety in the importance attached to this particular policy field. The initial increase in interest can be explained by the topicality of trilateral cooperation and the variance can be explained by the initial ideas about emerging donors (and different individual emerging donors) that chapter 5 elaborated upon. Moreover, as the theoretical framework suggested, path dependent behaviour might be less prominent in a relatively new policy field and therefore the weight of ideas might play a bigger role than it did for the better established and institutionalised policy field of conditionality.

The chapter looks at the same three traditional donors as the two previous chapters and uses an identical methodological approach to the previous chapter on conditionality. Each section focuses on a particular country, first looks at the arguments and reasons behind the cooperation, and then looks at the layer of rules and practices to see whether the practices are in congruence with the narrative. Both parts of each section examine whether a change has taken place in the observed period in the areas of narratives, rules and practices on trilateral cooperation from the three traditional donors. Section 7.4 compares the results and concludes.

7.1 United States of America

The main ideas that the chapter on ideas identified was the one that the United States should foster more cooperation with like-minded countries whereas cooperation with other countries (i.e. China) was not strongly envisioned. Moreover, similar to the United Kingdom, the United

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130 Note that the terms „triangular“, „trilateral“, and „tripartite“ cooperation are considered synonyms throughout this study.

131 Note that this study does not aim at evaluating the usefulness of trilateral cooperation, similar to the approach taken to conditionality. For studies evaluating the usefulness of trilateral projects, see Yamashiro Fordelone 2009; Langendorf et al. 2012; A. Johnson 2009; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012.
States defended the idea that a socialising of emerging donors needs to take place. The following section on the narratives takes a closer look of how these general ideas are influential when it comes to concrete trilateral projects with emerging partners.

7.1.1 Narratives on trilateral cooperation

The previous two chapters have shown that the United States perceives emerging donors – especially China – as a threat. Moreover, the last chapter addressed the question of whether the USA reacts to that threat by increasing its conditionality in selected countries. While the narrative seemed to indicate that the U.S. is increasing its preselection and thereby increasing its pre-conditions, the practice section showed that this principle is not actually implemented in countries where emerging donors are also active. The following analysis looks at U.S. engagement in trilateral cooperation and asks whether a significant change towards that policy field has taken place within the observed period. Section 7.1.2 contrasts the narrative with the actual figures on trilateral projects.

Relevance of trilateral cooperation within the official narrative

The United States do not have a specific directive regarding trilateral cooperation. However, references to trilateral cooperation and projects together with emerging donors are relatively frequent in official papers and narratives. The stated reasons for engaging in trilateral cooperation are very similar to the reasons given for a general cooperation with and welcoming attitude toward certain (democratic) emerging donors illustrated in chapter 5.

One of the reasons is that the increase in the volume of aid from emerging donors, together with a surge in the level of foreign direct investment, leads the U.S. to assume that this type of cooperation “will likely continue to grow in importance over the rest of the decade,” which makes cooperation with emerging donors more urgent (USAID 2007, 2). In order to better understand emerging donors and the possibilities surrounding trilateral cooperation, in 2008 the U.S. requested the publication of a research guide by the USAID Knowledge services centre. This research guide surveys the relevant research literature on trilateral cooperation at the time (Blumel and Nguyen 2008). Also in 2008, the Millennium Challenge Account proclaimed that it engages in Mozambique (one of its compact countries) with South Africa and Brazil in order to “promote business opportunities” (USMCC 2008b, 62). Emerging donors are therefore also seen as being suitable business partners. Marc Lopes, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean within USAID, stated in a speech that USAID “ha[s] formed trilateral cooperation agreements with countries like India, South Africa, Chile and Brazil – because the more we can be brokers of regional expertise rather than wholesalers of U.S. expertise, the better off we are” (Lopes 14.12.2011, 1). This quote indicates that the main rationale for supporting trilateral projects is the sharing of knowledge that (democratic) emerging donors can provide because of their own experiences. However, during the first years of the observed period, trilateral projects do not, on the whole, play a substantial role in the narrative.132

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132 Similarly, literature on the topic attributes an increasing interest from the US in trilateral projects since 2009, especially with pivotal countries in South America and Africa and within the capacity building and social sector (Chaturvedi 2012a).
This picture changed in 2012 and the references to trilateral projects in general became more frequent. For instance, the Domestic Finance for Development (DF4D) initiative recommended a cooperation with “emerging market countries to explore best practices and triangular technical assistance […] in partner countries” (USDS 2012c, 1). More specifically, the U.S. pledge from 2012 onwards to increase their cooperation with Asian providers of aid, including India and China, through the support of an American NGO – TAF (The Asia Foundation) – in order to increase transparency and better coordination between donor groups (USDS 2012c, 772, 2013d, 682, 2015c, 632). In 2013, a similar benefit of being able to “identify new and innovative approaches to development cooperation” when engaging with emerging donors was praised (USDS 2013e, 313). In the same year, USAID dedicated the publication of a fact sheet on the issue of trilateral cooperation, endorsing the concept and announcing the launch of 15 trilateral assistance projects (USAID 2013b, 1).

A true extension of the narrative on trilateral cooperation took place in the last year of this study. Within the congressional budget justification for 2015, trilateral cooperation was mentioned repeatedly. The U.S. vouched to engage “new aid providers (such as Brazil, China, Turkey, South Africa and Arab donors)” in order to “identify new and innovative approaches to development cooperation” and within the framework of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) to “helping partner nations with relatively advanced counterterrorism law enforcement capabilities to start training law enforcement in other ATA partner nations” (USDS 2015d, 213, 225, 322). This indicates a growing interest from the United States regarding trilateral projects. Moreover, in 2014, the U.S. pledged to support trilateral cooperation projects with Latin American donors “with strong citizen security models and best practices, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia” (USDS 2015b, 484).

The areas of cooperation vary considerably depending on the involved emerging donor. Therefore, a clear distinction was made in the following section between the specific approaches the U.S. government has regarding trilateral projects with the four emerging donors.

This introductory section has shown that, after a hesitant start, the willingness of the United States to participate in trilateral cooperation increased at the end of the observed period, and that the USA it largely uses this kind of cooperation in order to learn from best practices and make the best use of its own resources. The next section illustrates what approach the U.S. devotes to the specific four emerging donors of this study.

Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors

Within the group of emerging donors, it is Brazil that receives the most attention from U.S. publications. It is the first country with which the U.S. claim to have undertaken trilateral projects (USAID 2015d, 1–2). Reasons for cooperation with Brazil on development issues seem to be myriad in the U.S. narrative: first, the U.S. sees that Brazil “holds great potential for leadership on cutting edge socio-environmental issues, such as energy efficiency, biofuels production, and global climate change”, more generally as a “trendsetter in the region in many respects”

133 Note also that initiatives exist with other emerging donors are mentioned that are not dwelled on further below: for instance, the United States pledge to support projects from the African Union as this is seen to promote political consensus (USDS 2013b, 201, 2014b, 198). Moreover, the USA envision to enter into the “first-ever partnership with Mexico’s development agency” in El-Salvador in 2014 (USAID 2014, 20).
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and as a “global leader in social and economic development” (USAID 2011c, 1; Lopes 04.02.2013, 1; USDS 2012b, 751). Moreover, Brazil is seen as a “democratic state that conducts itself responsibly in the international system” (USAID 2011c, 1). A cooperation between the “two largest democracies and two largest economies” is hence seen as a natural alliance, and Brazil as a “natural partner” (USAID 2015d, 1; Otero 26.03.2010, 2). Importantly, Marc Lopes, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean has stressed in a blog that Brazil is seen as a “partner who shares our commitment to advancing global development” and also, more generally, as a nation which shares the values of the United States (Lopes 11.02.2011, 1). Cooperating with Brazil in trilateral cooperation is also considered to “increase[e] the impact of development-based U.S. assistance throughout the world” (USDS 2013b, 631).

Therefore, it is not surprising that cooperation with Brazil began as early as 2007 in the field of promoting biofuels (U.S. Government 2007). In 2009, repeated pledges appeared that the United States “continue to collaborate with Brazil in South-to-South initiatives” (USAID 2011c, 1). This willingness is confirmed in the following years: in 2010, the Congressional Budget Justification claimed that the U.S. “will also seek to strengthen its partnership with Brazil in working jointly on trilateral development programmes, such as health and food security issues in third countries”. Interestingly, the same publication also stressed that this type of cooperation “include components promoting racial and ethnic equality, improving the status of women, and removing barriers to persons with disabilities”, indicating that the U.S. and Brazil share a common language and priority list in development projects (USDS 2010b, 663). Staff exchanges between the two countries’ development agencies – USAID and ABC – began in 2009 and were formalised in 2011, further increasing the mutual understanding in development cooperation (USAID 2011b, 2; Lopes 11.02.2011, 1). Moreover, in 2012, the congressional budget justification stated that

“the United States and Brazil are committed to forging a strong partnership that promotes development in other countries, especially in Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Innovative trilateral cooperation will prioritise transnational challenges that are of mutual interest, including food security, health, the environment, agriculture, and economic development” (USDS 2012b, 751).

The publication also indicates that this will be a big shift in the relationship between the United States and Brazil as it resembles more and more an equal partnership. Another area of cooperation is added in 2013 with envisioning trilateral projects in the field of citizen security (USDS 2014b, 632; confirmed by USDS 2015b, 367). Further areas of cooperation were added on the website of USAID, such as education, women’s issues and social inclusion projects (USAID 2015d, 1–2). Throughout the years, Brazil has been hailed as a special expert on issues relating to agriculture and food (USDS 2012b, 754; confirmed in USDS 2013b, 631).\(^\text{134}\)

Several recipients are considered as potential partner countries for trilateral projects, with the focus lying mainly on sub-Saharan Africa and on South and Central America (USDS 2012b, 754; confirmed in USDS 2013b, 631). The cooperation with Brazil in Africa is embedded in both countries’ “common link with [their] African brothers and sisters” (Otero 26.03.2010, 2).

\(^\text{134}\) Sachin Chaturvedi’s (2012a) study also indicates a strong focus of the United States on its cooperation with Brazil.
Concrete projects are envisioned in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique (pilot project of trilateral cooperation), Haiti, Honduras and Angola (USDS 2012b, 754). The emphasis varies according to recipient. For instance, agricultural productivity is the focus in Mozambique, Honduras and Haiti, while women’s and children’s health issues are tackled only in Honduras and there is no country mentioned where citizen’s security is enhanced, but it is emphasised that projects of this kind will take place in Central America (USAID 2015d, 1–2; USDS 2015f, 1).

Alongside Brazil, a lot of attention is paid to possible projects with South Africa. The first willingness to support the government of South Africa through trilateral cooperation is expressed in 2009, slightly after the initiation of trilateral projects with Brazil: the annual congressional budget justification in 2009 stated that “the U.S. supports the [South African government] to provide development assistance” (USDS 2009c, 156). It further elaborates and claims that the U.S. worked for a trilateral project with South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo to improve local governance mechanisms in the recipient country (USDS 2009c, 156). Experiences of working with South Africa in trilateral projects is evaluated as “very positive” and considered to be “ground-breaking” (USDS 2010b, 170, 2011b, 188). Similarly, a press release in 2011 stated that trilateral programmes should be used to assist South Africa in its efforts to “support peaceful transitions in countries emerging from conflict” (USAID 2011d, 2). Moreover, it mentions that up to eight recipients were planned but only names Malawi (for agricultural projects) and Sudan (for civil servant training) (USAID 2011d, 2). Interestingly, the congressional budget justification of the same year only talks about seven initiatives and refers to South Sudan instead of Sudan, mentioning support for regional policies on gender justice (USDS 2011b, 188). These measures are seen as building South Africa’s “capacity to act as a full-fledged donor in the region” (USAID 2011d, 1). The cooperation with South Africa is also seen as a “capacity building mechanism [that] will advance a South-South cooperation model that is an important driver of future development assistance in Africa (USAID 2013a, 71–72).

Comparable to the reasons of cooperating with Brazil are the ones enumerated for beginning trilateral projects with South Africa. South Africa is valued as “a continental leader and a strategic U.S. partner” and is considered to be “well placed to help fellow African states end conflicts and consolidate peace” (USDS 2010b, 170; same reference in USDS 2011b, 188). Trilateral cooperation is seen as an appropriate measure to “build South Africa’s capacity [as a nascent donor] and leverage outside resources” and to extend its regional leadership in Southern Africa (USDS 2010b, 170; USAID 2013a, 48).

The focus of the cooperation lies in conflict prevention and security stabilization, but extends to other areas such climate change and an extension of South African agricultural production (USAID 2013a, 46–48; for promoting agriculture, also look at USDS 2015d, 21). The U.S. State Department also pledges to support South Africa in the creation of its development agency (USAID 2010b, i; also USDS 2011b, 188, 2012b, 179; USAID 2013a, 47). The reasons why South Africa is regarded as a good partner for trilateral projects becomes more evident with the next quote from congressional budget justification for 2013:

“This [trilateral] programme leverages South Africa’s significant influence in the regional and international organizations, while providing a platform for the SAG [South African

135 This project is also mentioned in Chaturvedi’s (2012a) study.
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The quote demonstrates that the United States sees the cooperation with South Africa in trilateral projects as an extension of its own foreign assistance policies. A 2013 fact sheet confirms this by stating that “USAID multiplies its development impact through demand driven development initiatives in other countries” for programmes “aligned with USG foreign policy interests” (USAID 2013b, 1). The country development cooperation strategy for South Africa equally praises the country as the perfect partner for trilateral projects as its “developed democratic systems, regulatory practices, innovative scientific research can assist developing countries” (USAID 2013a, 46). It is not surprising, therefore, that the U.S. also wants to collaborate in the sectors of good governance promotion and election support through trilateral projects (USAID 2013a, 46). Similar to its engagement with Brazil, USAID therefore foresees that its relationship with South Africa will transition from “a donor-recipient to a donor-to-donor relationship” (USAID 2013a, 46). Another interesting rationale is hidden behind this change of relationship as trilateral projects are seen to “ensure a legacy for the U.S. government’s development assistance long after funding ceases” (USAID 2013b, 1).

The cases of South Africa and Brazil seem to indicate that the United States is an enthusiastic supporter of trilateral projects, even though the interest only matures from 2010. The next two cases, however, paint a different picture. Chapter 5 focused largely on the negative ideas the United States have on Chinese development projects. Nevertheless, some tentative initiatives to collaborate with China in trilateral cooperation projects can be identified from 2009 onwards. Compared to South Africa and Brazil, these initiatives are rather limited. Talk of trilateral projects starts with the beginning of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009 where the U.S. envisioned an engagement with China to “promot[e] global sustainable development […] and future discussion of cooperation on poverty alleviation around the world” (Shear 10.09.2009, 2). A factsheet on cooperation with China on international development from September 2010 referred to several initiatives to collaborate with China in order to “develop a joint working relationship between USAID and China on development issues of common and strategic interest to both countries” and to “encourage China to adopt internationally agreed standards on good donorship” (USAID 2010a, 1). This quote clearly represents an implementation of the idea to socialise emerging donors to Western, American standards. Initiatives are taking place particularly in health, agriculture and food security, whereas the latter largely focuses on projects with Africa (USAID 2010a, 2). This ambition is further confirmed in 2012, when it was stated more precisely that feasibility studies on programs and projects should be undertaken for “joint development projects in third countries” in the “field of agriculture, health, and human resources” (Office of the spokesperson 04.05.2012, 2).

The factsheet from 2010 envisioned agricultural projects in Liberia, Tanzania and Sudan, but those projects are never spoken of again (USAID 2010a, 2). Projects that actually appear regularly in U.S. publications are those envisioned with China in East Timor and Afghanistan. The very first project of trilateral cooperation between USAID and China in East Timor was “intended to improve the production of income-generating crops to enhance food security and nutrition” (USDS 2014f, 1). The motivation for the United States behind this cooperation was to “advance mutual interests in development policy and to strengthen cooperation in partner government] to enhance its capacity to promote and strengthen democratic norms, including respect for rule of law and human rights, and good governance on the continent” (USDS 2012b, 179).
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countries” (USDS 2014f, 1). Moreover, the publication stressed that China was very eager to continue the project with the U.S. (USDS 2014f, 1).

In Afghanistan, China and the U.S. agreed to cooperate in 2013 and confirmed this pledge in consecutive years (Office of the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 3). In 2015, the USA pledged to “promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China and Afghanistan” (Office of the spokesperson 24.06.2015, 3). This dialogue should entail a joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and to launch new joint training programmes for Afghan medical workers and veterinary technicians (Office of the spokesperson 24.06.2015, 3).

Based on the experiences of these two projects, the two sides have recently taken decisions to further improve their collaboration on development issues. As such, a press release in 2013 and 2015 confirmed that new projects in these two countries “or others” were planned (Office of the spokesperson 12.07.2013, 4, 24.06.2015, 4). Moreover, in 2015, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of China and the United States to create a mechanism intended to help “share progress on joint projects, summarise best practices and lessons learned, and discuss new opportunities for cooperation”. Therefore, after a hesitant beginning, the U.S. seems to be reaching out to China in order to create moderate shared development projects, despite their rather negative perception of Chinese aid activities that the previous two chapters elaborated upon. Nevertheless, compared to the narratives regarding trilateral projects with Brazil or South Africa, the enthusiasm to collaborate with China is much less perceptible.

A similar apprehension can be shown towards trilateral cooperation projects with India. The first tentative start to trilateral cooperation with India was undertaken only in 2010. This was later than for South Africa and Brazil, but remains at the beginning similarly vague to that with China. In 2010, an agreement was signed between Prime Minister Singh and President Obama (U.S. Government 2013, 5). India is mentioned as a “strategic partner” for the Feed the Future initiative. The combined efforts of both countries should supposedly lead to the replication and advancement of “innovative solutions to address food security challenges in India and Africa” (USDS 2011b, 632; confirmed in USDS 2015d, 26). Equally vague concessions are made in 2012 with projects that work at reducing poverty in “India and globally” (USDS 2012b, 659). The country development cooperation strategy with India aimed to “share Indian development innovations proven in India in third countries” (USAID 2012b, 30; similar commitment in USDS 2013b, 567; and USDS 2014b, 652, 2015b, 274). A statement from a Senior Administration Official states that it is likely to see certain countries “like India, moving from assistance to trilateral cooperation”, also claiming that the cooperation within the Feed the Future initiative in the direction of trilateral cooperation has already started (USDS 2011a, 5).

A first strategy for implanting this relationship is planned in Afghanistan where the “trilateral discussions […] help advance our economic, political, and security objectives” (Desai Biswal 16.07.2014, 3; also mentioned in USAID 2012b, 9). Moreover, there are several statements of collaboration with India on the promotion of the role of women in Afghanistan (USDS 2014g, 1). Initiatives are not limited to the Asian continent, however, but are thought to extend to Africa as well. Candidates for a tentative start of the “triangular partnership” are Liberia, Malawi and Kenya where people should be “trained at Indian agricultural institutions” (USDS 2013c, 50–51; USAID 2012b, 9; confirmed in Rollins 30.04.2014, 2). Moreover, India is seen as a valuable partner in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS in “various African countries” (USAID
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2012b, 9). Areas in which India is thought to have some kind of leadership are health, food security, disaster management and women’s empowerment (USDS 2014g, 1). Nevertheless, compared to the other three emerging partners, trilateral initiatives with India remain vague and start relatively late. The very broad general idea of needing to cooperate more with emerging donors and to socialise them influenced the narrative presented here significantly. The most attention is paid to Brazil and South Africa, and an increasing interest is shown in trilateral projects with China in the narrative. Generally, after 2009 we can see a growing interest for the form of trilateral projects, with a steady increase since then that leads up to today. The following section investigates whether this general narrative has been transferred into actual projects.

7.1.2 U.S. rules and practices on trilateral cooperation

The rules are to be found in the diverse memoranda of understanding between the United States and the various emerging donors: with Brazil they signed a first MOU in 2007 in the field of promoting biofuels (U.S. Government 2007), while the MOU of 2011 institutionalised a staff exchange between USAID and ABC (USAID 2011b, 2). The cooperation with India was sealed with an agreement between Prime Minster Singh and President Obama and through the country development cooperation strategy of 2012 (USAID 2012b). In the case of South Africa, cooperation has been regulated through the country development cooperation strategy since 2013 (USAID 2013a). For the cooperation with China, a MOU was signed in 2015 (USAID 2015b). All these legal texts indicate that a change has taken place with respect to cooperation between the United States and emerging powers within the rules, a change which mirrors the increasing emphasis put on trilateral cooperation in the narratives. The next sections elaborate on the question of whether these changes also result in higher amounts of funding being dedicated to trilateral projects.

The OECD conducted two surveys in which they interviewed stakeholders on their perception of trilateral cooperation. In 2012, the United States appeared as one of the traditional donors alongside the United Kingdom and others (such as Germany, Japan, etc.). In 2012, the U.S. reported between 10 and 50 trilateral cooperation activities, in the category just above the United Kingdom that reported 1 to 10 trilateral cooperation initiatives, whereas Norway is not mentioned at all (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012, 20). Nevertheless, the picture looks very different in the 2015 survey, where the United States and the United Kingdom are not mentioned among the biggest providers of trilateral projects whereas Norway is mentioned (OECD February 2016).

The track record of the United States within trilateral cooperation is therefore not very clear. This might be due to the unspecific nature of U.S. funds reporting, in which no separate trilateral projects can be identified. Nevertheless, when project names are known, individual figures can be found within the money that is disbursed directly to the recipient. This was undertaken wherever possible. First of all, the figures seem to confirm the strong interest that the United States has in cooperating in trilateral projects with Brazil and South Africa.

In 2007, the U.S. signed the first two memoranda with Brazil regarding trilateral projects. The first concerned an advancement of their cooperation on biofuels, where it is clearly stated that “the participants intend to work jointly to bring the benefits of biofuels to select third countries”
beginning with Central American and Caribbean countries (U.S. Government 2007). The coun-
tries are however not specified in the memorandum. When looking at U.S. aid statistics, only
small amounts have been spent on biofuels in the regions concerned (for instance USD 100
thousand on biofuels development projects in Latin America and Caribbean region in 2009,
USD 170 thousand in 2011 for biofuels outreach were disposed to Brazil directly, increasing
amounts for biofuels throughout the world of USD 345 thousand in 2012 and USD 535 thou-
sand in 2013, and nearly USD 900 thousand in 2014 (USAID 2015a)). In total, this amounts to
USD 2.5 million, but we cannot be certain that all of these funds were distributed to third coun-
tries (among which Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Lusophone African countries, USDS 2012h,
1).

A more confined cooperation project is the second trilateral cooperation with Guinea Bissau.
In a 2007 speech in Brazil, Condoleezza Rice mentioned that a Memorandum of Understand-
ing is formulated between the United States, Brazil and Guinea Bissau to form a cooperation be-
tween “the most powerful country in the world, one of the biggest development countries in
the world to help one of the poorest and smallest countries in the world” (Rice 30.03.2007, 1).
Nevertheless, if one looks at the fine print of the memorandum establishing this trilateral coop-
eration it soon becomes clear that no additional funds will be disbursed for the project as it is
stated that “this Memorandum does not bind any of the Governments to provide funds, the
provision of which will be subject to the domestic requirements of the contributing Govern-
ment” (U.S. Government 30.03.2007, 1). Moreover, it states that the United States (and Brazil)
have both already made grants available to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) “to develop
a project for strengthening legislative capacity in Guinea-Bissau” (U.S. Government 30.03.2007,
1). These funds amount to USD 4.5 million that were disbursed to Guinea-Bissau from 2006
till 2008 (USAID 2015a). The memorandum states that the cooperation will cease when the
pilot project (of coordinating funds to achieve a similar goal, namely strengthening legal capac-
ity) is over, so it is not surprising that no new funds have been allocated to the trilateral coop-
eration in Guinea-Bissau since (U.S. Government 30.03.2007, 3).

A more general Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of Brazil
and the United States on the 3rd of March in 2010 regarding the implementation of technical
cooperation in third countries (U.S. Government 2010a; USDS 2012h). The cooperation is sup-
posed to take place in “selected beneficiary countries, primarily but not restricted to African
countries and Haiti” (U.S. Government 2010a).

This general memorandum triggered cooperation on many projects, starting with the piloted
trilateral food security cooperation in Mozambique (USDS 2013e, 50). Two years later, in 2012,
a congressional budget justification claimed that projects in Mozambique are still “in early stages
of implementation” and that monitoring is necessary to evaluate whether these are fruitful or
not (USDS 2012b, 754). Nevertheless, initial (though modest) funds were distributed to Brazil
in 2011 specifically for the trilateral cooperation project (USAID 2015a). In practice, the pro-
gramme aims to transport Brazilian experiences in the agricultural sector to Mozambique, in
particular crop management practices and the nutrition of school children through the National
School Food Programme (USAID 2015d, 1–2). The project has expanded its reach considerably
over the years, spending up to USD 2.8 million from 2011 till 2014. Moreover, even though
figures are still incomplete for the year 2015, a significant increase can already be reported as in
2015 alone USD 2.6 million were allocated to the project (USAID 2015a). The proclaimed in-
crease that President Obama made public during a visit in 2015 in Brazil seems to have been
implemented in practice (USAID 01.07.2016, 1). Moreover, the United States supports a health related project fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. In 2014, USD 540 thousand were spent for that purpose (USAID 2015a).

Projects in Honduras and Haiti followed in 2012 (USDS 2013e, 50–51). Similar to the projects in Mozambique, the focus here is on improving agricultural productivity and food security (USAID 2015d, 1–2; Tindell 06.03.2013, 1). In Haiti, a total of USD 1.3 million have been spent on improving agriculture since 2015 in trilateral efforts (note that figures are still incomplete, USAID 2015a, code 130234). The purpose of this money is largely to enhance the country’s capacity in research and development in order to further the Ministry of Agriculture’s ability to improve planting material, to increase agricultural production and improve nutrition (USAID 2015d, 1–2). The United States also has trilateral projects with Brazil in Haiti to fight child labour through the promotion of job creation within an incentive between the U.S. and Brazil on decent work (USDS and USAID 2009b, 48; USDS 2012d, 403). This builds upon a memorandum of understanding from 2011 (U.S. Government 2011). These funds were channelled through the International Labour Organisation. In 2011, the State Department distributed USD 990 thousand to the ILO for a project in Haiti to agency of democracy, human rights, and labour (USAID 2015a).

A legal document established in 2012 activities of trilateral cooperation between the two governments and that of Honduras (USAID 2012c, 2). Areas of cooperation that were envisioned included improving agricultural competitiveness, nutrition, health and renewable energy (USAID 2012c, 2, 2015d, 1–2). Similar to the trilateral initiatives in Mozambique and Haiti, these projects intended to improve agricultural productivity and aim at the better utilization of available technology, increasing crops resistance (USAID 2015d, 1–2). For Honduras, no clear traces of trilateral projects can be found in the statistics. Since 2012, about USD 600 thousand were spent on the same account (USAID 2015a). It is unclear however, if this is in connection with a trilateral project with Brazil or simply a bilateral project of the United States.

Furthermore, in 2014, the U.S. pledged to provide USD 2 million to the government of Honduras to implement Brazilian projects on renewable energy (USDS 2014b, 676). In 2015, USD 300 thousand have been spent so far (but reporting is not completed yet). Similarly, the U.S. pledged to spend USD 1.2 million in 2016 to the same cause (USDS 2015b, 425). These projects aim to facilitate the access to renewable energy for the poor, making, for instance, solar dryers accessible (USAID 2015d, 1–2). The projects to improve the health of women and children largely aim to introduce eco-stoves, in order to avoid death through open-fire stoves. The new stoves also supposedly increase the quality of the air (USAID 2015d, 1–2). No detailed funding on this initiative could be found.

Other projects that are more targeted between the United States and Brazil concern the environment and conservation of Peru’s forest (through the Peru forest sector initiative) (USDS 2012h, 1). The project started in 2011 and is supposed to run until 2016. The United States has distributed over USD 10.5 million to the Amazon Forest Sector Initiative to Peru in 2013 and 2014 (USAID 2015a). Once again, however, it is unclear how much of this is really spent on trilateral projects.

Moreover, there is a one-year counternarcotic pilot programme in Bolivia which began in January 2012 and aimed at “improve[ing] Bolivia’s ability to measure excess coca cultivation and
verify progress in meeting coca eradication targets” (USDS 2012h, 1). A total of USD 2 thousand was spent in 2012 on counternarcotic programmes in Bolivia and on further funding added in 2013, which suggests that the project never went beyond the kick-off phase.

Generally, the narrative of a close relationship with Brazil in terms of trilateral projects is confirmed through the practices, as many projects have been funded quite considerably (look at the table at the end of this section for an overview). Strictly trilateral cooperation projects with Brazil amount to a limited USD 8.3 up to 9.3 million. The following table recaps the projects and recipients (third partner country). Note that the figures in brackets indicate that not all funds might have been used for trilateral projects. All figures are in U.S. dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Targeted area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Agriculture/ Food security</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
<td>2011-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health/ AIDS prevention</td>
<td>540 thousand</td>
<td>2014-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Agriculture/ Food security</td>
<td>(600 thousand)</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renewable energy</td>
<td>300 thousand (pledge 3.2 million)</td>
<td>2014-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Agriculture/ Food security</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child Labour (through ILO)</td>
<td>990 thousand</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>Promoting biofuels</td>
<td>(2.5 million)</td>
<td>2009-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Strengthening legislative capacity</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Forest Service Initiative (forest conservation)</td>
<td>(10.5 million),</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Counternarcotics (coca)</td>
<td>2 thousand</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-1: Trilateral projects between the United States and Brazil

Within the narrative, the United States envisioned almost as many trilateral projects with South Africa as with Brazil. How many of these can actually be put into concrete figures? A 2013 factsheet on trilateral cooperation claimed that USAID has provided USD 7 million “to support South Africa as a regional leader in advancing African economic and social development” (USAID 2013b). Several of the initiatives are mentioned; for instance, to improve the adjudication of gender-based violence in Malawi and Angola, or to address food security issues in Mozambique. Other initiatives intend to provide help for constitutional development in South Sudan, to build the capacity of SADC to respond to climate change, to assess human health risks in transboundary water catchment areas in southern Africa and piloting conservation agriculture through a livestock grazing project in Zimbabwe. However, the same initiatives were mentioned on the USAID website in 2015,

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136 Other initiatives intend to provide help for constitutional development in South Sudan, to build the capacity of SADC to respond to climate change, to assess human health risks in transboundary water catchment areas in southern Africa and piloting conservation agriculture through a livestock grazing project in Zimbabwe. All are discussed further below in detail.
where it is stated that only USD 4 million was spent between September 2009 and September 2013, especially for mitigating conflicts and stabilizing the region (USAID 2015e, 1). The list of projects is identical to the one that mentions USD 7 million. In 2013, it was claimed that USD 1.7 million was used to “enhance South Africa’s capacity to address regional peace and security challenges” (USDS 2013b, 148–49). As no clearly identifiable traces of trilateral cooperation between the United States and South Africa can be found, the following paragraphs look at the funds that were disbursed for projects that match the description, arguing that it is likely that part of the funds were funneled through trilateral projects.

Starting with the last project – a livestock grazing initiative in Zimbabwe – the United States funded a project called “Building livelihoods and food security through interventions in the livestock and dairy value chains” in Zimbabwe from 2010 until 2014 and spent USD 5.8 million in total. A further USD 2.4 million was spent on conservation partnerships in the Southern Africa region. It is impossible to say how much of these funds were used for the collaboration with South Africa.

Indicative of the project assessing health risks in transboundary water catchment areas in southern Africa might be the amount spent by USAID on the Southern Africa Regional Environmental Program (SAREP). In total, USD 8.7 million were distributed to multilateral channels for water supply and sanitation within SAREP from 2011 until 2014 and USD 363 thousand through channels of South Africa directly in 2014 (USAID 2015a).

The United States pledged to help the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to build its climate change capacity. A regional fund was allocated with USD 550 thousand in 2012 to build SADC capacity (USAID 2015a).

South Sudan received considerable funding from the United States to develop its constitution and to support a democratic development. It is unclear which of the projects is tied to South Africa, however. Nevertheless, the details that might involve trilateral projects are: South Sudan received funding in 2013 and 2014 for about USD 50 million to strengthen its democratic potential. The amount spent on the trilateral cooperation will be a very small portion of this.

The collaboration with South Africa in Sudan is also hard to locate. While civil servant training has certainly taken place within the BRIDGE initiative in Sudan in 2010, the amount of that initiative with USD 15.6 million gives us no indication on the actual amount spent on trilateral cooperation with South Africa. On the contrary, it is likely that cooperation was dropped in favour of a closer collaboration with South Africa in South Sudan (USAID 2015a).

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137 Another USD 1 million was spent in 2014 on SADC, however in the field of building its capacity in the implementation of the trafficking in persons protocol which was not subject to the trilateral project (USAID 2015a).
138 Note that the following programmes have been taken into account for the overall figure: the South Sudan Civic Participation Project (in total USD 9.8 million), the programme on Political Parties as Institutions of Democratic Governance in South Sudan (USD 9.1 million), the programme on Systems to Uphold the Credibility and Constitutionality of Elections in South Sudan (SUCCESS) (in total 3.8 million), the Project on Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan (PROGRESS) with a total of USD 15.2 million and the Building Responsibility for the Delivery of Government Services (BRIDGE) with USD 11.4 million. All figures taken from US statistics, aid dashboard (USAID 2015a).
The United States pledged to support projects to fight gender-based violence in Angola and Malawi. The only project that remotely addresses issues of gender-based violence in Malawi is an initiative funded through the African Development Foundation, a U.S. NGO. This NGO received funds from 2009 until 2013 to the total of USD 1.3 million and cooperated with the local National Association of Business Women. It is even more difficult to find U.S. spending on gender-related violence in Angola. The only project that was found for the indicated period amounts to USD 25 thousand in 2011 to provide gender-based victims in the Norte province with assistance. The funds were disbursed through the state department as an emergency relief. It is unlikely that this project was what the U.S. government had in mind when it talked about trilateral projects with South Africa (USAID 2015a).

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the U.S. claimed to have collaborated with South Africa in the sector of improving local governance. There is indeed a programme called local government and decentralization which received about USD 4.6 million between 2008 and 2012. Whether or not this project has been undertaken in cooperation with South Africa remains unknown, but as it targets a very similar sector, it is likely.

Finally, regarding the initiatives in improving food security in Mozambique, the only amounts that could be found were regional funding to Southern Africa on a project to “enhance African capacity to achieve regional food security”. A total of USD 268 thousand were allocated to this project in 2009. Another initiative which is implemented throughout the world and specifically targets food security in Mozambique is the programme on local and regional food aid procurement pilot project, which received USD 817 thousand in 2012. Mozambique also received further funds for food security, such as USD 62 million within the food for progress project since 2009 and USD 10.7 million as food security assistance over the same period. Other than this, the government of South Africa received regular funding of food security programmes, under the umbrella of food security assistance. Since 2009 (and until 2014), a total of USD 1.9 million were allocated to this. Moreover, a further USD 4.3 million was disbursed from 2009 till 2014 on improving the agricultural sector within South Africa under the “farmer-to-farmer” project. There is, however, no indication if and to what extent these funds have been used on trilateral projects in Mozambique. The question remains if any of these funds were involved in trilateral financing at all. Generally, even though it is hard to find direct evidence of trilateral projects with South Africa, most of the mentioned projects receive some kind of funding from the United States even though it is unclear which amount is spent on trilateral initiatives. Generally, the above numbers suggest that it is likely that the amount lies somewhere in between the claimed USD 4 and 7 million for the overall period (USAID 2015a). The following table recap the above mentioned projects and amounts.

139 Note that within the table, the initiatives mentioned by the publications assessing US contribution to either USD 4 or 7 million are marked with a *.
### Table 7-2: Trilateral projects between the United States and South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Targeted area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Improve local governance</td>
<td>(4.6 million)</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Civil servant training</td>
<td>(15.6 million)</td>
<td>FY 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Improving the adjudication of gender based violence*</td>
<td>(1.3 million)</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Improving the adjudication of gender based violence*</td>
<td>(25 thousand)</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Provide assistance on constitutional development*</td>
<td>(50 million)</td>
<td>2013-2014 (project ongoing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Addressing food security issues*</td>
<td>(7.3 million)</td>
<td>2009-20148700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Building capacity to respond to climate change*</td>
<td>550 thousand</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Health (water management in Southern Africa)*</td>
<td>(9.1 million)</td>
<td>2011-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Conservation livestock*</td>
<td>(8.2 million)</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on figures from U.S. statistic and USAID dashboard

The narrative with China suggested a significant reluctance at the beginning of the observed period but an increasing interest in trilateral projects at the end of 2014. This recent interest is not yet evident in actual projects.\(^{140}\) Of the two projects that were mentioned in the narrative, evidence of cooperation could only be found for the case of Timor-Leste. The project with Timor-Leste started in 2010 and ended in February 2015. The whole project on improving agricultural productivity in East Timor amounted to USD 8.3 million in the five-year period, spent rather regularly over the years (USAID 2016a, 1–2). From the USD 8.3 million, USD 1.6 million was spent on agricultural development, the rest on business support services and information (USAID 2015a). It is likely that the USA would use the funds for agricultural development for improving food security which is the main aspect of the trilateral project with China. How much of those USD 1.6 million was truly spent on initiating trilateral cooperation with Chinese counterparts remains, however, unknown. The only clear figure that the United States themselves provide is that 52 farmers participated in a project to improve agriculture, and that those farmers “are seeing the benefits of modern farming techniques (USDS 2014f, 1). Figures on the collaboration with China in Afghanistan could not be found. The following table illustrates the initiatives and amounts.

\(^{140}\) Similarly, a report from the OECD DAC refers to trilateral projects between the United States and Brazil, India and South Africa but does not mention any projects with China (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2013, 17).
Table 7-3: Trilateral projects between the United States and China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Targeted area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Agricultural productivity</td>
<td>(1.6 million)</td>
<td>2010-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Education of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; health project</td>
<td>No figures found</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation, based on figures from U.S. statistics and USAID dashboard

With respect to co-operation with India, the narrative was slightly more positive than towards China. The cooperation with India is indeed on a similar level to that with Brazil, amounting to a total of USD 10.9 million. In 2013, USD 3 million was pledged to “sharing proven Indian agriculture development innovations with other countries as part of the […] Feed the Future initiative” (USDS 2013b, 556). The main focus lies on transferring “innovative agriculture products or technologies” (USDS 2013b, 556; confirmed in USDS 2015b, 26). From the website of USAID, it becomes clear that this project encompasses the training of personnel from three pilot countries in Africa: Kenya, Malawi and Liberia. The funds were disbursed to the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management in Hyderabad where the training of 219 Africans took place. A modest amount of USD 680 thousand were distributed in 2013 and 2014. In 2014, USD 21 thousand were also disbursed to the same institution in Malawi. Another USD 860 thousand were disbursed in 2015, indicating the funding is likely to increase as it is pledged that the project now enters into phase two where agricultural practitioners from 17 Asian and African countries will be trained (USAID 2015a, 2016b, 1). Nevertheless, this total of USD 700 thousand remains far below the pledged USD 3 million.

The following initiative is also considered to fall within the FTF initiative; the agriculture innovation partnership program, which coordinates the collaboration between American universities¹⁴¹ and three Indian universities¹⁴² in order to adopt “an innovative agricultural education curriculum, develop extension management training programs and launch research initiatives” (USAID 2016b, 1). According to the U.S. website, this project led to the development of a successful curriculum that is now implemented at the Agriculture and Forestry University in Nepal and the Liongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Malawi. Funds for this project were distributed from USAID to Cornell University and amount to USD 5.5 million (for projects in India) and USD 4000 (for projects directly in Malawi) from 2011 to 2014. In 2015, a further USD 500 thousand (to India) and USD 470 thousand to Malawi were allocated (USAID 2015a).¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Mostly Cornell University, but also Ohio States University, Tuskegee University, the University of California, Davis, the University of Georgia, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; for more information on the project, see Cornell Website or USAID on AIP
¹⁴² Assam Agricultural University, Jorhat; Institute of Agricultural Sciences at Banaras Hindu University and Vara-nasi and Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel University of Agriculture and Technology in Meerut.
¹⁴³ Note that since 2014, funds amounting to USD 1.5 million have been added to the initiative and are channelled through the Ashwattha Advisors Private Limited as well as through USAID channels.
Another fund that could possibly be used for trilateral projects is the Partnership for Innovation and Knowledge in Agriculture (PIKA) – an initiative that intends to link smallholder farmer organisation to major regional markets. India received USD 1.4 million from 2009 until 2014.

Also in the field of promoting agricultural productivity is the Cereal System Initiative for South Asia (CSISA). This initiative began in 2009 and is co-founded with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Following the USAID website, this project aimed at transferring successfully tested Indian technologies to Nepal and Bangladesh. No traces of this project could be found in USAID statistics.

While it is surprising that there are no figures on a project that was supposed to start in 2009, it is not surprising that no figures are yet available on the recent initiative on India-Kenya Dairy Innovation Bridge Programme (IKDIBP) which began in January 2015 and aims at transporting the best feed and fodder management from India to Kenya.

Two trilateral initiatives are aimed specifically at women. The first project aims to enhance the role of women in clean energy products and technologies (through the wPOWER project – Partnership on Women’s Entrepreneurship in Clean Energy). India received funds amounting to NGO USD 567 thousand in 2013 and 2014 through the Swayam Shikshan Prayog, while East Africa received USD 811 thousand in the same period (USAID 2015a). The second project looks at the role of women in Afghanistan. In 2014, a factsheet pledged USD 1.5 million to a project with SEWA, an Indian NGO of Self-Employed Women’s Association to mobilise Indian knowledge towards Afghan women (USDs 2014g, 1). The programme started in 2011 and was supposed to end in July 2014. Since then, a total of USD 1 million has been spent. Though the official project has ended, the Indian NGO continues to receive funds and implements projects in Afghanistan (it has received USD 300 thousand since the end of the project) (USAID 2015a). The amount given thus remains somewhat lower than the pledge.

Another regional initiative aims at integrating energy in order to reduce carbon emissions. The South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy Integration (SARI/EI) has existed since 2000. Through this initiative, India has received USD 1 million since 2013 and the project is ongoing. It aims at accomplishing a strong integration between India and Sri Lanka.

Generally, the attempts to form initiatives with India have grown in recent years (since 2013) and efforts are ongoing to maintain the initial projects. The following table summarises the projects between the United States and emerging donors, states where the projects are taking place (third partner country), gives indications on what area of cooperation is envisioned and (if available) accounts for the figures and the years of cooperation. Note that the figures in brackets indicate that not all funds have necessarily been used for trilateral projects. All figures are in U.S. dollars and taken from the U.S. dashboard (USAID 2015a).

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As a phase II programme to the Afghan Women’s Empowerment Program.
Table 7-4: Trilateral projects between the United States and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Targeted Area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>PIKA, promoting Indian knowledge</td>
<td>(1.4 million)</td>
<td>2009-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal, Malawi</td>
<td>Agriculture Innovation Partnership Programme</td>
<td>5.5 million</td>
<td>2011-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghan Women’s Empowerment Programme</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>2011-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya, Malawi, Liberia</td>
<td>Spread Indian agriculture development innovations through Feed the Future</td>
<td>700 thousand</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five African countries</td>
<td>wPOWER, women and clean energy</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia, especially Sri Lanka</td>
<td>South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy Integration</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on (largely from U.S. statistics, U.S. dashboard, see in text for details; note that figures in brackets, it is unclear how much of the money was disbursed towards trilateral endeavours)

The account of the practices indicates that the United States has recently intensified its efforts to engage in trilateral projects. Moreover, the USA seem to be more willing to cooperate in projects with like-minded countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, and recently with India. The projects with China are still very limited. Generally, the amount spent on trilateral cooperation is far from extensive, especially if compared to the overall amount that the United States spends on development cooperation.

Overall, the idea of collaborating with like-minded countries has strongly influenced the narratives, some of the rules and has been extended to include China. The cooperation started relatively late in comparison to the other two donors. The slightly tentative start is compensated through the increasing amounts that the United States has poured into trilateral cooperation in recent years. Moreover, the idea of cooperating with like-minded countries seems to have been extended to include China as well. This, in turn, can be explained by the idea of needing to socialise emerging donors, especially China, to Western, American values. Nevertheless, this idea seems to be less prominent than the notion of the U.S. increasing its cooperation with like-minded countries. The low level of funding might be explained by the fact that China is not considered a like-minded country and therefore did not benefit from the initial increase in funding in trilateral projects.

7.2 Norway

Unlike the other two donors presented here, Norway did not express the hope of being able to socialise emerging donors to their own standards. On the other hand, similar to the United
Kingdom and the United States, Norway did accept that an increased cooperation with emerging donors is necessary. In opposition to the U.S. and the UK, it envisioned this increased cooperation mainly within multilateral international institutions rather than with its own means.

7.2.1 Narrative on trilateral cooperation

The previous two chapters have shown that Norway is influenced by emerging donors. Their perception is characterised by a mixture of fear and opportunism. Within the narrative, the support for a stronger selective approach (especially including political conditions) was coupled with the intention to strengthen recipients’ ownership, while Norwegian practices showed only mixed results. The narrative on trilateral cooperation directly relates to the first challenge that Norway identified regarding emerging donors: the need for greater cooperation with them within multilateral institutions in order to avoid a rival world order. What is Norway’s position towards trilateral cooperation? And has this position changed considerably over the last ten years?

Fields for trilateral cooperation

Compared to the other two donors presented here, Norway generally has a positive but very cautious attitude towards trilateral cooperation. Overall, trilateral cooperation did not play a decisive role in Norway over the observed period. Moreover, as in the case of the United States, Norway does not have a strategy or concept regarding how it wants to engage in trilateral projects with emerging donors. Nevertheless, the country envisions some projects over the years in trilateral cooperation that involve sectors in which Norway considers itself to be an expert (see chapter 4 for details on Norwegian development policies). The following list of projects is chronological, as triangular cooperation is only mentioned in passing when discussing the link between aid and other important fields of cooperation. The chronological overview also enables us to identify potential changes in the intensity of the official narrative.

The first mention of support for South-South cooperation comes in 2004, where Norway stated that it can be beneficial to support South-South trade through development measures because it might facilitate access to whole regions and foster development processes faster (NMFA 2004, 49). Especially India, Korea and South Africa are mentioned as now entering such agreements with Norway. The promotion of South-South trade is invoked again in 2007 because, it is argued, this would “lead to more sustainable trade development” through the “breaking-up of the North-South trade” (NMFA 2007a, 11).

Another area where trilateral cooperation is seen as promoting competence-building and as facilitating South-South cooperation is in the field of cultural cooperation, which is regarded as “resource intensive, especially in terms of personnel” (NMFA 2005b, 31). Norad accords itself the task of stressing the importance of culture for development efforts, to provide technical advice on cultural development efforts and on evaluation. The white paper on cultural relations states that the “diversity of new actors and the growing activity in the sector” calls for a closer cooperation, involving local embassies (NMFA 2005b, 31). Trilateral cooperation is seen in this field to lower costs for Norway as well as for recipient countries.
A paper from 2007 mentions trilateral cooperation as a form of cooperation that could be beneficial when dealing with humanitarian issues. The cooperation with emerging countries is seen positively because it can foster the exchange of experience “with a view of promoting the dissemination of knowledge at regional level” (NMFA 2007c, 6). As an example, the paper mentions countries such as “China, Bangladesh, Cuba and Vietnam” which are considered to “have important knowledge and experience of risk reduction in relation to natural disasters that could benefit others” (NMFA 2007c, 6). Moreover, trilateral cooperation is seen as beneficial in the early reconstruction phase as countries that have themselves emerged from conflict can share their experiences with others (NMFA 2007c, 54). The Norwegian government therefore decided to “give priority to partnerships with China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cuba on South-South cooperation and cooperation with Norwegian centres of expertise on risk reduction and emergency response” (NMFA 2007c, 55). The experiences of emerging countries seem to be the key for engaging in trilateral cooperation here.

There is a slight increase within the usage of the terminology of trilateral cooperation from 2010 onwards. In 2010, a publication on the Oil for Development Initiative referenced increasing support for South-South cooperation, especially for the exchange of knowledge on anti-corruption, special issues surrounding the petroleum sector (data and environmental management, legal framework), and on good governance, issues that were of primary importance in the narrative for the OfD programme (Norad 2011c, 7).

In the environmental field, Norway is conscious of the impact of emerging countries (NMFA 2011b, 20). It has therefore formalised bilateral agreements on environmental issues with Brazil, South Africa, China and India (NMFA 2011b, 21). The impact of emerging countries is however also felt “increasingly through development-oriented South-South cooperation” (NMFA 2011b, 20). Norway sees a distinct role for itself in this field, separate from the European Union and the United States, because their experience on the delicate relationship between environment, economic growth and development is valued, especially in China, but increasingly in Brazil and India as well. This cooperation remains in 2011 however largely bilateral in nature but is seen as a priority (NMFA 2011b, 37). The implementation of trilateral projects regarding environmental protection are only in evidence with Brazil (see below) (NMFA 2011b, 21).

A 2012 paper on the UN stated that Norway supports the UN’s efforts to facilitate South-South and triangular cooperation and that the Norwegian government “considers that the UN should engage in dialogue with new actors” (NMFA 2012a, 62) in order to ensure that South-South cooperation does not bypass the UN (NMFA 2012a, 19). Norway pledges to “ensure that the UN plays a more prominent role in facilitating partnerships between member states, for example South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation” (NMFA 2012a, 83). The importance attached to the United Nations shows again how Norway relies on international institutions and is the clearest manifestation of the idea that emerging donors need to be better integrated into existing multilateral structures.

Another sector where Norway claims to be promoting triangular cooperation or fostering South-South cooperation is the field of sharing the experience of distributive and welfare policies (NMFA 2013b, 29). Norway sees this to be an area where it has special expertise:
“Together with the other countries in our Nordic-Baltic constituency, Norway is a natural dialogue partner for the banks on tax-related matters, including the taxation of natural resources. Lessons can be learnt from our own social model, but it will be even more important to contribute to South-South learning and to the banks communicating best practice in discussions about distribution” (NMFA 2013b, 87).

The Norwegian government further pledges to “promote […] South-South cooperation between national and regional social partners in the global South” (NMFA 2013b, 57). It also refers to the “experiences from Latin American countries, among others” that could “be of interest to more development countries” (NMFA 2013b, 27). The government therefore aims to “finance South-South cooperation on the exchange of experience of distribution and welfare policies” (NMFA 2013b, 27).

Finally, in 2014, the government made a statement about the benefits of trilateral cooperation in peace-building initiatives, expanding upon its decisions from 2007 on humanitarian issues. Norway stated that it would be advantageous to create “new alliances among Northern and Southern/emerging power donors and political dialogue between internal and external actors” because these could “facilitate the construction of more effective peace-building policies” (NMFA 01.10.2014, 1). Projects in the field of peace-building should “involve translation of research from both Northern and Southern/emerging powers into practical policy recommendations” that should be implemented in decision-making centres (NMFA 01.10.2014, 1).

Generally, the benefits of trilateral cooperation that Norway perceives are that it can save costs and it can lead to more effective development cooperation mainly through the sharing of experiences and knowledge (from emerging donors but also from Norway itself). Moreover, Norway claims that trilateral cooperation can help to integrate South-South cooperation into the international arena instead of bypassing traditional and multilateral donors. However, there is no overall policy or concept regarding trilateral cooperation in the narrative. While it is mentioned more and more frequently towards the end of the period (from 2010 onwards), the support behind it remains relatively vague rather than it being a concrete policy direction, and it is less emphasised than by the United States.

Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors

Other than envisioning general trilateral projects with emerging powers, the Norwegian government has specific strategies for all four emerging countries. At least within the narrative, the efforts to lure China and Brazil into a trilateral cooperation are more considerable than an engagement with South Africa or India – which distinguishes Norway from the United States, who worked more on the relationship with South Africa and was rather reluctant to engage with China.

The Norwegian government stated in its China strategy from 2007 that international cooperation with China is a priority (NMFA 14.08.2007, 1). In 2008 (much earlier than any attempts by the United States) a project between China, Norway and Nigeria on oil exploitation was initiated. This is seen as highly beneficial and a project report expresses the wish to extend the project because
Changes in trilateral cooperation?

“[i]f sustained, it will enhance long-term mutual understanding and cooperation among the three countries involved. This momentum should be maintained by embarking on a follow-up project, specifically on Nigeria’s expectations and agenda for engaging China and Norway in the petroleum sector. An extension of the process to another African country is also recommended” (Brandtzæg and Pöyry 2008, 33).

Therefore, trilateral cooperation is equally seen as a business investment while “improve[ing] Nigerian, Chinese and Norwegian policymakers’ understanding of the assistance provided and the development philosophy that underpins it” (Gahr Store 30.01.2008, 1). In a follow-up meeting in Beijing, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store stated that he hopes the event “will mark the beginning of mutually beneficial cooperation, both bilaterally between Norway and China, and trilaterally, together with African partners” (Gahr Store 30.01.2008, 2). However – and in contrast to the United States – Norway also perceives trilateral cooperation as a way to increase mutual understanding and to possibly mitigate the negative effects China could have on African development. It states that

“it is impossible to tell exactly how the Chinese engagement has an impact on development in African countries. The effects may vary from country to country. And it is difficult to determine how any single country’s influence leads to a specific pattern of change. However, through trilateral research we will gain better understanding – based on facts and findings – of how economic growth will benefit African countries” (Gahr Store 30.01.2008, 2).

In 2009, the government stated its intent to become more involved in trilateral cooperation with China, especially because of the controversial Chinese relations with the African continent:

“The EU, on its part, conducts a development policy dialogue with actors with which Norway would like to have closer contact. The tripartite dialogue between the EU, Africa and China is of particular interest” (NMFA 2009a, 106).

In 2013, a Norad report on sustainable development discussed a project involving a partnership between Chinese private sector companies interested in African renewable energy markets, the Chinese government, Chinese industry associations and African and Norwegian embassies in China. This initiative attempts to “develop business models and instruments to leverage commercial investments” (Norad 2013a, 43).

With China, Norway seems to be eager to assemble more knowledge on its activities as a donor especially in Africa in two main fields that are of particular interest: oil exploitation, where it is in direct competition with China in Africa, and work relations, where Norway believes it could have an impact on internal developments in China itself.

Many consider Brazil to be the champion of trilateral cooperation because it is eager to engage in such projects. Norway recognises that “Brazil has become a significant bilateral actor, donor and cooperation partner for a number of countries in the South and attaches importance to South-South cooperation” especially in Africa (NMFA 2011a, 20–21). The active pursuit of trilateral projects with Norway seems to come from Brazil itself, as opposed to the narrative within the United States, which was very eager to engage Brazil. Norway always stresses that “Brazil is interested in closer cooperation with Norway on promoting development in third countries” (NMFA 2011a, 21). The benefits for both sides and therefore the division of labour...
in this cooperation are clearly expressed: “Brazil has expertise and experience in the field of development that could be of great benefit to many countries in the South, and Norway has long experience as a donor that could benefit Brazil” (NMFA 2011a, 21).

Norway is actively planning several projects of trilateral cooperation with Brazil. Cooperation existed in Angola and Guinea-Bissau and was proceeding in Haiti in 2011. The main focus of such cooperation is in the field of climate and forest protection in which Norway plans further trilateral projects with Brazil (NMFA 2011a, 21). One such example is the trilateral cooperation between the two countries in Mozambique within the UN-led REDD\(^{145}\) programme. The programme is supposed to benefit Mozambique because it “can learn from Brazil and embark on its own REDD initiative” (NMFA 2011b, 58). This project is supported by Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) since 2007 (NMFA 2011b, 58).

Moreover, Norway advances the idea of cooperating in countries that are recipients of both Norwegian and Brazilian aid on the issue of following up on human rights commitments. Similarly, based on Norway’s statements, Brazil shows an interest in issues such as welfare policies and global health in third countries. The last field in which cooperation is envisioned is the one of promoting efforts for decent working conditions, similar to the project with China (NMFA 2011a, 21). The type of cooperation illustrates that it is easier for Norway to engage in trilateral projects with countries that share its political philosophy.

Within the narrative, Norway does not seem to plan an engagement in trilateral cooperation with South Africa or India on a large scale. The strategies for engaging India (2009) and South Africa (2011) focus on issues other than trilateral cooperation. With India, Norway is concerned to “strengthen its dialogue and cooperation with India on international political issues” within a joint commission and in the major multilateral forums to discuss key areas (such as climate change, energy, peace efforts, democracy, human rights, decent work, global health) (NMFA 2009f, 17). Regarding health issues, Norway and India have established the NIPI (Norway – India Partnership Initiative) in the health sector to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 4 (reduce child mortality) and 5 (improve maternal health) – but the goals are limited to improving the situation in India and therefore do not include trilateral projects (NMFA 2009f, 18). Norway and India have no trilateral projects planned, which could result from a mutual reluctance to engage the other country as a donor.

South Africa is seen as a gateway to the African continent. Therefore, very early on in 2006 – almost three years earlier than in the United States – Norway recognised the need “to establish lasting cooperative relationships between Norwegian and South African partners” (NMFA 2006b, 1). Moreover, Norway supported South African efforts in peace processes in Burundi and Sudan, focusing on including women in the peace process (Norad 2008a, 100). Norway also planned to “strengthen South Africa’s capacity as a donor country in development cooperation through cooperation with Norad” (Norad 2008a, 100). Some efforts were thus undertaken by

\(^{145}\) United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, a UN initiative under negotiation since 2005, transformed into the REDD+ initiative in 2007. Since 2008, the UN has its own REDD programme overseeing the diverse implementation processes in partner countries.
Norway to engage with South Africa on trilateral cooperation but the efforts remain minor from both sides.

Overall, Norway does not have a strategic plan on how to approach trilateral cooperation with emerging donors. It seems to be willing to engage countries that share a similar political vision (Brazil) and those which are considered to be too important and influential to be left out (China). However, generally, the enthusiasm and internal narrative for trilateral cooperation projects in Norway is quite low. While the topic receives increasing attention in Norway from 2010 onwards, the narrative does not change overall. Throughout the period, trilateral cooperation is viewed as a positive addition to other forms of cooperation. But it is considered one form next to many others, not as the new alternative for cooperation – which is something of a contrast to the two other donors observed here. Do Norwegian practices then show a similarly low level of engagement?

7.2.2 Norwegian rules and practices on trilateral cooperation

The previous section elaborated on the fact that Norway does not have a consistent strategy regarding trilateral cooperation. This factor explains why, within the rules, the only evidence for an increase in trilateral projects can be found in the specific country strategies for the four emerging donors where trilateral projects are mentioned in passing (NMFA 2011a, 2009f, 2007d, 29.11.2013). This section elaborates on the question of whether the restrained narratives and rules regarding trilateral cooperation is implemented in practice. This could be confirmed through an overall low engagement in trilateral projects.

One first indication that seems to confirm the rather cautious discourse is that Norway is not mentioned in the diverse studies of OECD on triangular cooperation as a provider of triangular cooperation (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012; Task Team on South South Cooperation 2010). Despite a fact sheet on a recent survey from the OECD that states that Norway is perceived to be among the top participants in triangular cooperation projects, the OECD peer review on Norwegian development cooperation from 2013 does not mention any trilateral projects (OECD DAC 2013; OECD February 2016). When asked about the link between his section in Norad and emerging donors, a Norad employee said:

“We are not in much contact with them. […] But we are not in any way, not wanting to have any cooperation with them. […] So, we don’t mind cooperating with them, but I think it hasn’t been a natural thing for us to do so far […] But, you know, I don’t think we have any issues with whom we cooperate. We could cooperate with the Chinese if the occasion presented itself” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 8’03-8’19; 15’52).

The interviewee gave the following explanation for this:

146 The DAC peer review from 2013 equally confirms that Norway plans to engage with China, Brazil, and India (OECD DAC 2013, 68–72).
“You know, it might be that we are operating in different areas of development assistance. You know, they are pretty much into infrastructure, I think, and we are not particularly into infrastructure” (interview with IX, 2014, October 2, 11'17).

These quotes then confirm the general narrative: an overall willingness to engage in trilateral projects and to cooperate with all countries, but also a certain restrained position towards actually engaging them.

While the narrative illustrated a willingness to engage in trilateral cooperation in many sectors, the only areas in which actual projects are taking place are in the protection of the environment, welfare distribution, peace building and oil extraction, as the following paragraphs illustrate.

For the cooperation with Brazil, the narrative identified projects with Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. While no figures were accessible on the trilateral cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, the amounts for the cooperation with Angola are rather low (USD 1.6 million), while the trilateral project with Haiti is funded with USD 4.9 million and thereby constitutes the highest trilateral cooperation within Norway’s budget. The cooperation with Brazil is particularly strong in the environmental sector, with Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) and its support of the UN-led REDD programme. REDD receives a large amount of funding in diverse recipient countries (of which about USD 9 million are directed to foster South-South cooperation, but do not necessarily include an emerging donor). One example that is clearly a trilateral cooperation is Norway’s ongoing support to Brazil’s cooperation with Mozambique, where USD 2.3 million has thus far been disbursed. The evaluation of the project has been rather positive (NMFA 2012c, 38; Norad 2015). Another ongoing budget post is the general support of the Brazilian government in South-South cooperation. The modest amount of USD 236 thousand have been allocated to this since 2013.

The projects with South Africa are largely taking place in the sector of humanitarian aid and peace-building measures and are much lower in figures than those supporting Brazil. The funding for South Africa’s initiative in the peace process in Burundi amounted to the small amount of USD 2.3 million over the period from 2007 till 2010. While the tripartite cooperation between Norway, South Africa and Sudan on police training was delayed twice (in 2008 and 2009), the support of the Sudanese police force with the assistance of South Africa amounted to a similar amount of USD 2.4 million for the years 2009 and 2010 (Norad 2009a, 100, 2010a, 99, 2015). It seems that Norway does not have any ongoing projects with South Africa, which is not wholly congruent with the positive view of that country in Norway’s narrative.

Despite a stronger support in the narrative for co-operating with China than was evident in the case of the United States, the amount spent on trilateral cooperation with China is even lower than for South Africa. Trilateral cooperation with China has occurred in Nigeria within a project that was supposed to “assist Norwegian authorities in developing a basis for a dialogue with China on matters related to petroleum investment and development assistance to Africa” (programme description within Norad statistics, Norad 2015). The overall funding of that cooperation added up to limited USD 233 thousand. Despite the wishes of several Norwegian authorities for the project to continue and to be applied in other oil producing African countries, no follow-up project funding could be found and the last distribution took place in 2008 (Norad 2015).
Norad also cofounded an interesting project between the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) and its counterparts in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. NHO’s main role is to “help the African employers’ organisations in getting into contact with Chinese companies” (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 9'47). Based on an interview with a member from NHO, the contact with the Chinese organisations works very well in Uganda and in Kenya, but is less intense (also because it is a newer project) in Ethiopia (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 12'42). The contacts are focussed so far in Eastern African countries due to the historic reason of Norway’s involvement in that region, but the contacts are equally planned in countries with oil as they are of particular interest for Norway (interview with VIII, 2014, August 26, 22'47).

Trilateral cooperation in Uganda has received the highest share with about USD 1.4 million over several years. After an initial funding in 2003, the project took off in 2008 and is still ongoing. While no trace of direct funding for NHO in its activities in Ethiopia could be found, the statistics revealed that Norway spent USD 26 000 on a project of the Chinese International Poverty Reduction Centre (IPRCC) in Ethiopia in 2011. No figures are available in the statistics about a trilateral project taking place in Kenya. It is possible, however, that the NHO founding for Uganda is used by NHO for projects in other East African countries (Norad 2015).

Norad also established several multilateral initiatives to foster South-South cooperation. One is in the sector of peace-building where Norway funds the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs to come up with ideas about how to establish a “South-South-North network” involving all four emerging donors covered here, but also including Turkey and Indonesia. The total amount spent on that project amounts to USD 970 thousand. Moreover, Norway funds several smaller projects within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its South-South-Unit. Together with projects strengthening the capacity of the World Bank in the area of South-South cooperation this multilateral funding amounts to a further USD 2.2 million since 2008 (Norad 2015). The following table gives an overview of the rather limited number of trilateral projects that Norway undertakes with three of the four emerging donors.
Overall, the practice on trilateral cooperation confirms the general trend in the narrative: while isolated projects get sizeable amounts of funding, the total engagement is rather limited. Moreover, one can observe that while there are no projects initiated with India, the narrative suggests that Norway is eager to engage more closely with China whereas the practice only shows limited projects which suggests that maybe China is less eager to engage with Norway. Brazil is the country that receives the biggest support, together with South Africa – in narrative and practices. This is very similar to approach of the United States, with both countries having illustrated a rather negative perception of emerging donors. Nevertheless, when looking at the amounts spent on trilateral cooperation, Norway does not seem to be a major player (despite the perception of the actors interviewed by the OECD survey on triangular cooperation, OECD February 2016). The reason here lies in the rather limited range of the main idea that is fostering this change: Norway largely agrees that multilateral institutions should be in charge of further integrating emerging donors into the existing world order. Its own role is therefore perceived to be

Table 7-5: Trilateral projects between Norway and emerging donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emerging donor</th>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Targeted area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>International organisa-</td>
<td>Foster SSC exchanges</td>
<td>2.2 million</td>
<td>2008-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tions (mostly UNDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, China, South Africa,</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>SSC peace-building</td>
<td>970 thousand</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India and others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>REDD, environment</td>
<td>USD 2.3 million</td>
<td>2009--ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Community development project</td>
<td></td>
<td>USD 4.9 million</td>
<td>2006, 2008-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Skill sharing and</td>
<td></td>
<td>USD 1.6 million</td>
<td>2005, 2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transfer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Support for Brazil to</td>
<td>236 thousand</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engage in SSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Oil sector</td>
<td>USD 230 thousand</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Federation of Employers</td>
<td></td>
<td>USD 1.4 million</td>
<td>2008-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Conference support</td>
<td></td>
<td>USD 26 thousand</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Support for UNDP to understand China’s African policies</td>
<td>7 thousand</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Peace keeping</td>
<td>USD 2.3 million</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Police force</td>
<td></td>
<td>USD 2.4 million</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on data from NORAD. Note that all figures were converted to USD through the exchange date of the year of the date.
minor, which is essential in explaining the low involvement of Norway, especially when compared to the United Kingdom, as the next section shows.

7.3 United Kingdom

The main ideas identified in chapter 5 that could trigger a change within the UK’s policies regarding trilateral cooperation are similar to the United States, though with some key differences; the United Kingdom did not divide the group of emerging donors into like-minded and other countries but indicated its desire to cooperate with all of them, emphasising its desire to “help” them and increase their impact in development cooperation overall. How do such ideas affect the institution of development assistance within the United Kingdom?

Within this study, the United Kingdom is the only donor that seemed to welcome emerging donors as a positive new element in development cooperation, as chapter 5 has argued. When it came to conditionality, the UK – like the other two traditional donors – embraced the narrative of a stronger preselection but only showed limited results in its actual aid figures of this pre-selective process, suggesting that they might not strengthen conditionality as a reaction towards emerging donors. It seems reasonable to hypothesise that a country that goes to some length in its official documents and speeches to welcome the aid policies of emerging donors is one that is also eager to engage with them in trilateral projects.

7.3.1 Narrative on trilateral cooperation

Fields of trilateral cooperation

Whereas Norway and the United States do not have a specific policy regarding trilateral cooperation, the United Kingdom at least has a strategy for engaging emerging markets. Already in 2005, the Economic Governance Programme – formerly referred to as Strengthening Relations with Emerging Markets – stated that all four emerging donors “will become increasingly important to British interests over the next decade (FCO 2005, 21). Similarly, in the annual report of 2006, it is stated that “China’s growing economic and political significance […] will have a disproportionate impact on how much progress the development world as a whole will make towards achieving the MDGs”, which leads to the conclusion that the UK needs to engage China in its policies with Africa (DFID 2006a, 72). The report in the following year endorses the idea that Britain is cooperating with “new and emerging donors […] to help them increase the impact of their work on poverty reduction” (DFID 2007a, 192; almost identical statement in A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 7). The annual report of 2008 further confirms this by stating that the UK ought to “develop closer working relationships with new non-OECD donors such as India and China” (DFID 2008a, 6). It is not surprising therefore that one of the six strategic objectives of DFID (DSOs) is to “develop a global partnership for development (beyond aid)” (DFID 2008b, 14). Within that DSO, DFID credits itself with having made strong progress from the beginning (four initiatives with emerging donors reported in DFID 2008b, 14–15; seven initiatives with BRICS countries in DFID 2009a, 118; equally ”strong progress” reported on that DSO in DFID 2009b, 16). In the 2010 report, a total of seven initiatives with all emerging donors of this study except South Africa are mentioned (see below for details on those initia-
Since 2010, the partnership has been built on a more concrete framework. In that year, DFID sets up its “Global Development Partnership Programme” (GDPP) which specifically refers to trilateral cooperation as one aspect of the partnership (DFID 2014b, 129). Similar to the policies of the United States and Norway, the UK plans to use trilateral cooperation as a means to stay engaged with countries that are no longer or soon won’t be recipients of UK aid anymore (DFID 2013a, 119). Throughout the period, the UK has strengthened the intensity with which it refers to the necessity of embedding emerging donors in global initiatives and thereby the necessity for the UK to collaborate with emerging donors (for instance, DFID 2014b, 128). Moreover, the UK also openly states that, through trilateral initiatives, it might be able to “help shape [emerging donors’] impact on development in poorer countries” (DFID 2014c, 16).

Although the UK started comparatively early and seems to be particularly eager to engage with emerging donors in cooperative projects, its reasons for doing so are very similar to the ones identified by the United States and Norway: “newly emerging economies” are seen to be experts in technologies that could be directly implanted in developing countries (DFID 2008c, 35). This exercise of sharing knowledge and experience is envisioned especially in areas where emerging economies are thought to be leaders, such as climate change and agriculture, as well as in terms of security cooperation (DFID 2009d, 131; see also A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 3–4; for the idea to work with emerging donors in the area of responsibility to protect, see FCO 2014b, 72). The UK pledges to “trade in ideas and in expertise” (DFID 15.02.2011, 1–2; similar DFID 01.12.2011, 1). This exchange is also thought to “ensure aid can make the most difference to the lives of poor people” (DFID 29.06.2012, 2).

Narrative on trilateral cooperation with specific emerging donors

The UK often mentions all four emerging donors for trilateral projects. At times, specific groups of emerging donors are selected for specific projects. As such, regarding research partnerships in the areas of trade and transfer of technology for clean energy and water, the UK mentions India, China and Brazil (DFID 2008c, 16, 19). In the area of making use of research in the field of cleaner, more sustainable biofuels, the UK intends to work with South Africa, India and Brazil (DFID 2014d, 1–2). This initiative foresees the sharing of knowledge through participation in workshops (DFID 2014d). Another project envisions cooperation between South Africa and Brazil in Mozambique to help introduce biofuels (DFID 2007a, 47). Moreover, those two emerging donors are referred to when it comes to the need to find new partners to promote human rights (FCO 2011, 6–7).

The other two traditional donors spent relatively little attention on the cooperation in trilateral projects with China and focused more on countries that were likely to be as dedicated to democratic principles as they themselves. The United Kingdom, however, has dedicated considerable resources on inducing China to cooperate – and from an early date. For instance, the UK agreed to hold six monthly senior level talks with China on international development issues as early as 2006 and confirmed that “the UK is working closely with China so that both our efforts support the African vision of development” (see for instance statements in DFID 2007a, 26; similarly DFID 2008a, 36). DFID talks about “an excellent working relationship in Beijing and
Changes in trilateral cooperation?

in London on China-Africa issues” (DFID 2008a, 18). Moreover, a stakeholder survey suggests that “China [is] now more open towards the UK in its approach to Africa […] wishing to learn more about the UK’s approach to overseas aid” (DFID 2008d, 56–57). Similarly, an evaluation from 2010 stated that the dialogue with the UK was successful in “influenc[ing] behaviour, thinking and policymaking at central levels in the Chinese government” (DFID 2010b, 2). In 2014, Justine Greening, the Minister for International Development, described the partnership between China and the UK as “ground-breaking” (Greening 02.04.2014, 1).

Reasons for cooperating with China are numerous: in the field of energy, Britain invokes the “size and growth of [China’s] global footprint” and the feeling that “if we fail to engage China, China’s impact may threaten existing or future development gains in some parts of the developing world” (Development Tracker 2012h, 1). Other than the necessity to include China in future arrangements, the UK also stresses that “China has experiences to share with other countries” in many fields (Development Tracker 2015b, 1).

Concrete cooperation is envisioned in the area of exchanging knowledge on agriculture and climate change adoptions, for instance with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DFID 2009a, 47). The cooperation in the DRC is referenced in a speech by Andrew Mitchell in which he mentions trilateral cooperation in infrastructure, as a “very successful outcome” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 6). A dialogue with China in January 2008 “allowed leaders to discuss the development relationship and China’s role in tackling global poverty” (DFID 2008a, 66). Several other dialogues followed, for instance about the “shape and scale of cooperation programmes on water and agriculture”, the UK-China Development Dialogue, the UK-China Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network or the UK-China Food security plan as well as international co-hosted conferences, such as the one in January 2010 focusing on food security and agriculture (DFID 2009b, 31). The country assistance plan (CAP) for China foresees cooperation with China on “important international development issues, focussing on sustainable development, climate change and China’s engagement in Africa” (DFID 2010b, 1).

When DFID closed its bilateral aid relationship with China in March 2011, it began working even more intensively on initiating trilateral projects (DFID 22.03.2013b). At the same time, the UK signed a memorandum of understanding with China and its Development Bank “to enhance the impact, quality and sustainability of investments made by the UK and China in Africa” (DFID 2014b, 129). Several projects derive from this memorandum: The first of these is the AgriTT Project (Working in Partnership with China to Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low Income Countries) which started in 2012 and aims at “sharing of successful experience in agricultural development, especially from China, with other developing countries in order to improve agricultural productivity and the food security of poor people” (DFID 2014a, 1).

Initial projects in in the AgriTT programme were planned for instance in Malawi (enhance tilapia production) and Uganda (maize and cattle value chains; cassava production), and one other country in Southeast Asia, later identified as Cambodia (DFID 2014a, 2014f). Later, projects with Tanzania (Chinese rodent management), Rwanda (pest control for vegetables), Cambodia (rice value chain development; mobile internet technology), Ethiopia (improve productivity), Ghana (transformation of organic waste) as well as several studies intended to improve aquaculture sectors (for instance in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria) were added to the programme (DFID 2014f; for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2013e, 2012g).
Engaging other important donors, even some that are not “traditionally like-minded” is envisioned in Sudan (DFID 2013b, 3). Also in 2013, DFID launched a new programme entitled “Sharing and Learning on Community-Based Disaster Management in Asia”, directing the development cooperation firstly towards Nepal and Bangladesh as trial cases (DFID 14.01.2013, 2013a, 119; for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015g, 2014f). Only two days later, on January 16, 2013, DFID launched another project in the area of global health. The project is intended to “build capacity for DFID and low income countries to learn lessons from China’s unparalleled success in reducing infant, child and maternal mortality rates, disease prevention and control, and China’s health development and health sector reform” (DFID 16.01.2013, 1, 22.03.2013b; for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015b, 2015c). Learning from China in the areas of “reducing infant, child and maternal mortality rates, disease prevention and control and health sector reform” is thought to have beneficial effects for low-income countries (DFID 2014b, 129).

During a visit to Beijing in 2014, Justine Greening pledged to “work together more closely” with China on development, indicating a strong commitment to trilateral projects with China (Greening 02.04.2014, 2). A relatively recent project that the UK engages in with China aims to jointly assess how trade, investment and aid-for-trade can be beneficial for poverty reduction in Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya (Greening 02.04.2014, 4). Throughout the observed period, the United Kingdom places a strong focus on cooperation with China and this interest in cooperation seems to even increase over time. Especially in comparison to the other two donors, the UK is the first to fully recognise the potential of China whereas Norway and the United States first had to abandon their prejudices before engaging China at all in trilateral projects.

Brazil, the country that received most attention for trilateral projects from the United States and Norway, is second in the United Kingdom’s narrative. The UK is quick to attribute Brazil with regional leadership on health issues, in particular related to the fight against HIV/AIDS in Latin America (DFID 2006a, 85). The UK therefore pledges to help spread Brazilian knowledge in this area to other Latin American countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (DFID 2006a, 90). In 2007, the UK agreed to spread the knowledge about the Brazilian Bolsa Familia project (a project targeting poor families and ensuring that their children receive education and health services) to six African countries, one of which is Kenya (DFID 2007a, 112–13; A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 5). In the annual report of 2008, DFID states that its “programme has evolved from bilateral aid to a partnership with Brazil, to help strengthen Brazil’s ability to share its development experience as a policy leader on climate change, biofuels, HIV & AIDS, inequality analysis, and social protection”. In particular, the programme foresees a collaboration in Ghana (DFID 2008a, 79).

Formally, the UK-Brazil Working Group on Africa was established in 2009 “with a view on joint working on African issues” (DFID 2009b, 31). This led to the support of Brazil’s assistance to the African Union and five African countries on Brazil’s design of social protection policies, building on the experiences of the Bolsa Familia project (DFID 2009a, 47). Moreover, since 2012, a strategic dialogue between the UK and Brazil has taken place in order to enhance “bilateral discussions” (FCO 18.01.2012, 1). In the same year, a press release announced the increased collaboration with Brazil on development issues because it could lead to “lessons being learned and adapted for low income countries” (DFID 24.08.2012, 1–2). The programme focuses on research into Brazil’s impact in Africa in four main areas: agriculture, institutions, social
programmes and economic spheres (DFID 24.08.2012, 1–2). The collaboration with Brazil also foresees the co-hosting of international events, such as collaboration on the Olympic Hunger Event in August 2012 and the Nutrition for Growth Event in June 2013 (DFID 2013a, 119, 2014b, 129). That cooperation with Brazil on African issues is one of the cornerstones of this relationship becomes clear from a speech by William Hague, the then Foreign minister, stating that “there is immense scope for us to do more together and achieve more together by working side-by-side in foreign policy, perhaps nowhere more so than in Africa” (Hague 19.02.2014, 1). Cooperation is envisioned in the areas of peacekeeping, where Brazil is considered to be an expert because of its experiences in Haiti and Lebanon, as well as strengthening food security and increasing agricultural productivity (Hague 19.02.2014, 1–3). The cooperation with Brazil is often praised because of the essential similarity of the two political systems, which enables the UK to work with Brazil in Africa on issues close to the UK development agenda, like good governance and stability, economic development, repeating similar appraisals to those of the United States and Norway, all referring to the similarities between the governments’ approaches towards development (Hague 19.02.2014, 4).

The relationship between India and the United Kingdom is a difficult one, characterised by a charged post-colonial narrative. The UK is careful to underline how highly it thinks of a close relationship with India. Nevertheless, as Mitchell stated in 2011, the UK also recognises that “nowhere will our partnership be more multi-dimensional than India” (A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 4). In 2012, India proudly declared that it would stop receiving aid from the UK. Justine Greening, Minister for International Development at the time, insists that the relationship with India will change but that technical cooperation with India to “maintain a hub of development expertise within India” will be continued and that the UK and India “will work together to help other poor countries learn from India’s experience on areas like trade, food security, climate change and health” (DFID 09.11.2012, 1). The framework paper from 2013 clarifies the content of the cooperation slightly by stating that “technical cooperation will continue after 2015, focusing on policy cooperation and skills exchange in areas such as growth, trade and investment, education and skills, health, and governance” (DFID 2013c, 2; similar DFID 2013e, 4).

Nonetheless, there is a certain vagueness when it comes to trilateral projects and the concrete content of the desired collaboration. The area in which this cooperation does seem to take place is research. In 2008, the UK planned to cooperate with the Indian pharmaceutical industry to lower the price for HIV and malaria drugs (DFID 2009a, 47). Similarly, the pledge in 2009 was to cooperate largely with non-governmental Indian actors to foster development – in India and elsewhere (DFID 2009b, 31; confirmed by A. Mitchell 15.02.2011, 5–6; DFID 2013a, 119). A press release from the end of 2013 then finally made more concrete the kind of trilateral cooperation that the two countries want to undertake: it aims to create a “global research partnership between India and the UK (more precisely between DFID, Research Councils UK and DBT) to fund “trilateral research partnerships addressing major global challenges on health, food security and women” (British High Commission 13.11.2013, 2–3). The initiative also builds upon the UK India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), which was set up in 2006 (British High Commission 13.11.2013, 2–3; DFID 2013e, 3). Through the Global Development Partnership (GDPP), the UK has supported the closer cooperation with Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers in African countries (South Africa and other countries) (DFID 2014b, 129). In 2013 the UK also agreed to collaborate with India’s Development Partnership Administration through the UK-India Global Development Dialogue (DFID 2014b, 129).
From the four emerging donors, the UK pays least attention to South Africa as a potential partner in trilateral projects, but still values the country as a “leader in Africa and for Africa” (FCO 2006, 298). In 2006, DFID launched a plan for the Southern Africa Region which enables it to benefit from South Africa’s expertise in the area (DFID 2006a, 45). In June 2007, the UK launched a small research initiative together with South Africa and Sierra Leone called “Research into Use programme” which intends “to put the best agricultural and natural resources research into widespread use” in Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Nigeria (DFID 2008a, 22). Similar to the other emerging donors, the DFID’s bilateral programme in South Africa runs out in 2015, “reflecting a new relationship between the UK and South Africa” (DFID 2014b, 77, 30.04.2013, 1). The UK remains however vaguely committed to “working together with South Africa to deliver effective development results both regionally and globally” (DFID 2014b, 129).

Overall, the UK seems to be strongly committed to engaging in trilateral cooperation in their narrative, which reflects the general idea of cooperating with all emerging donors and helping them to pursue more effective development policies.\textsuperscript{147} The UK mostly envisions cooperation with China and Brazil, with minor initiatives with India and South Africa. Does the practice confirm this ostensibly strong commitment?

7.3.2 British rules and practices on trilateral cooperation

The rules within the development cooperation of the UK largely reflect the increasing emphasis put on trilateral cooperation identified in the narrative. Most of it is institutionalised within the Global Development Partnership Programme that specifically foresees engaging in trilateral cooperation with emerging countries. Moreover, further Memoranda of Understanding structure the planned projects on trilateral cooperation (for instance, UK Government 2013).

Within the 2012 survey of the OECD on trilateral cooperation, the UK had reported between 1 and 10 trilateral projects, scoring slightly below the United States (which was in the category between 10 and 50 projects), but still above Norway (which is not mentioned at all by the report) (Yamashiro Fordelone and Soule-Kohndou 2012, 20). In the more recent survey, the UK is not mentioned under the top activists in trilateral cooperation whereas Norway is, despite the hesitant reactions regarding emerging donors that we have seen in the sections on Norway. The following section contradicts these findings and illustrates that the UK follows through with its narrative and pushes for many trilateral projects with all emerging donors, including China.

As in the case of the other two donors, it is not easy to find exact data on trilateral cooperation that is separated from other initiatives involving emerging economies. This, however, is only true for the early period (up until 2010). In 2010, the UK adopted the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee, a policy that requires the publication of any aid transfer. Recently, a new website, the Development Tracker, publishes figures on every development related activity that the UK finances and makes access to figures of trilateral projects comparatively easy.

\textsuperscript{147} This increased interest on the part of the UK is also noted in the literature (Knodt and Piefer 2012, 43; Binding and Kudlimay 2013).
The UK initially had figures on its spending on the Global Partnerships Programmes that started in 2009. The Global Partnerships department has received rising figures from an initial USD 3.1 million in 2010/11 to USD 14.5 million in 2014/15 (DFID 2011a, 145, 2012a, 201, 2013a, 224, 2014b, 235, 2015, 151). How much of this money is spent directly on trilateral projects remains unknown.

Contrary to the other two donors, the biggest share of the contributions to trilateral cooperation goes to China. Early on, the UK disbursed considerable amounts of money to engaging China in development policies. In the last ten years, the UK spent a remarkable USD 44.6 million on trilateral projects with China. Comparing this figure to the mere USD 1.6 million that Norway spent indicates that the UK holds a genuine interest in cooperating with China (Development Tracker 2012g, 2012d, 2012h, 2015f, 2015b).

The narratives indicated that the UK started to plan projects with China at a relatively early stage. This remains true when we look at the practices and the actual disbursement of funds. Already in 2004, the UK spent USD 6.5 million to initiate trilateral projects with China. Among those projects are peacekeeping initiatives, a small pilot water project between DFID and China in Tanzania and other multilateral initiatives, such as the funding of the China-DAC study group. Within the UK statistics, these projects all appear under the heading of “Working with China on International Development Issues” in Africa and on global public goods (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012g). The budget post accounts for projects that were pushed through from 2004 until 2011. The complete figure of this account amounts to USD 7.2 million. In the later years, this included first roundtables with China on collaborating in health projects as well as further trilateral peacekeeping training projects with African counterparts.

Many further initiatives accompanied this early glut of trilateral projects. For example, the UK financed a study to investigate the emerging relationship between China and Africa from 2007 until 2011 with USD 1.2 million. Two similar smaller studies were also funded: one ran from 2010 till 2014 with USD 158 thousand to investigate China’s role in fragile states, the other was founded in 2012 and 2013 with USD 71 thousand to investigate the Chinese role in the conflict surrounding South Sudan.

Another project that attempts to level the ground for future trilateral cooperation with China consists in the funding of China’s role within the United Nations Development Programme, where the UK has spent USD 214 thousand so far (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012h). The project is ongoing and a total of USD 1.6 million has been earmarked for investment in this cooperation. Another ongoing project attempts to strengthen the role of “successful emerging economies” and to learn developmental lessons from Chinese and Brazilian experience for low income countries. This cooperation kicked off in 2012 and is funded with USD 70 thousand for the Chinese component.

These initial projects led the way for further more concrete trilateral projects. One which attempts to make use of Chinese lessons from adapting to climate change to other countries kicked off in 2009 and is still ongoing. So far, USD 5.1 million has been spent. Another concrete example of making use of Chinese knowledge can be found in the area of water management, where a project ran from 2011 until 2013 and was funded with USD 120 thousand in order to
implement Chinese expertise in selected developing countries to improve their water resources management.

The biggest projects with China started after the signing of the memorandum between China and the UK to enhance their cooperation in the area of development in 2011 – the same year that the UK stopped its bilateral programme in China. In 2012, the ambitious Working Partnership with China to Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer to Low Income Countries began. The project intends to invest an ambitious USD 15 million of which USD 7.8 million have been spent. The project is proceeding in many different African countries and in Cambodia and adapts strongly to the specific contexts of the recipient country. For instance, the two pilot projects targeted Uganda – where the focus is on the production of cassava as well as the development of an effective value chain for maize and cattle – and Malawi – where the production of fingerling is enhanced (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012g, 2013e). Projects with many other countries are also in process (for instance with Ghana in the area of organic waste management, with Ethiopia in general agricultural development, in Tanzania for rodent management, in Rwanda for biologically based pest production, and in Cambodia where the rice value chain is in the focus of the collaboration).

Another large project, the International Development Support Project, is more general in nature and aims at improving the “understanding of China and its international development impacts” and “exposes Chinese officials and aid practitioners to new ways of approaching international development policy and implementation” (Development Tracker 2015f, 2). In more concrete terms, since 2012 the programme has aimed at fostering the exchange between British and Chinese aid practices through workshops, trainings and conferences in China, in the UK, but also in other, common recipient countries. Thus far, the project has been funded with USD 8.3 million, while a total of USD 17 million has been approved. In 2013, several smaller projects are proceeding with limited funding of a total of USD 51 thousand. They include a project that aims at increasing the collaboration with China in infrastructure in Africa (USD 17 thousand), the collaboration on limiting the outbreak of the foodborne disease (with USD 7 thousand) and the financing of a common workshop to limit antimicrobial resistance (USD 17 thousand) (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015f).

The two big projects that best characterise the rise in cooperation in trilateral projects between China and the United Kingdom are, however, Sharing and learning on community-based disaster management in Asia and the Global health support programme. These two initiatives, launched within days of each other, are both ongoing and ambitious in aims and funding. The disaster management project aims at increasing the collaboration with China in Asia – particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal – and has been allocated USD 9 million, of which USD 3.4 million has already been spent (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2014f, 2015g). The global health support programme aims at strengthening the effectiveness of China’s contributions to health governance and strengthens the cooperation in disease prevention and control, particularly of malaria and polio. This project has been allocated a total of USD 20 million, of which USD 9.9 has been spent so far (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015b). All of the big projects foresee a constant exchange between British and Chinese aid experts and aim at influencing Chinese development policies, but all stress that they also want to learn from their Chinese counterparts. Another smaller project was launched in 2014 with a scoping study on the increased exchange in research between researchers from Africa, China and the UK to deliver agricultural innovation in Africa. The project has a budget of USD 494
thousand of which most has already been spent (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012g). To illustrate that the UK continues to be very eager to remain engaged with China in trilateral cooperation, it is worth mentioning that another project began in 2015 which focuses on the usage of Chinese experience and knowledge for developing country. A total of USD 5 million is planned for that project. The following table summarises the trilateral projects between China and the United Kingdom.
Table 7-6: Trilateral projects between the UK and China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Target area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Working with China on International Development Issues</td>
<td>7.2 million</td>
<td>2004-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Financing of several studies on China in Africa</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>2007-2011, 2010-2014, 2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Global Knowledge on Climate Change Adaptation: Lessons from China</td>
<td>5.1 million</td>
<td>2009-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Supporting integrated water resource management in developing countries</td>
<td>120 thousand</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Development lessons from successful emerging economies for low income countries</td>
<td>70 thousand</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>Diverse projects (infrastructure; food safety, antimicrobial resistance)</td>
<td>51 thousand</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Working with UNDP on China in the world</td>
<td>214 thousand (project for 1.6 million)</td>
<td>2011-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>International Development Support Project</td>
<td>8.3 million (project for 16 million)</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Nigeria and Cambodia</td>
<td>AgriTT</td>
<td>7.8 million (project for 15 million)</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal)</td>
<td>Disaster management (natural disasters)</td>
<td>3.4 million (project for 9 million)</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, for instance Tanzania</td>
<td>Global Health Programme</td>
<td>9.9 million (project for 20 million)</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Scoping study: Working in partnership with researchers from Africa, China and the UK to deliver agricultural innovation in Africa</td>
<td>495 thousand</td>
<td>2014-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker
The cooperation with China is impressive, especially compared to the limited engagement of the two other traditional donors. That said, the UK’s engagement with Brazil is also far from negligible. In total, the UK spent USD 35.2 million on trilateral projects in the last ten years. The cooperation with Brazil did not begin as early as co-operation with China. An initial South-South learning programme started in 2008 to enhance the knowledge of Brazilian expertise in the area of social protection. The programme lasted from 2008 until 2011 and received a rather modest USD 212 thousand. Another project was financed through the World Bank with USD 312 thousand and aimed at improving the Africa-Brazil agricultural innovation marketplace. An even smaller amount of USD 70 thousand was disbursed for a project to work with Brazil as an emerging economy on global development. The first considerable amount of USD 2.5 million was allocated through the Global Development Partnership Programme where initial shared agendas were identified to promote trilateral projects with Brazil. The project started in 2009.

Cooperation was envisioned among other countries in Kenya. This initial project eventually led to the much bigger programme of Building Brazil’s development impact in low income countries that kicked off in 2012 and is an ongoing initiative (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012a, 2014a). Many research projects and concrete trilateral projects, such as the social development and poverty reduction project under the UK-Brazil partnership for national social development or the project between Brazil and Africa to work together to reduce poverty and promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. These include various recipients, such as Uganda (social protection), Pakistan (education) and Southern Africa (health). Other recipients include Gambia, Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia. This ambitious undertaking is funded with a further USD planned USD 9.9 million of which USD 4.8 million have already been spent, and it was enhanced in 2012, a year after Brazil and the UK signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2011 to increase their trilateral partnerships. Very similar to the cooperation with China, this memorandum was the starting point for many big trilateral projects. One of those is the same that was used for China, the programme that attempts to draw development lessons from successful emerging economies for low income countries (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2015d). Within this project, Brazil receives a much higher share than China, with USD 1.6 million. It aims to identify further interesting areas in which the UK can support Brazil in its development efforts. Another ongoing project similarly aims at enhancing Brazil’s global and regional engagement (for instance in the BRICS meetings or the G20) with a total of USD 2.6 million. Many of these resources are disbursed directly to Oxfam, a British NGO. Another, smaller project consists of the funding of the African Day round table which happened in 2013 and cost USD 12 thousand. Similarly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office spent USD 19 thousand in 2014 to create the innovation dialogue to foster cooperation with Brazil in development relations.

By far the biggest example of British trilateral cooperation with Brazil is one that works on climate-smart agriculture, called Africa-Brazil Partnership on climate-smart agriculture and food security. This also began in 2012 and was earmarked with a total of USD 22 million (which makes it the biggest trilateral project of the UK overall) of which slightly more than half (USD 11.3 million) has been spent. Many ventures are planned through this initiative; one of them continues the 2009 project on Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, another aims to increase food security in Africa, especially in Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Togo (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012b, 2014b).
While the narrative surrounding trilateral projects with China and Brazil suggested that many projects were planned, the narrative surrounding trilateral cooperation with India and South Africa was much more restrained. The only initiative that was mentioned for engaging South Africa in trilateral cooperation was the Research into Use programme. Nevertheless, several other projects could be found in the statistics that might have a similar spill-over effect for the same reason as the one envisioned by Research into Use.

As such, the UK funded a project to strengthen South Africa’s response to HIV/AIDS with a considerable amount of USD 82.5 million from 2003 until 2010. Most of the project almost certainly went directly to South Africa and it is therefore difficult to count this project as a trilateral initiative. Similarly, a project called Strengthening South Africa’s Revitalised Response to AIDS
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*and Health* started in 2009 and is ongoing with a total of USD 52.5 million planned for the project. But again, most resources will stay within South Africa’s national borders.

The *Research into Use* project began in 2006 and lasted until 2012 with a total of USD 66.2 million spent over the years (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2013c). The project intended to increase research on renewable natural resources and to communicate the results of research to the poorest people. While the overall assessment of the project is positive, it remains unclear how much of the 66.2 million has been used to fund research in or for South Africa and to what extent this money has been used for trilateral projects.

There are two projects that can be unambiguously described as trilateral projects between the UK and South Africa. The first one is the *South African Partnership on Global Economic Governance* where the UK supports South Africa’s participation in G20 discussions and in other multilateral conferences discussing development cooperation, expressly stating that the intent is to share South African experiences. A total of USD 1.9 million has been disbursed for that programme since 2012 (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2012f, 2015h). Similarly, the UK finances the *South African Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* since 2012 and has spent USD 5.9 million on this (Development Tracker 2012e, 2013d). While the amount of money spent on trilateral projects that include South Africa is more limited than the contributions to China or Brazil, the cooperation has steadily increased and the UK remains actively involved in attempting to shape South Africa’s development cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Target area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largely only to South Africa itself</td>
<td>Strengthen South Africa’s response to HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>(82.5 million)</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research facilities all over the world</td>
<td>Research into Use</td>
<td>(66.2 million)</td>
<td>2006-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largely only to South Africa itself</td>
<td>Strengthening South Africa’s revitalized response to AIDS and health</td>
<td>(52.5 million)</td>
<td>2009-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Partnership on Global Economic Governance</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation</td>
<td>5.9 million</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker

The narrative regarding India was even more restrained than that with South Africa, potentially because of the charged historical relationship between India and the UK. What is striking when looking at the statistics between the UK and India is that there are no early initiatives of engaging in trilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, there are several big initiatives put in place since 2010, which amounts to an astonishing total of USD 43.5 million spent on projects that involve Indian
development cooperation. Many of the projects are not, however, trilateral projects in a strict sense.

The first project is the TERI Partnership Africa Component that was located within the India Partnership Framework. A total of USD 13.9 million has been disbursed for TERI in 2010 (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2011). The initiative aimed at facilitating clean energy access and improved policies of sustainable development. Of that amount, USD 1.5 million comes from the account for Global Development Partnership Programme for activities in Africa and can therefore be counted as a trilateral project. The narrative indicated that most trilateral initiatives were attempted in the field of research. The UK India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI) is the most prominent result of that exchange. Throughout the years, a total of USD 10.2 million has been disbursed in 2013 and 2014 even though the initiative is ongoing for much longer (for further information on the project, see DFID 2014h). Another project in the area of research is the Global Research Partnership which received USD 905 thousand of a total budget of USD 8.2 million. The project started in 2012 and is ongoing. It largely aims at increasing research projects between India, the UK and other developing countries (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2014c). The Knowledge Partnership Programme also began in 2012 and USD 11.8 million of the planned USD 14.8 million has already been disbursed. The project aims at strengthening development policies, programmes and practices in developing countries through the generation and dissemination of knowledge using Indian expertise. Several areas of cooperation are envisioned, such as climate change, food security and resource scarcity; growth and trade; health and disease control as well as women and girls (for further information on the project, see Development Tracker 2013a, 2014e). The most recent initiative in the field of research is the INVENT programme (Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development) which aims at supporting technological and business innovations for the benefit of the poor in India, as well as in Africa and South Asia. A high share of the funds (a total of USD 8.9 million) of overall planned USD 57.2 million is devoted to technical assistance to support knowledge-sharing between India and developing countries. A further USD 2.6 million is planned for the replication of proven Indian innovations to developing countries. In total for the whole project, USD 6.7 million has been spent, of which approximately a fifth can be attributed to trilateral projects (therefore USD 1.3 in the table) (for further information, see Development Tracker 2014d).

There is another British-funded project that aims to enhance the relationship between India and Africa – this supports Indian trade and investments for Africa, and it has thus far received USD 11.3 million of a planned USD 31.3 million. The project kicked off in 2013 and is ongoing. Nevertheless, it largely aims at facilitating African exports to India and can therefore not be counted as a trilateral project in development cooperation (for further information, see Development Tracker 2015i). If we calculate the total that has been spent on proven trilateral projects, it amounts to a considerable amount of USD 25.7 million which is much higher than what is spent on trilateral projects with South Africa.
Table 7-9: Trilateral projects between the UK and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Target area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>DFID TERI Partnership Africa Component</td>
<td>1.5 million (total 13.9 million)</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>UKIERI (UK India Education and Research Initiative)</td>
<td>10.2 million</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Global Research Partnership programme</td>
<td>905 thousand (project for 8.2 million)</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Knowledge Partnership Programme</td>
<td>11.8 million (project for 14.8 million)</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development (INVENT)</td>
<td>1.3 million (project for 12.5 million)</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa</td>
<td>(11.3 million; Project for 31.3 million)</td>
<td>2013-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker

Next to the impressive cooperation in trilateral projects with all emerging donors, the UK is also committed to strengthening their multilateral power potential. One initiative intends to facilitate access to high quality health commodities, such as vaccines and HIV/AIDS medicines, and cooperates with China, India and South Africa, as the “key emerging power suppliers” (Development Tracker 2012c, 5). Since 2011, a total of USD 67.5 million has been spent on the ongoing project, which has a total budget of approximately USD 95 million. This projects largely funds research with the aim of making health commodities cheaper to the benefit of the three countries themselves but also with the intention of transferring these cheaper commodities to other developing countries. The highest share of funds is attributed to India’s contribution. As recipient countries, Uganda has been identified (for further information, see Development Tracker 2013b). A second interesting multilateral initiative that the UK supports is the GROW campaign, which is undertaken by Oxfam, a British NGO. The initiative aims at improving agricultural activity worldwide and to prevent land grabs and minimise negative consequences resulting from climate change. Since 2011, the UK has financed the GROW campaign in Brazil, South Africa and India with a total of USD 1.9 million. All of these campaigns aim at fostering the potential of emerging donors in enhancing agricultural productivity in third recipient states (for further information, see Development Tracker 2015e).

148 Note that since 2015, all funds are disbursed through Human Development Department rather than through the country departments which makes it much harder to identify trilateral projects in this.
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Table 7-10: Trilateral projects between the UK and multiple donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third partner country</th>
<th>Target area</th>
<th>Amount spent (in USD)</th>
<th>Years of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India, South Africa, Brazil</td>
<td>GROW Campaign of Oxfam, enhancing agricultural productivity</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>2011-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, South Africa &amp; China</td>
<td>Market-Shaping for Access to Safe, Effective and Affordable Health Commodities</td>
<td>(57.5 million) (project plans with 94.5 million)</td>
<td>2012-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on data found on UK development tracker

Overall, the UK puts an impressive amount of resources into collaborating with emerging donors in trilateral projects. Among the three donors observed here, it has the strongest narrative and follows through in the practices of its development cooperation. Their idea – of cooperating from the beginning with all emerging donors in order to “help them” – seems to have fostered a faster change than in the two other countries. The next section compares the results of all three traditional donors regarding trilateral cooperation and elaborates on the theoretical link.

7.4 Concluding remarks: institutional change within trilateral cooperation?

Several general conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, it seems that whenever a bilateral country programme runs out, the incentive for the traditional donor is to initiate trilateral cooperation. Expressed in relation to the total amount of bilateral and multilateral aid, only minor percentages are distributed through trilateral projects. Nevertheless, all three traditional donors spend increasing amounts on this form of cooperation. While this is true in the narrative, there is more ambiguity within the practices concerning the funding of trilateral projects. This difference can be explained through the explanatory variable of this study – ideas. Depending on the weight of the idea for fostering trilateral cooperation or not, the practices invariably follow suit. The following table summarises the amounts spent by the traditional donors on trilateral projects.

Table 7-11: Summarizing trilateral projects of all three traditional donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional donor</th>
<th>Ideas</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Cooperating with like-minded countries Socialise them</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
<td>8.3-9.3 million</td>
<td>10.9 million</td>
<td>4-7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Integrate EDs into multilateral structures</td>
<td>1.7 million</td>
<td>9 million</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Cooperating with all EDs Help them</td>
<td>44.6 million</td>
<td>35.2 million</td>
<td>25.7 million</td>
<td>7.8 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It seems therefore that the most influential and powerful idea that triggered the biggest change in trilateral cooperation is the one of a general willingness to cooperate with all emerging donors and to help them integrate into the system of development assistance. These ideas, which are perhaps most prevalent within the United Kingdom, have not only led to an increasing narrative surrounding the support for concrete trilateral projects, but also to a change within the rules and practices of the development cooperation of the United Kingdom. The UK started to view trilateral cooperation early on as a positive new phenomenon that enabled them to maintain a good relationship with countries where there would no longer be a bilateral aid relationship. What is striking in the case of the United Kingdom is that they engage with all emerging donors in trilateral cooperation irrespective of the potential similarities between democratic emerging donors and themselves. Even more, the strongest collaboration takes place between the UK and China, indicating that the UK sees cooperation with China as more important than potential other projects. The positive perception that the UK generally brought towards emerging donors had an effect on its activities regarding trilateral cooperation.

The second most influential ideas are those present in the narratives of the United States: the cooperation with like-minded countries and the willingness to socialise them to U.S.-American standards has fostered strong, if somewhat belated results in the narratives and has followed through in the rules and practices (even though to a lesser degree than in the case of the United Kingdom). The United States narrative towards trilateral cooperation varied depending on the diverse donors. While it was rather hesitant towards China, it was more positive regarding India, Brazil and South Africa. Nevertheless, the overall amount of aid disbursed in the practices to trilateral cooperation is minimal at best. Especially when compared to overall aid figures of the United States and to the commitment of the United Kingdom, the engagement can only be considered small. Moreover, in the practices, it becomes clear that the United States does not cooperate much with China and that the negative anticipation it has regarding that country’s development cooperation keeps it from engaging fully in trilateral projects. The United State seems to be more willing to engage with like-minded emerging donors that share democratic principles. But even here, cooperation remains rather limited if compared to the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in recent years, the United States seems to have picked up the general trend of collaborating more with all emerging donors – the initial ideas have therefore been adapted through exchanges and dialogues.

Finally, within Norway, the ideas that there is a need to further integrate emerging donors into existing multilateral structures has only led to minor incentives within the narratives and even lower incentives in the layers of rules and practices regarding trilateral cooperation. The narrative and practice illustrate that, while Norway stresses that it finds the idea of trilateral cooperation engaging, its narrative focuses on projects with either countries that are too important to ignore (China), or that have a similar political vision to its own (Brazil). The rules also illustrated that no general policy is formulated within Norway’s aid policies as to how to engage in trilateral cooperation. The practice confirmed the tentative approach of Norway regarding trilateral cooperation. Isolated projects receive funding, especially with Brazil, while China and South Africa only receive very limited amounts for trilateral projects. Generally, the engagement of Norway in trilateral cooperation has remained low and not increased, despite a slightly increasing presence of the topic in the narrative from 2010 onwards. This hesitance can only be explained by the fact that Norway lays the responsibility for integrating emerging donors into existing structures upon multilateral structures rather than upon itself – in contrast to the United States (with
the idea of socialising emerging donors) and the United Kingdom (with the idea to help them integrate).

Theoretically speaking, ideas about emerging donors and their activities have been highly influential for explaining the change within trilateral cooperation. It seems therefore that the hypothesis that change is easier to trigger within a newly established field is confirmed by the findings of this chapter. The hypothesis that change is easier within the layers of narratives than it is on the layers of rules and practices could be further confirmed within the cases of the United States and Norway. Moreover, the mechanisms of displacement could be identified as existing rules (of an aid relationship between the three traditional donors and of all four emerging donors) have been displaced and replaced by new rules and practices that form the framework of trilateral projects.
8 Concluding remarks

This study had three core aims. The first of these was to make a contribution to the general debate about the form of cooperation or conflict between established powers and new power centres. The second aim was theoretical: an attempt to link the contributions of institutionalist and constructivist theoretical prisms and illuminate this relationship regarding (a) the potential explanatory power of ideas and (b) the study of institutional change with the theoretical setting of an institution composed of three layers (narratives, rules and practices). The final aim was to make an empirical contribution to a field that is often speculated about, but rarely concretely investigated: the reaction of traditional donors to the emergence of new donors. This concluding chapter examines the findings of this study in detail and addresses its three aims in reverse order. The last aim (empirical findings) is addressed in the first section. The second – theoretical – aim is addressed in the following section. Finally, the first aim (a contribution to the general debate on cooperation) is addressed in the last section that discusses the lessons learned from this study for further studies on similar topics.

8.1 Summary of the findings of the study

This thesis set itself as a goal to find answers to the following main research question:

How do the three selected traditional donors react towards the increased presence of emerging donors?

This question was further subdivided into four guiding questions:

What are the dominant ideas that exist about emerging donors within the three traditional donors’ aid communities?

Is there, first, a change in their approach towards conditionality? And second, how do they approach trilateral cooperation?

Are there common reactions towards emerging donors from the three selected cases? If so, can they be generalised even further (for other traditional donors); if not, how can these differences be explained?

Can the ideas about emerging donor policies explain potential changes within traditional donors’ aid policies?

In order to answer these questions, chapter 2 established the theoretical hypotheses that guide this study. It first explained how each individual donor policy was conceptualised as an institution, composed of narratives, rules and practices, thereby rendering the study of institutional change more tangible and easier to track. The chapter further argued that the main explanatory variables which trigger institutional change are ideas; that change is more likely to happen on the layers of narratives than on the layers of rules and practices, and that change is likelier to be triggered in a newly established policy field rather than a well-established one. The following chapter gave the reasons for choosing the three traditional donors (through a most-different-case design), the material (primary documents, expert interviews, and aid statistics), as well as the interpretative method (qualitative content analysis with the support of the coding programme MaxQDA). Chapter 4 then introduced the empirical puzzle and briefly presented the
development policies of the four relevant emerging donors and the three cases studied here: the aid institutions of the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom. The chapter illustrated the institutional set-up of the three donors and drew out the differences between their respective aid policies. Finally, chapter 5 to 7 provided the empirical core of this study, addressing the question of what kind of ideas predominate in the three traditional donor countries about emerging donors (chapter 5), and what kind of institutional change took place within the field of conditionality (chapter 6) and trilateral cooperation (chapter 7). The following sections summarise the empirical and theoretical results of this thesis.

8.1.1 Empirical findings: New players – same game?

This thesis examined two policy fields – conditionality and trilateral cooperation – and asked whether institutional change has taken place in these areas because of emerging donors.

Institutional changes within conditionality

The main influential ideas that arguably influenced the change process within conditionality were discussed in chapter 5. All three traditional donors evidently feared that the values underlying their aid might be undermined by the competition of emerging donors. Nevertheless, the degree to which they emphasise this varies immensely, which is decisive for explaining differing reactions within conditionality.

In the case of all three donors, the principle background idea that might slow down change within conditionality (and trilateral cooperation) was a commitment to democracy, which possibly led to a defence of conditional approaches. Moreover, all pursued self-interest through their aid (with commercial and diplomatic goals paramount, though the United States arguably had a stronger focus on security objectives than the other donors). Even more importantly, the fact that all three donors pursue a value-driven development policy proved to be very influential in the layers of narratives and rules of conditionality, as these values were perceived to be under threat by some donors of our group. This was particularly true for the United States, where especially political values are seen to be under threat, mostly by China. Similarly, Norway saw important political values, such as good governance and human rights, threatened by emerging donors. This was less true for the United Kingdom where there was only an urge for more transparent aid policies by all donors involved.

The United States and the United Kingdom emphasised in their statements that there is a need to adapt the policies of emerging donors to their own (or similar) standards. Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of making their aid more results-based (for the UK) and more visible (for the U.S.) – two factors that explained the institutional change within conditionality of those two donors. Finally, Norway saw the sustainable use of natural resources under threat – another element that influenced its decision-making process with respect to conditionality.

Chapter 6 then analysed in detail the reaction of traditional donors within the field of conditionality. Overall, change was most present on the layers of narratives (as the theoretical hypotheses had suggested) and somewhat detectible on the layer of rules, where especially the United States and the United Kingdom advocated an increased selectivity in the choice of their recipients. On the whole, this was implemented for those two donors within the rules (for the
UK within their partnership principles and for the United States in the selective criteria for the MCC). For both donors, more emphasis was put on the criteria of respecting human rights and good governance approaches in their potential recipients. Norway, on the other hand, had a torn attitude towards conditionality because it also emphasised the idea of ownership, which it saw largely in opposition to the more paternalistic concept of conditionality. Nevertheless, Norway showed some support for political conditions (especially those representing its own values, such as human rights and good governance). Within the layer of narratives and rules then, the difference in the reaction can be explained by the ideas attached to emerging donors and especially to conditionality itself.

In the practices, however, there was no implementation of this stronger selectivity of political conditions. Norway, just like the United States and the United Kingdom, disbursed their money widely across the 11 selected countries where the three donors shared an interest with emerging donors. This can only partly be explained with the input of ideas – which would lead us to expect strong differences in the reactions of the three donors – but such change can only be found within the layers of narratives (and partly rules). Within the practices, however, a different rationale needs to be used to explain the increasing ignorance of the narratives that aim for a greater selectivity. Despite the strong narrative, the direct competition with emerging donors in the 11 selected countries seems to have frozen the relations that the donors maintained with the recipients prior to the policy change and money continued to flow whether or not the conditions of selectivity were respected in most cases. Only rarely, then, were conditional approaches truly followed through in practice. Other explanations could be the security or diplomatic rationale behind aid distribution that slow the process of implementing strict conditionality down considerably – especially, it seems, when emerging donors are also present. This is also true for Norway, where the Oil for Development initiative clearly advocated for greater selectivity which in the end was not realised in the practices – in a field where emerging donors are a direct threat to Norwegian interests.
Table 8-1: Summarizing the main empirical findings on conditionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of idea</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreground ideas</strong></td>
<td>Strong perceived threat of political values (especially from China)</td>
<td>Especially political values under threat</td>
<td>Undermining some values (like transparency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to socialise donors to American values</td>
<td>Strong emphasis on ownership</td>
<td>Idea to help them, attempts to socialise emerging donors to British values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to make American aid more visible</td>
<td>Unsustainable use of resources</td>
<td>Need for stronger results-based aid as a result of emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background ideas</strong></td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic, especially security)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; strong selectivity)</td>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; also diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results in the</strong></td>
<td>Strong increase in narrative for a more selective approach</td>
<td>Mixed results in narrative (especially because of the emphasis on ownership)</td>
<td>Increase in narrative for a more selective approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narratives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results in the</strong></td>
<td>Mixed results in practice and rules</td>
<td>Rules and practices: weak response!</td>
<td>Mixed results in practice and rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules and practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation

Within the field of conditionality, then, the explanatory power of ideas comes up against its limits. Some institutional change has taken place within the layers of narratives (and rules for the UK and the USA), but the practices have barely changed at all. This adding of another layer to previously existing rules and practices is well captured with the theoretical mechanism of layering that was at place here (but only on the layers of narratives and rules while practices remained largely untouched). A continued process of layering could lead to a change of all layers if the process continues – which means in practice that if the narratives and rules continue to push for higher selectivity among recipients this might well be implemented in practices – this process is however likely to remain theoretical as we have seen that other explanations are relevant when it comes to the implementation of conditionality.
Chapter 5 elaborated in detail on the main ideas held by the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom about emerging donors in general which could be influential for triggering change in trilateral cooperation. It showed that all three recognise the increasing economic relevance of emerging countries and the relevance of their donor policies. Moreover, all three paid more attention to the activities of China than to the other three emerging donors. Nevertheless, within the individual appraisal of emerging countries, some differences can be divined; the United States focused most of its attention on China and distinguished Chinese activities from those of like-minded countries. Similarly, Norway put most emphasis on Chinese activities in Africa but also recognised Indian efforts, while neglecting South African and Brazilian development cooperation. The United Kingdom similarly acknowledged the bigger importance of China but equally stressed the significance of Brazil’s development cooperation. South Africa and India received less attention. These differences in the focus of attention could explain a varying readiness to engage with some emerging donors in trilateral projects rather than with others.

Moreover, what could be influential for explaining change in the field of trilateral cooperation is the stated willingness to cooperate more closely with emerging donors that the United States and the United Kingdom have both expressed – though to a stronger degree from the latter. Both donors share the foreground idea that they would like to socialise or help emerging donors in order to “improve” their development assistance. Norway, on the other hand, also expressed a desire to cooperate more closely with emerging donors but especially focused on the need to integrate emerging donors better into existing multilateral structures. The same background ideas that we saw in the field of conditionality were in play here, and they could slow down change considerably.

Chapter 7 then addressed the question of whether these ideas really triggered institutional change within the field of trilateral cooperation. All three traditional donors spent increasing amounts on trilateral projects and often trilateral cooperation seemed to replace the cooperation whenever a bilateral aid relationship ran out, indicating that, indeed, institutional change had taken place. The strongest emphasis was put forward within the narratives, where especially the United States and the United Kingdom emphasised their willingness to engage in trilateral projects.

The most influential and powerful idea that triggered the biggest change in trilateral cooperation was the general willingness to cooperate with all emerging donors and to help them integrate into the system of development assistance. These ideas, which are perhaps most prevalent within the United Kingdom, have not only led to an increasing narrative surrounding the support for concrete trilateral projects, but also to a change within the rules and practices of the development cooperation of the United Kingdom. The UK started to view trilateral cooperation early on as a positive new phenomenon that enabled them to maintain a good relationship with countries where there would no longer be a bilateral aid relationship. What was striking in the case of the United Kingdom was that they engaged with all emerging donors in trilateral cooperation, irrespective of the potential similarities between democratic emerging donors and themselves. Even more striking is that the strongest collaboration took place between the UK and China, indicating that the UK saw cooperation with China as more important than potential other projects. The positive perception that the UK generally brought towards emerging donors
had an effect on their activities regarding trilateral cooperation. Interestingly, the emphasis within the chapter on ideas was put upon China’s and Brazil’s aid activities whereas India and South Africa received less attention. A similar picture can be painted of the actual trilateral projects where South Africa receives least funds of all. This further confirms the potential of ideas to trigger change in this newly established field.

The second most influential ideas were those present in the narratives of the United States: the cooperation with like-minded countries and the willingness to socialise them to U.S.-American standards has fostered strong, if somewhat belated results in the narratives, which has generally also been implemented in the rules and practices (even though to a lesser degree than in the case of the United Kingdom). The United States’ narrative towards trilateral cooperation varied depending on the diverse donors. While it was rather hesitant towards China, it was more positive regarding India, Brazil and South Africa – further confirming the importance of ideas about their aid activities for the actual engagement with them. Nevertheless, the overall amount of aid disbursed in the practices to trilateral cooperation is, at best, minimal. Especially when compared to overall aid figures of the United States and to the commitment of the United Kingdom, the engagement can only be considered small. Moreover, in the practices, it becomes clear that the United States does not cooperate much with China and that the negative anticipation it had regarding that country’s development cooperation keeps it from engaging fully in trilateral projects. The United State seemed to be more willing to engage with like-minded emerging donors that share democratic principles. But even here, cooperation remains rather limited if compared to the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in recent years, the United States seemed to have picked up the general trend of collaborating more with all emerging donors – the initial ideas have therefore been adapted through exchanges and dialogues.

Finally, in the Norwegian case, the idea that there is a need to further integrate emerging donors into existing multilateral structures has only led to minor incentives within the narratives and even lower incentives in the layers of rules and practices regarding trilateral cooperation. The narrative and practice illustrate that, while Norway stresses that it finds the idea of trilateral cooperation engaging, its narrative focuses on projects either with countries that are too important to ignore (China), or that have a similar political vision to its own (Brazil). The rules also illustrated that no general policy is formulated within Norwegian aid as to how to engage in trilateral cooperation. The practice confirmed the tentative approach of Norway regarding trilateral cooperation. Isolated projects receive funding, especially with Brazil, while China and South Africa only receive very limited amounts for trilateral projects. Generally, the engagement of Norway in trilateral cooperation has remained very low. This hesitance can only be explained by the fact that Norway laid the responsibility for integrating emerging donors into existing structures upon multilateral structures rather than upon itself – in contrast to the United States (with the idea of socialising emerging donors) and the United Kingdom (with the idea to help them integrate).

In general, all donors engage increasingly in trilateral projects – an institutional change has therefore certainly taken place within the development policies of the traditional donors examined here. Speaking in terms of the change mechanisms introduced by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010a), a process of displacement has occurred: the aid relationship between the traditional donors and emerging donors has ended (existing rules have been displaced), and a new form of cooperation has begun in the form of trilateral projects (new rules have been put in place). The mechanism of displacement therefore nicely illustrates the change process that has
Concluding remarks

taken place while ideas explain most of the empirical findings. The following table summarises
the empirical findings on trilateral cooperation.

Table 8-2: Summarizing the findings on trilateral cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreground ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideas (fostering change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentive to increase cooperation with like-minded countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong need to increase cooperation with emerging donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialising emerging donors to American values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“help them” to improve their development cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic, especially security)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideas (slowing down change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; strong selectivity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives (commercial and diplomatic; also diplomatic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-driven policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(narrative)</td>
<td>Increase in narrative</td>
<td>Smaller increase in narrative</td>
<td>Strong increase in narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rules &amp; practices)</td>
<td>Increasing trend in trilateral cooperation (biggest with India (USD 10.9 million) and Brazil (USD 9.3 million))</td>
<td>Weak response in rules and practices (strongest focus on Brazil (with USD 9 million) and South Africa (USD 4.7 million))</td>
<td>Strong increase in rules and practices (strongest focus on projects with China (with USD 44.6 million) and Brazil (USD 35.2 million))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation

Generally, then, this thesis has shown that all three traditional donors adapt their aid policies in both domains that were studied here, but more so in the newly established field of trilateral cooperation. Ultimately, we are dealing here with new players in a partly different game – where especially the narratives and rules for conditionality increased whereas trilateral cooperation has largely replaced the aid relationship between emerging and traditional donors. What about the theoretical implications of these empirical findings? The next section develops on these.

8.1.2 Theoretical findings: the results of mixing institutionalism with constructivism

The main theoretical questions were twofold: first, can ideas serve as an explanatory variable for institutional change? With respect to the material presented here, this question asks whether
the ideas that traditional donors had about emerging donors can explain the changes within their aid policies. The answer to that question is slightly unsatisfying: yes, they can, but only partly. First of all, a distinction is necessary between the two policy fields. Within the older policy field (conditionality) ideas were particularly helpful to explaining a change within the narratives and rules of the donor institutions, but were much less influential to explaining the change (or rather non-change) for practices. Different – and more interest-based explanations – could be helpful in explaining the inertia in the practices of conditionality. Within the newer policy field, however, ideas could explain most of the change (or lack thereof in the case of Norway) and proved to be a useful explanatory variable. Therefore, future studies should continue to take the explanatory power seriously.

The second aspect that was investigated here was the kind of change that took place within the thematic fields of conditionality (explained in chapter 6) and trilateral cooperation (studied in chapter 7). The theoretical hypotheses claimed that change is more likely to occur in less well-established thematic fields (such as trilateral cooperation) whereas it is less likely to occur in well-established, traditional fields (such as conditionality) as veto players are more active in a field with a long tradition than in one with less history to look back upon. Moreover, the claim was that change begins within the layer of narratives, continues within the layer of rules, but is least likely to occur in the layer of practices. Have these theoretical assumptions been confirmed by this study? These hypotheses were verified through the empirical study and give credit to theories focusing on path-dependent tendencies of long established fields. Moreover, the division of the institution of development cooperation into the layers of narratives, rules and practices has proven to be incredibly useful to understanding the underlying change processes that are otherwise difficult to decipher.

The above summary on the empirical findings has already developed on the usefulness of the mechanisms to illustrate what kind of change takes place: the mechanisms of layering and displacement could clearly be identified and combined with the helpful distinction into three institutional layers – these two theoretical inputs have greatly enriched the understanding of the empirical material and can be recommended for further studies.

8.2 Lessons and contributions of this thesis for future studies

What lessons can be drawn for future studies on similar theoretical or empirical topics? A first question that needs to be addressed is the choice of cases. Did this study undertake too big a task from the beginning – and would it potentially have benefited from focusing on one singular thematic field (conditionality OR trilateral cooperation) or excluding one of the three donors from the empirical observations? Both choices were made deliberately: focusing only on one thematic field would have limited the reach of this study considerably, as both aspects (conditionality and trilateral cooperation) are areas of strong adaptation. Focusing solely on the adaptation of conditionality could have painted too grim a picture for the relationship between the two donor groups – similarly, focusing solely on trilateral cooperation would have indicated a too optimistic outlook on the relationship. Moreover, excluding one of the three donors would have reduced the explanatory power of this thesis: had one simply concentrated on the United States and the United Kingdom, one would have had a nice, dense story of the Anglo-Saxon reaction towards emerging donors – but without the balance of another model of cooperation. Similarly, excluding either the United States or the United Kingdom would have either taken
away any European donor (in the case of the UK) or the largest nominal contributor in development aid, which is to focus on small changes and to ignore the bigger picture. Therefore, the study was conceived the way it is – with the limitations that were mentioned. Future studies might profit from the outline of this work and build possibly on a broader sample: as such, it could be imaginable to include further donor countries to the theoretical framework established here or to add another thematic field (for instance the work of infrastructure development). One should, however, keep in mind that when adding several other cases, one might lose interesting insights into the empirical reality of donor policies. As this study has demonstrated the reaction is individual to the ideas that reign within the particular donor country about emerging donors, but also about the general concept of development cooperation or cooperation more broadly. Moreover, the differences in the reactions of the group of three traditional donors can only be understood when taking national histories, interests and individual political settings into account. Including further countries into the study might have allowed for more generalisations to be made but to the detriment of empirical, detailed knowledge of what traditional donors actually do in reaction to emerging donors – the main purpose of this study.

The third and last aim of this study was to contribute to the academic debate about the (future) relationship between two distinct groups: established and rising powers. This thesis gives an indication of the sheer complexity of the relationship between these two groups in only one particular policy field: development cooperation. While trilateral cooperation could be indicative of a closer cooperation (or at least closer contact) between the two groups, the investigation of conditionality has highlighted remaining differences and strong rivalries. Similarly complex studies should be undertaken to enhance our understanding of the relationship between the South and the North. This case study on the field of development cooperation could be equally conducted in the area of financial cooperation (or competition), climate change policies, security policies, policies towards international institutions, trade relationships – in short in any field of international relations. The potential power shift is indeed a topic that is here to stay in the discipline of international relations. The lessons that can be drawn for future research from this study are manifold:

First, the study has emphasised that, especially when studying the relationship between two distinctive and potentially competing groups in international relations, ideas and perceptions do play a role in explaining policy change. Therefore, even though other factors are also very important and should not be neglected, neither should the factor of ideas.

Second, the study also indicated that it is important to understand a relationship as a two-way street. It would be beneficial for future studies to also take the reaction of emerging countries into consideration, even though this might require a more complex theoretical framework. What could be truly interesting is a study that looks at both reactions simultaneously in order to understand the mutual impact that countries have on each other. Possibly, a little more time could be beneficial in order to truly establish what is a reaction towards traditional donors and what is simply the consolidation of emerging donors’ aid policies – that might indeed be a worthy field for future researchers.

Third, the theoretical framework has allowed us to look at development cooperation through the prism of three distinctive layers. This enterprise was truly beneficial as it uncovered – especially for the field of conditionality – the great inconsistencies that often exist between what is said officially (narratives) and what is actually done (practices). This dichotomy should be kept
in mind when designing future studies so that none of the layers are neglected, as they all offer interesting insights into complex policy processes and their change mechanisms.

Finally, the thesis has shown that the story of the relationship between these two groups of countries will never be easy to tell. Any relationship cannot be summarised under headings such as “good” or “bad”. Most of the time, relations between two countries can probably be characterised as “OK”. What exactly defines this “OK” relationship and whether it has more elements of “good” or of “bad” is the work that political science has set out to do. This study therefore is a contribution towards defining more specifically the character of this “OK” relationship between emerging and traditional forces within the field of development cooperation: whereas the field of conditionality hinted at potential rivalries over influence in recipient countries and specific sectors, the field of trilateral cooperation could indicate a promising exchange of knowledge and ideas about how to accomplish the gigantic task of development.
9 Appendixes

9.1 List of persons mentioned in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Position of relevance</th>
<th>Active years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State for International Development</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applegarth</td>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>U.S CEO of MCC</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth Eide</td>
<td>Espen</td>
<td>Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benn</td>
<td>Hilary</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State for International Development</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blair</td>
<td>Tony</td>
<td>UK Prime Minister</td>
<td>1997-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bondevik</td>
<td>Kjell</td>
<td>Norwegian Prime Minister</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Børge</td>
<td>Brende</td>
<td>Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brill Olcott</td>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>US Associate, Carnegie Endowment for Peace</td>
<td>Since 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>UK Prime Minister</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Browne</td>
<td>Jeremy</td>
<td>UK Minister of State at the Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burns</td>
<td>R. Nicholas</td>
<td>U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>George W.</td>
<td>President of the USA</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>UK Prime Minister</td>
<td>2010-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>Kurth M.</td>
<td>U.S. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christensen</td>
<td>Thomas J.</td>
<td>U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clegg</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>UK Leader of Liberal Party</td>
<td>2010-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Hilary</td>
<td>U.S. Secretary of State</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danilovich</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>U.S. CEO of MCC</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desai Biswal</td>
<td>Nisha</td>
<td>U.S. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position of relevance</td>
<td>Act. years</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fagertun Stenhammer</td>
<td>Anne Margaret</td>
<td>Norwegian State Secretary for International Development</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>Patrick C.</td>
<td>USA Vice President MCC</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fore</td>
<td>Henrietta</td>
<td>USAID Administrator</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortenberry</td>
<td>Jeff</td>
<td>U.S. Vice-Chairman of Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights; US Member of House of Representatives</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahr Støre</td>
<td>Jonas</td>
<td>Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glad Pedersen</td>
<td>Bård</td>
<td>Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2013-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greening</td>
<td>Justine</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State for International Development</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulbrandsen</td>
<td>Håkon Ar-</td>
<td>Norwegian State Secretary to the Ministry of Development</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hague</td>
<td>William</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes</td>
<td>Stephen</td>
<td>President and CEO of the Corporate Council on Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higginbottom</td>
<td>Heather</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>Christopher</td>
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<td>Donald Y. U.S. (Principal Deputy) Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs</td>
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9.2 List of documents consulted

9.2.1 Document for the United States of America

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In total 546

United States Agency for International Development


United States China Economic and Security Review Commission


United States Congress


Appendices


United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (common statements)


United States Government


United States Millennium Challenge Corporation


United States Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights


United States Foreign Affairs Committee


9.2.2 Documents for Norway

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Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs


Appendixes


Appendixes


Appendixes


Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad


Norad


ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/norways-provision-of-budget-support-to-developing-countries---
guidelines.pdf.


9.2.3 Documents for the United Kingdom

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<td>ICAI</td>
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**In total 210**

**British High Commission**


**Department for International Development**


Appendixes


Appendixes


Development Tracker


Foreign and Commonwealth Office


House of Commons


Independent Commission on Aid Impact


UK Government / Prime Minister


### Appendixes

#### 9.3 Coding scheme/ results of coding for three countries

#### 9.3.1 Coding scheme

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<th>Code</th>
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<td><strong>Codes for chapter 6:</strong> Conditionality</td>
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<td>General narrative regarding conditionality/ positive or negative attitude towards conditionality</td>
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<td>General narrative regarding political conditionality</td>
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<td>C eco: Conditionality narrative economic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C HR: Conditionality human rights</td>
<td>Position regarding conditionality in human rights policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C GG: Conditionality good governance</td>
<td>Position regarding conditionality in good governance policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C BS: Conditionality budget support</td>
<td>Position regarding conditionality in budget support policies</td>
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<td>C IMF: Conditionality within IMF and World Bank</td>
<td>Position regarding conditionality within the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>C Debt: Conditionality within debt relief</td>
<td>Position regarding conditionality regarding debt relief (note that this category was abandoned)</td>
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<td>C pract.: Conditionality practices</td>
<td>Evidence for behaviour within the practices of conditionality (note that most evidence for this category was found in the statistics)</td>
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<td>TC pract.: Trilateral cooperation practices</td>
<td>Evidence for trilateral projects in practice (note that most evidence for this category was found in the statistics)</td>
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9.3.2 Search results and resulting coding for the individual donor countries

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9.4 Interview guidelines

Questions regarding the influence of the person

- Can you give us an insight into your position at XY?
- Since when do you work for XY?
- What is the main focus of your work?
- What kind of meetings do you attend? How many? How often?

Standing on conditionality/ efficiency debate?

- What is your opinion on the conditionality of aid?
- Has that opinion changed over the years?
- Since 2005, what progress/ regression have been made in your opinion?
- Should XY advocate for a stronger conditionality?
- What results has conditionality shown?

Standing on triangular cooperation?

- Triangular cooperation seems to be fashionable right now. What is your personal view on the issue?
- Advantages/ disadvantages?
- What do you think is the main goal of triangular cooperation?
- Do you think that triangular cooperation is a success so far?
- What influence do traditional donors maintain?

Perception of new donors

- Can you remember when the issue of the so called emerging donors was first addressed?
- Generally, what is your overall judgement of emerging donors?
- What do you think is the major advantage of emerging donors?
- What are the major risks involved when it comes to emerging donors?
- Do you think their development aid is equal to that of [country of origin]?
  - In quality?
  - In who it addresses?
- What is your reaction to these issues?
- Do they influence the policies of traditional donors? Do you have concrete examples of how emerging donors' development policies influence the policies of your country/ your institution?
Interview conducted on 9 October 2013; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised

[Introduction and explanation of procedure with the interview material] #00:05:18-9#

ME: I think we are ready to start then. First of all, you just said that you worked for [institution] for two years in the field of emerging powers. Maybe you could elaborate on that, what exactly do you do at the [institution] at the moment. You are working for the [specific programme]. #00:05:40-0#

I: Yes. So the [programme] from [institution] covers areas including the G20, the G8, our relationship with OECD donors. The OECD DAC and also with philanthropic foundations. We, about, just over two years ago, that [politician] said that he wanted [institution] to improve its collaboration with what we call emerging powers. And as a result a new team was created within that department to work with emerging powers specifically. So the role of our team is really to coordinate the network of people who are doing the work across the organisation. So, I work very closely with people based in our embassies in Beijing and Brasilia and also teams in Delhi and Pretoria. So I have a coordination role. We also obviously coordinate with other partners as well. Our role is really to make sure we have a coherent policy and towards working with this group of countries because it is quite a new area of work and also to be able to facilitate the sharing of lessons between all of them. Because it is quite a new experiment and it is quite useful for them to be able to learn from each other. #00:07:49-8#

ME: //mhm/ #00:07:50-2#

I: And then we have a role to reporting that to our ministers and aggregating information what is happening in this area. So that is the role of our team. #00:07:58-4#

ME: And you said that this team works since 2011. That it started working then. #00:08:05-8#

I: Yes. If you wanted a sort of reference to what kick-started it, it is the speech of [politician] at [institution] in 2011. And I think it is called something like [title]. That is what initiated the department. #00:08:34-7#

ME: Interesting. So you said also that you have some kind of a coordinating role. Do you also attend meetings with so-called emerging donors? #00:08:46-0#

I: Yes. To some extent. The main face to face contact happens in capitals. But I quite frequently seem to opt that back to my colleagues. When I visited them overseas, I would attend meetings with [institution]. And in addition when there are visitors from South Africa, we go, I can represent the institution here. In addition, there are some countries where we haven’t got a [institution] person and in those countries our team represents [institution] to a large extent. An example for that would be Mexico. #00:09:54-7#

ME: Okay. Very interesting. If you work there since 2011, but maybe still from your personal background, can you remember when the issue of so-called emerging donors was first addressed? When was the very first time that you have heard that term or have heard of their aid effort, increasing aid effort, because it is not new, obviously. #00:10:18-1#

I: The increasing aid of emerging donors. #00:10:22-0#

ME: Yes, exactly, or the term itself "emerging donors." #00:10:21-6#
I: Ahm. I can’t remember the term "emerging donors" used before 2011 but that might have to do with my own reading or my own focus. #00:10:48-4#
ME: Yes, of course. #00:10:47-1#
I: Ahm. But I do know that as an organisation we were very aware of the impact of the larger emerging countries like China quite before that. But we haven’t used the term to my knowledge. And I think the awareness of their impact has been more about private sector investment or parastatal investment. #00:11:16-9#
ME: Okay. #00:11:19-0#
I: Rather than aid. #00:11:26-1#
ME: Ahm. Generally, as you are in contact with the so-called emerging donors, say China, India, South Africa, Brazil. What do you think are the major advantages of these donors in comparison to traditional donors? #00:11:48-1#
I: Ahm. The main… I mean you have to think of advantage for whom. #00:12:02-7#
ME: Exactly. #00:12:00-8#
I: One of the main advantages for us to work with them, from our point of view, is that they have a lot of interesting experiences from their own domestic developments which perhaps we think could be relevant in other contexts. And working with them to share, to identify what those lessons might be and to help transfer them, is, you know, a good thing. There are a lot of hypothetical benefits; I guess that we need to test. Part of the reason why I say it is at an experimental stage is that we need to actually test a bit how valid the assumptions are. #00:13:07-3#
ME: Our assumptions? Our assumptions about their aid effort or? #00:13:12-7#
I: No. Our assumptions about for instance, whether for instance working with the South African revenue service, is a more effective way of helping to improve customs’ reform in other countries in Africa than working with consultancies for instance. #00:13:41-1#
ME: Okay. #00:13:42-6#
I: A direct collaboration between [institution] and revenue custom authorities and African countries. So there are some assumptions about perhaps the experience being more comparable, that they are more sensitive to the stage of development and the context, some of the challenges of the context, which lead us to work with them, but I suppose we haven’t tested all the assumptions. Not yet. #00:14:18-4#
ME: Obviously, the idea of risks or what potential risks could emerge from so-called new donors was mentioned in what you said a little bit. That obviously there are not only advantages, could you elaborate a little bit on the potential risks that you see while working with them? #00:14:48-8#
I: Ahm. So at the level that I have mentioned about their experience, I think the risk is that we assume that what is appropriate in one country or a reform that has happened in one country is immediately transferable to another. Because there are multilayered stages of development. And I think we should not simplify like that. I think that is one thing that we need to test through our experience. That is the risk of delivering during programmes using the experiences of emerging donors. Let me think about other risks. I mean, it would helpful to know if you are looking for risks in particular areas. #00:16:08-2#
ME: No, just generally your idea of what risks could be involved. Maybe if you look at the recipient side of the coin. What potential… Do you see any advantages or risks for their side when it comes to the cooperation between the two groups. #00:16:30-7#
I: I think the... It’s almost become a cliché to say that triangular cooperation is more transactional. And so I think that is a risk in the effectiveness of delivery and burden on countries. Which partners bury the biggest part of that, I don’t know in the triangle. But certainly, it’s a complaint that you hear from some donors. It’s not something that we’ve been particularly concerned about so far. But I think slightly linked to that is the... I think there are multiple objectives in triangular cooperation. The objective of delivering development results which is the primary reason people come together. There are then a series of motivations around understanding how different partners work and getting to know them better. And I think we need to get the balance right between making sure the work is a way of understanding how better to deliver aid programmes and to share experience on that but not, to make sure that deepening the partnership in understanding doesn’t outweigh the development projects you are trying to achieve. So you need to achieve a balance between those things. #00:18:50-3#

ME: And do you think, in the long, triangular cooperation will maybe replace bilateral cooperation? #00:18:58-2#

I: I find that hard to see at the moment. #00:19:09-1#

ME: Maybe you could mention some projects of the [institution] aiming at triangular cooperation? Who are you working with and what kind of projects do you do when you do triangular cooperation? #00:19:22-5#

I: Okay. It varies quite a lot between different countries. Before I go on, can I just check whether you have seen a recent report by ECDPM? #00:19:49-9#

ME: No, I don’t think so. #00:19:56-0#

I: I think it is about two weeks ago and they published a report from the approach of traditional donors to working with emerging donors. #00:20:01-6#

ME: Okay. That is very crucial for my research. #00:20:12-6#

I: Yeah. It would be well worth looking at that. We provided some information to them. So that would be a good place for you to look at. And after this interview I can also send you some other press releases about our work in China and that would give you some tangible examples. #00:20:27-5#

ME: Yes, that would be great. #00:20:32-6#

I: We have a few examples of triangular cooperation. One I mentioned was with South Africa. Working with the South African Revenue Service for a customs reform in the region and we are doing that in collaboration with the World Customs Organisation. And that is so far working in four countries in East and Southern African regions but there are plans possibly to expand that later. Some other examples, I think the most tangible examples come from China and Brazil. Earlier this year we launched a programme of [sector] cooperation, so joints between China and [traditional donor] and [recipient country] and [recipient country] and that would be looking at the context of agriculture in the case of [the recipient countries]. It would be looking at small pilot projects in those sectors and identifying any relevant experience from China that might be helpful there, but also in the context of a wider development project. And also with China and the UNDP we’re working with [recipient country] and [recipient country] in a community based disaster management. Again it is very much a pilot of work but looking at whether Chinese expertise could help develop the community based systems in [recipient countries] particularly after flooding, I think. #00:22:50-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:22:52-7#
I: So those are some of the most tangible ones so far, but both sectors are quite in an early stage. Something a bit bigger is going on with Brazil. We have provided for some time, including before 2011 but at a much lower level, some support for their agricultural and technology institution called EMBRAPA. And since 2011 that project has been scaled up. So it is working with EMBRAPA. You know that agency? #00:23:35-2#

ME: Yes, I do. #00:23:35-2#

I: Also with the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation at the UN in a few areas. First of all, climate risk crops, climate resilience, agricultural productivity and access of smallholding farmers to local markets and then nutrition programmes. So the programme has tried to look at the Brazilian experience in those areas, but then look at the current situation of smallholding farmers and nutrition programmes in a range of African countries. A lot of countries are included in this. It has basically helped improve agricultural resilience, access of local farmers, agricultural reform programmes and nutrition programmes. And it worked with such a range of countries that I can’t list them here. #00:24:51-8#

ME: No, of course not. #00:24:55-3#

I: And in each country, the focus is adapted to the local requirements. #00:25:05-5#

ME: Would you say that there is a division of labour in triangular cooperation between emerging and traditional donors? Or would you say it is really a shared experience working for development. #00:25:24-6#

I: I think at this stage, it is very difficult to generalize about triangular cooperation. I think, looking at the way [traditional donor] approaches it compared to other traditional donors, there are differences and even within what [traditional donor] is doing we work very differently with different countries depending on, you know, the nature of the partnership, the style of the emerging donor and the requirements on the recipient side as well. #00:26:04-#

ME: Could you maybe elaborate on the different styles of emerging donors? What kind of style would you characterise China with or India? #00:26:21-2#

I: Ahm. I think the main characteristic we observed in working with China is the fact that they very much want to start at the pilot phase. And I understand that coming from the way they work domestically as well. To manage their own risks, to start something full-scale and test it out before expanding it. So it’s being quite small pilot projects so far and with the involvement of Chinese experts and some of our experts, the involvement of the [institution] office in recipient countries as well as people from our office in Beijing coming together for quite technical studies worth and exchanging of information. On the other hand, with Brazil, because EMBRAPA is such an established organisation, it’s gone to scale quite quickly. And our participation had been mainly, or my understanding is, that it has been mainly from the Brazilian end, with the occasional participation on the African side, but mainly we were working through intermediary bodies, whether through EMBRAPA or UN agencies. #00:28:27-5#

ME: Very interesting. I think those were my questions on triangular cooperation. I have one more block of questions, concerning generally the efficiency debate and conditionality in particular because it is often claimed that so-called emerging donors do not focus on conditions whereas traditional donors still use conditionality. First of all, what is your opinion on that characterisation? #00:29:06-0#

I: Ahm. I think. Conditionality, again, there is a wide spectrum about conditionality. And it’s in most... Yeah... Whether it is budget support happening, there are some clearer requirements of what’s expected from the recipient. Usually in terms of public financial management. And on
top of that there is the political activity about human rights which - I am not really qualified to
speak about the current phases of our policies on conditionality around budget support. So
while there are some requirements associated with certain aid modalities of traditional donors,
on the other hand it is not the case that... In all cases we should be working to support the
government to do what they want to do. Ahm. So it is not about going against the grain of what
a country’s government wants to achieve. So, the idea is that South-South Cooperation support
is somehow more determined by the priorities of the recipient country government than tradi-
tional donors. And I think that’s overstated. I think both are supporting governments to achieve
what they want to achieve for the people. #00:31:42-2#
ME: And the conditions imposed from outside could actually help the government to push
through something that they probably want themselves maybe? #00:31:48-9#
I: Yes, perhaps. Or it is basically a statement of what, this is what we agreed the money would
be used for in line with your objective. So, it” not as if they are imposed, they are just restating
the agreement that was reached before the provision of money according to the government's
priorities. So, I don’t think there is a large distinction between whether South-South Cooper-
aion or traditional donor assistances are more country-led. #00:32:4#
ME: Interesting. #00:32:44-0#
I: I think it is an observation to say traditional donor approaches have become over time, over
the last twenty or so years more concerned with the policy environment in which aid is provided
because basically through experience of realising that small projects won’t have a large effect if
they are not supported by the right policy environment. #00:33:14-6#
ME: //mhm// And that would in the end obviously increase efficiency in the end. #00:33:19-
9#
I: Yes. #00:33:22-4#
ME: Okay. I think you also mentioned that you work with the OECD DAC and there is the
China-DAC study group and generally do you attend meetings at the DAC as well? Or did you?
#00:33:43-5#
I: I haven’t attended meetings of the DAC-China study group. My colleague in China tends to
go to those. I have been to meetings held by the DAC on triangular cooperation. And they had
two the last twelve months. I also think the DAC’s report on triangular cooperation as they did
last year. Have you seen that? I would say that’s probably the best analysis of the state of trian-
gular cooperation. #00:34:26-5#
ME: Yes, I thought it was quite well done as well. Okay. And what about the UN Development
Cooperation Forum? Is there any cooperation within that forum as it sometimes called to be a
larger forum for cooperation exchanges basically. #00:34:49-9#
I: Yes, we participate in those. But so far it’s not. It’s been more about policy and not so much
a forum for agreeing to practical collaboration. That is my impression again, I don’t represent
my institution on that. #00:35:18-1#
ME: Do you have anything that you thought would come up as questions? And that I have not
asked you? Or a topic generally that you think should have been mentioned? #00:35:32-3#
I: I suppose... Just to say, we’ve been talking quite a lot about aid and triangular cooperation.
And for us, we see that only as one part of the impact that emerging powers will have on devel-
opment. So the other impacts will be the role of their private sectors organisations, including
finance from Southern banks. Also the role that countries play in the multilateral system whether
at the agency level, say a UN agency on the board of that, or at the system level for instance in
discussing what the successors of the MDGs will be. And then there is a wider issue which is beyond, which is about policy coherence of development, around trade policy negotiations and of all the complex international prerogatives. It's not to say that we have identified in all of these cases what the exact role of a traditional donor should be. We want to make sure we don't lose sight of the bigger picture. And just a final thing to say, you've mentioned the OECD and the DCF. For us, we are very keen to support the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation which came out of the Busan agreement. For us, the participation over time, the global participation of emerging donors in that forum is very important. But it obviously has to demonstrate whether it can deliver useful outputs and show that it is a worthwhile enterprise. But for us, that is a very important objective as well. #00:38:32-8#

ME: As is working through multilateral organisation in general. #00:38:34-1#

I: I think partly because we realise that our bilateral and trilateral programmes can only ever do a limited amount so we need to look at working the multilateral system and on global issues. #00:38:50-3#

ME: Do you think that emerging donors will be willing to go that path as well? Or do you feel that there is some resistance from their part? #00:38:58-9#

I: Is your question about working within the multilateral system? #00:39:05-5#

ME: Yes. #00:39:04-6#

I: Ahm. I think my impression is that working multilaterally can be more challenging than bilaterally but there is still opportunity. Within the UN system there are very traditional groupings, like the G77 which countries find it hard to break away from certain issues. Ahm. But both at the technocratic level around aid performances at certain agencies and on particular issues for instance the World Bank has a Trust Fund on South-South knowledge exchange which a number of emerging donors contribute to. So there are opportunities like this to have a dialogue around the multilateral work. #00:40:11-5#

[End of conversation]

9.5.2 Interview VIII

Interview conducted on 26 August 2014; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised

[Introduction and explanation of procedure with the interview material] #00:01:46-4#

ME: Okay, maybe as a first question because I am not that familiar unfortunately with the [anonymised] development setting or with your [institution]. So if you could just give us an insight into what kind of work you are doing or your institution is doing. #00:02:05-4#

I: Okay. The [institution] is a non-governmental organisation and it is membership-based, so //ahm// all our income and all the things we do are based on //ahm// income from our members. It’s a business and employer’s organisation. #00:02:27-3#

ME://mhm// #00:02:28-2#

I: We have around 23000 member companies, most of them are small and medium-sized enterprises but we also have the big ones, like the oil companies and telecommunication and that kind of companies. #00:02:44-4#

ME: So very diverging kind of membership. //mhm// #00:02:50-6#
I: And we do lobbying on behalf of our companies towards the government to ensure that there is a /ahm/ stable and good business environment. #00:02:59-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:03:01-9#

I: We are also part in the tripartite cooperation, meaning the government, the unions, trade unions and the employers. We have this tripartite model /ahm/ in the working life in [anononymised] and we are also involved in the ILO, the labour organisation in Geneva, so we are representing the employers. #00:03:26-1#

ME: //mhm// #00:03:26-1#

I: Then we do, of course, a lot of services to our members, like legal services or training, CSR, occupational safety and health, all these issues that are important for the employers. #00:03:43-4#

ME: Yes. #00:03:43-4#

I: And then in 2002, we entered into an agreement with the agency of development cooperation [anonymised] and /ahm/ then we /ahm/ made an agreement where our company was going to support sister organisations in different development countries. #00:04:04-3#

ME: Okay, sister organisations of your company or of the development cooperation agency? #00:04:08-0#

I: No, of our company. So it’s employers’ and business’ organisations in developing countries. #00:04:16-0#

ME: Okay, that is very interesting. #00:04:19-3#

I: So, we cooperate with some countries in Asia, like China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar and then we cooperate mainly with the employer’s organisation in Africa and with focus on Eastern Africa, like Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Angola. We also had a project in Nigeria before. #00:04:44-9#

ME: Okay. #00:04:45-9#

I: So, what we do in this cooperation, we transfer knowledge about [our] experiences in labour relations. Very many countries are interested in the tripartite set-up. #00:05:04-1#

ME: Yeah, like the model. #00:05:06-8#

I: Right. With the trade unions and the government and how to avoid strikes, how you do negotiate with the trade unions, how you have stable labour relations but they are also interested in, you know, how employers’ organisation can assist its member companies in occupational safety and health, CSR, how you can support your members with legal services /ahm/ etcetera, etcetera. Yeah, how you lobby towards the government, to have good labour laws and stable labour relations and business environment. #00:05:49-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:05:53-0#

I: The development cooperation supports us with financing. #00:05:55-2#

ME: Okay. //mhm// #00:05:56-3#

I: We use our. We have some money that we put into this /ahm/ cooperation ourselves. #00:06:05-8#

ME: Okay. From your members then. #00:06:06-7#

I: Yes, from our members. So, we use experts from our member companies or from the organisation and they will give capacity training or /ahm/ participate in training or conferences in different countries where we cooperate. #00:06:25-5#
ME: //mhm// #00:06:29-5#
I: So, in this cooperation, we - then - we notice that in Africa some seven, eight years ago, the increased presence of the Chinese in these countries. #00:06:40-2#
ME: //mhm// So, seven years ago, you would say, so 2007? #00:06:43-6#
I: Yes, 2006 we started, we signed the agreement in 2007. #00:06:51-5#
ME: Okay, yeah. #00:06:54-0#
I: So, then we signed the agreement, first of all with our sister organisation in China and then with different African employers’ organisations. #00:07:05-0#
ME: //mhm// #00:07:05-9#
I: So, on equal terms with the Chinese, we assist the local African employers’ organisation to get into contact with the Chinese business community. For example, in Uganda. #00:07:20-8#
ME: Yes, okay. That’s very interesting. #00:07:25-3#
I: So, both the Chinese and the CEC and the Chinese business organisations and the different //ahm// companies, Chinese enterprises. #00:07:34-6#
ME: And what is your general perception of their engagement, because you said when you sent me the first email as well, that you were in direct contact with the Chinese counterparts in Africa. What’s your take on the so-called emerging donors even though they have been spending money on development aid for decades as well? #00:07:56-8#
I: Yeah. So the contact is also of a private, it’s not the government, it’s more the private because our sister organisation in China is more or less a private organisation. #00:08:13-8#
ME: I was about to say, how private is it in the context of the Chinese system. #00:08:16-1#
I: I think, it’s/ they describe it as a non-governmental organisation but they get one third from their member companies, maybe one third from the government and one third through other sources. #00:08:34-5#
ME: Okay. #00:08:36-1#
I: But many of their members are state-owned companies. #00:08:47-9#
ME: Yes. And when you talk to them in Africa, do you also engage in cooperation with them? Or? #00:08:56-8# #00:08:58-0#
I: Yes, we have one special project together with the //ahm// CEC China Enterprise Cooperation which is our sister’s organisation in China, they represent the employers in China and they also represent the Chinese employers in the ILO conference. #00:09:14-6#
ME: //mhm// Okay. #00:09:17-2#
I: That’s. You know, all the countries have representatives from the government, the trade unions and employers meeting in ILO //ahm// every year in a big conference where they decide on different conventions and //ahm// concerning labour laws. So CEC would represent the Chinese employers. So, we decided to help the African employers’ organisations and in getting into contact with Chinese companies. #00:09:47-3#
ME: Ah, okay. #00:09:48-2#
I: So, we started. And of course we needed to get in contact with the Chinese embassies, so CEC was like a door opener to get into contact with Chinese embassies. #00:10:01-0#
ME: //mhm// #00:10:01-8#
I: So, physically they opened the door. Then also the Chinese embassies were very interested because they realised that a lot of companies are helpless when it comes to labour relations. #00:10:17-5#
ME: Yes. #00:10:18-6#
I: This is a big struggle. So, on the one hand, we got into contact with the Chinese embassy and in the Chinese embassy there is an economic and commercial faction of the embassy. They are quite independent but they are sort of under the Chinese embassies. #00:10:35-7#
ME: //mhm// #00:10:36-5#
I: So, we cooperate with them. And then we cooperate with. So the Chinese enterprises in the different countries they are organised in either //ahm// the state-owned companies, the big companies. They are organised in business councils, and then you have the smaller and medium-sized and very private Chinese enterprises. They are often organised in different kind of organisations, business organisations. #00:11:09-8#
ME: //mhm// #00:11:09-9#
I: It is a little bit complex because it’s, it’s different from country to country. #00:11:13-6#
ME: Yes, it always is. And with regard to China, I have the feeling that transparency isn’t that great yet. Or it’s difficult to say who is state-owned, who’s not state-owned and what level of independence do they really have. It’s difficult to assess from outside. #00:11:33-5#
I: Yeah, it’s difficult. But you know, the state-owned companies, they are big and they are //ahm// responding to the embassies or the commercial section of the embassy. They have a very close contact. But all the smaller, medium-sized companies, they prefer to be very private and not to interfere too much with the embassy. #00:11:56-9#
ME: That’s interesting. #00:11:56-9#
I: The problem is that the Chinese embassy doesn’t have any control over them. #00:11:59-8#
ME: Okay. #00:12:00-9#
I: Yeah. #00:12:03-3#
ME: So they are completely independent actors? #00:12:06-4#
I: Yeah. And, you know sometimes, they organise, like in Uganda, they have a lot of different organisations. They can organise depending on which province they come from in China. Or in Kenya, they are very, they are better organised, so it’s only two business organisations, one for the smaller, medium-sized and one for the state-owned. #00:12:28-7#
ME: Okay. #00:12:28-7#
I: But in Uganda, you have many different. So, it depends a little bit from country to country. #00:12:34-3#
ME: //mhm// #00:12:36-9#
I: So, in Ethiopia, they establish the business organisation just a year ago. So they are not so organised yet. #00:12:42-5#
ME: //mhm// Okay. #00:12:43-7#
I: And it's very different in Ethiopia. It's. It's very difficult to get to know who they are and //ahm// they are very suspicious in a way. But in Uganda they are very open and, you know, very friendly. It seems like also the Chinese companies get in a way influenced by the country mentality, the African country. #00:13:11-1#

ME: Okay. #00:13:11-1#

I: It's interesting. #00:13:15-6#

ME: So, would you say that generally Ethiopia is more suspicious of your organisation and Uganda less so, or more friendly. And that is why the Chinese also act that way. Or? #00:13:28-3#

I: //ahm///ahm// I would say, like in Uganda we have cooperated with the - our sister organisation for twenty years. #00:13:36-6#

ME: //mhm// #00:13:37-6#

I: And we are very close friends. But with Ethiopia we just started. #00:13:40-7#

ME: Of course, then there is big difference in confidence. #00:13:43-3#

I: And trust and confidence it's key, are key words for this cooperation. You have to build the confidence and build the trust. And the Chinese companies are very suspicious about who are the local //ahm// employers’ organisations, are they really willing to help you. Are they on your side? So they question all these things in the beginning. But once they understand that you are there to help them, then, it's okay. #00:14:18-8#

ME: And you also said that you actually //ahm// make like a bridge between the Chinese companies or the Chinese organisations and the African counterparts? #00:14:30-6#

I: Yes. What we want to do is that we want the Chinese companies to become members of the local African employers’ organisations. #00:14:37-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:14:36-6#

I: So, like in Uganda, they also. They have two kinds of membership, either through the Chinese business organisation or direct members. So, if you are a direct member, you are treated on equal terms as a Ugandan company or a company from my country being a member. And then you can get free legal council from the organisation. For example, the African, the Ugandan employers’ organisation is called Federation of Ugandan employers and //ahm// the head of this organisation, she had helped many Chinese companies in avoiding strikes and labour conflicts. #00:15:16-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:15:17-7#

I: So, then you are into their system into being helped and of being advised upon different labour laws and how you should treat your employees, how you should follow government rules, etcetera, etcetera. #00:15:32-4#

ME: Okay. //mhm//. And do you generally see from the Chinese a willingness to cooperate with you or also with these African counterparts? #00:15:41-9# #00:15:42-5#

I: Yes. Once they know who you are and once they can trust you, they are very much willing to cooperate because they see it’s a big benefit. #00:15:53-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:15:54-5#

I: They admit that there is a lot of problems with understanding labour culture and //ahm// and they see that it’s it’s a great benefit for them to become members. #00:16:07-5#

ME: //mhm// Okay //ahm// #00:16:10-3#
Appendixes I: For example, in Kenya, just a month ago, over one hundred Chinese companies came to a seminar we had on //ahm// security and //ahm// on //ahm// a lot of problems also with the visa, the working permits. So, then we facilitated a meeting with the //ahm// the police and the authorities in Kenya and the Chinese community. #00:16:38-0#

ME: //mhm// #00:16:39-3#

I: So, that you have a direct communication in understanding the government. #00:16:43-1#

ME://mhm// #00:16:44-3#

I: And this is very, very helpful. #00:16:46-2#

ME: Yeah, that sounds very useful. And generally, what would you make out of the Chinese engagement, because there have been lots of debates in academia that there is a difference between traditional engagements, like that of your country or the EU, and that of China, that it’s more business oriented etcetera. Do you see any differences like that on the ground? Or is it in your field of work, is it just rather another actor that joins the group, basically? #00:17:17-2#

I: (.) I mean they are different. Chinese, of course, are different. #00:17:20-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:17:21-6#

I: We visited a lot of different Chinese companies in Eastern Africa and some of the companies are very well organised //ahm//. Just some weeks ago we went to a shoe factory in Ethiopia, they had over 3000 local employees, everything was very clean, very organised, they got good salaries above the //ahm// lowest rate and they had good canteens, they were paid three meals a day, they had free transportations. They were very good factory, very impressive. #00:18:05-4#

ME: //mhm// #00:18:05-4#

I: I think, //ahm// of course, they have another experience when it comes to labour. #00:18:13-9#

ME: Yes. #00:18:17-2#

I: So, we have to understand that they come from a communist background. #00:18:19-3#

ME://mhm// #00:18:20-3#

I: And where they are there are one billion people, I mean, if you are a company in my country and we are used to [relatively small number of] people. And we have another democratic tradition and a very different hierarchy at work. //ahm// Different relations between, //ahm// to our bosses //ahm// And if you are a small company coming from a province in the Western region in China and you have never been out of your country and you come to Ethiopia, you open up a factory and you employ twenty local employees. Of course, there will be challenges. So, there is a big difference. #00:19:04-3#

ME: //mhm// Yes, of course. #00:19:04-3#

I: We have seen a very big difference between the big professional international companies and the smaller companies that don’t have this experience. And they want, you know, they want people. Especially, they want people to work more efficiently. #00:19:22-4#

ME: //mhm// #00:19:23-1#

I: And then, you know, when people don’t come to work. There is a lot of. Many of them have problems with stealing. And, //ahm// you know, labour relations problems [laughs]... #00:19:39-1#

ME: Are generally very difficult to manage. Yeah. #00:19:43-0#
I: When you ask, we asked some people in Ethiopia. And we asked them if if you can choose between working in a European company, Indian company or Chinese company. What would you prefer. So, they said, of course, European company because they treat you better. And then the Chinese company, and then the Indian company.

ME: Okay, that is interesting.

I: But it’s more related to labour relations.

ME: Hmhm. Yeah.

I: But of course, this is if you can choose. Then we have to remember that the Chinese are creating a lot of local jobs.

ME: Hmhm.

I: So, ahm, of course, if you could choose, there is no company [from my country] for shoe factory employing 10000 local employees, you know. So, it’s ahm. There is a lot of problems with labour conflicts, but ahm, they also create jobs. So, I think they need experiences. And they need to understand how it works, and that you. Yeah.

ME: Yeah, to get integrated basically into the African context, I think.

I: Yes.

ME: When you mentioned India, do you have any contact with the Indian labour groups as well? Or?

I: No, we don’t.

ME: Not at all, okay. Hmhm. But you noticed that there is an involvement? Do you notice that, or?

I: The Indians have been there for many years. So they are already members, some of them are members of the employers’ organisations from before.

ME: Hmhm.

I: But these companies, you know, they are often family based companies and they have been there for maybe two hundred years. So, that’s different. They are already integrated in the local community. At the same time, in some countries they stick to the Indian, ahm, kind of group. But still they are more integrated. The Chinese are very new.

ME: Yes.

I: So, it’s different.

ME: And, just one question, why is it that your institution focusses on Eastern African countries? Does that have a historical reason, or?

I: We we wanted to ahm, to see the kind of synergy with what we do. ahm. With this project supported by our development cooperation agency and our member companies investing in Africa.

ME: Hmhm.

I: So, of course, we wanted to be in those countries where also there are some companies of my country. And officially, [my country] has had a lot of contact through the missionaries, you know, in Eastern Africa.

ME: Okay.

I: And because of the language, so you know, West Africa is with the French, so that’s not really close to us.
ME: Yes. #00:22:40-7#

I: But of course, Angola and Nigeria where the oil is also important countries. #00:22:47-9#

ME: But you stopped cooperating with Nigeria, you said? #00:22:52-8#

I: We did, we did, yeah. We have stopped the project. It came to an end. But it was very successful. #00:23:00-2#

ME: Interesting. Quite generally, you said a big advantage of China, also as a so-called emerging donor getting involved in Africa, is that there is an explosion of jobs //ahm/ for the locals. Do you see any risks as well related to your work? #00:23:19-3#

I: (.) You mean companies of my country? Or our? #00:23:23-5#

ME: Yes. #00:23:24-8#

I: Yes, of course. Some companies have already lost a lot of contracts. I, we spoke to one company that was building roads and infrastructure. #00:23:35-9#

ME: //mhmm// #00:23:36-6#

I: They had a lot of work until 2010, after that nothing. They lost all the bidding. #00:23:44-8#

ME: //mhmm// #00:23:45-7#

I: So, of course some of the companies, they can’t compete with the Chinese companies, while other companies, yes, they can do. #00:23:56-1#

ME: Okay. #00:23:57-1#

I: Like, of course the oil companies is in a very different group and we have a lot of oil companies and also sub-contractors for the oil industry. They are still competitive. //ahm// But, in some sectors, especially in the infrastructure sector, [companies from my country] can no longer compete. #00:24:22-6#

ME: And is that something where you say, maybe there should be more funding for companies from your country when they engage in Africa because it is important projects or it is important work. Or do you think, oh well, that’s competition and your companies now no longer have the best price maybe? #00:24:40-1#

I: I think, you need competition. #00:24:43-4#

ME: //ahm// #00:24:43-4#

I: I mean the African country should get the cheapest project of course. I mean, you shouldn’t tie the aid, or tying the //ahm// investment projects, I think that’s wrong. It should be open market. But I think it’s very important that it is an equal market. And that it is an equal level playing field for all the businesses. So of course, if Chinese companies have a lot of government funding, and the rest of the international companies are on completely commercial basis, then it will not be an equal level playing field. #00:25:28-8#

ME: //mhmm// #00:25:29-4#

I: So, I think it’s important that the African companies also realise that it’s important with that there is equal terms. And some of the Chinese companies of course, you know, they build things for free and then they get maybe an advantage of the next bidding. So, I think there are... I think the transparency is very important. #00:25:55-1#

ME: Yes. #00:25:55-9#
I: So, transparency and //ahm// equal terms and level playing field for business, it’s important. I don’t think our companies need any government money or aid money. It should be on commercial competitive ground. But, of course, there is some very difficult countries, difficult markets, and poor countries, you maybe need some funds for the first feasibility study or the first phase of the investment. #00:26:30-1#

ME: Can you give us an example of such a country where you think maybe some initial help would be needed? #00:26:39-2#

I: For example, South Sudan. #00:26:39-3#

ME: Yes. #00:26:41-1#

I: Could be one country where you need some special condition. #00:26:43-8#

ME: Yeah. #00:26:46-0#

I: In Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, no. #00:26:47-9#

ME: //mhm// Okay, very interesting. //ahm// And you also participated in the DAC-China group, I saw your name on that list. Can you maybe give us a short insight into what was discussed at that - if you can remember, I think it was in 2010 or so? #00:27:15-3#

I: Yes, some years ago. We studied how China had been fighting poverty and if that model could be used in Africa. Or if that model is interesting, not to copy, but to study for Africa. #00:27:30-8#

ME: Okay. #00:27:31-9#

I: So, we conducted five conferences and for each conference we had a special topic. If I remember correctly, it was infrastructure, agriculture, //ahm// and one for business cooperation which I took part in or organised, and I think the first one was how to cooperate with, let’s see .), I can’t remember the first one but I can find the papers if you are //ahm// interested. #00:28:10-6#

ME: That would be very interesting for me because it is difficult to access some. #00:28:14-6#

I: And the last one was the more the summing up of //ahm// the (.). And then we started, we had some //ahm// Chinese researchers, some Africans, we were represented by different donor countries. #00:28:39-9#

ME: Yes. #00:28:39-9#

I: It was very interesting and and //ahm// we studied how did China fight poverty through the agricultural reforms in the 1970s. #00:28:49-4#

ME: Yes. #00:28:50-8#

I: And then how they opened up for business and then how the small and medium-sized companies were encouraged, how they were having access to financing, to technology transfer and also how China used Japan’s investment in infrastructure. And the model this cooperation //ahm// was done in the 1970s and 1980s is the same way as China is using in Africa today. #00:29:22-5#

ME: Yes, exactly. So the purpose of the study was also to see whether this is a valid approach or. #00:29:33-8# #00:29:33-8#

I: Yeah. #00:29:33-8#

ME: Very interesting. //ahm// And maybe generally, you said that the Chinese are eager to join these African corporations in order to get more insights into the African labour structures and so on, they are also eager to cooperate with you. Do you think, generally, //ahm// we
talked also about the maybe imbalance regarding the Chinese still funding their companies strongly whereas others don’t get money from states. Do you think there will be, China will rather convert to, I call it, Western model, maybe? Or do you think they will continue to do their own policies? #00:30:11-3#

I: I think the smaller medium-sized Chinese companies, they don’t get any funding from the government, they are there on commercial terms. #00:30:22-3#

ME: //mhm// #00:30:23-0#

I: And many of them are there. Also, like this shoe factory we visited with 3000 employees, they didn’t get any government funding. But of course, if you are building the AU building in Addis #00:30:38-5#

ME: Yes. #00:30:39-5#

I: This is government money. So, //ahm// I think //ahm// the Chinese will also get more and more on the commercial side. Yeah, I think so. (.) It’s difficult to say, I mean. #00:30:59-2#

ME: Obviously. It was just to get a general impression whether it is rather going in that way or if you have the feeling that they are further isolating themselves. But from what you said it didn’t seem that way. #00:31:13-7#

I: I don’t think so. I think you will get more and more private companies coming because there are so many good opportunities and if China is glowing down a little bit, I think you will find more of these medium-sized companies investing in Africa on commercial terms. #00:31:31-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:31:32-4#

I: But, once you know, once you have a family member there or you have some contact, they are, you know, very dependent on each other, so if one is making good money in Ethiopia in producing shoes, soon you will have more people coming. #00:31:48-0#

ME: Yes, of course that is always the story. It’s the same for us or our companies. #00:31:53-4#

I: Yeah. So, I think there are many, and they are very good entrepreneurs. It’s like when we studied the OECD DAC group, the entrepreneurial spirit of China was very instrumental in the fighting of poverty. So of course, the Chinese are very very good entrepreneurs. #00:32:18-5#

ME: Yes. #00:32:19-8#

I: This is of course helping them. #00:32:23-1#

ME: And might also be helpful or insightful for African companies. #00:32:26-7#

I: Yeah, very much. And I think many of them feel that they can handle the level they come to. You know if a company from my country comes to South Sudan or to Angola, no, to Uganda, maybe they will feel a little bit lost because it is on another level in many ways. #00:32:47-3#

ME: Yes. #00:32:47-3#

I: Even if you have very, you know, a lot of good things and a number of high educated people, but still the Chinese they match more or less the same level. #00:32:58-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:32:59-4#

I: //ahm// Don’t misunderstand. But I think it’s easier for them in many ways to settle there than it’s for somebody used cold temperatures in winter and everything is very clean, you know? #00:33:18-5#
ME: Yes, obviously it is a different background simply. If you also come from a country that did develop itself or that has gone through that process recently and that still lives in poverty for big parts of it, //ahm// you have obviously more facility to adapt. #00:33:36-7#

I: Of course, yeah. And I think they welcome the Chinese in a certain way. Even if there are a lot of questions about how they work and how they manage people. They have a trust that they are doing a good job. And even, you know, I was there when Obama was launching the new //ahm// the new funds for Africa, new investments, so we asked them, So this is good, you know, what do you think about now the Americans will come, and they were there: No, we don’t trust them, they take so long time and it will, you know. But when the Chinese say they will do it, they do it. #00:34:19-5#

ME: Yes. #00:34:20-5#

I: And then they come and in one week you have a new highway. You know, instead of Americans, it would take years. #00:34:27-8#

ME: Yeah, I have heard that from several people, that it is simply faster. #00:34:34-3#

I: I mean it’s true that it takes longer time when you need to prepare and you need to do a lot of feasibilities and things, but the Chinese, they do it. #00:34:46-1#

ME: Yes, hands-on approach definitely. //ahm// I think I have already taken more than half an hour and I promised that I would be rather short. Is there something that I have completely left out and that you thought would come up in that interview? #00:35:01-9#

I: //ahm// No, I can’t think of anything just now. //ahm// I can send you the old paper from the OECD DAC, I can send them to you. #00:35:19-4#

ME: That would be absolutely brilliant if you could do that as they are not all available online, so it’s quite difficult to get access to them. #00:35:25-1#

I: At least there was a main lesson from the last. #00:35:29-8#

ME: Yes, that would be brilliant if you could send me that. That would be very good. One further questions, [question about further contacts]. And I thank you very very much for your time and your interesting insights. #00:36:24-9#

[End of conversation]
Appendixes

9.5.3 Interview IX

Interview conducted on 9 October 2014; ME: Interviewer; I: Interviewed; Text in brackets: anonymised

Introductions #00:01:03-3#

ME: Then maybe if you could start by telling me what exactly it is you do within [donor institution] so that I have an overview of the activities that you do in your job. #00:01:17-3#

I: Okay, //ahm// I am //ahm// working in the sections for economic development, gender and governance. That is the name of the department. Within that there is a section called private sector development. #00:01:38-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:01:39-3#

I: And I work in there. #00:01:39-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:01:40-4#

I: And my, //ahm// what we are doing is that we are administrating certain application-based schemes for support for private sector development. #00:01:53-1#

ME: //mhm// #00:01:54-1#

I: //ahm// And my duty is to //ahm// //ahm// make sure those //ahm// projects we embark on are //ahm// you know, are of most //ahm// good quality. #00:02:10-3#

ME: Okay, so quality assessment of the project. //mhm// #00:02:16-5#

I: Yeah. Project assessment of whatever projects we embark on. #00:02:20-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:02:22-0#

I: And what else do I do? I support basically the //ahm// the various people working in the section, or mostly doing the //ahm// work. And //ahm// I also assist in, you know, various processes in the house with respect to all kinds of issues with, related to, how we should perform better, how we should learn from our experiences. #00:02:51-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:02:52-2#

I: And mistakes. And, you know, try to //ahm// assist as best as I can to ensure that we are, use the funds efficiently. For the ones we engage in with respect to development assistance, but also that we also are efficient in our use of resources when assessing projects and programmes. #00:03:18-1#

ME: //mhm// So all in the, in the name of aid efficiency generally? #00:03:24-4#

I: You can say so. You know there is a more and more //ahm// requirements of development assistance that it shall comply with all kind of //ahm// cross-cutting issues and have safeguards. So it’s actually in many ways getting //ahm// more complex than it used to be. #00:03:48-3#

ME: //mhm// #00:03:48-8#

I: So there are more considerations to take into account. #00:03:49-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:03:50-2#

I: //ahm// And therefore I also need to be //ahm// to make sure I am compliant with other //ahm// issues which are handled by other departments within the [donor institution] that depends on the size of the application in question. #00:04:11-9#

ME: //mhm// What other departments are you talking about or where do you have the most //ahm// issues when it comes to compliance of projects? #00:04:21-8#
I: Well, there are other departments here which are specialised in energy and climate and for instance in gender and //ahm// energy and climate is the priority for [country’s] development assistance. #00:04:39-7#
ME: Yes. #00:04:39-7#
I: So we are trying to //ahm// you know, in many ways //ahm// have //ahm// kind of a //ahm// compliance with what they are thinking with respect to at least environment. #00:04:55-1#
ME: //mhm// #00:04:55-3#
I: And if it so happens that we have projects which are energy related we would ask for assistance in assessing those projects. #00:05:05-4#
ME: //mhm// #00:05:07-3#
I: Yeah, you know, we are prone to receive applications from all sectors. #00:05:11-5#
ME: Okay. #00:05:12-5#
I: So that’s only should there be applications which are related to climate or energy, then I would also ask them. Or if there is, you know, a particular dimension of //ahm// of //ahm// gender or human rights or any of the other ones, other cross-cutting issue then we have to take into account, then I will ask from advice from elsewhere. #00:05:35-9#
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course, yeah. And you are largely, or your section is largely approached by the private sector or do you also approach the private sector yourselves? #00:05:47-2#
I: No, we are application-based which means people have to approach us, so companies approach us. #00:05:53-6#
ME: //mhm// #00:05:54-6#
I: We also engage with //ahm// institutional cooperation #00:06:00-2#
ME: //mhm// #00:06:01-0#
I: Or, you know, capacity building. #00:06:03-3#
ME: //mhm// #00:06:03-9#
I: And //ahm// although that’s also application-based, there might be instance where we also kind of //ahm// basically //ahm// assist in finding //ahm// institutional cooperation programmes. #00:06:22-9#
ME: //mhm// And //ahm// do you have these contacts with [country’s] private sector or with //ahm// the private sector of recipient countries? #00:06:34-5#
I: //ahm// #00:06:35-4#
ME: Or both? #00:06:36-6#
I: Our schemes are untied. So anybody can actually apply. #00:06:40-4#
ME: Okay. #00:06:41-3#
I: From wherever. But you know, we, we, in practice it is mostly [country’s] companies which apply. With respect to capacity building or institutional cooperation we might use [country’s] as well as we might use //ahm// international or national institutions. #00:07:04-7#
ME: Okay. #00:07:06-0#
I: Multilateral or whatever, but there is no real preference for any particular nationality. #00:07:12-0#
ME: //mhm//. Okay. And, as you know, my project asks the question whether //ahm// the emergence of so-called new donors, which aren’t new of course, like China and India, does have any implications //ahm// for the work that more traditional donors like [country] are doing in development cooperation. And regarding to this, do you have any, in your field of work, did you have any //ahm// contact with Chinese or Indian or Brazilian //ahm// donor capacities or //ahm// do you largely approach them as potential partners in development cooperation? #00:07:56-6#

I: Yeah, well. We don’t have, we are not in much contact with them. #00:08:02-3#

ME: //mhm// #00:08:03-2#

I: You know, in our section. But we are not in any way, not wanting to have any cooperation with them. #00:08:12-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:08:13-3#

I: So, we don’t mind cooperating with them, but I think it’s //ahm// hasn’t been a natural thing for us to do so far. #00:08:19-6#

ME: //mhm// #00:08:20-3#

I: It hasn’t kind of, you know, the setting where this seems to be appropriate. So, //ahm//, we continue, you know, with our approach as we have done before. We are of course aware of their //ahm//, you know, entrance or their presence on, you know, where we operate, but //ahm// we don’t have any kind of //ahm// //ahm//, you know, declared aim of doing this or that basically with respect to any way we shall look upon or handle their presence in, yeah. #00:09:03-4#

ME: //mhm//. Can you recall when was the first time that the issue or simply the topic of //ahm// emerging donors appeared in the discussions in your department, in your section. Generally, where was, when was it that this topic actually //ahm// was discussed? Or was it always discussed? #00:09:27-4#

I: I couldn’t remember exactly when. #00:09:27-1#

ME: //mhm// #00:09:28-6#

I: It became apparent that //ahm// I guess, especially the Chinese were active in //ahm// various countries as they do in Africa. And of course, we were aware and became aware of their way of doing things. And and, you know, at the beginning it was, might have been felt as unorthodox or a bit of a stretch, in a sense that they have this kind of non-interference kind of approach. #00:10:01-4#

ME: Yes. #00:10:01-6#

I: But, you know, as of today, I think that, many also look upon it as being refreshing. #00:10:07-3#

ME: //mhm// #00:10:07-8#

I: In a sense that they have an approach which //ahm//, you know, which makes us having to think //ahm// maybe twice on what we are doing. But //ahm// it is my impression that, you know, //ahm// there hasn’t been much of an impact on us as to what they are doing. We are not any less prudent in our approach than we used to be. #00:10:34-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:10:34-9#

I: We are as right-based //ahm// as we used to be, if not more. #00:10:37-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:10:38-4#
I: //ahm// So, so //ahm//, I feel that //ahm// we respect their presence and and //ahm// but we don’t necessarily //ahm//, you know, have the same //ahm// approach. #00:10:51-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:10:51-8#

I: And and so far, as far as I know, it hasn’t really presented us with within the particularly //ahm// conflict of interests or any issues basically. #00:10:59-1#

ME: //mhm// So, both approaches, if you want, coexist more or less? #00:11:07-6#

I: You know, it might be that we are operating in different areas of //ahm// development assistance. You know, they are pretty much into infrastructure, I think, and we are not particularly into infrastructure. #00:11:17-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:11:18-0#

I: Well, we are, but not as much as they are, you know. We are, you know, much more into softer sectors but I don’t know really, I haven’t personally had the challenge or experience of //ahm// having to sit down and scratch my head and try to find out where this is, how to perceive their presence. #00:11:42-8#

ME: //mhm// Yes. #00:11:42-8#

I: You know, I haven’t //ahm//. That hasn’t had any implications in my work. #00:11:48-7#

ME: //mhm// Okay. //ahm// You said that [country] follows a right-based approach maybe even more right-based approach. Can you a little bit develop on that? What exactly do you mean by rights-based approach? #00:12:04-7#

I: I mean that there are more and more considerations which we have to take into account, you know. We are having those cross-cutting themes like //ahm// gender, gender balance, gender equity. We have environmental issues which we want to be present in all our appraisals of projects. #00:12:26-7#

ME: //mhm// #00:12:27-3#

I: We are looking into //ahm//. I can’t recall all of them, but //ahm//, you know, we are preoccupied with the ILO conventions on decent work, we are //ahm// looking into having, a do-no-harm-kind of approach. #00:12:49-0#

ME: //mhm// #00:12:49-5#

I: So, so, our approach hasn’t in my view, experience, hasn’t, has not really changed much //ahm// by the fact that the Chinese or whatever the Brazilians are present //ahm// on our //ahm//, in the same countries as we operate. And those issues haven’t been less prominent now than they used to be. On the contrary, we are even more preoccupied with trying to //ahm// make sure that our projects do no harm, basically and actually follow those best practices and follow those considerations which I just told you about. #00:13:36-3#

ME: //mhm// Do you, do you think that has largely to do with the whole process that was internationally launched as well with the aid effectiveness debate around the Paris Declaration 2005 and all the follow-up meetings and generally a tendency for aid agencies to be very concerned about what kind of impact do their projects really have on the ground. #00:14:03-0#

I: You know, we are more and more into impact, you know. We //ahm// are preoccupied with making sure that //ahm// there is impact which means results and and //ahm//, you know, to justify [country’s] engagement we are expected to bring about results. #00:14:23-5#

ME: Yes. #00:14:24-4#
I: That’s more and more prevalent. //ahm// And expected from us. So, so we are trying to be concerned with the //ahm// looking at it from the development partners’ perspective. //ahm// #00:14:36-8#
ME: //mhm// #00:14:37-4#
I: Trying to make sure what we are doing really is in accordance with their priorities and fitting in their development plan. #00:14:47-9#
ME: //mhm// #00:14:46-3#
I: //ahm//, you know, more or less. You know, sometimes we are good at doing so, sometimes we are less good. But at least there is a more //ahm// recognition of that approach //ahm// compared to before and, and yes, we are basically willing to cooperate with anybody. #00:15:09-0#
ME: Yes. #00:15:09-9#
I: We don’t have any, any //ahm// we don’t exclude anybody. So that’s on a case by case basis, you know. It depends on that particular case but in practice, I guess that we are somehow more prone to cooperate with //ahm// what is called like-minded which is a group of donors which probably //ahm// restore from historical background have had more or less of the same approach. #00:15:38-9#
ME: //mhm// Yes, of course, that’s only natural, I mean. //mhm// #00:15:42-0#
I: Yeah. So, so. But you know, I don’t think we have any //ahm// issues with whom we cooperate. We could cooperate with the Chinese if the occasion presented itself. #00:15:52-5#
ME: //mhm//. But //ahm// as you know, so far there is no triangular cooperation going on between [country], the Chinese and some recipient country. #00:16:03-6#
I: As far as I know, I don’t know of anyone. But I just represent a small section, so. #00:16:10-3#
ME: Yes. #00:16:11-1#
I: My portfolio is small compared to the total //ahm// budget of development assistance, I couldn’t guarantee that //ahm// there aren’t any other institutions cooperating with them. #00:16:20-9#
ME: Yes, of course, but in your experience... #00:16:23-3#
I: Yes, not in my experience. #00:16:23-9#
ME: //mhm// Okay, you’re also and //ahm// your section is also about economic development, governance and //ahm// gender, you said, the, your overall department. #00:16:39-9#
I: Yes. #00:16:39-9#
ME: Do you have anything to do with the governance part as well //ahm// when you deal with private partners? #00:16:43-3#
I: Yeah. With private partners we are //ahm// preoccupied that, especially if they are from [country] that they follow a code of standards. You know, ethics, if you want, which is, which is of high quality. #00:17:02-2#
ME: Yes. #00:17:03-1#
I: So, we would. We encourage them to do so and we actually willing to support any additional cost about national standards, you know, in our project countries, so that they can uplift to [country’s] standards, you know, should that [country’s] standard, which it usually is, is of a higher level. #00:17:23-3#
I: So, we are concerned with CSR, corporate social responsibility. #00:17:29-0#

ME: //mhm// #00:17:29-6#

I: We are concerned with //ahm// tax revenues for the countries and, and a transparent approach and //ahm// so forth and so forth. #00:17:38-3#

ME: Yes. //ahm// Did that increase or stay more or less on the same level that it has stayed since, let’s say, 2000, or 2005, or since your work experience? Did these kind of concerns to include governance issues of any kind //ahm// in the relationships with recipients... #00:17:59-8#

I: I would say it has increased. That’s why it has become much, more complex. #00:18:04-2#

ME: //mhm// #00:18:04-8#

I: than it used to. We are trying to, you know, and that’s an issue in itself in a sense that we have to look at how we work, you know, and also worry about efficiency, you know, in our work. Because since we have so many considerations to look into it kind of forces us, basically to //ahm// look into how the way we work and maybe also forces us to try and work on larger projects which can justify //ahm// the use of resources. Because sometimes, you might say that a small project is as time consuming as a big project. #00:18:45-8#

ME: //mhm// Okay. #00:18:47-3#

I: And that’s the realisation that we are, at least I am doing. #00:18:50-2#

ME: //mhm// #00:18:50-7#

I: I am not sure that we have fully, //ahm//, you know, taking that into account, but I hope we will, because //ahm// administrating application-based schemes over small values it becomes time-consuming and inefficient //ahm// compared to //ahm// dealing with larger projects. That is my personal opinion. #00:19:17-1#

ME: Where then the money could go more directly to the people in need and less to administration in a way. #00:19:22-7#

I: You know, comparatively speaking, that much more work to be done if we hand in, I don’t know, let’s say a million [currency] compared to half a million [currency] project //ahm//, you know, that works a hundred times more and we don’t use 100 times more amount of time for the large project. So that means that, and since we, we are, you know, we are not many people //ahm// compared to Germany for instance, right? You know, in Germany you have GIZ with 16 000 persons or something at times, you know, we are at most 400 at [institution]. #00:20:01-9#

ME: Yes. #00:20:01-6#

I: dealing with private sector schemes and civil society schemes and other schemes. So therefore, we are forced to think in the future, it hasn’t really dawned upon us, but I think it will. #00:20:20-3#

ME: [Laughs] Yes. #00:20:21-3#

I: There is a need to rationalise our resources. #00:20:23-7#

ME: Yeah. To be more economic, economical there. #00:20:27-9#

I: I would say so. #00:20:27-9#

ME: //mhm// Ok. //ahm// And //ahm// maybe in that same vein, does development aid also need to deliver more results for the, not only for your institution in order to justify your
funding //ahm// but also for the voters, I mean for the government? Do they, or is the [country’s] public generally concerned with how the aid money is spent or does that not really matter that much? #00:20:59-4#

I: Well, the interesting thing is that there has always been //ahm// appreciation by the [country’s] public for development assistance. #00:21:08-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:21:08-5#

I: And the [country’s] parliament has approved, you know, a rather large budget, compared to, comparatively speaking //ahm// without much questioning. #00:21:21-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:21:21-8#

I: And therefore, by default the public, if you, if you know what I mean. But then, there is obviously, now that the amounts are even larger as the [country’s] economy has been growing #00:21:35-9#

ME: Yes. #00:21:37-0#

I: There has been a certain awareness within the [country’s] public as to, you know, whether the results are there which has specially come about, maybe the last ten years in a more predominant //ahm// way. #00:21:53-0#

ME: //mhm// #00:21:54-0#

I: And //ahm// and rightly so, I would say. Because //ahm// it is a lot of money and //ahm// the [country] needs to make sure that it has an impact and and the sense of impact has also //ahm// got a lot of attention as to way you make or measure impact. #00:22:17-3#

ME: //mhm// #00:22:18-0#

I: So, a lot of discussion around that as well. #00:22:22-4#

ME: Yes. #00:22:23-3#

I: //ahm// Which is good but then the, the impact has, has to be, you know, primarily has to be in the developing country itself but of course within that there is a debate between the lines as to whether one donor, I mean the donor country should have an impact as well #00:22:47-5#

ME: Yes. #00:22:48-5#

I: Or how should we go about making sure there are //ahm// some opportunities for a win-win based #00:22:55-7#

ME: Yes. #00:22:56-7#

I: right? if you see what I mean. #00:22:57-7#

ME: Yes. #00:22:56-8#

I: So, so we are trying to juggle with all these considerations and depends who you ask. Some people are saying that that's secondary. #00:23:05-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:23:06-2#

I: You know, that there are win-win for [country’s] society. Some will say that if you don't have it, you might lose interest //ahm// from the public. So it depends who you speak to. #00:23:14-9#

ME: //mhm// #00:23:15-6#
I: And it depends what kind of, you know, conviction you have with respect to how you go about doing //ahm// development assistance, you know, if it’s health or education or private sector, you know, it depends who you speak to. #00:23:29-7#

ME: Yes, of course. And the win-win situation is actually a rhetoric that the Chinese are very proud to present because they say when we do development aid, we want something back. And they do it very openly and actually it results in, generally in //ahm// the recipient country in a kind of relief because it’s open, it’s transparent //ahm// they know what they are dealing with and... #00:23:54-1#

I: Yes. In many ways yes, I think that’s clear on the side there. They want a piece of hospital being delivered, they will get it to your hospital being delivered. But sometimes, my impression is that the lack of involvement of the local, //ahm// of the country. #00:24:17-0#

ME: Yes. #00:24:17-0#

I: might be //ahm// something which might //ahm// become a //ahm//, what you call it, //ahm// a caveat. #00:24:28-6#

ME: Yes, yes. //mhm// #00:24:28-6#

ME: Yes, [laughs] which then makes obviously a huge difference //ahm// probably also in the eyes of recipients, both are valuable but they are just different approaches and you get different benefits out of each approach, I would say. #00:24:54-0#

I: If I may, you know, I know about GIZ, you know, usually, you know, in many ways executes #00:25:04-1#

ME: //mhm// #00:25:05-1#

I: projects themselves. #00:25:06-7#

ME: Yes, they do. #00:25:07-8#

I: We don’t. We make sure we have partners who execute and we are also of the opinion that it’s important that local //ahm// partners acquire knowledge however a long time that takes, because that’s, you know, how we build up knowledge in the country. #00:25:27-5#

ME: //mhm// Yes, so very true ownership-based approach that you describe there. #00:25:34-3#

I: Yes, pretty much occupied with what they call recipient responsibility. #00:25:37-6#

ME: Yes. #00:25:38-7#

I: Which means that they, you know, we have to listen to their priorities, and we have to have their participation. #00:25:45-4#

ME: //mhm// #00:25:45-4#

I: This is at least how it is supposed to be done in theory, #00:25:51-6#

ME: Yes, of course, well between theory and practice there is always a gap. #00:25:55-7#

I: There is always a gap, yes. #00:25:57-1#

ME: That’s a, yeah. But //ahm//. Wait, now I forgot what I wanted to ask you. //ahm// #00:26:05-7#

I: That’s okay. #00:26:06-0#
ME: It was related //ahm// to the thing you said before about the GIZ //ahm// having an approach where they actually have their own project implementers in the country and you actually really just employ local communities and local projects, local firms, if you... #00:26:25-9#

I: Unless you can really prove or justify using [country’s] expertise. #00:26:33-2#

ME: Yes. #00:26:33-2#

I: That’s actually something also debatable, that we should focus on what we are presumably good at. #00:26:40-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:26:41-0#

I: You know, for instance being energy, you know. You know we are presumably good at oil exploration, oil and gas, or //ahm// or hydropower for that matter. #00:26:51-4#

ME: //mhm// #00:26:51-7#

I: And in there we feel that we can //ahm// come up with some good //ahm// institutional //ahm// experience and //ahm// that we can help them setting up an enabling environment which will safeguard that, the //ahm// windfall revenues from natural resources is //ahm// used in a good way, for instance, right? #00:27:17-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:27:17-5#

I: For instance; with respect to //ahm// taxes, equitable institutions and so forth. So that’s something we do at the programme, we have something called [name of programme anonymised]. #00:27:27-5#

ME: //mhm// #00:27:28-4#

I: where we assist countries where, which discover oil and gas to, to, if they want to, to //ahm// to set up //ahm// institutional and legal framework which we believe has benefitted us //ahm// and which doesn’t, you know, //ahm// and which channels it to the public more than to the elite. #00:27:52-6#

ME: Yes. #00:27:53-8#

I: Basically, yeah. #00:27:56-0#

ME: And, you are not working for the [name of programme anonymised], so it is probably difficult for you to judge or to answer that question, //ahm// because in oil, you might have some competition with the Chinese. Do you know anything about that or discussions going on? #00:28:10-8#

I: We are trying be, to separate, you know, when we //ahm// the [name of the programme anonymised] #00:28:16-6#

ME: //mhm// #00:28:17-4#

I: It is very obvious that people might think that we are there to try and exploit opportunities to have our [country’s] oil companies come and //ahm// take it to business. #00:28:28-8#

ME: //mhm// #00:28:28-8#

I: So we are very much preoccupied that that’s not the case, so there is no //ahm// there is no commercial interest of [country] //ahm// within [name of the programme anonymised]. #00:28:43-3#

ME: //mhm// Yes, of course. #00:28:46-5#

I: Well, that’s not of course, if you are trying to apply that principle. #00:28:50-6#

ME: Yes, yes. #00:28:52-0#
I: Yeah. #00:28:54-1#

ME: //ahm// #00:28:55-2#

I: I am not sure what your question was but //ahm// #00:28:57-7#

ME: No, no, that answered the question. Thank you. //ahm// I think we are nearly approaching the 30 minutes timeframe I set for this interview as well. So, do you, maybe you have something that what you thought about would come up during this interview or what we have neglected now or what do you want to point out in the end of the interview? Maybe something? #00:29:25-8#

I: No, I think we covered quite a lot of ground. //ahm// I think development assistance is a complex business. #00:29:31-9#

ME: Definitely [laughs] yes. #00:29:33-9#

I: So there is no right or wrong answer, you know. There might be good reason to accept the Chinese //ahm// way of doing things as opposed to ours which are demanding a lot of things #00:29:44-4#

ME: //mhm// #00:29:46-1#  

I: on the part of the recipients, you know, with respect to abiding conventions and other things which //ahm// might make things very complicated. #00:29:56-0#

ME: //mhm// #00:29:56-4#

I: And maybe not justified there and then so, so. I don’t have any, you know, true answers, but I have, I think there are some flaws in the Chinese approach in the sense that they have built //ahm// things which haven’t been well suited to the needs. #00:30:17-0#

ME: Yes. #00:30:18-0#

I: Sometimes. So I hope the Chinese will learn from that but //ahm// there seems to be more of a //ahm// kind of //ahm// sort of study of what they are doing because to me it seems that they are quite open about their intentions. #00:30:35-8#

ME: Yes. #00:30:36-6#

I: They want to enter into contracts for //ahm//, you know, especially mineral provision //ahm// but sometimes I think that they are not doing sufficient ground work to make sure what they are kind of providing in return so to speak, is //ahm// adequately //ahm// thought for and based on needs. #00:31:01-7#

ME: Yes. #00:31:00-9#

I: That’s my thing. //ahm// Secondly, I think that //ahm// there should be more cooperation amongst donors. #00:31:15-6#

ME: Yes. #00:31:16-8#

I: We are, although there are, there is this Paris Declaration and that stuff, it is not really //ahm// applied in practice. There aren’t that many programmes and projects which truly have //ahm// kind of //ahm// a joint approach amongst our donors. There seems to be in many instances an agenda somehow. #00:31:42-7#

ME: A national agenda? #00:31:45-4#

I: Yes, a national interest agenda somewhere and that //ahm// might be coming back depending on the economic, macroeconomic conditions of the various, of the world basically. #00:31:57-6#
ME: Yes. #00:31:58-3#

I: That kind of selfish or whatever it is called approach, is not prevalent in bad times and I guess rightly so, because it has to be justified towards your tax payers #00:32:13-1#

ME: Yes #00:32:13-1#

I: and //ahm// unfortunately that makes the Paris Declaration a bit hollow in many ways. #00:32:19-8#

ME: //mhm// So stronger implementation of the real principles behind it. #00:32:26-5#

I: Yeah, there should be. It doesn’t seem to happen. And I don’t know how to make it happen but, but //ahm// that would be probably more efficient //ahm//, you know, if we were able to think long term what would be best for all of us in long term rather than having short term approaches. #00:32:48-1#

ME: Yeah short term national interest-based approaches. #00:32:50-6#

I: Short term national interest based approaches, yes. #00:32:51-9#

ME: //mhm// I agree with you there [laughs] #00:32:59-4#

I: [Laughs] #00:32:59-4#

ME: Okay, good. Thank you very much for your time. And as I thought it would be interesting, it was very interesting for me //ahm//. Thank you for making the time //ahm// thank you also for calling back. #00:33:11-5#

I: No problem. #00:33:13-7#

[End of conversation]
9.6 Aid statistics for eleven selected countries (chapter 6)

9.6.1 Aid statistics for the United States in the eleven selected recipient countries

Table 9-1: Table indicating the percentage of overall U.S. aid distributed to selected 11 recipients

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Source: Own calculations based on (OECD Stat 2015b)
Table 9-2: Overall amount spent by the USA on selected 11 recipients

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Source: in constant USD millions from 2013 (OECD Stat 2015b)
9.6.2   Aid statistics for Norway in the eleven selected recipient countries

Table 9-3. Table indicating the percentage of overall Norwegian aid distributed to selected 11 recipients

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Source: Own calculations based on (OECD Stat 2015b)
Table 9-4: Overall amount spent by Norway on selected 11 recipients

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Source: in constant USD millions from 2013 (OECD Stat 2015b)
9.6.3  Aid statistics for the United Kingdom in the eleven selected recipient countries

Table 9-5. Table indicating the percentage of overall UK aid distributed to selected 11 recipients

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Source: Own calculations based on (OECD Stat 2015b)
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Source: in constant USD millions from 2013 (OECD Stat 2015b)
10 References


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