Impact of Asian Soft Power in Latin America - China and South Korea as Emerging Powers in the Subcontinent

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List of abbreviations

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICS: Acronym for Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CI: Confucius Institute
CP (in citations sometimes CCP): Communist Party of China
C-Pop: Chinese pop
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
IR: International Relations
FTA/FTAs: Free Trade Agreement(s)
Gastrodiplomacy: Culinary (gastronomic) diplomacy
Hanban: Zhongguo Guoqia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi (中国国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室)/Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOTCFL)
HSK: Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (汉语水平考试)/Chinese Proficiency Test
J-Pop: Japanese pop
K-drama: Korean drama
K-Pop: Korean pop
Mercosur: Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul/Southern Common Market
MCST: Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
MIKTA: Acronym for Mexico-Indonesia-South Korea-Turkey-Australia
MOFA: Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU: Memorandum Of Understanding
OAS: Organization of American States
PRC: People’s Republic of China
R&D: Research & Development
SI: King Sejong Institute
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US/USA: United States of America
TV: Television
WTO: World Trade Organization
1. Introduction

1.1 Preliminary remarks

International relations research about Latin America\(^1\) has generally focused on political and domestic instabilities, a shift towards socialist political systems, and on the changes the subcontinent has undergone in the last decades. Until recently, most events occurring in the region were categorized under the umbrella of the “US backyard” notion, referring to the sphere of influence created by the North American country, for example through military (Möller, 2006, p. 244, Nolte, 2010, p. 888 and Leiteritz, 2012, p. 76) and political interventions (Armony, 2012, p. 195). With more and more Latin American countries becoming important international actors and the hegemonic influence of the US diluting,\(^2\) the region’s international focus is beginning to shift (Sun, 2013, n.p.).

Latin American countries have accumulated enough expertise to carry out extensive relations, including with actors who shared similar experiences or growth models in the past. Brazil, for instance, is part of BRICS (Tank, 2012, n.p.).\(^3\) “These countries’ increasing might in the global economy was (and still is) believed to have the potential to reshape the global economic and political landscape of the twenty-first century” (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65).

Mexico is part of MIKTA.\(^4\) It shares with the other countries common starting points as rising economies and middle powers (Fisher 2014, p. 4),\(^5\) while taking advantage of the “significant changes [that] have taken place in the distribution of political power in Latin American countries over the past decade, at both national and hemispheric level” (Varas, 2009, p. 2). It is through Latin America’s “‘multidirectional diplomacy’” (Dosch, 2010, p.5) that a door has opened for new actors to step in. One of them is East Asia.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) A region that in this study refers to South and Central America (UNSTATS 2013). Caribbean countries such as Cuba are also mentioned as part of Latin America.

\(^2\) Some authors blame that situation on an “imperial overstretch”, meaning that the US’ ”global interests and obligations is nowadays larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 666).

\(^3\) Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

\(^4\) Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia.

\(^5\) These concepts will be explained in the current state of research.

\(^6\) According to the United Nations Statistic Divisions, East Asia is composed of China, Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea (UNSTATS 2013).
That last region has built up an immense growth potential, above all in the economic sphere (Chellaney, 2006, p. 17 and Kennedy, 2008, p. 568). Research has consequently focused for several decades on its significance as a growth hub within the international system. Embedded within the East Asian region are China and South Korea. Both countries followed a similar path starting in the 1960s and 1970s, which transformed them completely and which led to their current position within the international system and, as will be seen, to their rise as emerging powers in Latin America.

China had been the most advanced country in the world, with its fleet, discoveries and scientific inventions (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 21-26) until its eventual encounter with more powerful European counterparts (Hayes, 2012, pp. 17-20 and pp. 49-54). Events during the 20th century, such as Maoism, again limited the country’s international relations (Kissinger, 2012, p. 208) due to inward-oriented growth policies. With Deng Xiaoping leading the country in the 1970s, future changes included on the one hand less ideological - i.e., pragmatic - premises (Hayes, 2012, p. 49, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 13 and Brown, 2010, p. 85). On the other hand, the traditionally communist economic model morphed into the so-called socialism with Chinese characteristics7 (Möller, 2006, p. 128 and Kang, 2012, p. 919) through the open-door policy that “welcomed foreign capital and businesses (...) [and] infused life into the hobbled economy” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 72).

The Four Modernizations that were carried out domestically and internationally in fields such as the economy, defense and technology (Kissinger, 2012, p. 346, Khanna, 2009, p. 302 and Schaeff, 1994, p. 78) did also play an important role. The country aimed at applying capitalist methods (Hartmann, 2006, p. 71 and p. 73) to reenter the world stage, leaving its worldwide isolation behind by reforming and changing itself (Schaeff, 1994, p. 78). Nowadays, China can be considered almost sui generis as it has achieved, in the shortest amount of time, an unprecedented growth of its previously weak economy (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 3). As an example, it “now has a tangible (...) presence in Latin America that spans politics, economics, and regions” (China Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 1). Due to China’s growth on a worldwide scale and

7 “[M]eaning capitalism with an element of state ownership” (Hauser, 2009, p. 12). Other terms are also used, for example socialist market economy (Meder, 2000, pp. 101-102), hybrid, mixed economy (Haug, 2006, p. 2) as well as “modified” Marxism (Kennedy, 1988, p. 578).
because it is the vanguard for East Asian growth and emerging presence in the subcontinent, I chose the country as one of the cases to be analyzed. For a comparative research, a second case was necessary.

South Korea may seem inconspicuous when compared to its regional neighbors, but it is full of potential. The country is a regional economic hub of its own as well as an exporter of technology and expertise (Pascha, 2005, pp. 106-107) even though it is surrounded by American, Japanese and Chinese presence (Lee, 2005, p. 15 and Kim and Jaffe, p. 64). Similarly to China, South Korea’s current position on the international stage was achieved after a radical transformation.

The Korean War (1950-1953) was followed by the “Miracle on the Han River”, which marked the beginning of a quick development of the country’s industry and thoroughly export-oriented growth (Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989, p. 2). The authoritarian regime of Park Chun Hee, in the 1960s and 1970s, accelerated the country’s development, for example by supporting family-run companies that became enormous conglomerates known as chaebols (Castells, 1992 p. 38 and Kang, 1993, p. 79). His dictatorship ended in 1979 (Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim, 2007, pp. 9, 22 and 25) and had at that point already changed South Korea’s role in the world. This happened during the same period as and in a similar way to Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations. South Korea’s growth from a war-torn country (Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989, p. 2) to one of the most important economies worldwide has enabled it to gain respect as a model of growth, and to establish multiple links with Latin America. These include commercial, cultural, political and economic exchanges.

Both China and South Korea have spent decades broadening the presence of their cultural institutions (Ryoo, 2009, p. 137). More recently, they have begun exporting their culture strategically through policies that build on existing perceptions and knowledge of and about them (Yang, 2003, xi-xii and Russell, 2008, xii). Latin America is at the receiving end, being shaped by these events (Roett, 2010, p. 206) that are hidden behind economic developments and high politics.8

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8 The term “high politics [refers to] security and survival (...) low politics [to] economic and social affairs” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 106). For Keohane and Nye the term high politics includes security and survival, matched directly with military force (Keohane & Nye 2007, p. 24).
While liberal theory of IR states that countries are changing their power tools and are turning to low politics, high politics and the so called “hard power” still dominate research on Latin America and on East Asia. Culture, along with related foreign policy actions, are mostly forgotten even though “[c]ultural policy, backed by relative cultural attractiveness, is [an] element of national power” (Robinson, 1994, p. 580). This so called “soft power”, a concept introduced into international relations (IR) theory by Joseph Nye in the 1990s, will be explained, analyzed and further defined throughout the study as it represents the element I chose to compare the regions of Latin America and East Asia.

1.2 Current state of research and theoretical approach

Two concepts are central to this study: soft power and emerging powers. I will first define each of them through an analysis of the current state of research, afterwards depict where there has been a lack of academic definition and how it opens a door for an extension of these concepts through the research. Additional terms will be defined on their own when they become relevant for further analysis. The theory of complex interdependence, part of the liberal theories that constitute international relations analysis, was chosen as the theoretical approach.

1.2.1 Power

Most concepts used in this research include the word “power”. What does power in international relations mean?

Power is, foremost, the ability of a country to achieve its goals, purposes and outcomes, which signifies a certain degree of control over others (Nye, 1990a, p. 26, Nye, 2004a, p. 1 and Nye, 1990b, p. 154). Nye further defines power as “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do” (Nye, 1990a, p. 26). In international relations, it is possible to become powerful either through own efforts or by influencing and controlling other actors to achieve outcomes that suit the state’s own goals (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). If a country seeks power, it must first possess the necessary resources, e.g. “economic strength” (Nye, 2004a, p. 3).

9 See segment 1.2.2. in this chapter for the definition of that concept.
10 In fact, for Bilgin and Eliş “there are no relations exempt from power” (Bilgin and Eliş, 2008, p. 15).
But there is no agreement among international theory scholars about which elements a country should accumulate to be powerful. For Yan, a state’s power can be political, economic or military (Yan, 2011b, p. 84). “[P]olitical power is the resource power for operating power, military power, economic power, and cultural power” (Yan, 2011b, p. 101). This would in turn mean that a country without political power cannot harness other elements (Yan, 2011b, p. 101).

According to Clemens, military, cultural and economic factors determine the power a country has (Clemens, 1998, p. 187). For Nye, “technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more (…), whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important” (Nye, 1990a, p. 29). The author clarifies that power has changed over time as the resources countries have needed vary according to the period studied. Technology and economic force are now decisive for the success of current states, while those in the 18th century depended on their population, due to the existing tax system (Nye, 1990b, p. 154). Nowadays, different power constellations enrich the international system. For instance, resource poor countries like Japan have positioned themselves internationally (Menzel, 2004, p. 195).

Yet, having power alone does not guarantee that goals will be met or that existing resources will suffice. “[S]ome countries will make the most of their potential while others waste their assets” (Clemens, 1998, p. 200). This means that a weaker actor could become stronger or stronger powers could lose their previous influence when the context changes (Nye, 2004a, pp. 2-3 and Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). “Power conversion is a basic problem (...). Some countries are better than others at converting their resources into effective influence (...). Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others” (Nye, 1990a, p. 27).\(^\text{11}\)

Two possibilities for countries to convert potential and exert power are the foreign policy tools of hard and soft power.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{11}\) See Clemens (1998, p. 147) for conversion power, its influence on achieving hard power and Meder (2000, p. 96) for his analysis of political power derived from economic one. How can an economic power turn into a political one?.

\(^{12}\) A country can decide between using coercion and threats, sanctions could also be added, or attracting and coopting other countries (Nye, 2004a, p. 2).
1.2.2 Hard and soft power

Hard power determined international relations theory in the past (Lamus, 2011, p. 78). According to realism, the traditional current of IR theory, (hard) power could be acquired through military means only, through aggressive politics as well as through territorial expansion (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 103). Realism emphasizes characteristics of the international system such as predominance of the coherent and unitary state, integration between states when it “serves the national interest of the most powerful” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 23), acting without moral principles to prioritize one’s safety (Donnelly, 2005, p. 31-35) and struggle for power (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 24). For a country to be and to remain powerful it must stand alone and prevent others from taking advantage of its weakness, for example through not letting its hard power become diffused (Bell, 2011, p. 12).

Opposing this view, Liberal IR theory states that “welfare—not security—is becoming the primary goal and concern of states” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 107) even though military power and economic pressure still matter for most states (Vasilevskytė, 2013, p. 145). Liberal theory comprises distinctive strands (Burchill, 2005, p. 55), each with their own analytical core area. As a theoretical approach, I chose liberal complex interdependence theory, which was developed in the 1970s. It affirms that countries permanently depend, for their international standing and in situations of reciprocal effects (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8), on the actions of other actors (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 44 and p. 103) and on “international transactions–flow of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 9).

Within complex interdependence, not only mutual benefit is possible. In dependence situations, like those between developing and industrialized countries (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 9), one country benefits more than the other and the weaker depends on the actions of the stronger for survival. Events in one country might even initially implicate and affect one actor, then spread to its neighbors, region and eventually to the international system (Fujita, 2013, p. 3). Interdependence will “always involve costs (…) but it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relationship” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 9-10).
States are understood as actors with a distinct agenda in foreign relations and international politics that varies according to needs: they can either cooperate or compete, depending on their current priorities (Clemens, 1998, p. 32). Because even aspects such as cultural policies and negotiating skills do matter, it has become more difficult for states to decide on how to carry out a coherent foreign policy (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 27). Within that “absence of hierarchy among issues” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 44) “military force is not used by governments toward other governments (...). Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues of an alliance” (Keohane & Nye, 2007, p. 25). Using military force is becoming more and more costly and its consequences uncertain (Nye, 1990b, pp. 154-156). If a country does not respect given rules, it will be shunned by others who might even resort to penalties (Burchill, 2005, p. 66).

For countries to achieve their goals, another alternative to exert influence and power (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 44) is needed. This is where soft power steps in.¹³ Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye, 2004a, p. x).

Soft power is composed of resources that produce attraction, through which a country can “shape the preferences of others” (Ernst & Young, p. 4) and co-opt them into changing their behavior towards itself (Norris, 2010, p. 1). In short, a state with enough soft power dominates or defines the agenda of another actor (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). “Ultimately, nations with the greatest soft power find that citizens of other countries aspire to share their values and institutions, and leaders of foreign countries view their policies as legitimate and want to follow their leads” (Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 420). Seeking the expansion of power requires convincing others without the use of coercive power because if too much of it is deployed, “attraction can turn to repulsion” (Nye, 2004a, p. x).¹⁴

¹³Although the term “soft power” was first coined by Nye, literature states that it is based on previous concepts. According to Pan, “[t]he term can be seen as an extension and development of Carr’s (1954) idea of ‘power over opinion’ and Lukes’ (1974) ‘third dimension of power’, both shed light on how the attractiveness of a nation’s culture, ideals, policies (...) give it the capacity to persuade other nations to willingly adopt its goals” (Pan, 2012, p. 23). Previous ideas, including the constructivist discussion about the creation of ideas or norms, did not become as well-known as Nye’s, because he turned them into an international instrument of foreign policy (Janelli and Yim, 2007, p. 1).
¹⁴As an example, the US is losing its position as a great power, its soft power has notably weakened while
Attraction and admiration do not necessarily have to produce the outcomes a country had imagined beforehand (Nye, 2004a, p. 6). Instead, they depend on the subjective perception of the recipients of the policy carried out internationally. Power outcome varies greatly, more than in the case of hard power (McClory, 2010, p. 7). An example would be Japan’s anime and manga industry. Young people all over the world are attracted to Japanese culture, even travel to the country and learn the language. However, this does not mean that governments in countries like China will start liking Japan.

According to Nye, a country’s soft power consists of three categories: “[c]ulture (in places where [a country] is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004a, p. 11). This study will place an emphasis on cultural soft power. As will be seen, culture comprises far more facets than those mentioned by Nye. His definition of culture includes “high culture such as literature, art, and education (...) and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment” (Nye, 2004a, p. 11). Culture turns into soft power when it manages to attract other countries’ populations and governments, but it is also important to keep in mind that different contexts lead to different degrees of power conversion (Nye, 2004a, p. 12).

Countries that cannot rely purely on their appeal, their values and their culture to attract others, can also choose to combine pressure with high politics for example offering free trade agreements on the one hand and exchanges in the cultural and educational field on the other hand. To achieve a perfect or even sufficient combination is difficult, but if managed, power can be enhanced, and the desired outcomes be attained (Kounalakis and Simonyi, 2011, p. 9). Current literature suggests that countries should resort to that “smart power” (Nye, 2002, p. 34).

Wilson defines smart power as the combination “of hard (...) and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and its hard power has gained the upper hand (Nye, 2004a, p. xi).

15 The concept of soft power can still grow beyond these three categories. Norris writes that “it is possible that states can have soft power sources outside those which Nye advanced; insofar as the potential soft power resource is attractive and influences another state by co-opting its behavior” (Norris, 2010, p. 1).

16 Other authors and institutions, i.e., the British Council include additional sides to culture in an international context, for example sport, food and religion (Holden, 2013, p. 3). As will be seen in the case study, culture can also be linked to education (Janelli and Yim, 2007, p. 1).
efficiently” (Wilson, 2008, p. 110). Smart power combines command power and co-optive power (Nye, 2004a, p. x-xiii and p. 7 and Lee, 2009, p. 6). The first one is defined as ‘the ability to change what others do’ and relies on coercion, usually through military force, or inducement, usually through payment.” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 5). The second one, co-optive power, is “the ability to shape what others want–can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices” (Nye, 2004a, p. 7) of others. Smart power has been criticized for the lack of specification on the interconnection that persists between hard and soft power (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 4).

Soft power has also received much criticism, due to several existing theoretical and practical flaws.

The first issue is that Nye has conceptualized that tool without operationalizing it, which means that it is so flexibly described that it is still vague (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). The author himself writes that “attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action” (Nye, 2004a, p. 16). How can soft power be measured if, for example “it is almost impossible to establish the causal chain between a country’s attraction and specific policy outcomes” (Lee, 2009, p. 7)? Which categories can be useful to split soft power into measurable units? How do other power resources, for example economic strength, have an influence on soft power growth? And can culture be measured at all?

This study splits cultural soft power into several categories (benchmarks) and determines whether this kind of soft power is being employed as a foreign policy tool in the subcontinent.

The second flaw in Nye’s theoretical approach is equating soft power to great power politics, which reduces the use of that tool to already powerful countries. The author fails to establish a congruent proposition for smaller or weaker countries to take advantage of.

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17 For Nye, “economic prowess contributes not only to wealth but also to reputation and attractiveness” (Nye, 2004a, p. 33).
18 That same question is posed in international relations theory and in other study areas too. Hopper asks “can the sheer quantity of cultural movements be measured and evaluated in any meaningful way? How do we quantify both the vast number and different types of cultural intrusions into any given country or region?” (Hopper, 2007, p. 45).
their cultural potential as a tool to position themselves internationally. For instance, his 2004 book about soft power mentions that Norway and Canada possess soft power, which would help both countries vis-à-vis stronger neighbors or countries, yet their actions depend on the perception of stronger actors (Nye, 2004a, 10).

Nye further affirms that “both countries and nonstate actors, also possess soft power than can be used to help or hinder the United States’ achievement of its preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2004a, p. 73). Such a statement reflects his persistent Western bias. Furthermore, the author does not offer concrete suggestions for countries that want to increase their resources by turning them into soft power tools. It is solely mentioned that soft power “is available to all countries, and many invest in ways to use soft-power resources to ‘punch above their weight’ in international politics” (Nye, 2004a, p. 89).

Through this research, I will show an extended analysis of why and how the soft power concept can be applied to other countries besides great powers.

Another important aspect to be considered is that, according to Nye, “popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar” (Nye, 2004a, pp. 15-16). Then, the question to be asked is how Asian countries have been able to exert soft power in culturally different contexts, specifically in Latin America. This is the third aspect I will analyze.

The fourth aspect is that Nye did not sufficiently define what happens when one power resource is understood as both hard or soft power, nor extend his research on that topic to give sufficient explanations about why this situation presents itself (Lai and Lu, p. 24 and Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). In short, Nye “did not provide a clear, logical and persuasive explanation to this contradiction” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 24).19

In an article of 2008 Nye states that the “military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power. In addition to (...) power that is generated by its hard

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19 For Zheng and Zhang, “there are no absolute soft or hard power resources in world politics. Compared to Nye’s static thinking, dynamic thinking is more suitable to be applied in the analysis of the soft or hard effectiveness of power resources in international politics” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 26). These authors offer a helpful insight into alternative methods of differentiating soft and hard power.
power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime” (Nye, 2008, p. 106). Nevertheless, analysis by the author remains focused on the US and his original definition of hard and soft power, which is why this study will aim at further differentiating both concepts from another and questioning why foreign policy that is intended to be hard power might be perceived as soft, and vice versa.

Finally, one recurrent topic within Nye’s texts that has caused skepticism is the ability of governments to generate soft power from existing resources. “Generally, (...) soft-power resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard-power resources [yet,] the fact that soft-power resources are awkward to wield has not prevented governments from trying” (Nye, 2004a, pp. 99-100). At times, soft power reaches the target population before the government can start to adapt (Lee, 2015). So, how much control do governments indeed have over their soft power? How do they manage to achieve the desired attraction and how long does it take for outcomes to be seen? (Nye, 2004a, p. 17 and p. 99).

Having stated the most important questions related to the conceptualization of soft power that will be researched, the next two sections will offer a deeper analysis of the concepts of traditional, emerging, middle and regional powers.

1.2.3 Great and emerging powers

Countries with power exertion and acquisition capacities fall into four categories. I exclude from this enumeration smaller countries that do not have much international influence (Narlikar, 2010, p. 21).

The first category is composed of great (sometimes called traditional) powers. The second category consists of emerging powers, the third of regional powers and the fourth of middle powers. Some types of power can also overlap. China, for instance, is considered a great power, a regional power, and an emerging power, depending on the frame of analysis.

Great and established powers (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 70) are those that have achieved
a predominant position in the international system, having left behind most obstacles that could impede their current position. They dominate in the economic, military, political, social and cultural realms. They constitute the core of the international system, “enjoying both material power and legitimacy” (Narlikar, 2010, p 7) and become “managers” that define mechanisms that will be called upon to create balance within it, such as military force or diplomatic arrangements (Østerud, 1992, p. 6).

Such dominant actors, “have usually framed the rules under which interdependency has flourished” (Burchill, 2005, p. 67). Therefore, the undergoing decline of the U.S. as a hegemonic power facilitates new types of interdependence between international actors. At the same time, “great powers are now much less inclined to use force to resolve their political differences with each other” (Burchill, 2005, p. 82). An opportunity has appeared that did not exist before for countries with less hard power resources.

The international system has become more diverse with some countries having welcomed the possibility of asserting their power (Varas, 2009, p. 9) through “rapid economic, development, and expanding political and cultural influence” (Tank, 2012, n.p.). A similar movement took place during decolonization, when countries that were previously dominated by great powers had the opportunity to carry out their own regional and international relations while having to learn from their newly acquired independence (Østerud, 1992, p. 9). Those that manage to take advantage of this situation and of the resources they have at their reach, are known as emerging powers.

One concurring definition for this concept is still absent from international relations literature (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65 and Strauss, 2012a, p. 135). The fact that each author can create his or her own categories to determine what an emerging power is, makes it harder to apply it to case studies - a commonality with soft power. I will start the analysis of emerging powers by stating the most common categories used in literature to define the classification of a country as such. They are:

1. Economic and/or financial strength, as well as potential to continue growing (Tank, 2012, n.p.). BRICS are the quintessential emerging powers, i.e. strong economic actors

20 Hegemonic meaning here that a country can determine the rules and the agendas of international politics, by itself (Nye, 2002, p. 39).
who invest in other world regions (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65 and pp. 72-73).
2. A considerable amount of political power. An important issue for emerging powers is how to turn political power into economic power (Tank, 2012, n.p.).
3. Internal cohesion (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65), because emerging countries still “face major domestic political challenges (...) endemic poverty, major income inequality, insufficient infrastructure, regional imbalances (...) and major environmental challenges.” (Vogt, 2009, p. 5)
4. The “ability to contribute to the generation of a revised international order” (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65), meaning the potential to acquire a more influential position within the international system and to challenge the status quo (Tank, 2012, n.p. and Ding, 2010, p. 255). This could be done by taking a more active stance in international institutions, bloc voting, forming issue-based alliances, providing peacekeeping forces or other types of aid during crisis situations (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 66 and 75 and Tank, 2012, n.p.).
6. Close relations to other emerging powers, at the institutional, regional or bilateral level (Varas, 2009, p. 5). If these actors gather, they create a balance within the international order (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 66 and p. 71) and weaken the influence of emerged countries (Vogt, 2009, p. 8). More growth and integration into the international system entails responsibility and effects like spillovers. While in the past emerging powers could only harm themselves with their actions, or within their region, these countries’ actions now may reverberate on others (Vogt, 2009, p. 4).

This study will expand the preliminary definition of emerging power stated in this section, and punctually define the following two aspects:

The first one is that literature acknowledges a possible rise of countries with economic and political power, but neglects a rise through cultural policies. Just as with soft power, the emerging power concept has been tailored to great or dominant powers, not to smaller or weaker states. Some countries do not participate much in the international system as they do not, yet, have the necessary resources at hand. Will they nevertheless be able to

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21 Liberal theorists believe that not all emerging powers want to change the established system, but prefer free-riding, cooperative instances or a less proactive leadership as well as agenda-setting, and precaution (Narlikar, 2010, p. 14 and p. 21).
rise? I would like to bolster the existing groundwork through the comparison of Chinese and Korean culture in Latin America.

The second aspect I will question is that China is an emerging power in Asia and Brazil in South America, according to the literature on emerging powers. But can Brazil not be considered an emerging power in Africa and China an emerging power in Latin America? International relations theory neglects a rise of countries in world regions besides their own, as well as the characteristics that determine and shape it.

After the introduction of the concept of emerging powers, I will proceed towards the analysis of the third and fourth power categories mentioned at the start of this section: middle and regional powers.

1.2.4 Middle and regional powers

Literature seldom mentions those countries that are in between emerging and emerged. These middle powers are neither great powers, nor are they emerging powers. According to realism, it is due to their power resources that they are ranked in the middle of the international system; for liberals, their behavior justifies that categorization (Kim, 2012c, p. 534). They have limited options and as a result aspire to participate in the world stage by achieving a measurable degree of influence, for example as mediators (Flemes, 2007, pp. 10-11).

Considering that these states cannot act out by themselves, they mostly prefer to be part of groups or of international institutions. Their guiding principle is an active diplomacy, or niche diplomacy, which is “the capacity of middle powers to increase their global influence and acceptance through the employment of their specific capabilities (e.g. peacekeeping)” (Flemes, 2007, p. 11). According to Kim, soft power is also one type of niche (Kim, 2012c, p. 535).

These countries can be differentiated from emerging powers as the latter were “never fully integrated into the post-1945 order. Being on the outside looking in has heavily conditioned their strategic interests and conceptions of national purpose” (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 67).
One example of a middle power is South Korea. It owes its title as a “middle nation” to its “tenuous position between the two great powers on the parameters of its territory: China and Japan.” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 64). Kim adds the US to actors the East Asian country must balance when it carries out its foreign policy (Kim, 2012c, p. 535).

Contrary to middle powers, who need a functional leadership to survive within the international system, for example through acting as negotiators or catalysts (Nolte, 2010, p. 892), “regional leadership is more focused on comparatively high military and economic capabilities” (Flemes, 2007, p. 11). Middle and regional powers can also be differentiated through their responsibility in their own region, which means that the latter must be stable in a domestic sense, express their willingness to take care of regional issues and their capability do so; they must be accepted by others in the region (Nolte, 2010, p. 890) as the responsible stakeholder. Just as with emerging powers, regional powers lack a unified definition in literature. The word “region itself means something different, depending on the scientific approach or discipline and (...) world regions change together with their internal dynamics” (Østerud, 1992, p. 2).

In the following paragraphs, I will define what a regional power is and how countries fit into that framework. Taken from different approaches (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 8), the characteristics that these countries have in common and on which the research will be based, are the following:

3. Interconnection with the other countries in the region, which allows for commonalities such as a “identity or (...) [a] regional security agenda” (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). That same regional power should represent the region in the international sphere, by stating its own interests and those of the whole region (Nolte, 2010, p. 893).
4. Participation and influence in regional cooperation, governance structures and affairs (Nolte, 2010, p. 889 and p. 893), as well as in organizations that “serve as power bases for their largest members to project power in world affairs” (Flemes, 2007, p. 7).

5. Reputation and recognition as a regional power (Østerud, 1992, p. 5). Nolte adds that it is also important for a regional power to be recognized by its peers, for example other regional powers (Nolte, 2010, p. 893).

A final aspect to be considered is that the concept of regional powers can encompass others, i.e., emerging and great powers. As mentioned before, “[o]ften the conceptualization of the term lacks clear distinctive characteristics in relation to comparable classifications, so that several terms are applied to one and the same country” (Shim and Flamm, 2002, p. 7 and Nolte, 2010, p. 883). For example, the US is a regional as well as great power, China is an emerging and a regional power, Mexico is a middle power in some areas, an emerging power in other cases and a regional power within Latin America.

1.3 Research design

1.3.1 Units of analysis

Soft, hard and smart power refer to foreign policy tools or instruments, while the concepts of emerging, traditional, small, regional and middle powers refer to a country’s position within the international system. A country cannot be an international hard or soft power. Instead, it resorts to one of these tools as part of its foreign policy, for example if it wants to be a pioneer or a leader.

To position itself as an emerging, regional or another type of power, a country can make use of different tools that include military, cultural or economic policies. They are then classified according to a spectrum of hard or soft power tools. A country could consequently be a regional power, having achieved that status through hard power.

The variables state power (emerging, regional, etc.) and a state’s foreign policy tool (soft or smart power) form a circular connection. A country needs hard or soft power to position itself. Once having achieved that goal, it becomes stronger and can invest more
to further enhance its power tools. Conversely, if a country’s power starts dwindling, it starts losing the power of its tools. Foreign policy tools represent the dependent variable. On that account, both variables are dependent on each other, influenced by independent variables such as other countries’ perceptions, external impacts on the international system or changes in the domestic sphere.

Within liberal theory of IR, other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), populations acting as the recipients of soft power or companies form part of the international system. These stakeholders can carry out soft or hard power related activities which change their international positioning. In this study, companies and other actors are considered part of the network of activities that countries carry out and rely on for the enhancement of their foreign policy tools, so that they can determine their position within the international system. Thus, states and their foreign policies are my main unit of analysis.

1.3.2 Research goals and methodology

With the main elements and concepts of already mentioned, the research question can be stated as follows: Has using soft power as a strategic foreign policy tool enabled China and South Korea to position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America? The corresponding hypothesis is that soft power is a strategic foreign policy that enables both countries to position themselves as emerging powers in the subcontinent. The main research goal is to further conceptionalize the notion of soft power and to operationalize it, using the case study of Chinese and South Korean foreign policy in Chile. A sub goal is to expand the definition of emerging powers, as it currently lacks concrete conceptual analysis and definition within IR literature.

Data and information for this research were collected via different methods within a triangulation approach that was chosen because sources vary according to their given meaning within the research. For the main body of the study, a combination of literature,

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22 Of almost exclusively qualitative nature and using a mixed methods analysis with multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009, p. 98) to avoid bias. Quantitative data, for example government or university statistics are included, but they are not evaluated through quantitative methods. If secondary data are compared or put together as new categories, this is done within the case study and as evidential support to show tendencies and interpretations.
desktop research and secondary data analysis was used to filter all information that could be found. For the case study, research material was initially acquired through an extensive work with literature and desktop research (secondary sources), qualitative semi-structured expert interviews carried out in May 2014 (primary sources), participation in seminars in Chile (primary sources), data from e-mail contact with institutions and researchers in Chile (primary sources) and finally secondary data analysis, mainly of governmental and academic sources in Latin America and in Chile.

The study is a comparative research based on assimilar cases. China and South Korea were chosen because of their different historical paths, divergent relations with Latin America and distinctive foreign policies, among other reasons. The use of soft power and their rise in Latin America is the lens through which both countries are compared.

Within that comparison, I chose a hypothesis testing case study (Levy, 2008, p. 6). That single-case, representative and instrumental case was chosen, as the amount of information available on China, South Korea in Latin America would have been overwhelming for a multiple-case study. Chile was singled out due to its historical links to East Asia, within APEC\(^{23}\) and in the economic field (Khanna, 2009, p. 164), because of its predominant position in Latin America as one of the closest trade partners of both China and South Korea, as well as due to the amount of information available from different sources on these topics.

The case study was designed to analyze the local presence of South Korean and Chinese soft power. Its aim is to conclude whether China and/or South Korea have become emerging powers in the Latin American subcontinent, not primarily how their domestic policies allow them to act in a specific way or how they perceive Latin America.

The experts for the interviews\(^ {24}\) carried out during the field research in Chile were chosen according to their position, own experience within the context of Asian presence in Latin America, and according to the knowledge that could contribute towards answering the research question, as well as testing the hypothesis. The main actors were government

\(^{23}\) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

\(^{24}\) See “List of interviewees and observations” for more information on each of the interviewees. Two of the experts asked not to be included either by name or by institution, which is why their association is not mentioned or their name was changed.
employees (Ministry of foreign relations, Central University), professors (Catholic
University, Andrés Bello University), nongovernmental institutions (Corporación
Cruzando el Pacífico) and entrepreneurs (Empresas Chile).

Expert interviews were designed as systematizing (Bogner and Menz, 2009, pp. 64-65),
in the interest of acquiring as much information and knowledge as possible. While I
prepared a guideline resembling a database with essential questions to be asked during
the interviews, new ones were added throughout the field research, when required.
Consequently, the expert interviews acquired an additional explorative perspective.
During my stay in Chile, I was also invited to a seminar about binational cooperation with
China, at the Ministry of foreign relations, was able to research at the library of the
Confucius Institute of the Catholic University and to attend the opening ceremony of the
regional office of Hanban in Santiago.  

I adopted the method of content analysis for the case study research (Yanow and
or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory (…). Existing theory or research
(…) can provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships
among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships
between codes” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). Hsieh and Shannon state that this
method balances different sources such as literature research, interview and observations
to categorize new information, complement the initial theory or contest it. Data that do
not fit into the initial categories can become a new category or the subcategory of
previously created ones. They can also support, contradict or extend the theory on which
the categories are based on (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, pp. 1282-1283).

All research carried out for the case study, including the expert interviews and their
transcriptions, literature, desktop research, secondary data analysis and participation in
seminars, was coded through categories based on Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power and
the liberal theory of IR. These categories were subdivided into indicators to
systematically include all characteristics of the soft power measured. In conclusion,
comparative research, the research question and the hypothesis, set a limit to the use given

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25 Opening ceremony of the Confucius Institute Latin America Regional Center at the Catholic University
in Santiago de Chile, 12.05.14.
to the information categorized through the content analysis, as well as within the indicators.

1.3.3 Time frame

One possible time frame for this study would have been between the 1990s and 2016, to evaluate the development of the concept of soft power, which was itself defined at the beginning of that period. Yet, China’s international and regional rise has been more recent, specifically since the country became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Permanent Mission of China to the WTO, 2011). South Korea’s cultural soft power has skyrocketed since the beginning of the new century, with its middle power tools multiplying at a rapid pace. The notion of East Asian soft power in Latin America became relevant about 15 years ago, a time during which the subcontinent also began distancing itself from the US. Thus, the period between 2005 and 2016 is apt as a time frame. Previous dates are briefly mentioned when they are relevant for the research carried out.

1.4 Structure

The study is divided into five chapters.

This first chapter introduced all important concepts and elements, including the research question, the goals and the hypothesis, the current state of research, the theory of IR it is embedded in and the methodological approach. Defining these components beforehand is crucial as the research employs all of them, particularly soft and emerging power.

The second chapter immediately makes use of the results from the introduction. It outlines China’s and South Korea’s positioning along with use of power in the global arena and in their own regional context. The chapter gives an insight into how both countries have risen, and which concepts are most central for an analysis of soft power, as well as of other types of power (tools). For example: Which regional factors have shaped China’s and South Korea’s foreign policies and soft power? Which are the different types of hard and soft power tools that a country has or can have at its disposition? The chapter lays the groundwork for the application of the soft and emerging power concepts to one specific region.
The third chapter continues the regional approach to international relations, but within Latin America. Starting with the changes that occurred in the subcontinent during the last decade - i.e., an increased East Asian presence, specifically of China and South Korea - that chapter prepares the transition towards the analysis of one specific country within that regional setting.

The fourth chapter presents the case study Chile. First, the country’s relations to East Asia, specifically to China and South Korea are presented. Afterwards, the chapter is divided into the categories created with the help of content analysis.

The fifth chapter combines the preliminary conclusions from all previous chapters and discusses whether and how the research goals have been achieved, if the hypothesis established at the beginning of the study is valid and what the answer to the research question is. It also accentuates questions for further research.

2. Power constellations in the international system and in the context of East Asia

This chapter analyzes China’s and South Korea’s positioning and use of power within the international system and in East Asia. A first step will be made to conceptualize Joseph Nye’s soft power theory. I will discuss the tools China and South Korea have at their disposition to exert that power and up to which point cultural closeness within the region enables both countries to broaden their soft power more effectively. Furthermore, it will be shown that Nye differentiates insufficiently between power tools. Part of the research is also going to investigate whether soft and hard power are two sides of the same coin. 26

2.1. China: Emerging power

Before analyzing China’s power resources, its soft power and its role in East Asia, I would like to define why the country can be considered an emerging power, based on the categories I formulated in the introduction. 27

26 With hard power, for example, being concealed as soft power.
27 Other authors state that China is not growing and compare its status to that of a middle power which poses no threat. “China (...) is consistently overrated as an economy, a world power, and a source of ideas.
The first category states that a country is an emerging power when it has economic strength and potential for growth. China has set the bar on how another country can achieve economic growth while simultaneously positioning itself internationally. China was still considered underdeveloped until the 1980s. This was the result of the Maoist Great Leap Forward, a catastrophically planned program to transform the country’s economy (Hayes, 2012, pp. 73-74), and of the cultural revolution (Kennedy, 1988, p. 515) that proposed eliminating vestigial cultural, educational, moral and ideological elements and radically abandoning Chinese traditions, to start anew towards the (communist) future (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 109-110 and pp. 206-207 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 14).

China began changing after the end of Maoism. Through Deng’s Four Modernizations and reform policies, the inward-oriented country opened itself again and external relations with other countries were formalized (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 346-360). China started becoming a massive economic hub and a growing power; it even discarded fear of intervention in and disrespect of its sovereignty that it associated with entering international organizations (He, 2009, p. 118). This was confirmed through its long-awaited entry into the WTO in 2001 (Hayes, 2012, p. 78) and its assertive position within the United Nations Security Council (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 59, Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 131).

The second category stated in the introduction refers to the need for emerging countries to have political power. China has proved that it has political strength through actions in its own region and in countries ranging from Zimbabwe (Rawnsley, 2009, p. 290), to Jamaica (Henderson, 2010, p. 14). Basing its actions on the principle of sovereignty, and nonintervention policies (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 110), the country has established relations with many different actors. Its political power is reflected in the ability to successfully pressure other countries in the world (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 4). China has for example established close or strategic partnerships, motivating actors to turn their backs on Taiwan, or

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Economically, China is a relatively unimportant small market, (...) and politically its influence is puny” (Segal, 1999, p. 24).

28 Which are subject to double moral standards as China itself has been carrying out small interventions. Nevertheless, it keeps emphasizing “how determined it is to preserve its own complete independence, and how much it disapproves of (...) superpowers’ military interventions abroad” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 589).

29 Referring to a denomination adopted by the Chinese government since the 1990s. It refers to countries
forcing them to choose between the two of them by tying Chinese investment and trade to their response (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 5).

The third category is internal cohesion, which China has achieved. Nevertheless, it faces internal disputes in Tibet, Xinjiang (Khanna, 2009, pp. 78-81, Hauser, 2009, pp. 33-34 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 28-29) and Taiwan (Yahuda, 2007, p. 106).

The fourth category refers to a country’s ability to challenge the status quo in the international system and to contribute to generating a revised international order. China is challenging the established order (He, 2009, p. 104) as a powerful actor in different world regions, as the creator of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (Yoon, 2014), the Shanghai Group and of the Chinese bank for development, as a major aid giver, and as a consulting partner of ASEAN and other international organizations. With China’s growth, there is hope the country will turn into a responsible stakeholder (Heilmann, 2004, p. 251 and Dittmer, 2010b, p. 226), especially because it has become difficult to make decisions on a global level without its participation (Saich, 2004, p. 310 and Heilmann, 2004, p. 245).

The fifth category states that China must be recognized as an emerging power to become one. With the creation of the acronym BRICS, it has achieved that recognition. This last category also refers to close relations with other emerging powers. Contrary to how China interacts with major powers and with smaller ones, it adopts a different strategy when negotiating with its peers. Narliskar calls it a “competitive-cooperative relationship” (Narlikar, 2010, p. 103). South-South cooperation has also increased through the country’s ability to achieve investments and contracts throughout the world, in part by portraying itself as a developing country (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 117), rather than as an emerging or great power (Kissinger, 2012, p. 504).

Having defined China’s power status, the next segment will analyze Chinese soft power the Chinese government wants to deepen relations with (He, 2009, p. 115); no clear guideline on who becomes strategic partners exists, as both industrialized and developing countries are included (Oviedo, 2006, pp. 385-386 and p. 391 and Schmalz, 2006, p. 36).
tools and how the country is implementing them in East Asia.

2.1.1. China’s power resources and implementation of its soft power strategy

Already in the 1990s, when Nye first coined the term, there was discussion in China about the term soft power, e.g. how it could be translated and how it would benefit the country. Edney analyzes how Nye sees soft power and how the Chinese do: for the former, it is more important to foster a country’s own strength, while the Chinese perspective focuses on “countering the effects of Western influence (…), and does not yet see soft power as a means by which the fundamental patterns of international relations might be restructured” (Edney, 2012, p. 906).

An important part of the discussion within China about how to treat soft power was influenced by the definitions Chinese authors themselves offered. Yan and Xu define soft power as “a combination of country’s international attractiveness, (…) its external and internal mobilization capabilities” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 20). Both authors, as well as professors Qian Chengdan and Chen Yugang clarify that China’s institutions are a hindrance to its soft power and that the country’s political system needs to be reformed to achieve better results (Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 21).

The approach towards soft power that was chosen by the Chinese government underlines the importance of soft power for a country like China that aspires to actively participate in the world system as a respectable actor. Soft power had to be adapted to Chinese tradition and to emphasize the country’s uniqueness (Lai, 2006, p. 2). For example, Nye defines culture as one of three pillars of soft power, while the Chinese government has put it on a pedestal, where it “has become almost a synonym for cultural attractiveness” (Edney, 2012, p. 908). That almost purely cultural approach might reflect Chinese fears of being questioned about other issues, i.e., politics (Dynon, 2014). Dynon refers to “all culture, no politics” (Dynon, 2014), which could hinder the growth of Chinese soft power.

Another important part of the government’s actions concern the inclusion of soft power in actual policies. One example is the 10-year guideline passed in 2011, which relates to cultural industries, socialist culture, soft power related institutions and the commitment of the government to become more competitive in those areas (Huang, 2011). Most
importantly, culture has been included in five-year plans and in important declarations (Smits, 2014, pp. 12-13) related to the expansion of cultural industries as part of the country’s development (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 195-196).

The eleventh plan reinforces “a larger presence of China at international cultural markets. It designs a comprehensive approach to popularizing Chinese culture worldwide through cultural exchanges (...). It also emphasizes the growth and exports of Chinese (...) artistic products, including movies, TV dramas (...), music, electronic games” (Lai, 2006, p. 6). The twelfth plan (2011-2015) continued this approach by promising to invest heavily in cultural industries, with the goal to modernize and to make China’s cultural sector more competitive, specifically in areas such as philosophy, cinema and literature (Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 195).

Beijing Consensus

The actions and strategies that characterize China’s soft power strategy are sometimes referred to as its charm offensive (McClory, 2010, p. 2). That term also includes development aid, infrastructure-building, the hosting of international events (Nye, 2011, Rawnsley, 2009, pp. 285-286 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 18) as well as concepts such as Peaceful Rise (Yan, 2011b, p. 100).

Chinese concepts and policies can also be summarized as the so-called Beijing Consensus (BC). It is a clear contrast and alternative (Schmidt, 2009, p. 142) to the Western Washington Consensus for the development of countries, which has been on a steady downfall since it failed to bail countries out of the economic crisis, while China was not disastrously affected by it (Fanjul, 2009, pp. 1-2).

The Consensus “avoids rule making and (at least in theory) the imposition of rigid standards of political and economic conduct on China’s partners. It is guided by a proclaimed noninterference in the affairs of other states, (...) support of state-centered development, and removal of conditionality from trade, aid, and investment policies” (Gurtov, 2010, p. 21). The Beijing Consensus has thus opened new possibilities for those countries in the international system who now feel treated as equals (Dittmer, 2010a, p. 7 and Schmidt, 2009, p. 142) despite having instable or autocratic governments, e.g. Sudan,
Rawnsley notes a possible “success of soft power as this approach to development connects an attainable economic paradigm with a set of specific political and cultural values—authoritarian state-led management (…), ‘Asian values’, etc.” (Rawnsley, 2009, p. 283). On the other hand, doubts persist over how the model can be exported despite Chinese peculiarities that cannot be easily imitated or left out (Fanjul, 2009, pp. 5-6).

According to Edney, “there is disagreement among scholars and officials over whether China’s development experience ‘is or should be a source of China’s soft power’” (Edney, 2012, p. 911). Li states that the Consensus is not a model for other countries in East Asia, due to its flaws and to the problems present in China, e.g. inequality (Li, 2009, p. 38). The democratic institutions in existence in several countries makes them oppose the autocratic elements of the Consensus (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 16).

**Confucius Institutes**

The main channel for China to exert its soft power is the Confucius Institute (CI), which was modelled after other cultural institutions, for example the Goethe Institute (Pan, 2013 p. 25 and Lai, 2006, p. 2). The institute was named after Confucius, the most influential scholar in Chinese history. During the Maoist regime, Confucian thoughts were repressed, and his legacy shunned, but with the arrival of new governments they were again treated as part of China’s traditional culture and history (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 504-505, Pan, 2013, pp. 24-26 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 19).

Brown refers to CIs as “the front line in presenting the ‘soft side’ of Chinese culture” (Brown, 2010, p. 90). They allow China to work towards its goal of using “language teaching as a means of building relationships, enhancing socio-cultural understanding and promoting trade and foreign investment” (Pan, 2013 p. 25).

The CI remains different from other international cultural institutes. It is closely linked to the Communist Party although being called an independent organization, and functions within the host university which partners up with a Chinese one (Pan, 2013, p. 23). “Sino-foreign joint partnership (...) allows Confucius Institutes sounder financial fundamentals.
While the Chinese partner supplies the teaching staff and materials, the host university (or school) houses the institutes” (Lai, 2006, p. 10). In some cases, the institute has even helped create local programs related to Chinese studies (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 5).

The first CI opened in 2004, and within six years there were already 322 Institutes and 369 classrooms present throughout the world (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 4). Within 9 years, there were 353 institutes and 473 classrooms worldwide (Pan, 2013 p. 22). According to Hanban, 440 institutes and 646 classrooms had been opened by 2013 and it became necessary to create regional centers with an aim to coordinate all efforts (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 3).

The goals of the institute are to promote Chinese culture, for example through activities on special occasions, and Chinese-language learning. It also offers scholarships and coordinates the China bridge competition (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 7, p. 37 and p. 54). Official guidelines such as “The development plan of Confucius Institutes (2012-2020)”, “The Guidelines for Chinese Language Teaching Materials” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 2 and p. 60) and the “International Curriculum for Chinese Language Learning” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2008, p. i) give a thorough insight into some aspects of the cultural soft power that the country wants to extend to the rest of the world (Robinson, 1994, p. 581).

Hanban, a representative of China’s government abroad, oversees the CI and Chinese cultural presence in other countries by maintaining, evaluating and upgrading the existing infrastructure (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, pp. 32-33). Other entities also participate in these activities, which weakens the coordination ability of the government. Examples are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and TV, the Ministry of Commerce and of Communications (Smits, 2014, pp. 14-16).

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30 See Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) (2016) for the full list of institutes and classrooms that existed in 2015.

31 Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language.
International media presence

China is promoting itself internationally through its news agency Xinhua (Nye, 2011), which achieves worldwide coverage through its channels in different languages. This is strategic calculus, since one of the factors that could hinder the growth of the country’s soft power is “that Chinese movies, television programs, and literature, among other offerings, are almost exclusively available only in the Chinese language.” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 17)

CCTV (Nye, 2011 and Smits, 2014, p. 8)\(^{32}\) is also attracting the attention of a wide population in different countries (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 17). The channel “is a political instrument: it receives instruction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about what to include in its programming, based on guidance provided by embassies in the target areas. Programs are designed (...) to sell Chinese business, culture, tourism, and even language” (Rawnsley, 2009, p. 286). China Radio International streams are also constantly being expanded (Nye, 2011 and Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 423).

Television and the film industry are also related to the impact a country’s soft power can achieve through the media. Chinese drama production has adapted to changes in the country and to new realities, for example the emigration of Chinese nationals and the role of women in society (Fernández, 2012 and Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 204). Chinese dramas are being exported worldwide via internet, for example through the online presence of CCTV, which has turned dramas into cultural ambassadors (Fernández, 2012).

Hong Kong cinema, once an example for good “plots and cinematographic style” (Khanna, 2009, p. 263) has been on decline for several decades. Before 1997, it influenced generations of fans of Jet Li, Jackie Chan and Bruce Lee (Yang, 2003, pp. 52-55, pp. 60-65 and p. 97). Their main topics were mostly thrillers, action and especially wuxia (martial arts). Since then, regional and international blockbusters such as Enter the Dragon from 1973 and A Better Tomorrow from 1986 (Yang, 2003, p. 55 and p. 87) have slowly been replaced by partially state-financed movies, i.e., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (Nye, 2004a, p. 88 and Yang, 2003, p. 103).

\(^{32}\) China Central Television.
Current Chinese movies are barely competitive outside the country, since there is no motivation to export them due to China’s immense domestic market, while censorship and excessive bureaucracy hinder the creation of innovative productions (Keane, 2006, p. 12 and pp. 17-18). The “persistence of protectionist policies in media, communications and culture neglects the nurturing of national champions and targeting of potentially lucrative international markets” (Keane, 2006, p. 12). Keane confirms that weak innovation capacity has led China to copy contents, which has in turn hurt the country’s industry while others, such as in the South Korean case, have grown (Keane, 2006, pp. 17-18).

**Education**

China is reinforcing educational policies to make them part of its soft power attraction. This has been successful as more international students are going to the East Asian country to study. Most of them stem from Asia, but Western students’ numbers are also rising (The Independent, 2010). China’s Ministry of Education (MOE) has been actively enabling an easier “visa access, an increase in the number of scholarships available and more English language courses (…) among the policies to be implemented by the MOE as it looks to open up China’s institutes of higher education to the outside world” (The Independent, 2010).

Accompanying initiatives in the field of education and cultural exchange are cultural centers in different countries (Lai, 2006, p. 6), the “Confucius China Studies Program”, which invite foreigners to China to acquire a doctoral degree, and the “Young Leaders Program” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 6).

Another initiative is the “Chinese Program for Foreign Diplomats” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 54) There is also the Chinese Bridge, a worldwide competition that includes summer and winter camps, and which hosts thousands of participants each year, including foreign students in China to college as well as secondary students from other countries (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 7 and

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33 Instead, American filmmakers have, for example, used the story of Mulan to create content with inherently East Asian traditions, something the Chinese themselves have yet to achieve (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 197-198).
The purpose is to get to know Chinese culture and language while creating an opportunity for exchange (Hubbert, 2014, p. 34). The summer camps, which are sponsored by the CI, “build soft power by creating attraction to Chinese culture, but also wield soft power through encouraging targets to understand China as an object of desire.” (Hubbert, 2014, p. 34)

**Conclusions**

As could be seen from the Beijing Consensus, the sections about CIs, media presence and education, the Chinese government is permanently present (Heberer, 2008, p. 164) in China’s soft power policies.

Another important aspect is that Chinese soft power is composed of different elements, which extend beyond the original definition of the concept and of its cultural derivates. Culture includes education, it also includes media such as television and movies. In the next section, these elements mentioned will be transferred to the East Asian content, and then complemented by additional, not necessarily cultural, notions that also form part of China’s (soft) power arsenal.

2.1.2 China’s role in East Asia

This section will analyze China’s position in East Asia, as a regional and as an emerging power. China’s rise in the last decades in East Asia has generated several consequences that are as diverse as the reasons for the country’s positioning.

Whitney and Shambaugh state that its growth into a rising power “is reshaping the strategic map. (…) The region is also experiencing a shift in power, both in terms of U.S.-China relations and key regional relationships. The emergence of China as a major power has strengthened the region’s role as a global economic engine and altered the regional balance of power.” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 1)

Another important consequence is the impact of Chinese culture on East Asian countries, which is an issue not normally included in literature, but nevertheless related to the analysis of emerging powers’ rise. According to Li, “China’s increased influence in East
Asia in the past decade is primarily attributable to its soft use of power in foreign policy.” (Li, 2009, p. 43). Therefore, China’s cultural presence and its growing soft power in East Asia cannot be separated from its classification as an emerging power.

One example of how the East Asian country’s soft power is growing is the growing willingness of school and university students, as well as business people, to learn the country’s language because of its usefulness and the possibility of it replacing other languages as the lingua franca (Clemens, 1998, p. 146). The financing of the CI and of cultural policies through the government has had a major impact on creating 1. Cultural presence through films, series and local cultural activities 2. Future generations of Chinese speaking, maybe even Chinese educated, people 3. A cultural attraction that may help China overcome its weakness in other areas 4. A combination of cultural soft power with the ideological (China as a growth model) and economic (non-interference, China as a donor) one.

The factor that has driven China’s rise in East Asia is its role as a regional power (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 59) through which it can exert far more influence than if it were a purely emerging power. China had been that type of power before (Henderson, 2010, p. 8), which is why falling back into that role happened swiftly, with the country turning into “East Asia’s leading regional growth locomotive” (Dittmer, 2010a, p. 2). China can be classified as a regional power for different reasons, according to the categories mentioned in the last chapter.

First, it is in East Asia, its neighborhood, where it exerts most of its influence. China is also well connected to its surroundings (Snyder, 2009, p. 1), including Southeast Asia and its border regions (Chellaney, 2006, p. 241).35

Secondly, the country acts on a bilateral (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 110) and multilateral basis (Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 423) especially in ASEAN36 (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 8 and Smits, 2014, p. 20), in

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34 See section 1.2.4 of the first chapter for the definition of regional powers.
35 It is well connected, and its influence is growing with “Southeast Asia increasingly accepting it as a key player in the region” (Chellaney, 2006, p. 241).
36 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. China has promoted ASEAN + 3, which includes Japan and South Korea (Hauser, 2009, p. 14).
APEC since 1991 (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 8) and at the East Asia Summit.37

Thirdly, China is working on its ability to act as a representative for Asia. For a long time, it “regarded itself (with some justification) as being isolated and surrounded. This resulted from Mao’s policies toward China’s neighbours, and from the rivalry and ambitions of other powers in Asia during the preceding decades” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 576). The future possibility of China controlling East Asia and beyond depends on its ability to achieve more political, economic and cultural potential as an international actor.

As a regional power, China has achieved great influence and leadership in its own region, where it has built an amalgam of relationships as well as cooperative agreements, which have been very effective in acting against possible coalitions. For example, when Taiwan has tried to lobby for its own policies, China has pressured others at the cultural, political, and economic level to adhere to the One-China policy. One practical example is that a CI is only opened in a country without close links to the island (Lai, 2006, p. 10 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 30).

China’s regional power status is sometimes questioned and regarded “as somewhat ineffective in dealing with regional problems” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 6). This relates to the variety of issues that the country has been confronted with, including North Korea’s actions in recent years, which it has not resolved. Also, China competes for regional power with the strength of Japanese and American presence in the region (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 6-8).

Literature concerning China’s position as an emerging or regional power barely mentions its cultural (soft) power, especially if and how it has contributed to the country’s rise in East Asia. But, if historical influences in the region are analyzed, it can be shown that China has been a crucial presence, due to the expansion of Confucius thoughts in the whole region. For example, South Korea adopted Confucian traditions and its social structure absorbed Chinese social structures, which in combination resulted in giving a higher meaning to origin, ancestors, and other traditions (Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 164-165).

37 A group of countries in the Pacific that includes Australia, Russia as an observer, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea, but not the US (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 8).
Derived from research and from China’s palpable power resources, the preliminary conclusion can already be drawn that the country has soft power in the diplomatic area, for example through multilateral negotiations and in the cultural area, with the appearance of a network of cultural as well as language infrastructure in East Asia.

After having extensively discussed China’s status as an emerging regional power, its soft power policies, along with its presence internationally and in East Asia, I will now turn my attention to South Korea, before comparing both countries to each other.

2.2 South Korea: Middle power

This segment will start with the analysis of why South Korea is a middle power in East Asia and not a regional or emerging one.

Already during the early 1980s the country was participating in international politics as one of the Asian Tigers. At the beginning of the 1990s, while still being called a Newly Industrialized Country (Kang, 1991, p. 68), Korea quickly became a world leader in areas such as information technology (The Academy of Korean Studies-Center for International Studies, 2012, p. 36). Now it is one of the most powerful countries worldwide.

South Korea is not classified as an emerging power since it lacks supremacy in purely economic or political factors, a regional and international leadership role, and the capacity to form lasting blocks around topics related to, e.g., environmental issues (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 59 and Kim, 2012a and 2012b). It has instead positioned itself as a middle power in East Asia, where the country is surrounded by emerging powers, industrialized countries and North Korea (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 64). Shim and Flamm mention that the country “has only limited leeway within its foreign policy and must maneuver constantly between the more powerful regional actors” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 5).

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38 See section 1.2.4 of the first chapter for the definition of middle powers.
39 South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 178).
40 The same authors state that “South Korea is quite capable of keeping up with other assumed regional powers, yet is widely perceived to be only a minor player in regional and global politics.” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 6) and that “[a]t this stage the lack of acknowledgement from peer nations therefore appears to be the main obstacle to considering South Korea a regional power.” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 17)
By hosting a G20 summit (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 2), the Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 4), the Olympic games (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 164)\(^{41}\) and a football World Cup South Korea has left a mark as a bridge between different countries, and a leader in the economic and diplomatic area (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 2 and p. 4 and Kim, 2012a and 2012b). South Korea also uses niche diplomacy, which is “the capacity of middle powers to increase their global, influence and acceptance through the employment of their specific capabilities” (Flemes, 2007, p. 11). It has created institutions aimed at aiding people in other countries, for example through voluntary programs coordinated by KOICA\(^{42}\) (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 264 and Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.).\(^{43}\)

South Korea has already managed to leave behind the limitations of its middle power status (Snyder, 2009, p. 6), in aspects such as cultural soft power in the East Asian region and beyond. Its culture has become a pivotal part of the country’s economy. With “few natural resources to exploit, Korea has depended on its human capital (...) to develop. (...) Foreign ideas were readily imported (...) then innovated upon so that they took on distinctively Korean forms.” (Seo, 2011, pp. 99-97).

Having stated why South Korea is a middle power in East Asia, the limitation it faces and, at the same time, the leverage it has at hand, the next segment will analyze its power resources in that region.

2.2.1 South Korea’s power resources and implementation of its soft power strategy: The Korean Wave

A diversity of factors has determined the type of power South Korea developed. In the past, it was called a Hermit Kingdom due to its inward policies and refusal to subject to others’ demands (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 201 and Kang,

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\(^{41}\) The country has been amply promoting the Winter Olympics it will host in 2018 in Pyeongchang, as part of its public diplomacy strategy (MOFA, 2012, p. 251).

\(^{42}\) Korean International Cooperation Agency.

\(^{43}\) See Korea International Cooperation Agency (n.d.) for the programs that KOICA has summarized, since 2009, under the keyword “World Friends Korea”.

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1993, p. 47). Significant influences,\textsuperscript{44} such as Chinese\textsuperscript{45} and Mongolian presence (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 18 and The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 103 and pp. 112-113), reached the kingdoms of Gojoseon (7\textsuperscript{th} century, or earlier–108 b.c.), Baekje (10 b.c.–660 a.c.) (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 58 and p. 76), Silla (57 b.c.–935 a.c.), Goryeo (918-1392) and Joseon (1392-1910) (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 196-199).

After becoming an imperial power at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Japan started an incursion into Korean territory, eventually annexing the country in 1910, exploiting it economically (Lee, 2005, pp. 40-45 and Croissant, 2008, p. 286), socially and politically (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 201-202).

The Korean War, which erupted after the end of World War II, meant US American presence in the territory. Afterwards, South Korea kept growing with the help of thriving industries and corresponding infrastructure, among other aspects (Lee, 1996, p. 17). That growth has continued through treaties such as FTAs, and close economic relations with a number of countries (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 5). Shim and Flamm state that “approximately 60 percent of the world is now part of South Korean ‘economic territory’ in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). In this sense, the country can be described as a ‘truly’ global economic actor” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 5).

Korea’s usage of economic power is one of the power tools most frequently situated in the spotlight. As it happens, the biggest chaebols\textsuperscript{46} Samsung,\textsuperscript{47} Hyundai,\textsuperscript{48} and LG\textsuperscript{49} have subsidiaries all over the world, where they act with government support.

\textsuperscript{44} Examples of foreign influence are South Korea’s religious beliefs and Confucian tradition that all, except shamanism (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 55), came from different cultures and regions (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 34).
\textsuperscript{45} For example, there was an active commerce of books and other luxury goods between the Silla and Tang dynasties (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 92).
\textsuperscript{46} Enormous conglomerates with brands spanning over different areas of business and corporate investment (Steers et al., 1989, pp. 2-3 and p. 34).
\textsuperscript{47} Created in 1938, the company started as a rice trade business and had already by 1987 expanded into semiconductors and modern technology (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, pp. 119-121, pp. 122-123 and p. 125 and Kang, 1993, p. 86).
\textsuperscript{48} Founded in 1946, the company began its activities in the area of construction. It later stepped into transportation, commerce and finance (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 196 and Kang, 1993, p. 89).
\textsuperscript{49} Founded in 1947, LG first produced cheap cosmetic products and afterwards switched to small electronic devices (i.e., radios). Nowadays, it is a world leader in modern technology, cellphones, household appliances (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, pp. 132-135 and Kang, 1993, p. 92), and oil refining (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 197).
President Park Chung Hee allowed these conglomerates to monopolize their respective markets in the 1960s and 1970s (Kang, 1993, p. 79) by guiding them “toward the sectors considered strategic for the national economy” (Castells, 1992 p. 38), which is how they were able to influence the country’s development (Croissant, 2008, p. 292). With time, South Korea became a liberal and democratized country equipped with an economic model which allowed it to continue its industrialization (Croissant, 2008, p. 291).

Fukuyama states that the Korean model cannot be easily copied due to specific cultural roots and strong government intervention that will not function in other countries (Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 178-182) and because it was built up by authoritarian regimes (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, pp. 14-15). Still, developing countries such as Uganda are adopting the “Saemaul” model designed in the 1970s to help Korea develop it rural sector (Kim, 2014, pp. 40-41).

In the area of diplomacy, South Korea has promoted its values, e.g., nonintervention, through intensive development aid (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.). It has for example invested in “the knowledge-sharing program (...) to share Korea’s development experience with the emerging and the developing world.” (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 6).

As a middle power, one of the tools that has suited South Korean foreign policy the most has been cultural soft power. The next two segments will analyze how that tool has been institutionalized and how the Korean Wave has become South Korean culture’s face in East Asia.

Cultural institutions

Several institutions related to South Korean soft power have grown or have been created since the 1990s (Chung, 2011, p. 55). Some are private, others funded by companies or through combined efforts. According to Kim, so many actors are involved in South Korea’s public diplomacy that they have become rivals and that there is not always a “clear delineation of the division of functions among them.” (Kim, 2012c, p. 539) At the highest level are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism (MCST); “the distinction between them in the division of labour on
international cultural relations is blurred.” (Fisher, 2014, p. 6) Activities by MOFA related to Korea’s national brand include cultural agreements, cultural events, e.g., performances or celebrations in other countries within the Korean embassies (MOFA, 2012, p. 260), promoting language learning and awarding scholarships (MOFA, 2013b).

The Korea Foundation, created in 1991 (Kim, 2011c, p. 130), and MOFA’s main channel of action, “supports the airing of Korean soap operas” (Chung, 2011, p. 49). The foundation further “specializes in cultural exchanges with other countries” (MOFA, 2013b) as well as in academic exchanges and Korea-related activities such as the international “Korean Festival”, and other film and food festivals (MOFA, 2012, p. 25).

Since 2009, KOCIS — the Korea Cultural Information Service — “has been responsible (...) for Korean Cultural Centres, which disseminate information on, and promote engagement with, Korean culture and life” (Fisher, 2014, p. 6). The information service is responsible for online contests that invite winners to the country to experience Korean culture first hand; one example from 2014 was called “Fall in Love with Korea” (Wi and Paik, 2014).

The Korea Culture & Tourism Institute (KCTI) carries out studies analyzing cultural issues and gives suggestions. One example is that “Korea’s cultural diplomacy/cultural exchange approach should strive to establish an international image of a country that communicates through culture and promotes diversity.” (Fisher, 2014, p. 12)

The Korea Arts Management Service (KAMS), “is funded by the MCST to provide assistance to Korean contemporary and traditional arts organisations and practitioners to make the performing arts sector in particular more competitive” (Fisher, 2014, p. 9).

Another entity within the cultural sector is the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), which combines several agencies, including the Korea Culture and Content Agency, the Korea Game Industry Agency and the Cultural Contents Center (Fisher, 2014, p. 15).

The Presidential Council (created in 2009) (Fisher, 2014, p. 14) coordinated efforts50 by

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50 See Presidential Council on Nation Branding (n.d.-a) for a brief outline of the Council’s activities from 2009 until 2012.
different actors (Kim, 2011b, p. 148) to enhance Korea’s brand worldwide, such as the
Global Korea scholarship,\textsuperscript{51} volunteers (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.
and Fisher, 2014, p. 8), aid-giving, tourism and even Taekwondo (Dinnie, 2009, p. 4 and
Kim, 2011c, p. 126). The council oversaw Korea’s international nation brand index
internationally, after the country realized that its ranking did not compare to its existing
power (Kim, 2011c, p. 125 and Kim, 2011b, p. 148).\textsuperscript{52}

The King Sejong Institute (SI)\textsuperscript{53} that started functioning in 2010 (Im, 2013, p. 38)\textsuperscript{54}
resembles other language institutes such as the CI. The King Sejong Foundation is to the
SI what Hanban is to the CI. It was created in a joint effort by the Presidential Council on
Nation Branding and by the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness, and
coordinates the institutes together with MCST. The Foundation also helps international
scholars broaden their knowledge of South Korea, by funding different activities (Im,

The different institutions mentioned serve different goals, all in the name of nation
branding and of cultural soft power, but, as will be seen in the next segment, the Korean
Wave, or Hallyu, has become the true face of Korea’s cultural soft power.

\textit{Cultural soft power: The Korean Wave}

“The Korean culture craze in Asia has led many Asians—especially the younger
generation—to view Korea as the epitome of cool. If one lived in Asia, one would
probably be inclined to think that Korea’s brand power ranked within the world’s top five”
(Kim, 2011b, p. 155). This sentence exemplifies why South Korea is currently excelling
with its cultural soft power. Ryoo even calls the country “Asia’s pop culture leader”
(Ryoo, 2009, p. 139).

In the past, the country was known because of the Korea War or confused with North

\textsuperscript{51} “Which unifies since 2010 all of the government’s initiatives on scholarships, including development
assistance, training for foreign students, educational scholarships for studies in Korea” (National Institute
\textsuperscript{52} Internationally, nation branding is measured through indexes such as the Anholt-GfK Nations Brand
Index (Kim, 2011b, p. 155).
\textsuperscript{53} The Institute is named after King Sejong of the Joseon dynasty (1418-1450), during whose reign the
Korean alphabet Hangeul was created (Lee, 2005, p. 36).
\textsuperscript{54} See King Sejong Institute Foundation (2016) for an exemplary map of where these Institutes are located.
Korea, therefore projecting a hardly beneficial image, but with government support (Kim, 2011c, p. 124) South Korea’s cultural policies started succeeding at the beginning of the 20th century (Seo et al., 2013, p. 9). At that time, Korean dramas, or K-dramas, reached East Asia, thus the Korean Wave started. The term “Hallyu” is synonymous with it and was first coined in China in the 1990s (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 152 and p. 165). It means “Korean pop culture—television, movies and music—that has spread across Asia and to other parts of the world” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 164).

Hallyu can be divided into two phases. The first one began in 1997 and ended in the 2000s, reaching East Asia as well as countries of Southeast Asia; the second one, the Neo-Korean Wave (Seo, 2011, p. 39) started in the 2000s and continues nowadays, accessing all of Southeast Asia and the rest of the world (Wi and Sohn, 2013).

According to Kim, Hallyu is connected to several important aspects, i.e., economic power, government participation, cultural institutions and media presence, which is why it can additionally be divided into four stages that represent its impact on consumers.

“In the first stage, foreigners become avid consumers of Korean dramas, movies, and music (...). The second stage involves (...) buying products that are directly derived from Korean pop culture and visiting Korea (...). In the third stage, foreign customers buy Korean electronics and other everyday items made in Korea (...). In the fourth and final stage, the foreign consumer admires Korean culture and prefers the Korean lifestyle” (Kim, 2011b, pp. 153-154).

Hallyu is now able to reach a more diversified audience, it is “riding on the ‘Digital Silk Road’—a new way of sharing cultural content beyond barriers of race, culture, and region (...). [T]his globalization (...) has moved from its Internet beginnings onto offline platforms throughout the world” (Kim, 2011a, p. 16).

Korean series, or K-dramas form an important part of the Korean wave. They have obtained a cutting advantage as they inspire awe and create a liaison to the audience (Seo, 2011, p. 72), which is further facilitated by the way they are presented that allows audiences to understand them (Kim, 2013). Like other branches of the Korean Wave that started in the 1990s, “the general look and structure of the industry was most similar to


Lyrics in English, good songwriting, choreographies that can be easily copied and a mixture of rhythms are attracting bigger crowds worldwide (Seo, 2011, pp. 51-59 and Klung, 2013, p. 48). Lie states that K-Pop “fill[ed] a niche that was relatively open for clean, well-crafted performers (...). K-pop exemplifies middle-class, urban and suburban values that seek to be acceptable at once to college-aspiring youths and their parents” (Lie, 2012, p. 355).

Before the Korean Wave, movies made in South Korea were unfamiliar to the international public (Russell, 2008, p. 4). Russell mentions in his book about Hallyu that they were always measured against the quality of their American counterparts until one blockbuster, Shiri, attracted international attention by outshining its competitor at that time, Titanic, in Korean cinemas (Shim, 2006, p. 33, Seo, 2011, pp. 80-81 and Koehler, 2013a, p. 7). Starting then, the film industry began catering to different tastes and genres including family, detective, and horror movies (Russell, 2008, pp. 51-56 and pp. 67-68 and Ra, 2012, pp. 222-223), providing “greater sophistication in visuals, music, and genre elements, with the results that Korean films are now recognized for their originality” (Seo, 2011, p. 85).

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55 After Japan’s colonization of South Korea, its “music, movies and television were all off limits, considered too painful a reminder of a difficult time. For decades it was like the biggest pop culture force in Asia did not exist (...). Despite the ban, Japan still made its culture felt in Korea, if only unofficially.” (Russell, 2008, p. 120)
The country has earned its international reputation (Seo, 2011, p. 15) through “strong plots that can win over overseas audiences [through] a deep understanding of foreign cultures and intercommunication with Korea’s own unique emotions and sensitivity” (Seo, 2011, p. 82). Attraction generated by Korean movies has sparked remakes in the US and China (Seo, 2011, p. 13 and pp. 80-84).


Korean movies, dramas and pop music generate an influence beyond cultural factors. The public feels attracted to South Korean products after watching dramas or movies and may want to learn Korean, travel to and study in the country. The mechanism of soft power attraction works in the following way: people become interested in Korean productions or music (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 169) and start connecting with others who share the same tastes and an admiration for current trends in the country. Simultaneously, technological products are shown as part of K-dramas; afterwards the interested public wants to buy them (Chung, 2011, p. 18).

“[M]ultinational corporations have recognized the global economic values of K-Pop artists, and (...) those companies have taken interest in the rising popularity of K-Pop as

56 The Lake House, My Sassy Girl and The Uninvited are all remakes of Korean movies Il Mare, My Sassy Girl and Tale of Two Sisters (Koehler, 2006, p. 10).
57 According to Russell, by “exposing Korean movies to the world and developing connections between producers and filmmakers all over Asia, PIFF played an integral role in the rise of Korean movies” (Russell, 2008, p. 75). The festival started in 1996 (Ra, 2012, p. 221).
58 Puchon International Fantastic Film Festival-PiFan.
its contents have reached all over the world through the Internet” (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2011b, p. 9). Samsung and LG have particularly benefited from the Korean Wave through sponsored content shown internationally. A constant fan base all over the world faithfully buys the products as soon as they appear on Korean television; “overseas viewers’ tastes for Korean dramas both directly and indirectly influence the material, emotional and symbolic benefits sought by the Korean government and Korean businesses” (Kim, 2013).

During the last two decades, the Korean government has actively supported the growth of Hallyu by adapting its laws as needed (Chung, 2011, pp. 48-49 and Kang, 1993, p. 108). Screen quotas (Ryoo, 2009, p. 142) for domestic production with the goal of disabling unequal competition (Mackey, 2010, pp. 111-112) and growing infrastructure, such as studios and training for staff involved in K-drama, are all part of the government’s support (Chung, 2014, p. 12). It has made it clear that culture is part of the “three priorities (…) economic renewal, the happiness of the people and a cultural renaissance. The focus of the latter was to be the Hallyu, cultural heritage and cultural life” (Fisher, 2014, p. 5).

The Korean government “has committed significant resources and energy to position the Korea brand as a vibrant dynamic democracy, creative and open to the world” (Dinnie, 2009, p. 1). One of the first steps it took towards supporting cultural policies was the creation of a “Cultural Industry Bureau” in 1994 (Shim, 2006, p. 32). In 1999, “the Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion” followed (Shim, 2006, p. 34 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32, p. 67). The office of Public Diplomacy (Fisher, 2014, p. 7) supplements the government’s work. The establishment of further institutions to exert more soft power (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 7) is encouraged.

KOFICE — the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange — for example, was created with the aim “to orchestrate all governmental and private endeavors pertaining to the Korean Wave” (Nam, 2013, p. 221). Examples of international activities have been the 9th Drama Conference of Asia, the 4th, the 5th Hallyu Now Seminar and the Korean Wave Industry Leaders Forum 2015; several stakeholders from across the region were invited and topics discussed included exporting Hallyu, connecting it to tourism, K-dramas and the cultural content industry (Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange, 2014a, 2014b and 2015).
Additional efforts include the Cultural Partnership Initiative, “a special intercultural exchange program every year to promote Korean culture worldwide” (Chung, 2012, p. 38). Experts from, e.g. African and Latin American countries with knowledge in diverse fields such as culture travel to Korea to receive an intensive training. While being there, they get in touch with local culture (Chung, 2012, pp. 38-39). MCST coordinates this initiative with the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and with other organizations related to the field of expertise of the foreign specialists (Chung, 2012, p. 39).

*International media presence*

In international media the Korean Wave is present through Yonhap news, Arirang TV and the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). Yonhap is the country’s news agency, with at least 49 worldwide offices (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 55). Arirang focuses on current news, cultural programs and modern Korean culture, including the Korean Wave, which can be accessed via television, cellphone apps or online (Yang, 2012b, pp. 42-43). KBS was founded in 1961 (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 55). Korea’s other main TV stations, MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) were created, correspondingly, in 1969 and 1990 (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 55-56 and Chung, 2011, pp. 59-65). Korean TV channels are also supported by chaebols such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, Daewoo, Saangyong and Kia Motors (Yang, 2012b, p. 44).

This last segment analyzed South Korea’s soft power arsenal, especially the Korean Wave, which can be considered its strongest tool, especially because Hallyu combines several elements such as media, education and, most importantly, culture. Yet one question remains. How has the country used them to position itself in East Asia?

**2.2.2 South Korea’s role in East Asia**

In the past, South Korea did not dominate in any of the power areas within its own region, where Japan, China, and even the US have been permanently present. Cultural assets and soft power have changed that. Hallyu is as a much a tool as the economy or military weapons are. After K-dramas became popular in China, they quickly reached Japan and

Korea has been seeking artists from different Asian countries to include them in its music industry. Singers from the US (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2011b, p. 8), Canada, (Russell, 2008, pp. 156-157) China and Thailand (Kim, 2011a, p. 9 and p. 28) are trained in South Korea and then sent to represent K-Pop in other countries (Seo, 2011, pp. 70-71). They are crucial for closing language gaps, while opening possibilities for market expansion. Producers from other countries, for example the US, are also included in the training and production phase to ensure international reach (Seo, 2011, pp. 63-64).

And not just K-Pop is including foreign artists. Television shows are applying the same formula (Ebora, 2014, pp. 24-25). “The presence of international personalities on television programs (...) has helped both Korean and non-Korean viewers learn more about Korea. With every issue discussed, audiences can get a better understanding of the Korean perspective of the world” (Ebora, 2014, p. 25).

Popularity has had an impact on other areas related to the K-phenomenon, which have become as famous as movies, songs or dramas. With the beginning of Hallyu, sales “soared for Korean popular culture-related products such as books, magazines, DVDs, and accessories” (Chung, 2011, p. 18). I will show some examples of how Korea’s culture has opened these markets in East Asia, resulting in a spillover effect that has proven of crucial benefit to its own cultural as well as economic power.

After the boom created by K-dramas, even make up became fashionable (Leong, 2014) just because of its Korean origin, with products quickly gaining popularity in China and in Japan (Suk, 2013, pp. 31-33) “With the help of top idol stars as the face of these brands

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59 Where “Koreanovelas” have become popular (Chung, 2011, p. 23).
(…) Korean beauty stores are now people’s go-to places for trying the Korean celebrity style (Suk, 2013, p. 32). The same has happened with clothing. Pieces worn actresses or actors are sold out in the region because of the popularity of certain dramas. Korea’s industry has reacted by selling its products locally (Seo, 2011, pp. 62-63). “In this way, the Korean Wave has had a multiplicative effect in encouraging many foreigners to embrace various elements of Korean culture.” (Kim, 2011b, p. 153)

The popularity of Korean TV animation has grown regionally and internationally (Park, 2012, p. 1). This fact is remarkable for a country whose animations only became successful in the mid-1970s, that did not have success till the 1990s, and was facing strong competition from Japanese and American products; the latter were often themselves animated by Koreans who worked for companies such as Pixar (Park, 2012, pp. 6-7 and Lee, 2013, p. 10).

Pororo and Pucca are two of the most popular animated figures to stem from Korean studios. Both have widened the niche of animation for smaller children (Lee, 2013, p. 9). As soon as that industry grew (Ra, 2012, p. 223), the Korean government financed a festival and included animation in its categorization of cultural industries while, characteristic for Hallyu, online platforms were divulging information about it (Park, 2012, p. 8, Lee, 2013, p.5 and p. 9).

In the area of gastrodiplomacy, thousands of Korean restaurants were opened that specialized in chimaek (which means chicken with beer) after it was eaten by the main female character of one K-drama, My love from another star (Chung, 2014, pp. 4-6 and Wan, 2014). Another drama, Daejanggeum, about a royal cook, also sparked a wave of Korean food fans, with restaurants carrying that name being opened in East and Southeast Asia (Chung, 2011, p. 27).

“The Korean government aims at accelerating the further globalization of the national cuisine (…) [its] bold new goal is to make the domestic fare one of the world’s five most favorite foods within a decade, and increase the number of Korean restaurants around the world” (Seo, 2010, p. 11). Seoul initiated a campaign called “Korean Cuisine to the

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60 Also known as Jewel in the Palace.
World”, with the goal of augmenting the quantity of Korean restaurants worldwide (Rockower, 2012, p. 239). One fund “will be used to promote Korean cooking classes in internationally acclaimed cooking schools and help support Korean culinary students with grants and scholarships to attend culinary schools and international food fairs” (Rockower, 2012, p. 239). There is also the Korean Food Foundation which coordinates most efforts (Lee, 2015) and the Korean Cuisine Committee (Kim, 2011c, p. 127).

Through the interest in the Korean Wave, the country has become one of the most popular tourist destinations in its region. People are visiting shooting locations of movies and dramas, traditional houses, monuments, as well as cities (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 63-69) wishing to experience themselves the locations they saw online or through television (Chung, 2011, p. 69 and Chung, 2014, p. 7). In Japan, for example, an “agency offers Korean Wave tour packages connected with Korean concerts and shopping in cooperation with Korea’s duty-free shopping centers.” (Seo, Lee, Hong, and Jung, 2012, p. 11).

The gaming industry is also appealing to younger audiences. This branch started growing in the 1990s (Baek, 2012, p. 197). No devices comparable to PlayStation or to Nintendo consoles stem from South Korea, and still, the development of smartphone apps (Huang, 2011) online, mobile, video (Baek, 2012, pp. 202-203) and role games (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 266 and Huang, 2011) is tightly dominated by Koreans. While online streaming can serve multiple purposes, for example watching music videos on YouTube, this “online pattern extends beyond just music in Korea to videogames, movies, and even comic books” (Russell, 2008, pp. 182-183).

Some countries in the region have started reacting towards South Korean success (Russell, 2008, p. 130). “Government officials in Taiwan, China, and other Asian countries have talked of putting quotas on Korean content or otherwise restricting it if Korea does not import more of their programs.” (Russell, 2008, p. 130). According to them, the country’s growing presence is endangering their local products and culture; they accuse the South Korean government of carrying out cultural hard power policies, and Hallyu is sometimes understood as an extension of US cultural presence (Ryoo, 2009, p. 148). Lie explains that in the case of K-Pop, “the (…) industry, despite being a content-rather than technology-led enterprise, seems to share many of the common South Korean practices.
of doing business” (Lie, 2012, p. 359).

Continued backlash (Seo, Jung, Joo and Lee, 2013, p. 12) sheds light on the fragility of the Korean Wave and the possibilities of its demise in the future (Seo, 2011, p. 95). For now, the country is “advantageously seen as ‘non-offensive’, a political tabula rasa” (Leong, 2014).

2.3 Preliminary conclusions

This chapter examined China’s and South Korea’s international positioning and also their roles in East Asia.

China has positioned itself as an emerging power in its own region. It is the dominant regional power, a position it acquired through the deployment of different power tools. Economic power has enabled the country to expand its soft power presence. For Khanna, it is common in East Asia that economic growth and culture are situated in a circle where culture has created more growth, which has in turn enhanced culture - the author calls it “cultural pride” (Khanna, 2009, p. 266). Yet, cultural soft power has not been the only factor that has allowed China to position itself in the region, but instead can be understood as an element of its foreign policy as well as a catalyzer for other types of power, for example diplomatic soft power.

South Korea’s case is different. With Japan, China, North Korea and the US present, the middle power position in its own region has evoked a niche diplomatic approach, and the deployment of cultural soft power (Ryoo, 2009, p. 149). Hard power has remained relegated. Specializing on a soft power approach, South Korea has managed to rise as a cultural power in East Asia.

China’s and South Korea’s soft powers are similar in the fact that there exists a strong governmental presence in each policy that is decided on. Both countries also share that they evoke threat reactions by other East Asian countries. The “China threat” theory states that a rising China will repeat the actions of other countries that have emerged before (Narlikar, 2010, p. 23). The theory is supplemented by the fact that China has not respected its own principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. The South Korean
“threat “stems from its strong cultural presence in East Asia, which has created a feeling of cultural hegemony.

Besides these conclusions, some of the goals mentioned in the introduction, such as the conceptionalization of soft power, were approached in this chapter.

For Nye, greater powers are the only ones who effectively exert soft power in the international system. He almost solely focuses on the US, or explicitly talks about how “[g]reat powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests” (Nye, 2012), while not mentioning other countries. In this chapter, it could be seen that South Korea, as a middle country, strategically utilizes its soft power to position itself in East Asia. According to Russell, the country is “at the forefront of a variety of changes that are (or will be) affecting all of Asia and the rest of the world.” (Russell, 2008, pp. 216-217) I want to prove with this research that soft power can be helpful to acquire more power regionally and internationally, leaving behind a Western-centered analysis of the concept (Rawnsley, 2014, p. 163).

Nye has not sufficiently defined the differences between hard and soft power. Only in more recent research, the theory was created in the 1990s, did the author reach the conclusion that hard power might be soft. I proved that the opposite is also possible. One example is China’s development aid, which is linked to economic presence and then again to political pressure. Another one is the South Korean “threat” theory.

How much control governments have over their own resources matters much in the East Asian context. The Chinese and the South Korean cases provide enough examples. Soft power cannot be completely manipulated because other countries’ populations are those who “process” what they receive from elsewhere. Governmental presence could hinder the expansion of soft power as it endangers free cultural flows. According to Nye, “postmodern publics are generally skeptical of authority, and governments are often mistrusted. Thus it often behooves governments to keep in the background and to work with private actors.” (Nye, 2004a, p. 113)

Finally, according to Nye, (cultural) soft power works best when cultures are similar. East Asia shares common Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist and shamanistic believes which include
filial piety and a belief in the importance of education, a fact that supports that statement. What would happen to that same cultural soft power in other world regions?

The concept of emerging powers was also expanded in this chapter. It normally does not include culture as a possible category for a country to rise, yet South Korea has proven the opposite in East Asia where it has quickly risen as a dominant cultural presence.

3. Latin America meets East Asia

This chapter starts with the changes that have happened in Latin America, especially in more recent years, and investigates the increased East Asian presence in the subcontinent. One justification for that type of analysis is stated by Nolte who observes the necessity to “include outside powers in the analysis of regional orders and regional power relations in a more systematic manner.” (Nolte, 2010, p. 898) According to that same author it is crucial to see “the relationship between region and powerful actors from outside and from within as one key area for further research” (Nolte, 2010, p. 898).

Through the following analysis, I will determine whether China and South Korea have positioned themselves as emerging powers in Latin America by using soft power strategically as a foreign policy tool, also whether they have replicated their strategies and position, in their own region, within the subcontinent.

Factors that I will analyze are that soft power has been so far almost exclusively studied with an emphasis on the US or on other great powers, without offering a framework for smaller countries that wish to deploy it as a foreign policy tool to increase their international standing. Another relevant issue is that, according to Nye, a common cultural background creates a basis for soft power to have a greater impact on the corresponding countries. With Latin America and East Asia being distant geographically and culturally, how have soft power dynamics developed there?

The concept of emerging powers, again, will be analyzed, taking into account that 1. A rise through cultural policies has barely been considered by literature, which is why I want to prove that it is in fact possible to become an emerging power through its use 2. China and South Korea are middle and emerging powers in their own region, but are both
relatively new actors in Latin America, which makes them “emerging” actors. Will these new powers replicate the position they have in their own region? Or will they turn into another type of power, e.g. small and great powers, once they act in a different local context?

3.1 Latin America. From US backyard to independent subcontinent

No analysis of Latin American politics, or of other actors in the region, can completely exclude the US. Ever since the north American country became a hegemonic power, its presence has had a tremendous impact on the subcontinent.

But, just as with US dominance in the rest of the world, the first problems with its hard power were felt after the end of the Cold War (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 187), when “America decided (...) that it preferred democracies: providing vivid confirmation (...) that Latin America’s political destinies had been directed by American preferences” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 108). In the aftermath of 9/11, when the eyes of the world turned towards the Middle East (Ellis, 2006, p. 6), Latin America became less and less relevant for the hegemon (Leiteritz, 2013, p. 75 and Mols, 2010, p. 27), with the growing impression by governments in the region “that their positions were not taken into consideration on a wide range of international issues from the Iraq war to immigration policy.” (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 8)

At the same time, changes were happening regionally, with socialist governments being elected in several countries (Ellis, 2006, p. 6 and China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 8 and Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 185). A “factor that propelled them into power was widespread disillusionment with the effects of American domination in the region (...). By the end of the 1990s (...) pro-American sentiment had evaporated, followed by the election of a series of populist and left-leaning governments in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 109)

Some countries allied with Venezuela and its leadership in the creation of ALBA, the “Bolivian Alternative for the Americas” (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 188). ALBA opposed “ALCA”, in English the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTTA), an initiative proposed by the US since the 1990s (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, pp .2-3).
Others chose to remain close to the US (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 16).

Yet, even with these political changes occurring, the US remains the main commercial partner for many Latin American countries (Philipps, 2010, p. 194). It has signed FTAs throughout the region, including NAFTA with Mexico (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 15). In the cultural area, even countries who criticized US military interventions consume everything American culture offers such as movies, clothing style and music. One explanation for that type of cultural soft power is that those who are at the receiving end of soft power do not care about US interventions or the country’s hard power as they either do not know much about the country’s history or feel unaffected by it. Which means that, if US products are popular, they will buy them without further consideration about their origins.

For this to happen, Latin American and US American cultures did not have to be close from the start. The language is different (apart from English-speaking countries in the Caribbean), as are the historical origins and development paths. But it should not be forgotten that, for at least the last six decades, Latin American media, politics along with the population have been oriented towards absorbing as much American products as possible. The country’s status as a hegemon, the biggest economy in the world and a hard power giant, created the existing attraction. People do not want to go to the US because they love drinking Coca Cola, but because of how they could benefit from the country’s economic power. People learn English because they know that their employment and educational chances, as well as the possibility to leave for the US, could skyrocket.

In the meantime, less US presence has left enough space for extra-regional actors, e.g., from East Asia, to act proactively (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 3 and Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, p. 1), taking away part of its hard and soft power success from the past. With the hegemon distracted, they have increased their power dimensions (Mora, 1997, p. 41 and Sun, 2013) since the 1990s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2004). Two of the actors that have taken advantage of the new dynamic have been South Korea and China.

The next segment will evaluate both countries’ emergence in the region, and if they have done so through the deployment of soft power.
3.2 Chinese presence in Latin America

China’s current position in Latin America can be described as such: it is “taking advantage of (…) Washington’s unwillingness to pursue ‘good neighbor’ relations in Latin America with much enthusiasm” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 225) and it has become the most important trade partner for many countries in the region. The main one for “Brazil, Chile and Cuba; and the second one for Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru. It is (…) the main provider of imports for Paraguay and the second for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 34, own translation).

China’s history with Latin America dates back several centuries, even if its “growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenomenon that has developed over the past several years” (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 16).

There is some dissent in literature about whether China was present in the subcontinent before Spanish colonization. According to publications dating from the beginning of this century, Chinese reached Latin America before the subcontinent was discovered and colonized, taking advantage of maritime power in the 15th century (Khanna, 2009, p. 303, and Menzies, 2002, p. 410 and pp. 460-461). There have also been efforts, from the Chinese side, of proving an early connection between Latin America and China. “For two decades, Chinese investigators (...) have studied the link between ancient China and Pre-Columbian America. In 2006, they traveled to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, in the footsteps of what is known as the ‘journey of the Yin to the east’ ” (Castro Obando, 2015). These theories are largely based on supposition (Slack, 2010, p. 7) and on contrasting Chinese and international hypotheses (Xu, 2008, pp. 31-32); it is widely accepted that the extensive exchange between China and Latin America developed later.

In the following paragraphs, I will shortly analyze the historical presence of Chinese in Latin America, due to its importance for the subcontinent’s relation with the country.

According to Look Lai, there have been three clearly discernible periods of Chinese immigration: “the early colonial period (pre-19th century); the classic migration period
The early colonial period included commercial links between China and Latin America and centered on products such as silver; Mexico served as a bridge between East Asia, Southeast Asia (especially the Philippines), Europe and Latin America (Gordon, Morales and Muñoz, 2015).

It was during the second period that the massive coolie trade took place (Look Lai, 2010, p. 2, Xu, 2008, pp. 32-33 and Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 134). According to Look Lai, the term means “Chinese indentured-worker migrations to the plantations of slave and ex-slave America, especially to Cuba and Peru, and sometimes to the (...) British, French, and Dutch West Indies in the 19th century.” (Look Lai, 2010, p. 2). The reason behind that Chinese workforce was the need for replacement of the African slaves that were diminishing in number (Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 131).

Migration flows accompanied the historical situation in China — including the Opium Wars and Maoism (Look Lai, 2010, p. 3 and Eng Menéndez, 2013, pp. 132-133). They were also determined by the natural resource that was being extracted locally. For example, some Chinese went to Cuba when there was a demand for work in local plantations, and to Peru, which was exporting guano (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 68) and looking for hacienda workers (García and González de Castejón, 2004, p. 32 and Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 207).61

The waves of immigrants also depended on the political atmosphere in different Latin American countries, and on the economic situation that accompanied it (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 91 and p. 97, and Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 130). For example, when a government was open to other countries migration would be encouraged (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 143). In Peru, the “Ley china, allowed the introduction of an indentured work force from China thanks to an extremely lucrative commercial enterprise which replaced the slave trade.” (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 143). When the governments decided otherwise, Chinese immigration would be stalled (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 148).

In several countries there were aggressions against Chinese living there, as “sooner or

61 According to García and González de Castejón (2004, p. 32), in the years around 1860 about 100,000 Chinese workers were brought to Peru to work at these haciendas.
later negative reaction from those around them would arise, resulting in outbreaks of sinophobia (...) ranging from angry discourse to physical violence and extreme measures of ethnic cleansing” (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 65).

Those Chinese that overcame difficulties, created their own communities in different countries, including Chinese quarters (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 146 and p. 172) and Chinatowns (Robinson, 2010, p. 110 and pp. 118-119). Those who had been indentured, under contract or that had gone to Latin America in search of new opportunities, later pursued other types of occupations when the conditions were right. “[T]he Chinese quickly and effectively established themselves as small manufacturers, shopkeepers and retail merchants, at the same time providing services such as laundry, tailoring (...) food preparation and hotels” (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 71).

Chinese immigration did not stop after the East Asian country became more powerful. Instead, the last and current wave of Chinese migration started. Although the quantity is not the same, nowadays Chinese are migrating to Latin America as part of international firms (Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 6 and Lausent-Herrera, 2012, p. 391), as government staff (Ellis, 2009, p. 275), among other reasons. Ellis considers that more recent immigration “is likely to expand the presence of Chinese culture in the region, from entertainment to foods to style. Although Latin America may continue to be dominated by US culture” (Ellis, 2006, p. 19).

Beginning in the 1970s, the Chinese government initiated official and pragmatic relations62 as part of its strategy to reach out to the subcontinent (Mora, 1997, pp. 35-42). “Because of China’s support for the region’s revolutionary groups (...) Beijing [had been] (...) unable to establish normal diplomatic or economic/trade relations with any country except Cuba” (Mora, 1997, p. 40).

With China’s growth as an economic as well as political power and its status as an emerging and regional power, the country started competing directly with established powers (Sun, 2013). While the US gradually lost control over its “backyard”, the East

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Asian country was carrying out closer South-South relations (Oviedo, 2006, p. 397 and Leiteritz, 2013, p. 69) with it. At the beginning, though, none of these dynamics was massive, as “Latin America was of marginal interest to Beijing´s foreign policy priorities. The region seemed impenetrable and distant, largely because of China´s general lack of knowledge concerning [its] culture, language, politics, and socioeconomic conditions” (Mora, 1997, p. 36 and Jacob, 2010, p. 140).

The complex relations that exist nowadays with Latin America started forming after China’s entry to the WTO that afterwards led to initiatives such as the strategic partnership model, which focuses on economic factors (Oviedo, 2006, p. 400). One of the main reasons for countries to be chosen by China as strategic partners is “because they are key powerbrokers in the region, as bilateral actors as well as leaders in regional organizations like UNASUR, ALBA or BancoSur, with significant influence over other smaller countries.” (Dominguez and Stenman, 2009, p. 22)

FTAs focus on the trade of resources from Latin America, frequently in exchange for low quality products from the Chinese side (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 33, Leiteritz, 2013, p. 73 and Oliveira, 2012), “the bulk of which are labor-intensive, low-technology, and low-value added. Key products here are textile and apparel, footwear, machinery, and plastics” (Philipps, 2010, p. 184). Meanwhile, a slow transition can be observed towards trade in sectors related to, e.g., “automobiles, (...) steel, telecommunications, and electronics” (Philipps, 2010, p. 184).

China´s pragmatic foreign policy, which includes win-win deals, (Leiteritz, 2013, pp. 71-72 and Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 26) has offered Latin America the possibility to open its own markets. But, there have been some strings attached. On the one hand, the countries in the region could be walking right into a resource trap (Santiso, 2007a, p. 14) by not building their own industries in more advanced sectors but exporting, for example, strictly agricultural products (Ellis, 2009, p. 12). On the other hand, China will and might already have begun to face the same challenges in Latin America as in East Asia, where local populations are reacting to its presence. Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom speak of different China effects, depending on the country analyzed within

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63 Already in the 1980s had trade occupied the top most priority for China’s relations with Latin America (Mora, 1997, p. 44).
the subcontinent (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 181).

Some industries are being affected by competition (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 16), and resources are becoming scarce, while environmental problems have arisen (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 26) because of massive Chinese-funded infrastructure and economic projects (Gallagher, 2010, p. 7 and Ellis, 2009, p. 150).

One way to counteract problems arising from extended economic relations are political and diplomatic exchanges. One example is Chinese presence in regional Latin American organizations. It includes membership, observer status at and investments in the Interamerican Development Bank (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 34), the Latin American Integration Association\(^{64}\) (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 11) the OAS (Ellis, 2009, p. 3) and exchanges with Mercosur (Philipps, 2010, p. 180). Active participation in issues related to APEC,\(^{65}\) the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PECC) (Hauser, 2009, p. 14), FEALAC\(^{66}\) (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 11)\(^{67}\) has kept growing.

Political visits could be attributed to the One-China policy (Leiteritz, 2013, p. 75 and Strauss, 2012, p. 148). China has long wanted to achieve one political goal through its diplomacy, which is to keep pushing Taiwanese presence back from Latin America (Mora, 1997, p. 42), where the island still has at least half of its worldwide supporters (Khanna, 2009, pp. 126-127, Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 7 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 33).

China has become an emerging power in the region, through its economic policies, presence in multilateral organizations, as well as growing political ties with the subcontinent. It has received the recognition as a growing power through its participation in regional political and multilateral dynamics, as part of BRICS (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 34).

\(^{64}\) ALADI.

\(^{65}\) Only Chile, Mexico and Peru (Berrios, 2012, p. 139) are full members of APEC, which has allowed them to benefit from closer ties with East Asia (García and González de Castejón, 2004, p. 56 and Jacob, 2010, p. 147).

\(^{66}\) Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation.

\(^{67}\) Since the creation of FEALAC, “almost all (…) Latin American countries” (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, p. 1 and pp. 19-20) have participated in it; cooperation takes place through multiple channels, including cultural issues (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, p. 20).
China’s economic strength towers over all other factors (Mora, 1997, p. 48). Political exchanges, diplomatic arrays or development aid, mostly accompanied by the building of infrastructure, or both at once (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 16) can be understood as accompanying initiatives. What role does cultural soft power play in all of this? How is it connected to the economic factor, to political and diplomatic initiatives? Has it helped China turn into an emerging power in the subcontinent? I will analyze these questions in the next subchapter.

3.2.1 Chinese soft power in the region

China’s cultural soft power in the region is not recent, starting even before official political relations with the region formed. In the 1940s and 1950s, the country “hoped to win sympathy of educated Latin Americans (...) and convince them that the Chinese revolutionary experience and strategy were applicable to their situations. The individuals were targeted because of the great influence they exerted in their own countries. In short, along a combination of diplomatic channels and economic resources” (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 11). China had, already at that time, realized the importance of cultural and ideological diplomacy (Mora, 1997, pp. 38-39).

Hanban’s current activities within the subcontinent make it possible to state that CIs are the Asian country’s ambassadors of culture in Latin America. Their main activities include language courses, cultural knowledge and expert advice on China.

One big step towards creating specific programs by the CI for its bureaus in Latin America was taken in 2014, when a regional center for the coordination of Hanban’s activities in the region was created in Santiago de Chile. Meetings of all CIs located in Ibero-American countries had been taking place for years. For example, “[t]he 2010 Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Iberia was held in Chile. More than 100 delegates from 25 Confucius Institutes in 10 countries, Chinese embassies to 10 countries and 14 partner universities and colleges in China attended the conference” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 61).
Confucius Institutes are located at universities, but academic exchange between China and its Latin American counterparts remains limited. “Much of the cooperation between educational institutions in China and Latin America remains focused on science, vocational, or technical education.” (Inter-American Dialogue, 2012) One reason being that East Asia has only recently appeared on the subcontinent’s radar, when compared to other regions (Jacob, 2010, p. 140). Another one is that there “has been no systematic policy network involving the state, domestic companies and academic institutions to design and promote an Asia-Pacific policy” (Berrios, 2012, p. 148).

The Community of Chinese and Latin American Studies (CECLA), located in China and created in 2015 by academics from that country and from Latin America (Comunidad de Estudios Chinos y Latinoamericanos, n.d.), is an active actor within the educational sector in areas ranging from research to exchange to cultural activities, business, politics and education. CECLA created the Guanghua Fund in 2015, which is “its first public fund to generate exchange between young Chinese and Latin Americans.” (Castro Obando, 2016a) The fund takes advantage of Latin America’s cultural year in China in 2016, which enables using public diplomacy elements related to that event, to bringing both sides within the academic sector closer together (Castro Obando, 2016).

Chinese presence has had another source in Latin America: soft power related to China’s massive growth since the beginning of the 20th century. It took several years for the local population to accept the Chineseness in the products that they were buying, as well as for the government to realize that Chinese culture should be promoted for soft power sake and to improve the country’s international position.

Recently, Chinese cultural products and brands Made in China have acquired more prominence within the Latin American landscape.

For example, Chinese technological brand names used to be discarded due to the low quality associated with them. Nevertheless, companies, i.e., ZTE and Huawei (Silk and Malish, 2006, p. 123), have become active actors in countries such as Brazil, both winning important contracts in the country (Ellis, 2009, p. 55). “Telefónica, the leading Spanish firm with a regional Latin American franchise, (...) offered Huawei facilities to enter the Latin American market in a move to sell products for all of (...) [its] Latin American
subsidiaries.” (Blázquez et al., 2007, p. 70) Huawei has been successful in Colombia, where it is supplying local companies Movistar and Colombia Móvil (Ellis, 2009, p. 164).

China’s cultural soft power in Latin America is intrinsically related to the country’s economic situation and steady growth. It is difficult to know how much the Chinese government realizes and adapts its strategies, and how much it is interested in, for example, the CI offering more courses related to business (culture), investment and others. Yet, this connection is vital to understand how Chinese cultural soft power is working.

The strong interaction between the cultural and economic spheres is reflected in the country’s soft power capacity. Economic possibilities could attract more people to Chinese cultural initiatives to show them that, by learning the language and knowing the culture, they are able to participate in the Chinese miracle. But, a combination of economic and soft power could only become a reality once the government does not strictly separate, as it is currently doing, culture from power factors such as politics and economy.

In the next part of the chapter, I will discuss soft power from the point of view of a middle power. South Korea had almost no influence on the Latin American landscape before the last decade.

3.3 A growing presence in the subcontinent: South Korea’s foreign relations with Latin America

The first step towards bilateral relations between South Korea and Latin America was taken at the end of the 1940s, and taken advantage of during the Korean War. South Korea’s progressive growth in the following decades was accompanied by more solid relations and exchanges with the subcontinent, for example in the area of manufacture (Giné Daví, 2008).

During the 1990s, the East Asian country became a member of the United Nations and an important economic actor. At the same time, the East Asian crisis hit those Latin American countries that had profited from closer relations to the region’s countries, as they were not able import resources at the same pace they had done before (García and
González de Castejón, 2004, 100). Trade with South Korea almost fell to half of its normal volume, while investments and other financial transactions had to be stopped (Giné Daví, 2008).

Nevertheless, South Korea began positioning itself internationally as a middle power in the subcontinent (Velarde, 2015, p. 41), for example by emphasizing diplomatic and economic relations, which included the first official visit of a South Korean president to Latin America (Kim Young Sam) (Chacón, 2011, p. 3).

Important middle power initiatives such as MIKTA, of which Mexico also forms part, and the Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean also became a reality. KLAC “was founded on August 21st, 1996 with the mission of improving and deepening (…) economic, social and cultural realms between Korea and Latin America and the Caribbean.” (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006) The Council creates exchange with Latin American countries in topics related to trade, diplomacy, political relations, business and culture (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016), among others. The Council has even signed MOUs with several (inter-)regional institutions (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006).

Additionally, South Korea has either a permanent or an observer status in the PECC, OAS, FEALAC, IDB since 2005 (López Aymes, 2012, p. 4 and Giné Daví, 2008), and ECLAC68 since 2007; these institutions serve the purpose of amplifying interregional cooperation (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 33 and Giné Daví, 2008), as does APEC (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011, p. 29).

The country has become an important actor within FEALAC, where it has “not only participated, but played a leading role (…) as: Regional coordinator for East Asia (2004-2007), Co-Chair of Working Group on Economy and Society (2010-2011) and Co-chair of Working Group on Politics, Culture, Education and Sports (2010-2011)” (MOFA, 2012, p. 101). In 2012, the first “High-Level Forum between Korea and the Caribbean” took place (MOFA, 2012, p. 101), broadening South Korea’s area of possible diplomatic influence. The country has also cooperated with the Central American Integration System

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68 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
founded in 1993; an alliance that resulted in a MOU (MOFA, 2012, p. 102).

Economically speaking, South Korean interests in Latin America resemble China’s. Its economy relies on natural resources (Lee, Kim and Shirley, 2011, pp. 252-255) for the continuous development of its industries, which include high technologies and other areas, i.e., shipbuilding. “[I]t is not only China in the Pacific basin that represents an important market for Latin American exports with potential to grow. Asian countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (...) are interesting trade partners for Latin American economies.” (Jacob, 2010, p. 146) This is reflected in the fact that, nowadays, several FTAs have already been signed between Korea and Latin American countries (MOFA, 2012, pp. 97-98), including with Chile in 2002 (Giné Daví, 2008 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 33).

Where China has its official strategic partnerships, South Korea has strategic relations with its closest partners, with whom the country cooperates closely. Politically, Latin America offers to South Korea a new group of countries to partner up with on an international level, around topics such as intellectual property or human rights. The fact that the East Asian country (Snyder, 2009, p. 4) and the subcontinent have been close to the US for decades, might also matter. Common ideological believes, i.e., neoliberalism, democracy and respect for human rights, are areas where a closer relationship could develop.

There is no “Seoul Consensus”, but the East Asian country’s growth model provides “valuable lessons coming from its successes in mass and elite education, information technology, transport infrastructure and clean energy technologies” (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011, p. 25). South Korea, as a middle power, can offer the experience of transitioning from developing to developed and from a producer of cheap products to one of high technology (MOFA, 2012, p. 105).

The following analysis of South Korean foreign policy tools will demonstrate that Nye and other soft power experts have been systematically neglecting smaller and middle countries’ capacity of building soft power. I will also show that countries can emerge, in

69 See Inter-American Development Bank (2011) for more information about bilateral agreements and cooperation initiatives between South Korea and several Latin American countries.
their own or in other world regions, through (cultural) soft power.

3.3.1 South Korean soft power in the region

South Korea has emerged in Latin America through cultural soft power.

That cultural rise happened within a region that had not before been strongly interested in East Asia and which had been influenced by American cultural presence. The Korean government has tried to reduce geographical distance by financing programs that support cultural events throughout the subcontinent. One example is the “Mutual Cultural Exchange Program” to promote more bilateral contacts (MOFA, 2012, p. 251 and pp. 254-255). The “program gives an opportunity for more than 130,000 Koreans to experience other cultures and helps them to gain a deeper understanding of cultural diversity” (MOFA, 2012, p. 256). Cultural exchange on a bilateral level also takes place through Joint Cultural Commissions, which have brought Korea closer to several Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Colombia (MOFA, 2012, p. 257).

But governmental efforts have not single-handedly caused the phenomenal growth of Korean culture in Latin America since the beginning of the 2000s. So many Latin Americans are now interested in learning Korean that the SI is offering different language course levels (Lee, 2012) and has opened additional branches in the subcontinent. So-called “Hangeul schools” teach the language by focusing on the Korean alphabet, which is “a valuable cultural asset that encompasses the Korean people’s culture, history, and tradition in a concise form” (Song, 2012, p. 55).

The rise of Korean as the “it”-language has been caused by the presence of Korean cultural products in Latin America. As mentioned before, for some authors Hallyu reaches other countries in four stages (Kim, 2011b, pp. 153-154). As will be seen in this chapter, some Latin American countries have already reached the second stage, by surpassing mere consumption while associating cultural products with the country they stem from.

I will start the analysis of Korean cultural products in Latin America with K-Pop. Fans

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70 See the second chapter of this study, segment 2.2.1 “Cultural soft power: The Korean Wave”.
are attracted to the voices, and the esthetics of singers, boys or girl groups. Learning K-Pop lyrics and dances, imitating (Seo et al., 2012, p. 10) and understanding them is one of the elements that have powered Korean language learning. South American (…) fans hold regular meetings online and offline to share information about the most recent albums and concerts or promotional activities of their favorite singers” (Seo, 2011, p. 50). According to the Samsung Economic Research Institute, “companies need to turn their attention to K-pop fans in (…) Latin America (...). [They] should devise an overseas marketing strategy that includes K-pop management companies’ use of SNS platforms” (Seo et al., 2012, p. 11).

K-dramas are also attracting younger generations who watch them via internet or (MOFA, 2012, p. 259) on their favorite TV channels, in countries varying from Cuba (Limb, 2013) and Venezuela, to Costa Rica and US territory Puerto Rico (Chung, 2011, p. 34). They began airing in the region about 14 years ago (Seo, 2011, p. 74). “In Mexico, Winter Sonata, My Lovely Samsoon, All about Eve, Autumn in My Heart, (...) and Four Sisters aired on the country’s public network Mexiquense” (Chung, 2011, p. 34). In 2007, SBS partnered with Telemundo, which is present throughout Latin America, with the goal to export K-dramas to the subcontinent’s market (Lee et al., 2011, p. 257). In Peru, several dramas have been shown on TV Perú (Chung, 2011, p. 34 and 2013, p. 9) and Channel 7 (Seo, 2011, p. 74). K-dramas proved to be popular in regional channels such as Mundo Fox and Red Guaraní, where they are even actively competing against local TV content through higher ratings (up to 200% more) than other productions (Chung, 2013, p. 9).

This may be related to the fact that there are “[g]overnment measures to sustain (...) [them] (...) included subsiding production costs of some films and TV dramas, as well as facilitating the broadcast of Korean TV drama series in Latin America” (Fisher, 2014, p. 15.) They are also liked because they “explore themes and values that the Korean people share with many other cultures that are (...) traditional, collectivist, and hierarchical” (Kim, 2011b, p. 155).

71 Peruvian K-Pop fans, for example, are very active. One “flash mob turned into a Korean cultural experience with Korean food, dancing, and even a Taekwondo demonstration.” (Seo, 2011, p. 49)
72 SNS meaning Social Networking Service(s).
73 See Chung (2011, pp. 32-33) for a map of countries in which K-dramas are watched.
74 “[T]he Korea Foundation supports the airing of Korean soap operas free of charge; as a result, Autumn in My Heart and Winter Sonata were dubbed into Spanish for broadcast in eleven countries (...) while Jewel in the Palace was shown in eight Central and South American countries” (Chung, 2011, p. 49.)
While it cannot be considered a product, interest in Korean education is also part of Hallyu. However, university programs in Latin America that center on Korea remain limited. Some examples are the Korean education program and a degree in Korean studies offered in Mexico, a lecture offered in Cuba and, “Korean language programs or lectures on Korean studies (...) run by universities in seven Latin American countries, including Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Guatemala” (Lee, 2012). These efforts could be further developed, for example by “creating professorships at foreign universities, sending visiting professors, and research[ing] on Korean studies” (MOFA, 2012, p. 260), financing scholarships, lectures, materials and language programs, extending invitations to experts and researchers, among the options that the Korea Foundation and MOFA offer to countries worldwide (MOFA, 2012, p. 261).

There is also the possibility of expanding regional meetings dedicated to Korean studies in the subcontinent, the so called “Encuentros de Estudios Coreanos en América Latina” (EECAL), which started in 2003 (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2013). About 32 professors from all over the subcontinent were invited to the first event hosted by EECAL in Argentina (Velarde, 2015, p. 42). Since then, they have taken place every two years, in different Latin American cities. Goals are to strengthen academic networks, existing cooperation and integration between the subcontinent and South Korea, as well as to research political, economic and cultural issues (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2013). Case studies have also included Cuban-Korean exchanges, the Colombian FTA with Korea, Korean culture in Buenos Aires (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2015), ASEAN, education, online presence, Confucianism, and religion (Velarde, 2015, p. 42).

Another important aspect of South Korean soft power is its cultural presence in Latin America through immigration. Compared to the Chinese case, not as many ethnic Koreans live in the subcontinent and immigration started much later than in the case of other countries. The first wave (previously just a few individuals had chosen that path) of Koreans reached the subcontinent at the beginning of the 20th century, for work at local plantations; a second wave arrived shortly after the end of the Korean War (Mera, 2006). A third wave of Korean immigrants reached Latin America in the 1960s (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32). They “moved to cities (…) and devoted

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75 See Velarde (2015, p. 43) for an exemplary list of Korean studies that exist in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
themselves to commercial activities” (Mera, 2006). Most of these Korean emigrants left for countries in South America, including Brazil and Argentina (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32). Further re-emigration to other countries in the region also took place.

The relatively small number of Koreans living in Latin America has managed to take advantage of Hallyu by multiplying business activities, selling diversified products, e.g., Korean food (Mera, 2006), and attracting fans from different countries. As will be seen in the following chapter, Koreans in Chile have even contributed to the growth of Hallyu, and with that, of Korean cultural soft power.

In the last part of the analysis of South Korea´s presence in Latin America, I will compare the country´s position within the region with that in East Asia, to analyze the following topics: how South Korea has positioned itself in a region that is not its own, the role the government plays in how cultural soft power has developed there, the smart power or other power combinations that are present in the country´s foreign policy and if soft power functions better between countries that are already culturally close.

Comparison of South Korean presence in East Asia and in Latin America

The characteristics of a middle power become visible through South Korea´s foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America, as they do in East Asia. For instance, the country is actively participating, through niche diplomacy, in diplomatic and development aid related issues and developing different channels of interactions with Latin American countries, be it through MIKTA, APEC, or the G20. A middle power is expected by others to abide by the international rules and to not grow into a dominating or hegemonic power (Lee et al., 2011, p. 249), which is why the use of soft power, cultural or not, adapts more to South Korea´s international image, and why it has enabled the country´s rise in East Asia, and in Latin America.

The subcontinent generated new opportunities for the country to overcome its limited middle power status, for example by hosting conferences on environmental protection, on human rights or on conflict prevention, or by collaborating on local initiatives with the help of its volunteer programs. One related initiative has been World Friends KOICA
Advisors, through which “[a]dvisors specialized in public administration, education, health, agriculture, etc. are dispatched to partner countries for knowledge transfer and policy advice.” (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.)

The spillover effect of K-Pop, K-dramas, K-movies and other elements that started the Korean East Asia was unexpected in Latin America. It is South Korea’s main tool in the cultural area, and one example of why Nye’s thesis of how cultural closeness is required for soft power to work, cannot be sustained. If Latin American and East Asian cultures are different, why has soft power now got a stronghold there? Is it the Asianness in Korea’s soft power, which has drawn Latin Americans to it? I will expand that analysis when focusing on the case study Chile.

South Korea has adapted its cultural soft power to different contexts due to government participation (Kim, 2012c, p. 550) and simultaneously due to internet presence, television, fan clubs, among other elements (Ko et al., 2014, p. 314). The country’s, mostly cultural, soft power in Latin America has therefore expanded to the point of accentuating the separation between soft power supported by the government and that which has grown by itself (MOFA, 2012, pp. 101-104).

Korean government efforts and the massive influx of Korean cultural products have created in East Asia what could be dubbed as a “Korean threat”. Japan and China have already started to limit the presence of K-dramas or movies in their markets, out of fear of a cultural domination. This is not the case in Latin America due to several factors. As a new actor, it can even be considered a “counterbalance to the presence of other major economic powers such as Japan and China, under the assumption that even while acknowledging Korean industrial superiority compared to Latin American counterparts, there are commonalities with developing countries. This may influence the perception that Korea is a more trustworthy partner” (López Aymes, 2012, p. 2).

Additionally, not much interest in or knowledge of South Korean politics or for that fact, of its history is shown, for people to think about a cultural domination in the future. South Korea is a middle power, an inconspicuous status that allows it to move forward (López Aymes, 2012, p. 2) without as much resistance as other countries would experience. It is an example of Nye’s disregard for the role of smaller countries’ soft power.
3.4 Preliminary conclusions

The previous chapters have underlined the differences and commonalities of Chinese and South Korean presence in Latin America.

China’s position as an emerging power is powerful enough for it to compete with local regional powers, i.e., Brazil and the US. It does have, accordingly, greater responsibilities accompanying it. South Korea is an emerging power that takes advantage of middle power diplomacy and elements shared with its foreign policy in East Asia. The country has, due to its rise in the cultural sector, the possibility to dominate as a cultural emerging power and thus surmount its traditional role as a middle power.

In the Chinese case, the soft power employed is part of its foreign policy package, yet not the main determinant of its rise. Its position as an economic powerhouse strengthens its ability to influence and to attract (Smits, 2014, p. 4 and Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2009, p. 12). Cultural soft power merely accompanies the strategic interest expressed by Latin Americans towards that country. The South Korean case is different because its soft power element of culture has reached people first, and then attracted their attention through the existing ties between Korean cultural products, for example with Korean technology or education.

“Hallyu provided a small state like South Korea, the opportunity to positively influence the awareness of Korean culture and educational development in different states in Latin America. At the same time, it also provided the Korean state with the possibility of a new consumer group of Hallyu interested people and a new market for exporting its culture and products. In these ways, the cultural phenomenon provided the (…) government with an additional mechanism that brought the economies, education, government, and peoples of both Latin America and South Korea together” (Ko et al., 2014, p. 322).

While Nye holds the view that close cultural traditions or a common culture, make it easier for a country’s soft power to succeed, they are not a prerequisite. Neither China (Wen, 2012, p. 30) nor Korea have deep cultural roots or common political or historical traditions with the subcontinent, besides issues such as collaboration during the Korean
War or Maoist China’s influence guerilla movements within the subcontinent (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 6). Hallyu’s common roots in American culture, though, might have an impact on why the second country is accepted culturally. Latin Americans are more accustomed to US cultural presence, as a deduction these same elements that they perceive in South Korean cultural soft power might have presented the country with an advantage its competitors do not have.

Both East Asian countries offer models of growth: The Beijing Consensus in the Chinese case, the “Miracle of the Han River” for South Korea. With its cultural soft power enabling it to position itself in the region and to impact worldwide, South Korea can also be understood as a growth model based on soft power for smaller, middle and emerging countries.

Differently to East Asia, the knowledge about both countries history and its influence on their culture, as well as the role of their governments, is not well known or may not be considered of interest for the local population. Neither of these countries was part of US presence during the Cold War, which allows them to start with a clean slate that generates space to expand different power relevant areas such as investments (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, pp. 83-84) or cultural industries.

Finally, China and South Korea apply a different combination of soft and hard power to the subcontinent, equilibrating both tools accordingly. China uses both hard and soft power in Latin America. The former (particularly its cultural element), is not the decisive factor for the country’s rise in the region, instead, economic power is, especially the part that concerns “culture, commerce, cooperation and investment” (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, p. 86, own translation).

Soft power is the decisive factor in the South Korean case: niche diplomacy, aid, sending volunteers, and especially culture. The country’s smart power is, clearer than in the Chinese case, part of the soft power spectrum and has enabled it to rise within Latin America.

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76 The Tiananmen incident for example, “had comparatively little impact on Sino-Latin America relations, mostly because a majority of Latin American countries did not criticize or pressure Beijing.” (Mora, 1997, p. 47)
4. Case study Chile

This chapter will center on the case study Chile. The main goal is to provide empirical support to the research carried out within the previous two chapters, which focused on Chinese and South Korean soft power in East Asia and in Latin America.

The analysis of the last two chapters demonstrated that China and South Korea are in fact emerging powers. Thus, the research for the case study Chile will be initially based on these results, taking into account that China’s rise does not depend on cultural soft power, while South Korea’s does. Relevant questions are: How are both countries perceived in the South American country? Is culture, or are rather economic factors, the determinants of a growing relation between Latin American countries, and China and South Korea? Another crucial aspect is to continue with the research goals of conceptualizing soft power and expanding the definition of emerging powers.

The following research will show an example of how power resources, particularly soft power, can be divided into different categories. Three benchmarks have been created based on literature, on interviews carried out during a field study in Chile, data obtained from personal contact (e-mails), observations, and on online statistics. Another determinant for their creation was the method of content analysis, because it allows to directly derive categories from theory and from the literature examined. These benchmarks are called: official cultural soft power by the government, non-governmental (unofficial) cultural soft power, and combined efforts which include companies and universities. Indicators include educational programs, presence of Chinese and South Korean culture in media, cultural institutions such as the Sejong and Confucius institutes, among others.

The chapter will start with a short analysis of Chile’s importance for and relation with the Asia-Pacific region and its bilateral relations with China and South Korea. Thereafter, the

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77 See this study’s first chapter for additional information about the case study, for example about the methodology and approach employed for the research.
78 Opportunities for observation were given through the participation in a Seminar by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on bilateral cooperation, a visit to the CI of the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile and a visit to Barrio Recoleta, where much of the Chinese and South Korean commercial and cultural activity in Santiago takes place. Each of these observations will be portrayed in the relevant benchmark and indicator.
focus will be on the operationalization of soft power.

4.1 Chile-China and Chile-South Korea

Some countries in Latin America have developed limited bilateral relations with East Asia. Others, i.e., Brazil, Peru and Colombia, are further along the way in diversifying their partners in the political, commercial and cultural areas. They have exceeded an export-import based bilateral relation. Chile is one of them.

The country is leading worldwide in the number of FTA’s signed with different countries (Toro, 2010, p. 66), and in exchanges with the Asia-Pacific region (Hosono and Nishijjima, 2001, p. 18). Diversifying its exports and imports, by selling natural resources and other internationally recognized products such as wine, has formed part of the country’s actions since the 1990s when the government started its “re-insertion into the global economy as well as international politics, after its prolonged political and economic isolation” (Fernández Jilberto, 2012, p. 87).

Commercially speaking, it is now seen as a bridge “situated to make the strongest claim for this position: it has effectively leveraged a combination of geographical locations, good physical infrastructure, government and business infrastructure, and an interlocking network of free-trade agreements.” (Ellis, 2009, p. 41)

Chile and East Asia cooperate in numerous organizations and institutions, i.e., APEC (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 10), FEALAC and Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b, and Fundación Chilena del Pacifico). The South American country has also become an important actor within APEC (Wilhelmy von Wolff, 2005, p. 171).

Chile was one of the first countries in the region, and worldwide, to recognize the People’s Republic of China in after its founding (Manuel R., 20.05.14). At that time, the 1950s, “Chinese-Latin American relations (…) were predominantly politically motivated and

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79 See Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System (2016) for the trade agreements that Chile has signed so far.
80 Manuel Rivera, M.A in East Asian history, works as a professor and researcher at Universidad Alberto Ibáñez in Santiago de Chile.
Steps that were taken to deepen the bilateral relations with its East Asian partner (Fernández Jilberto, 2012, pp. 93-95), included exchanges with the Maoist regime (Kennedy, 1988, pp. 525-526) before Pinochet’s coup d’état, and continuing diplomatic contact afterwards (Mora, 1997, p. 43, China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 21). Chile was also the first country within the subcontinent where a Chinese cultural institute was instated in the 1950s, first in supporting China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, first to recognize China as a market economy and first in the subcontinent to sign a FTA with the East Asian country (Embajada de Chile en China, n.d. and Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 14).

Bilateral relations, which were already strong before, between these two countries deepened through that same FTA, which entered into force in 2006 (Roett, 2010, p. 201 and Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System, 2016). China is now Chile’s main commercial partner and the South American country is one of the top three preferred investment and trading partners by China in the subcontinent (MercoPress, 2012).

The importance of Chilean-Chinese relations can be stated as follows:

“Chile is currently positioned to play the leading role in the expansion of Latin America’s trade relationship with China. (…) The number of Chilean businessmen in China (…), the number of Chinese businessmen in Chile, and the number of Mandarin language schools and China-oriented business classes in Chile, positions [it] as an intellectual center of gravity for Chinese businesses …” (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 14).

Korean-Chilean relations have a different dynamic. After South Korea’s independence and after the end of the Korean War, Chile quickly established diplomatic relations with it in 1962 (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2012). They were soon reinforced, and Chile and South Korea have since then been constant partners, collaborating on multiple issues, including political, economic, cultural and social ones. Most recently, Korea’s Hallyu has led to a strong presence in television and other media,
through K-Pop concerts in the country (Karina P., 19.05.14), and through the trade of Hallyu-related merchandise.

Korean trade with Chile has been constantly growing, especially after the FTA between both countries (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 9) was signed in 2003 (Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System, 2016). Cooperation has been expanded towards the areas of natural resources, technological exchange and the creation of chambers of commerce.

Collaboration also takes place within international and regional institutions (Fernández Jilberto, 2012, pp. 91-92). Juan Masón states that Chile is one of the most stable countries in Latin America, that it has positioned itself internationally and still lacks leadership skills. It has left behind its status as a development country, which changes its commercial and business possibilities (Juan M., 26.05.14). These are elements that would enable a categorization as a middle power and emphasize its commonalities with South Korea.

4.2. Operationalization of soft power

The current chapter focuses on operationalizing the concept of soft power by adopting the results of the case study research which resulted from interviews, observations and desktop as well as literature research carried out in and outside Chile, and on analyzing how China and South Korea have risen there and in Latin America.

Chile was chosen as a case study due to the easy access to information about the South American country through statistics on culture, cinema, commerce, and others published regularly by the government. Information by the Chinese side about its presence in Chile is not always readily available. Frequently, data are not up-to-date, or websites cannot be

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81 See Benjamin (2014) for a graphic of the growing number of K-Pop concerts worldwide. Chile is mentioned within Latin America as the number one country for this type of event, when the numbers from 2010 till 2013 are analyzed.
82 Karina Piña Pérez is the executive director of Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico and an expert in cultural and educational exchanges between China and Chile.
84 That FTA, combined with another treaty signed with Japan, is considered to have created “surging agricultural exports across the Pacific” (Khanna, 2009, p. 164). Giné Daví describes it as paramount for a growing number of FTAs between Asian and Latin American countries, also for Korea’s growing exchange with the region (Giné Daví, 2008).
85 Juan Masón works at the Korea desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile in Santiago de Chile.
accessed. South Korean online presence was already mentioned several times in this study. It enables a constant influx of new information, academic and non-academic about the East Asian country.

Obtaining information about South Korea through interviews resulted in complications as China experts are more numerous in Chile and they are present in different sectors, while experts on South Korea are not; the notable exception are those who have specialized in East Asia and include the latter country as part of their research or of their area of work. The combination of all data and research lead up to the information used for and the analysis carried out as part of the categorization, operationalization as well as conceptualization of soft power. Additionally, other sources, e.g., statistics by the United Nations or regional centers for Latin America, books and articles by international authors along with websites were consulted for the case study.

**State of research: Measuring soft power**

An important effort by IR authors of operationalizing soft power can be found in Whitney and Shambaugh (2009). This index measures public opinion and the development of soft power in East Asia (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 2). It “questions how (…) nations view each other’s popular culture, commercial prowess and brands, intellectual influence, and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations and political systems” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 7). Soft power is divided into several categories, i.e., cultural (movies, tourism), human capital (language learning, universities), diplomatic (international leadership, trust), political (political system), and economic soft power (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 2, pp. 8-10 and pp. 35-36).^{86}

Research carried out in the United Kingdom resulted in the creation of an index^{87} that focuses on the enhancement of the country’s own soft power. “[B]y its very nature, soft power is a relative and intangible concept that is inherently difficult to quantify. The relational nature of soft power, where the perceptions of one country may vary

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^{86} See Whitney and Shambaugh (2009, pp. 15-17) for examples of the tables and charts created by the authors to represent the categories included in the index for the case study China.

^{87} See McClory (2010, pp. 9-13) for different categories and elements used within the index, e.g., tourism, foreign aid and number of foreign student, how these elements were measured, and which sources were used.
substantially from another, also makes cross-national comparison difficult” (McClory, 2010, p. 1). Sample countries from different world regions, including BRICS, great and small powers were chosen for the index (McClory, 2010, p. 8). It is based on both subjective and objective indicators and incorporates the factors that impact the most on different countries’ soft power and Nye’s definition of the three pillars that generate this type of power (McClory, 2010, p. 1 and pp. 3-5).

Ernst & Young created a “Rapid-growth markets soft power index” for emerging market economies. Some of the categories used as benchmarks or indicators include: tourism, universities (rankings), immigration, language (enrollments) and media exports (films, books, etc.) (Ernst & Young, 2012, pp. 7-9 and p. 20). The publication mentions that “soft power is a relative and intangible concept that is inherently difficult to quantify (…). Where the perceptions of one country may vary substantially from another (…) cross-national comparisons are difficult.” (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 6).

Pew surveys on world opinion of countries and topics are useful inputs for measuring soft power. One example by the Pew Research Center is a publication from 2013 about the US’ and China’s global image. Questions in this study included “Is the U.S./China a…Partner”, “Does the U.S./China consider your country’s interests?” and “Who Is World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Pew Research Center, 2013, pp. 3-4). In the category of cultural soft power, the survey concludes that “Chinese pop culture is not well liked in much of either Africa or Latin America (…), Chinese music, movies and television is disliked by majorities in six countries, including in Brazil (75%), [and] Argentina (68%) …” (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 29).

Yan and Xu wrote an article that proposes a Chinese supplement to measuring soft power. According to them, discussion and research in China about soft power has been too limited, neglecting aspects such as: its conceptionalization, how it could be increased, the elements it contains, its quantification, and its operationalization (Yan and Xu, 2008, pp. 16-17). The authors explain that “China’s soft power cannot become stronger if there is 

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88 Objective indicators are weighted more than subjective ones.
89 See Ernst & Young (2012, p. 10 and p. 14) for the final results of this index and for a comparison of emerging market’s soft power.
90 See Pew Research Center (2013, pp. 24-31) for examples of the data and of results related to China, including public opinion in Chile.
not a way to wage weaknesses and strengths against each other, something they consider can only be done through quantitative research” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 18).

In “Sino-U.S. comparisons of Soft Power”, the authors choose to measure soft power through three categories, namely international appeal, external mobilization capabilities and internal mobilization capabilities. The three categories are divided into several indicators, which include the appeal of a political system and cultural attraction (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 16 and p. 21). The authors conclude that “it is in the realm of cultural attractiveness where China is the least effective. (…) No policy readjustments whatsoever can possibly narrow the popularity discrepancy between Chinese folk music and Western music (…). So, playing the cultural card as a shortcut will only end up in getting half the result with twice the effort.” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 25)

Anholt has included in his online index about nation branding the categories: people, products, governance, tourism, culture, immigration and investment. The research included the questions “How highly do people in” XX country “Rank the culture of XX country?” Latin American countries Argentina, Chile and Brazil as well was East Asian countries China, South Korea, and Japan were used as case studies (Anholt, 2009). This online index shows how perceptions can be ranked and operationalized in different cultures and contexts.

The benchmarks I created for this study are based upon the efforts by these diverse authors, especially the categorization of soft power.

Benchmarks used for the case study Chile

The first benchmark (soft power use by the government) analyzes the cultural soft power which is carried out by the Chinese and the South Korean governments in Chile. This category is divided into three indicators: treaties and MOUs, cultural institutions, and cultural events. The second benchmark (non-governmental soft power) observes cultural soft power from the point of view of actions by non-governmental actors in Chile; this category consists of three indicators: Chinese and South Korean immigrants, cultural

91 Films, educational appeal, etc.
institutions and cultural events. The third and last benchmark (combined efforts) stresses actions by the Chinese and South Korean governments and public actors, and is again divided into three indicators: education, media presence, South Korean and Chinese companies.

The differentiation between government and non-governmental actions serves the purpose of analyzing to what degree governmental presence within cultural soft power impacts on how the latter is received in other regions, and which tools are available for the actors using that type of power.

The benchmarks’ indicators carry the same argumentative weight. Each contains a set of data or information from the interviews and is an argumentative structure by itself. All of them will be measured against the hypothesis of China’s and South Korea’s rise in Latin America through soft power. Other factors, such as cultural distance, the role of culture for emerging powers and Nye’s uncertain differentiation of power tools will be included in the analysis when fitting.

4.2.1 Soft power use by the government

The previous chapter stated that both the Chinese and the Korean governments are active participants in the countries’ foreign policy; consequently, they intervene in (cultural) soft power. Chinese soft power depends more on government support, while Korea’s Hallyu has been successful with the help of different types of actors. I will start the operationalization of soft power with the role that government action plays in the case of both East Asian actors.

a. Treaties and MOUs

Measuring the impact of cultural soft power while only relying on the number of treaties signed in that sector would not ensure a thoroughly objective indicator. It is therefore important to investigate, quantitatively and qualitatively 1. How many treaties have been signed, especially in the last 15-20 years in which soft power has consolidated its position within international relations theory 2. Their contents—do they mention the same issues throughout the years, or have they changed? Which elements of culture have been
included? Do they fit into the concept of soft power? And 3. if there have been more cultural treaties within the period analyzed than they were, numerically, before China and South Korea began rising in Latin America.

In the Chinese case, the number of treaties in the cultural sector has been relatively constant, although decreasing since the 1990s. Six cultural, and related, treaties came into force in 1982, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992 and 2008 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-a). This means that only one governmental cultural treaty has been signed since China started emerging in Latin America.

The first one was related to cultural exchange between both countries (1983-1984), as was the second one (1985-1986). The third, fourth and fifth treaties continued the same approach, creating the background for cultural exchange till 1993 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-b) Topics include the presence of artists and of expositions, translating literature, educational programs, intellectual as well as sports and student exchanges (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile & Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, n.d.-a).

Afterwards, no more cultural treaties were signed between both countries till the sixth one in 2008 (treaty for the protection of cultural goods). Instead, efforts were made on ad hoc programs (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-b). One of them was the “Memorándum en las materias de entendimiento entre Chile y China”, a pilot project within Latin America that marked the beginning of teaching Mandarin Chinese within the Chilean educational system (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 17).

A MOU in education was also signed simultaneously with the FTA between China and Chile, during an APEC meeting. At that time just two teachers were sent to the south American country, but efforts rapidly reached Chilean regions (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14). The FTA itself, albeit a commercial treaty, does include contents of educational and cultural importance.

First, culture is mentioned as an important area for more future cooperation (Fábrega-Lacoa, Fábrega-Lacoa and Piña Pérez, 2011, p.21). Second, the document highlights the
urgency to sign treaties in the educational area, fourth, it proposes to support efforts by institutions and organizations related to education, and fifth, it outlines the creation of exchange possibilities for professors as well as students, educational projects, study programs, among others (Fábrega-Lacoa, Fábrega-Lacoa and Piña Pérez, 2011, p.23).

MOUs between Hanban’s CIs and local universities are also signed, but their contents are generally not made public.

Those treaties in existence have yet to be expanded and their goals clearly stated for soft power to have a clear base on which China can rely on and to generate more impact in Chile. M.W.,92 affirms that the relationship with China lacks content, which means much is said, but not carried out. That fact is particularly visible when compared to the Chilean relationship with the US, where academic, scientific and technological exchange, visas, travels, globalization, internet and other topics are highly relevant (M.W., 14.05.14).

One example of how culture might be placed in the front line, are White Papers by the government (Fabricio R., 22.01.15).93 The Chinese White Paper about Latin America from 2008 analyzes how closer ties and historical events between both sides can be achieved (Verónica N., 03.06.1494 and Wen, 2012, p. 26).

In the South Korean case, the main cultural treaty and the only one to be listed online assigned by Chile, was enacted in 1984 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-c). Its contents parallel those included in the Chinese cultural treaties of that time, such as sporting events, scholarships, exchange of artistic presentations, etc. (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile & Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, n.d.-b).

Like in the Chinese case, coordinated efforts and a thought through strategy on the field are missing (Karina P., 19.05.14), which could lead to a diffusion of soft power efforts. Furthermore, commercial treaties (i.e., the FTA between Chile and the country) (Leiteritz, 2013, p. 72 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-c) outnumber those in

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92 M.W., who is employed at an institution related to Chilean-Asian Pacific relations in Santiago de Chile, asked to remain anonymous.
93 Fabricio Rodríguez is an expert in Chinese-Latin American relations and a researcher at Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institutin Freiburg im Breisgau.
94 Verónica Neghme is an Asia Pacific expert and former director of the Instituto de Estudios del Pacifico y del Indico at Gabriela Mistral University in Santiago de Chile.
the cultural and social sector, which could limit Korean culture’s reach in Latin America.

South Korea has already published several documents on a yearly basis which have included chapters on Latin America showing diverse areas of foreign policy, including commercial and diplomatic aspects. As an example, the Diplomatic White Paper of 2012, mentions South Korean projects in Chile. For instance, the government “supported 37 cultural events promoting Korean culture to foreigners at 26 Korean embassies, including those in Chile, Ecuador (…) and Spain” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 255).

For this indicator, the following conclusions can be reached:

Both countries signed treaties in the past, in an effort to make their actions official. There persists a discrepancy between the contents of the treaties, i.e., cultural exchanges, and the range of activities carried out.

The East Asian countries also have in common that economic and commercial treaties outnumber cultural and social ones. While it is impossible for a country to put its cultural efforts over everything else, if both East Asian countries intend to grow their soft power, they might have to equip their foreign policy with a stronger cultural presence.

China and South Korea have neglected culture in favor of other interests, e.g., commercial activities. Nevertheless, the latter’s cultural efforts have grown beyond those acknowledged in official documents. There is more movement within the cultural sector, which is the country’s leverage and main soft power tool.

Analyzing treaties served as an indicator of how the elements China and South Korea have established as part of their cultural foreign policy have permeated Chile. This theoretical aspect, because it is primarily dictated by the governments, can then be compared to the cultural soft power that has reached Chile and to how local perception has been. This measurement of power conversion can be applied to the next two indicators and to their counterparts within the benchmarks to follow.
b. Cultural institutions

Both China and South Korea have representative cultural and language institutions created by the government.

There are two CIs in the Chinese case, as well as Confucius classrooms at different schools.95 The Institute at the Catholic University in Santiago (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) was created in 2008.96 In 2011, it began organizing the Chinese Bridge competition and in 2012 HSK exams, at the time of its creation, 87 students were enrolled there (Instituto Confucio Universidad Católica, n.d.-c). Since then, it has taught more than 1500 people, with an average of 200 each year (Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 12.05.14). This CI does not limit itself to university students, but also focuses on other groups. For example, it also teaches business people, diplomats and government officials, among others (Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 12.05.14).

The CI of Santo Tomas University in Viña del Mar was created in 2008 (Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, n.d.). A steady rise in the number of students can be observed there too (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarin en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 4). While there were just 43 in 2008, that number rose to 118 in 2009, then 472 in 2011 and reached approximately 834 in 2013, while attendance to cultural workshops rose from 24 students in 2008 to 458 in 2013 (estimate) (M. Fernanda Aliaga T., personal communication, August 30, 2013).

The CI expanded its course offering in 2015, afterwards making it possible to learn about business with China, and about traditional and modern culture through, for example, fashion (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015a). According to Mary Acosta, that same institute produces a constant flow of information about activities related to China (Mary A., 15.05.14)97 and it organizes events such as movie festivals (Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2016), sports competitions, New Year celebrations and even a congress for Mandarin Chinese teachers in Chile (Asociación de Profesores

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95 By 2012, at least 31 schools in Chile were teaching Mandarin Chinese to their students (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarin en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 17).
96 And inaugurated in 2009.
97 Mary Acosta is an international cooperation and business development manager, expert in Chilean-South Korean and Chilean-Chinese bilateral business relations in Santiago de Chile.

In addition to the CIs, the Chinese government has sponsored other initiatives, i.e., the Centro de Cultura China, created in 2005, which teaches Mandarin Chinese as well as Spanish, provides translations and carries out cultural activities (Centro de Cultura Chino, n.d.). The Center is located in Providencia, which is an exception since most infrastructure related to Chinese culture and to the area of education remains centered in and around Santiago. It forms part of China’s governmental or governmentally supported language and culture infrastructure in Chile, but will not be further be taken into consideration due to its relatively small impact on the field study (Centro de Cultura Chino, n.d.).

Other organizations and institutions play an important role in bringing China closer to Chile. One example is the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. The CPAFFC first started in 1954 and has since then created its own regional organizations, one of which is the China-Latin America and Caribbean Friendship Association (CHILAC, sometimes also CHILAF), which was founded in 1960 (Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, n.d.-a and n.d.-b).

In the South Korean case there is less cultural infrastructure, at least for now. The only SI in the country, at Diego Portales University, has similar goals to those of the CI, i.e., language learning and increasing cultural knowledge. It offers advanced courses on either cultural-Korean, for example K-drama analysis or academic-Korean (Centro Asia Pacífico Universidad Diego Portales, 2013). One example of another institution besides the SI, is the Instituto Coreano de Cultura in Chile, which is sponsored by the Korean embassy (Mary A., 15.05.14). The “Korean Cultural Centers” that the Korean government has created, are only present in Argentina, Brazil (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, n.d.) and in Mexico (Velarde, 2015, p. 44).

Institutions such as KOICA 98 or the Korea Foundation (Marcos J., 05.05.14) 99 complement the existing but limited, governmental infrastructure in the cultural area.

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98 Korea International Cooperation Agency.
99 Marcos Jaramillo, professor and director of the Asian Studies Center at the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile.
The reason why people learn Korean stems, as mentioned in this same indicator and in interviews, from a strong interest in Korean culture (Mary A., 15.05.14) after having experienced it online or through other media. The quick rise in the number of people interested in the country’s language and culture can then be attributed to the Korean Wave.

As was the case with the previous indicator, soft power can be measured through the institutions that the Chinese and the Korean governments have created. They serve as a benchmark of the cultural infrastructure that exists in Chile (the theoretical aspect of soft power that was mentioned in the last indicator) and of the actual soft power that has reached that the country. That latter has ultimately had an influence over the rise of both countries within Chile and within the Latin American continent.

c. **Cultural events**

It cannot be measured how many cultural events there have been on the Chinese or on the Korean side or how many people have attended them. Instead a substantial analysis of the types of cultural events that take place in Chile and of their impact on soft power is needed for this indicator.

I will first analyze China. One official event in 2014 by that country’s government was an international seminar about decentralized cooperation between Chilean and Chinese regions and cities; it brought together governmental as well as non-governmental actors and led to the signing of a MOU between the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and its Chilean counterpart (Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades). The goal was to achieve a concrete institutional arrangement to support existing efforts. Topics discussed were: education and culture, trade and investment, land management, Chinese medicine and tourism (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile; Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades; The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Cruzando el Pacífico, 2014, and Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).

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100 “Seminario Internacional: Cooperación Descentralizada e Integración: Nuevos desafíos para la relación bilateral entre Chile y China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 27.05.2014.
The objectives of the working group “Educación y Cultura”\textsuperscript{101} were to reinforce teaching and learning Mandarin Chinese and Chinese culture within schools in Chile, and also to “collaborate with the teaching of Spanish to Chinese speakers” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile et al., 2014 and Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).

In 2015, the Year of Chinese culture “Año de la Cultura China” took place in Chile. It was organized by the Chinese embassy in Santiago (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b). The year began with a concert presenting Chinese music and included “a variety of large-scale cultural events to mark the 45th anniversary of the two countries’ ties.” (ChinaCulture, 2014)

2016 was Latin America’s cultural exchange year in China, accompanied by Chinese cultural presence throughout the continent, in addition to Latin American activities taking place in China (Castro Obando, 2016b). “Under the framework of CELAC-China Forum, the (…) Year of Cultural Exchange (…) host[ed] a wide variety of cultural activities to promote Chinese and Latin America culture, advance mutual friendship and understanding, and push forward bilateral cooperation to new heights” (ChinaCulture, 2016). Cultural years enable China to carry out massive initiatives that involve multiple actors, and which position its public diplomacy and soft power agenda at the front line.

Another event that takes place at the CI in Santiago is the Blue Porcelain competition,\textsuperscript{102} which can be compared to a talent show of Chinese singing, dancing and martial arts;\textsuperscript{103} the event has been highly praised by the participants and by the press (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2012 and Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 12.05.14).

In recent years, there were two paramount events related to Hanban. One was the “2010 Joint Conference of Confucius Institute in Iberia”, which Chile hosted, and which brought together “delegates from 25 Confucius Institutes in 10 countries, Chinese embassies to 10 countries and 14 partner universities and colleges in China” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 61). Another one was the official opening ceremony for

\textsuperscript{101} I was able to attend the seminar and to form part of the working group, after being invited by the Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico.

\textsuperscript{102} Concurso Porcelana Azul.

\textsuperscript{103} Martial arts are an important part of Chinese soft power in Chile because, as Fiona Cai and Manuel Rivera mentioned Kung Fu is often one of the first things Chileans associate with China (Fiona C., 15.05.14 and Manuel R., 20.05.14).
the CI’s Regional Center in Latin America, which is located in Chile, in 2014 (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 61). Its purpose is to coordinate efforts by different sectors and institutes in the subcontinent, which in 2014 were 29 in total (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 and Centro Regional de Institutos Confucio para América Latina, n.d.).

One yearly event, since 2011, is the Chinese Bridge competition (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 11). Chilean participants have managed to reach the international round of the competition (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14). Winning the national competition and maybe afterwards the regional or international one will guarantee scholarships by the Chinese government, attracting participants. This generates educational soft power.

It is visible from these events, and others that follow the same formula, that the Chinese government is present in almost every step the country takes, regarding its cultural soft power in Chile, and in extension in Latin America.

After analyzing China, I am going to focus on South Korea. The country’s government thoroughly reports, online and offline, about cultural events taking place in Chile, enabling a constant following of the activities.

The Korean embassy in Santiago organizes different events, catering to the public, students and even companies and showcasing the country’s culture. Examples since 2011 have been a forum to enhance cultural closeness, K-Pop dance and song contests, celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between both countries, a food and a film festival, K-Pop concerts, the Asia Week 2013, a video competition, a seminar about Korean literature and Chile’s educational system in 2015, and language courses offered free of charge in a conjoint effort with the Catholic University (Embajada de la República de Corea en Chile, 2015).

This indicator exemplifies events created in Chile by the Chinese and South Korean governments, which are related the soft power initiatives by both countries. By itself, the indicator appears to be inconspicuous, but when compared to the next benchmark and its
indicator about events without government intervention, the difference between both East Asian country’s soft power in Chile will become clear. Even though both the Chinese and the South Korean government promote events that include different cultural aspects, it will be seen that the latter acts like a coordinator rather than the sole creator of soft power.

d. Summary

This benchmark about governmental cultural soft power in Latin America has shown several aspects of Korean and Chinese rise in the region.

Both countries’ cultures are increasingly creating an impact on Chile. Korean diplomacy forms part of its middle power foreign policy strategy, which the country has cultivated in the south American country, through cultural events on a governmental level. South Korea can be considered an emerging power through culture, and Hallyu plays an important part.

China, which has been present for a long time in Chile, does not depend on cultural soft power to attract, as its growth into an international power and the commercial ties it has created with Chile suffice for it to position itself in the country. Nevertheless, is has fostered cultural exchanges, institutions and events, which would initially seem to indicate a growth through cultural soft power. This is a hint as to why Nye’s differentiation of soft and hard power is not sufficient. Even if China were to expand its cultural presence and even if it states that its main goal is to do exactly that, it does not follow that the tool has enabled its rise in Chile, and in Latin America.

4.2.2 Non-governmental soft power

The following paragraphs will analyze diverse actions carried out by private institutions or by the public that have resulted in the presence of China’s and South Korea’s soft power in Chile.

a. Chinese and South Korean immigrants

The complexity of analyzing immigrants from China and from South Korea, and their
descendants within Chile requires choosing well which methodology to adopt. One option could be to consider quantity. That type of indicator would focus on connecting the number of immigrants to their growing or diminishing impact on both East Asian country’s soft power in Chile.

The other option is to explore the quality of migration, which analyzes the impact immigrants generate in Chile and its society. I choose this aspect because finding reliable sources with coinciding numbers regarding East Asian migration to Chile is difficult. In some cases, information is missing from Chilean statistics, in other from Chinese or Korean ones. Within those, different categories are used: resident Chinese, recently arrived Koreans, types of visa given to Koreans, Hong Kong Chinese, South Koreans and Chinese who have acquired the Chilean nationality (Farias, 2010).

A commonality between them is a higher number of Chinese present in Chile, in all categories and periods mentioned. Examples are the OECD migration database which states that in 2000, 231 Chinese migrated to Chile, while in 2011 1575 did; in the Korean case, 104 people did so in 2000 and 453 in 2011 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.). Other databases, e.g., those by Chile’s “Departamento de Extranjería y Migración Chile” reflect the same tendencies (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración Chile, 2014).

According to another source, in 2008 there were approximately 4000 Chinese in the country (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008b). For 2009, Ellis estimates approximately 7000 ethnic Chinese (Ellis, 2009, p. 36). Farias stated that in 2009, 4599 Chinese were living in Chile, plus 20,000 nationalized citizens and about 1000 Taiwanese (Farias, 2010). The data are, altogether, too diverse for a thorough analysis. Knowing the exact number of Chinese in Chile would require an extensive new body of research.

The Chinese colony in China is very active in the city of Iquique since the Pacific War, 

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104 Official translation: “Alien Status Office”.
105 During the War of the Pacific, the southern part of Peru became Chilean territory (García and González de Castejón, 2004, p. 33). One of Chile’s admirals who was on the frontline during an incursion into Peru, spoke Chinese and became very close to the Chinese population that had been on the other side (Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 207). Mistreated Chinese subsequently allied with Chilean troops to combat the Peruvian ones in 1878 and established themselves in the north (Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 133), after Peru lost the territory (Strauss, 2012, p. 170).
and in Punta Arenas, in the southernmost part of the country (Javiera F., 14.05.14\(^\text{106}\) and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008b). Other Chinese descendants live in Santiago and in major cities where they have formed several institutions that will be highlighted as part of this benchmark. Later Chinese migration has followed mostly due to commercial interests (Karina P., 19.05.14), or through students that decide to study in Chile (Fiona C., 15.05.14).\(^\text{107}\) Many Chinese have arrived in Chile searching for job opportunities, for example in Chinese restaurants, but remain alienated from Chilean society due to factors such as missing Spanish skills (Farias, 2010).

Chinese culture has been incorporated into Chileans’ daily lives for a longer time than recent cultural products from other East Asian countries. Reyes Matta claims that their cultural impact should be looked upon (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 206-208) because immigrants represent one important source for combined efforts in the cultural sector, for example by helping change the imagery that persists in the subcontinent, and vice versa (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 205-206).

The Korean case is different from the Chinese one.

“[F]rom 1962 small, isolated groups of immigrants began to set themselves up in Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile. From the outset, this wave of immigration was characterized by overland remigration between these countries” (Mera, 2006). More Korean immigrants arrived in Chile in the 1970s as well as in the following decade. “[A]n agreement was signed by Chile and South Korea which exempted Koreans who wished to settle in Chile from visa requirements” (Mera, 2006). According to Palacios S., only six families arrived at the beginning of the 1970s and several Koreans moved to Santiago in the 1980s (Palacios S., 2011).

Because many returned to their home country afterwards, the number of Koreans in Chile sank, only to grow again in the 1990s when “a small community had finally come into existence, by 1997 it amounted to 350 families, about 1500 people in all” (Mera, 2006). 104 Koreans migrated to Chile in 2000, 453 in 2011 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d.). That same year, about 2100 Koreans were estimated

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\(^{106}\) Javiera Flores, coordinator for Asia Pacific at Central University in Santiago de Chile.

\(^{107}\) Fiona Cai is a China expert in Santiago de Chile.
to be living in Santiago (Palacios S., 2011). The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that in 2014, there were about 2725 Koreans living in Chile (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, n.d.). As can be seen from these data, Korean migrants were not only less in number than the Chinese ones, but they established themselves much later in the south American country.

Currently, the South Korean community in Santiago de Chile, the biggest in the country, has mainly settled around Patronato (Mera, 2006, Ortiz, 2014 and Mary A., 15.05.14). During the field research in Chile, I visited that area. One street is predominantly filled with Korean stores: supermarkets (Mera, 2006), a K-drama store, a bakery, Korean clothing, a Korean hairdresser, the store “Corea Mall”,108 and several restaurants, e.g., “Seoul”, “Chicken Store” or “Sukine” (Visit to Recoleta/Patronato, 17.05.14). Through efforts by Korean migrants, even a newspaper “NewsCorea” can be found in Santiago (Ortiz, 2014).

Similarly to the Chinese, Koreans first created their own companies in the “clothing and commercial textile production” (Mera, 2006). Afterwards first and second generation overseas Koreans diversified their businesses, now working in real estate and centering on Patronato, where several buildings have been built to create more space for the Korean colony’s needs, such as selling clothing, modernizing the existing business model, facilitating transport, contact with clients and potential buyers (Palacios S., 2011).

Cultural soft power should not leave out the “human” side of power, as culture is not an abstract governmental construct. Measuring the impact of migration in a country is important for soft power, since how ethnic Chinese and Koreans engage with it reflects how the tool is perceived locally. Moreover, local Chinese and Koreans act as catalyzers of soft power as they make culture known to Chileans.

It can also be concluded that Korean culture has expanded in Chile, to the point of impacting on the role of the existing infrastructure, specifically in the capital. South Korea’s more recent cultural presence has made it possible for migrants to profit from it on a larger scale than the Chinese one which has been present in Chile for several

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generations, which means that cultural soft power has helped it rise.

b. Cultural institutions

This indicator is going to evaluate cultural institutions that exist in Chile and which have not been created neither by the Chinese nor by the South Korean government. Since there is not much infrastructure by Koreans, except the Korean school and the Sejong Institute, this indicator will mention Chinese institutions and others for which South Korea is merely a focus.

In the Chinese case, a relevant non-governmental cultural and educational entity has been Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico. One interviewee mentioned this institution as one of the few experts within Chile on educational efforts related to learning Chinese (Mary A., 15.05.14). Its goals are to bring both countries closer together, essentially by training Chileans and through online courses designed by the NGO (Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico, n.d.-d). In 2013, about 1000 students, mostly from high schools, were enrolled in a course for introduction to Chinese, called “Introducción del Chino Mandarín” (Karina Fernanda Piña Pérez, personal communication, October 10, 2013).

The organization informs the public through seminars, as well as conferences in different universities in and outside the country, in cooperation with institutions varying from Latin American universities to Chinese ministries. Topics are, e.g., Chinese as a foreign language in Latin America and language tourism (Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico, n.d.-a, n.d.-b and n.d.-c). The Corporation’s work also includes facilitating internships and scholarships for language courses and creating “public-private alliances” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b).

Furthermore, there is Red Chile China (Mary A., 15.05.14 and Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico, n.d.-b). The binational network and research initiative has been launched in several Chinese cities, with the help of Chileans living in the East Asian country (Red Chile China, 2014). It aims at enabling “collaboration and exchange in academic and education.”

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cultural, education and business areas” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b, own translation).

Another institution is the Sociedad de Beneficencia China, created by Chinese immigrants in 1893, years after the War of the Pacific had ended and some of them had moved to Santiago (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013b). By 2010, Sociedad de Beneficencia China had about 2000 members (Fariás, 2010). Since its beginnings, the organization has helped nationals solve issues such as monetary problems in Chile (Fariás, 2010). Other objectives are to help interested Chileans get in contact with East Asian counterparts (yet, the organization does not engage in commercial activities), and to invite the public to celebrations, e.g., the Chinese New Year (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013b).

The Centro Cultural “Casa de la Cultura China” was created in 2013, with about 20 people enrolled in its Chinese courses, and a waiting list of more than 80 (Rodrigo Riveros Arias, former director of the cultural center, personal communication, October 4, 2013). While most of the infrastructure relating to East Asian language and cultural studies can be found in the region of Santiago, this center is in Tarapacá, in the north of the country (Centro Cultural “Casa De La Cultura China”, n.d.).

The “Insituto Asiático de Cultura: Escuela de Negocios Asiáticos” focuses on business and culture in (East) Asia. It teaches entrepreneurs and wants to promote Chilean initiatives in Asia, which will latter result in the creation of local jobs (Instituto Asiático de Cultura, n.d.). One activity carried out in China has been “Viajes de Negocios a China para Pymes” (Business trips to China for SMEs–Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, own translation), with the specific goal of creating opportunities there and training Chileans in language and commerce, among other skills. Support is offered for up to a year after return (Instituto Asiático de Cultura, 2015).

Institutions that are not considered cultural can facilitate exchanges and help expand connections with business, besides helping stagnating efforts diversify. Commerce chambers in Chile include the Asia Pacific Chamber of Commerce founded in 2002

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110 According to information received per e-mail, it was created in 2013 but, according to its website, that happened in 2007 (Centro Cultural “Casa De La Cultura China”, n.d.).
(Cámara de Comercio Asia Pacífico, n.d.), the Cámara Chileno China de Comercio, Industria y Turismo\textsuperscript{111} founded in 1997 (Cámara Chileno China de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, 2012), the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) (Korea Trade Promotion Corporation–Korea Business Center, n.d.) as well as the Chilean-Korean chamber of commerce founded in 1990 (Cámara de Comercio Chileno Coreana, n.d.).

ProChile has worked on engaging Chile with China and with South Korea, in the areas of market access for small Chilean companies. It “has offices in each of the [foreign] ministry’s bureaus in China, integrated with the activities of the ministry, in order to support the dealings of Chilean businesses in China” (Ellis, 2009, p. 43). One event took place in Santiago in 2015, in the form of a binational seminar (ProChile, 2015a), another one in Seoul — “Seoul Food and Hotel 2016” — a trade fair organized with the goal of attracting Chilean investors, namely in the areas of food, beverages of all types and hospitality, among others (ProChile, 2015b).

Fundación Imagen de Chile/Imagen País and FEALAC should also be mentioned here. Fundación Imagen de Chile was founded in 2009; it enhances and promotes Chile’s nation brand, mainly through research in areas such as commerce and marketing, and supervision of international media that mention the country (Fundación Imagen de Chile, n.d.). FEALAC has already included cultural topics in its agenda (M.W., 14.05.14).

\textit{Comparison}

After having analyzed governmental and non-governmental indicators about cultural organizations in Chile, I will compare different aspects, namely: their success in promoting soft power, the differences in the programs or courses they offer, the attraction they exert on potential students and the potential of growth they have. Lastly, I will analyze if they have helped China and South Korea rise in Chile.

As for their success in promoting soft power, both types of institutions complement each other. For example, the CI puts an emphasis on traditional culture and on language, while private institutions offer other options, such as business courses. As mentioned previously,

\textsuperscript{111} Chilean Chinese business, industry and tourism chamber.
Korean culture and with it the Korean Wave, are not dependent on government or institutional arrangements. The wave disseminates online (Chung, 2011, p. 38) and has quickly promoted cultural soft power, which explains the explosive growth of people interested in it and why there might be less local initiatives to create language and cultural institutions. Governmental efforts complement Hallyu.

Chinese soft power programs depend on the country’s budget or on political factors, all of which might affect it. Should the country’s economy start dwindling, then the cultural factor might pay the price. Thus, institutes, private or public have done well in diversifying the programs and courses they offer.

In the long run, having more institutions is beneficial for both China and South Korea’s position in Chile, and the same can be said for Latin America. Nevertheless, relying on governmental institutions to expand cultural soft power, which is a tendency in the Chinese case, will appear to strengthen soft power, but it is not a fundamental factor in it. As can be seen in the South -Korean case, there are less institutions present (private or by the government), but the Korean wave has been disseminated by internet and through other channels.

Soft power is not determined by more or by less institutions, their role is that of a coordinator of different efforts, they help “market” or expand nation branding. They also help combine efforts from locals, one example being the Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico, and by doing that they reveal how much interest there is in some topics, such as business or language. They serve as an indicator to the Chinese and to the South Korean government of where soft power is already present, and of where more presence is needed.

c. Cultural events

This indicator consists of some examples and of an analysis that aim at clarifying the importance of non-governmentally sponsored and organized public events. More examples will be mentioned within the third benchmark, as part of soft power initiatives by universities, by Chinese and South Korean companies or within the indicator of media presence by both countries.
China’s tradition plays an important role in the recognition of the country on an international level (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, p. 80), which confirms its impact on cultural soft power efforts. As will be seen throughout the rest of the chapter, most soft power related events are carried out by the government and are coordinated by both Chilean CIs. Consequently, it is difficult to find any events not carried out by the government, which is why just one example is mentioned, that is the very successful exposition of the Terracotta Army in Santiago (M.W., 14.05.14 and Fernando R.M., 16.05.14). Villamizar Lamus writes that for Chile, it “was the exposition with the highest number of visitors in history” (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, p. 80).

On that note, the Chinese soft power case is an exceptional one: Even if the country did not promote its culture actively, and even if events remained bound to the government, people would still be attracted to it and to the country’s power (Karina P., 19.05.14). I mentioned in the last chapter that China’s history and direct control by the CP over different issues, e.g., culture, do not matter enough in Latin America to create a feeling of threat. Chile’s pragmatic approach (Fernando R.M., 16.05.14), explains why interest in history and politics and the interest in commercial and cultural issues (Karina P., 19.05.14) remain disconnected to each other. Cultural events accompany China’s soft power, but do not determine its growth.

South Korean events are mostly oriented towards Hallyu or towards modern culture. Compared to Chinese ones, several can be enumerated because they are not completely controlled by the government, and because there are more local initiatives. One example was the Korean gastronomy week that took place in 2010 in Chile, in which Korean chefs prepared different national dishes, and a class on Korean cooking culture was included (Embajada de la República de Corea en Chile, 2010).

Another important event was Music Bank Chile in 2012 (LG Chile, 2012). Together with Mexico (Mérida, 2014) and Brazil in 2014 (Knabben, 2014), Chile formed part of the series of concerts which were accompanied by events related to the Korean Wave. Organized by LG, Music Bank invited several K-Pop artists and attracted thousands of Chilean fans (Romero, 2012).

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112 Fernando Reyes Matta is the former Chilean ambassador to China as well as professor and director of the Center for Latinamerican Studies on China at Andrés Bello National University (Santiago de Chile).
Hallyu is constantly present in Chile. In 2014, the band CNBLUE finished its world tour there (RPP Noticias, 2014), boy group SHINee’s concert in the same year attracted fans from all over South America (Reyes, 2014), and in 2016, the group B1A4 carried out one concert in Chile (Lee, 2016).

Korean soft power could become exactly the type of cultural effort which can position a country and its brand, if strategically carried out and continued. The question here is: What if the country did not use its soft power, but instead relied on other foreign policy efforts? While it is already Chile’s fourth most important trade partner, the country would not have achieved its existing fan bases, the interest in its language, the growing sales of its products, were it not for its cultural soft power.

Events in Chile related to Hallyu are needed as an indicator because they show how much the Korean Wave has permeated society. If they were to disappear, that would be a sure sign of a shrinking soft power. The fact that many of them, concerts for example, were held because of flash-mobs or organized by Chileans themselves demonstrates that the Korean Wave has helped South Korea position itself in the country, and that this has happened through nothing other than culture.

d. Summary

Similarly to the previous benchmark, the second one enables a deeper analysis of China and South Korea’s rise through soft power in Chile.

Chinese culture has been known in Chile for a long time, and that presence has enabled the country to offer diverse opportunities to get in touch with its traditional culture, including multiple cultural and language learning opportunities. China’s positioning in different spheres of Chileans’ daily lives enables it to not have to rely as much on cultural soft power as South Korea. Consequently, culture does not serve its main purpose, albeit its constant expansion through governmental efforts.

One of the conclusions reached through this benchmark is that Chinese cultural soft power would still attract Chileans even if it remained more distant, if there were stronger governmental influences, etc. Not China’s culture has made the country such a
remarkable actor within the South American country, but the attraction that stems from it being an emerging and regional power.

South Korea needs cultural soft power for its rise in Chile and, more generally, in Latin America. The country is still lagging in its actual presence, while dominating in the online placement of its soft power efforts, because Hallyu has outbalanced the spheres of governmental control. South Korea can very much benefit from private cultural endeavors. Hallyu-related products and other South Korean cultural endeavors have benefitted ethnic Koreans and their descendants who have profited from selling Korean products to interested Chileans, which means that for them, the Korean Wave equals growing profit opportunities.

4.2.3 Combined efforts

This third benchmark analyzes local initiatives, financed by a mix of public and private efforts, that are related to soft power. It also includes the general public. That approach reflects the liberal approach to IR theory mentioned in the first chapter of the study (complex interdependence), as it investigates different actors, besides the state, who collaborate on topics that include commercial or environmental interests, possibilities for cooperation, agenda-setting, and others.

This benchmark is divided into three indicators.

a. Education: Universities, research centers and schools

Throughout texts by Nye and authors who study this foreign strategy tool, education plays a networking role within soft power. Universities and research centers combine expertise, the government, private and public efforts in a most visible way. Education furthers initiatives ranging from scholarships to student exchanges and cultural centers, which enhance a country’s national brand and its soft power.

In the last chapter, I mentioned the small number of study programs in the subcontinent that focus on one of the two countries or on Asia in general (Manuel R., 20.05.14). Chile fits the Latin American standard when compared to Argentina and Mexico, two of the
countries with the most advanced research facilities on East Asia (Javiera F., 14.05.14 and Velarde, 215, pp. 43-44). Centers within universities in the country are important, considering that they function as research, language and teaching institutions that enable creating classes and study programs related to the focus areas.

As for the programs that do exist in Chile, classes are offered within the Centro de Estudios Asiáticos at the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile (Marcos J., 05.05.14 and Manuel R., 20.05.14). One example is the interdisciplinary “Academic Certificate on Asian Studies”, (“Certificado Académico en Estudios Asiáticos”, own translation) which consists of several optional courses that can be turned into study credits (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos Universidad Católica, n.d.-c).

The center aims at increasing knowledge about Asia, in Chile and in Latin America. It works on an interdisciplinary basis, including collaborations with Asian counterparts. Cooperation and research exchange form a crucial part its work, also publications, seminars and trainings (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos Universidad Católica, n.d.-a). The Center has organized, since 2008, the so called “Seminario Internacional de Estudios Coreanos”, with the support of Korean companies and of the Korean government (Velarde, 2015, p. 43). Courses at bachelor, master and doctorate level on Chinese law are taught at the Faculty of Law, with the goal of teaching students the Asian way of thought (Marcos J., 05.05.14).

The Central University of Chile in Santiago has created an international center, an office for Asia Pacific and a program called “Programa China es Central”, which offers language courses, scholarships and training in business related activities—including Chinese courses catering to specific needs, for example knowledge of marketing strategies (Universidad Central, n.d.-b).

At Andrés Bello National University the Center for Latinamerican Studies on China

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113 When I interviewed Marcos Jaramillo, the director of the Center, he commented that negotiations were taking place with the University to create master studies related to, for example, China (Marcos J., 05.05.14). Until mid-2016, this had not yet been the case.

114 E.g., Samsung and Daewoo.

115 The Korea Foundation.

116 Universidad Central de Chile.

117 Universidad Andrés Bello.

118 Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China.
was created in 2011. Its objectives are to help Chileans understand China and to show its international impact, on a political and economic level (Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos Sobre China, n.d.). It has organized seminars such as “Pensamiento griego/pensamiento chino: ¿Qué traen Platón y Confucio al siglo XXI?” in 2014 (Fernando R.M., 16.05.14 and Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China de la Universidad Andrés Bello, 2014).

The Center for International Studies within the Universidad del Desarrollo carries out research in specific areas, e.g., China’s foreign policy and economic reform, Chile’s and Asia Pacific international relations, and Chinese language and culture (Universidad del Desarrollo, n.d.). Another important endeavor by the university is its program “Embajadores del Futuro”, which takes bachelor students to China and shows them the country from different perspectives, including historical, cultural and economic ones (Universidad del Desarrollo, 2015b).

In 2011, a diploma course called “Diplomado en Asuntos Asiáticos” was offered that centered on China, on Japan, and on other countries in Asia through a multidisciplinary approach. The course included seminars and networking opportunities (Universidad del Desarrollo, 2011).

The Catholic University of the Most Holy Conception, in the Bío-Bío region, created the Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico (CEDAP) in 2005. Its goal is to bring the Latin America and Asia Pacific together (Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico, n.d.). Events have included the third China Week in 2015, which put an emphasis on cultural presentations, language learning and Chinese business etiquette, together with commercial exchange opportunities (Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico–CEDAP, 2015).

Diego Portales University has its Centro Asia Pacífico UDP, embedded within the Faculty of Economics and Business, which carries out several activities, mainly focused on Latin

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119 “Greek thought–Chinese thought: What will Plato and Confucius contribute to the 21st century?”.
120 Culture, IR, economy, and others.
121 Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción.
122 See Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico (2015) for the program of the China Week 2015.
American and Asian business relations. One important event is the Asia Week, with the participation of different actors, i.e., chambers of commerce, and the CI of the Catholic University. Activities in 2015 included language courses, sports and movie festivals (Centro Asia Pacifico Universidad Diego Portales, 2015 and Universidad de Santiago de Chile, 2013). The Center also offers academic programs such as 2010s “Estrategia de Negocios en China” (Business strategies in China, own translation), an executive program aimed at entrepreneurs, “Business Circle CEAP” is an initiative that embodies a network and a research facility (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010b). The only SI in Chile is also located within this center (Centro Asia Pacifico Universidad Diego Portales, n.d.).

The University of Chile’s Institute of International Studies created a Center for Asia Pacific that researches security, regional dynamics, politics and economy. One diploma course was offered in 2013 by the Faculty of philosophy and humanities, with a focus on China’s economy and culture (Universidad de Chile-Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, n.d. and Velarde, 2015, p. 43).

Gabriela Mistral University created the Instituto del Pacífico y del Índico in 1982, placing emphasis on Chile’s role and that of Chileans in the Pacific region. It published newsletters as well as other documents related to its regional focus (Universidad Gabriela Mistral, n.d.).

The University of Santiago expanded its academic offer in 2011, by creating a unit of oriental and traditional Chinese medicine within its faculty (Universidad de Santiago de Chile, 2011). In 2014, the same university opened the Chilean-Korean Study Center Program (ChKSCP), which is founded by the Korean government (Chilean-Korean Study Center Program, n.d.-a). The center “has established three courses at undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as offering opportunities for studies abroad and academic grants” (Kim and Yi, 2015). It also publishes papers periodically, and might offer a “Diploma on

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123 See Centro Asia Pacifico Universidad Diego Portales (2015) for the program of the Asia Week 2015.
124 Universidad de Chile.
125 Centro de Asia-Pacifico.
126 Universidad Gabriela Mistral.
127 According to one of the interviewees, the institute had ceased to exist by 2014 (Manuel R., 20.05.14), but apart from the interview with him, no information could be found on that topic.
128 Universidad de Santiago de Chile.

Besides research centers that exist within Chilean universities, there are others on a national and regional level. The Fundación Chilena del Pacifico is one example. It even signed a MOU with the Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016).

ECLAC, which has its headquarters in Chile, has fostered exchanges between China and the south American country, for example by inviting former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to speak about China’s “peaceful development” and its loyalty to developing countries, at a conference in Santiago de Chile in 2012 (Wen, 2012, pp. 25-31). Another event was the “International Seminar China and Latin America. Multidisciplinary approaches about a complex relationship” (own translation) in November of 2015 (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 2015).

FLACSO\textsuperscript{129} created in 1957 and nowadays present throughout the region (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, n.d.), has also carried out research about Asia Pacific and organized events. One of them was “China: ajustes, cambios y el largo plazo. La mirada desde Chile” for which it partnered up with Andrés Bello National University. The aim of the seminar was to debate changes taking place in China’s government at that time and how they were related to the country’s economic situation (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2014).

Chile collaborates with Latin American universities through the Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China (Karina P., 19.05.14 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b). Its main goals are to exchange information, create own interdisciplinary content and enable the participation of multiple actors from different sectors (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, n.d.-a). The network regularly organizes seminars, including one in 2014 called “América Latina y el Caribe y China: condiciones y retos en el siglo XXI” (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, n.d.-b) and a continuation of that same seminar in 2016 (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, 2015a).\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{129} Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.  
\textsuperscript{130} Tercer Seminario Internacional “América Latina y el Caribe y China: condiciones y retos en el siglo XXI” (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, 2015a). 
\end{flushright}
Not only universities or research centers are important elements of soft power, so are schools. The Confucius Classrooms project started in 2011 at the Instituto Nacional school in Santiago and is the continuation of efforts by the Chilean government. One program by the Ministry of Education called “Proyecto de Enseñanza de Chino Mandarin” had already started in 2008, after the CIs had opened their doors in Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013a) and afterwards helped “add (...) Chinese into the foreign language elective courses of secondary schools in May 2009” (Yang, 2011). These classrooms are supported by Hanban, which means that they mirror the CIs (Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Chile, 2011).

Chinese teaching and learning at schools has been so successful that an increasing number of students are successfully passing the Young Chinese Learners Test (YCT), more teachers are being sent to the country and more schools want Chinese to be taught there (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013a). The Chinese government immediately reacted to the efforts by Chilean students, inviting them to language camps in the East Asian country (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).

One Confucius Classroom opened more recently, in March 2015, with the support of the CI at Santo Tomas University. It is situated at the Instituto Chile Asia Pacifico in Valdivia. Students carry out studies of Mandarin Chinese, take the HSK exam, apply for scholarships, among other activities (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015a). Another Classroom was created at the Colegio Yangtsé. The school “has been sponsored by the Chinese Embassy since 1987” (ChinaCulture, 2015). Chinese is taught there from age 5 to 13, as a supplementary class and in combination with cultural activities. Only the school’s name is Chinese, and it cannot be considered bilingual (Marcela Rojas Cantillana, school director, personal communication, November 11, 2013).

As could be seen in the previous paragraphs, the Chilean government encourages Mandarin Chinese learning. Another example is the program “Conoce y emprende con XXI”.

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131 See Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 for examples of schools in Chile that are teaching Mandarin Chinese (2005-2014), they were 18 in total in 2014.
132 First mentioned in the second chapter of this study, segment 2.1.1, “Confucius Institutes”.
133 Chile Asia-Pacific Institute.
134 Classes are provided up to 8th grade in the Chilean educational system.
China” (roughly meaning “learn about and embark on a journey/innovate with China” (own translation) ), launched by the Instituto Nacional de Juventud in cooperation with Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b). The program offered scholarships from 2014 until November 2015, for online and on-site Chinese culture and language courses (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2014).

The “Programa Idiomas Abren Puertas”\textsuperscript{135} by the Ministry of Education, seeks to further Chinese language teaching in schools throughout the country. It supports the goal of making that language part of the standard curriculum of schools (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).

South Korean language teaching is mostly carried out by the SI and at private academies, or online. There are no “Sejong Classrooms”, yet, but there is at least one Korean school in the country that teaches Korean on a first or second language basis. Finding Information about the school is difficult, since it can only be accessed through social media, or via its website in Korean (Colegio Coreano en Chile (칠레한국한글학교), n.d.).

South Korean soft power in the educational sector is surpassed by the Chinese one, a fact that is on the one hand related to historical factors. China has simply been present for a longer time. On the other hand, Chinese studies have proliferated due to the country’s position as an international emerging power and due to Chile’s economic interests towards it. Yet, in both cases there is a lack of infrastructure, which would enable both East Asian countries to better expand their soft power resources. Measuring the role of educational programs and of schools facilitates the analysis of how lack of soft power could be tackled through more programs financed either by the government (including the Chilean one) or through initiatives by the private sector.

b. Media presence

Media presence happens through a combination of efforts, sometimes by the state, by companies, via internet or through fans who strive to know more about the East Asian countries. Mouth-to-mouth propaganda by itself could not have promoted soft power in

\textsuperscript{135} Program “Languages open doors”.
Chile, were it not for China´s and South Korea´s use of television, radio and internet resources.

There has been a growing presence of K-dramas in Chilean television´s prime time slots. Chile is considered “one of the main Latin American countries where Korean soap operas have flourished since early on” (Limb, 2013). The collaboration between channels KBS and TVN¹³⁶ (Embajada de Chile en Corea del Sur, n.d.), created an early institutional basis for media exchange between the South American and the East Asian country.

Cable and private channels are now periodically showing K-dramas. Examples are Vía X (Limb, 2013) and Mega, which showed Boys over Flowers (Ortiz, 2014 and Molina, C.A., 2012). ETC TV has included K-dramas (Brilliant Legacy), alongside a wide spectrum of Japanese programs (Molina, 2013 and ANMTV, 2013). Additionally, Korean broadcasts such as Arirang TV, can be watched in Chile through service provider GTD Manaquehue; other providers in Latin America that show Arirang TV are in Argentina and Brazil (Yang, 2012b, p. 44).

K-dramas are offered prime-time slots due to two factors: the general openness of Chileans towards other cultures (Juan M., 26.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14) and the fact that South Korea has managed to create an international appeal which is attracting Chileans, for example due to the absence of violence in K-dramas (Karina P., 19.05.14).

K-Pop radio broadcasts in Latin America are first and foremost online initiatives. China Radio International and KBS World have Spanish language channels. The former transmits completely in Spanish (China Radio International Online en español, n.d.), while KBS World uses the same channel for different languages. Kpop Replay is an online radio station that reports about Korean celebrities, but also plays J-Pop and theme songs from anime series (Kpop Replay n.d) The station began transmitting in 2015, and was created by Korean culture experts in Chile (Kpop Replay, Facebook message, personal communication, January 21, 2016).

Online radio is connected to the analysis of how the Korean Wave has reached other

¹³⁶ Televisión Nacional de Chile.
world regions, including Latin America, through social media, apps (Instagram, Kakao, Line, VApp, etc.), YouTube, blogs created by fans, and drama sites. Having access to the newest K-Pop news, drama videos and Instagram accounts of Korean singers gives fans a sense of empowerment and of closeness that cannot be achieved through events or language schools alone. This situation could be compared to how Japanese culture influenced generations through anime and mangas. According to Juan Masón, Japan was actually the opening door for Korea to enter Chile. Anime became too mainstream for some fans, so they decided to search for something new, which is how their preferences changed towards Korean culture (Juan M., 26.05.14).

Chinese soft power has underestimated online presence and the possibility it offers to nurture soft power in ways that language or culture courses by themselves could not. One possible explanation to why China has been reticent or insecure about promoting its brand online, is strong governmental control over contents generated online. Chinese movies and documentaries might appeal to an older generation or at least to people more interested in traditional culture (Fiona C., 15.05.14). Notwithstanding, Chinese and Taiwanese dramas are beginning to appear in Chilean television. Cable channel Vía X, for example, has been showing Happy Noodle (mainland China) and Office Girls (Taiwan) as part of its program (Vía X, 2014a and Vía X, 2015).

One publication from 2014, “Películas ‘estrenadas’ por año distribuidas por procedencia y nacionalidad: Periodo 2001-2013”, by the Chilean government, lists the countries of origin of movies shown in Chile’s cinemas in the years 2001-2013 (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes, 2014). It sheds some light on Chinese and South Korean presence in Hollywood-dominated Chilean movie theaters. From 2001 to 2013, the number of East Asian movies shown was as follows: in 2001 there were three Hong Kong movies and one Taiwanese, in 2002 one Chinese, in 2003 one South Korean, in 2004 two Chinese and one South Korean, in 2005 three Chinese and two South Korean, in 2006 two South Korean and two from Hong Kong, in 2007 two Chinese and two Korean, in 2008 one Chinese and one Hong Kong movie, in 2009 one Korean, in 2011, no East Asian movies were shown, in 2012 and in 2013 one Japanese movie per year was shown (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes, 2014).

In summary, Chinese movies (including Hong Kong) dominate the Asian movie scene in
Chile. Successful ones were for example: *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* and *Hero* (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes, 2014). Finding South Korean movies in local theaters is not easy. An explanation might be that fans watch them online or at film festivals, download or buy them at Recoleta.\(^{137}\)

Since soft power’s goal is to reach local audiences and to attract them towards a specific culture, and by extension country, being present in media, and especially, being able to compete with, for example the USA or local programs, means achieving exactly that. Thus, measuring media as an indicator, and establishing how competitive a country’s brand is and where it is lacking, enables a deeper analysis of how soft power can be directed, so that it will grow in the future.

What does media presence reflect about the rise of China and South Korea in Chile? China’s role in the media landscape is not remarkable, except for having an advantage within the movie market and that can be taken away by South Korea, or by other countries that now how to position themselves through media. As can be seen from South Korea’s dominating cultural soft power in television, radio and internet, the country has used the tools at its disposition and achieved an online and offline presence, which guarantees that its soft power is received locally.

c. South Korean and Chinese companies

The reputation of a country’s companies is an indicator of how that same country is being branded internationally. This is especially the case when companies are deeply associated with one country’s government, which is financing them and which is at the same time controlling soft power. South Korean and Chinese companies, most of them financed by the corresponding governments (M.W., 14.05.14), participate in disseminating both countries’ cultural soft power in Chile.

Companies are active actors in cultural soft power, where they can either play a passive role, or create their own content. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, cultural appeal can turn into an interest in other products (spillover and cross-promotion). That

\(^{137}\) Korean and Chinese dominated area of Santiago.
connection can be facilitated by already known brand names.

By using publicity and marketing strategies, on- and offline, these companies position their brands locally. One example of an event sponsored by LG was Chile’s K-Pop festival in 2012, in which several K-Pop artists participated. The company previously created a contest for Chilean K-Pop fans to take part in and to win VIP tickets to the main event (LG Chile, 2012). Companies profit from Hallyu (Leong, 2014) and so does soft power because being a part of the wave may attract fans and others who want to buy their products after, for example, seeing them in K-dramas. South Korea’s cultural soft power is being directly affected by the branding of its companies, they are active actors and catalysts and create a spillover effect towards the economic (soft) power, on which the East Asian country can also count.

China’s companies have only recently begun creating their own branding. Consequently, names such as Lenovo, Huawei or ZTE are not always recognized as Chinese or do not enjoy the same product placement success that Korean ones do. Even though China does not need culture to rise, branding its own companies by creating an association to the country’s tradition and culture directly affects cultural soft power and would help the country move away from being a purely economic soft power.

d. Summary

This last benchmark about Chinese and South Korean soft power in the form of mixed governmental and private efforts accentuated both East Asian countries’ rise in Chile.

China is more present within the educational, national and regional research sector than South Korea is, a fact that confirms the former country’s status as Chile’s closest economic as well as commercial partner. Having that commercial power has led to the growth of Chinese study programs and research centers, which is why the country does not need more soft power initiatives, besides efforts by Hanban. South Korea could, for example, promote its worldwide leadership in education as part of its soft power arsenal (Kim, 2012c, p. 550), for the local infrastructure to have an incentive to grow.

138 Due to the reputation of producing bad quality products that still accompanies China (Javiera F., 14.05.14).
At schools, Chinese is considered as important as other international languages. The Chinese and Chilean governments finance Confucius Classrooms, as well as classes taught in public schools. The same way that Chinese economic relations with Chile influence the importance of Mandarin Chinese at an academic level, they also do at schools, where the language is sought after due to the possibilities that arise from learning more about the East Asian country. Korean is rarely a subject, which means that students have to continue searching for alternatives to learn the language.

When media is included as an indicator within the benchmark, the panorama changes. Here, South Korea dominates in television and internet presence, yet online access to Korean media might also keep Chilean moviegoers away from Korean movie screenings, which could explain why China is more present there.

Even if that country does not dominate Chilean media, it will still have positioned itself in the South American country as an emerging power—but not through cultural soft power. The reason is economic attraction, which has propelled Chileans’ interest towards wanting to do business with China (Fiona C., 15.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14). Mary Acosta states that many are not learning Chinese because of an interest in the country’s “movies or the Great Wall” (Mary A., 15.05.14, own translation), while in the Korean case, culture this is the main trigger (Mary A., 15.05.14).

Finally, some Chinese and South Korean companies form part of the mix of actors that export soft power to Chile. Korean ones have been active in promoting soft power, collaborating with the government, sponsoring events, etc., which would allow them to take advantage of the spillover effects of Hallyu. Chileans tend to know South Korean culture first, before turning their interest towards that country’s companies.

Branding has not helped in the Chinese case, because not much is known locally about that country’s brands, although they are universally present. Simultaneously, companies such as Huawei and ZTE have found a growing market in Chile, from where they have participated in multiple business activities including internet, telephone and other modern technologies (Ellis, 2009, p. 40). People might just buy them because they are cheaper than their counterparts (Karina P., 19.05.14).
4.3 Conclusions drawn from the case study

This chapter encompassed Chinese and South Korean soft power in Chile through three benchmarks: governmental, nongovernmental as well as mixed cultural soft power efforts present in the South American country. The purpose was to analyze the hypothesis that both East Asian countries have risen in Latin America due to soft power, and to operationalize that concept.

South Korea has risen through cultural soft power in Chile. Its efforts in that area have kept growing, despite being at a disadvantage due to China’s powerful position and its history of cultural contacts with Chile. Hallyu has been the main stimulus for that growth. The country has created a modern cultural phenomenon that attracts people to it, as has happened with Korean products that are being sold in Chile and which have benefitted Korean communities who have been carrying out more commercial activities.

South Korean culture is reaching Chilean population through mouth-to-mouth propaganda, a very strong online presence as well as flexibility within the government’s cultural sector. The former acts as an intermediary but not necessarily as a regulator. Through Hallyu, South Korean commercial and cultural foreign policy have started to intertwine. For instance, South Korean companies (chaebols) have benefitted from a spillover effect created by it. Due to its cultural rise, even if South Korea became economically stronger or weaker this would not cause as much harm to its presence as the possible weakening or disappearance of the Korean Wave.

China has not risen through cultural soft power in Chile, especially because commercial activities represent its main foreign policy tool there. Besides being an emerging power and a regional power in its own region, China’s reputation surpasses the foreign policy it carries out. Chileans are being attracted by its economic strength as well as its constant growth (Verónica N., 03.06.14, Karina P., 19.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14). The Chinese economy has become a soft power tool that doesn’t depend on cultural or other soft power elements.

This type of economic soft power has not been included in the country’s soft power efforts, which have been culturally-biased, despite it having been stated that “in the conceptual
development of ‘soft power’ in China, economic relations appeared as part of scenarios of understanding” (Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 199, own translation). Researching if China has purposely created a strategy for expanding its economic soft power is a task that cannot be achieved within this research. According to the arguments mentioned and to the sources consulted, it has been a byproduct rather than the intended outcome.

An important consideration for the future is the sustainability of China’s (unintended) economic soft power, should the country’s international strength weaken, together with its reputation and negotiating abilities as an economic giant. On the one hand, cultural soft power may stay the same, but economic soft power will eventually be affected. On the other hand, a shrinking economic soft power might affect cultural soft power which, if less governmental resources are available, will begin its downward turn.

Nye’s differentiation of hard, soft or smart power is not sufficient to explain if and how China is attracting through economy, rather than through culture. His categories remain limited to political systems, ideology and culture. In more recent literature, the author states that economic success could influence Chinese soft power, the same way cultural factors do, but when analyzing China’s power resources, he lists economic separately from soft power (Nye, 2015, pp. 48-62, p. 69 and p. 83). In summary, his theory alone is not able to explain where economic power fits into. This study concludes that the same power enabled China’s rise in Latin America, and can thus be considered soft power.

Nye mentions in his texts that cultural distance makes it more difficult for soft power to impact. This does not affect either China or South Korea. The former has not had to impact through culture. The latter has reached younger generations, which are more open to other cultures, and adults who have been captivated by Korean content on TV. People have felt attracted to that country, even if the culture is different.

Why Chinese modern cultural soft power is not achieving the same results as the Korean one relates, according to Fernando Reyes Matta, less to China’s “Asian” culture or difficult language, but more to the lack of innovation and creativity that persists in the cultural sector. Only when the government notices that there could be an economic benefit, for example from the popularity of Chinese art, it does offer its support (Fernando R.M., 16.05.14).
Transferability of the case study to the subcontinent

The analysis of the case study Chile is representative for Latin America, even though the country’s relations with China and South Korea might seem unique. There are so many nations in the subcontinent, such as Mexico which opposes Chinese commercial activities, Venezuela, which depends on Chinese aid, and Peru, with much cultural presence from both East Asian countries, yet, if one considers the categories established in the second and third chapter, China and South Korea have emerged in the whole subcontinent. The third chapter also demonstrated that they have not done so through hard power.

Accordingly, the goal of the fourth chapter was how to measure the soft power, to support those previous statements. That was done through the benchmarks within the case study. The same categories can be used for other Latin American countries. Different conclusions might be reached, for example that China has emerged through diplomatic soft power, or that South Korea has emerged through economic soft power, but the exemplary use of Chile as a case study is not affected by that.

This specific case study can also be applied to other countries with a similar international positioning to evaluate the impact of soft power in them. Equally, it sheds light on how and if a country, which is neither a great power nor an emerging international power (South Korea) can emerge through culture. Consequently, the study broadens the analysis that exists about soft power, which has so far been limited to strong countries and shows that soft power can be useful for any country that wishes to change its international position.

The last chapter will condense previous conclusions, while focusing on the research question and hypothesis.

5. Conclusions and outlook

The research question of this study was if soft power enabled China and South Korea to position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America. The hypothesis was that soft power policy is a strategic foreign policy that enables both countries to do so. Research goals were to conceptionalize and operationalize the concept of soft power and to further
define the concept of emerging powers.

The first chapter started with an analysis of the current state of research and the definition of concepts such as emerging powers, middle powers, soft and hard power. It also included the methodology used, the explanation of the theory of complex interdependence and stated the research goals, as well as the units of analysis.

In the second chapter, China and South Korea were presented as actors within their own region, East Asia. It was crucial to first show how soft power tools have been used there and how both countries have positioned themselves as emerging, middle or regional powers, before the third chapter continued with an analysis of Latin America and a comparison between both regions.

The second and third chapter both focused on: soft power strategies, e.g., inaugurating language and cultural institutes, the role of governmental and online presence (Velarde, 2015, pp. 45-46) play within soft power, how a country can implement its resources, economic factors that impact on cultural soft power, hard and smart power strategies that complement soft power and the different elements that the term “cultural soft power” builds upon.

The fourth chapter focused on the case study within Latin America, through which it was possible to finish the conceptualization and the operationalization of soft power and to further the definition of emerging powers. Chile was presented as a meaningful partner for both China and South Korea. Afterwards, the chapter was divided into benchmarks and indicators. First, there was official cultural soft power with its indicators: treaties, and MOUs governmental cultural presence and cultural events organized by the government. The second benchmark was non-governmental cultural soft power with its indicators: immigration, cultural institutions and cultural events. The third benchmark analyzed the combination of both types of soft power. Indicators were: education, media, and companies. The benchmarks and indicators were weighted equally.

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139 Universities, research centers and schools.
This chapter will summarize all research results, goals, the corresponding hypothesis and research question. It will also highlight topics that can serve as an input for further research endeavors, beyond this study.

**Conceptionalization and operationalization of soft power**

Some aspects of soft power have not been thoroughly discussed or analyzed, neither in Nye’s own definition of the concept, nor in the work of other authors, which makes it difficult for it to be conceptualized and operationalized. Since that foreign policy tool includes several elements, not all notions can be easily defined. How can the word “culture” be interpreted? How do other variables such as economic power impact on soft power growth? What is attraction?

One of the first aspects that I tackled was Nye’s assumption that only great powers can deploy soft power effectively. Even when mentioning China, the author considers that this type of country cannot challenge the US. His soft power approach is Western biased, which is why small power and middle powers are almost entirely left out from analysis. Additionally, there is no mention of how smaller countries could take advantage of the resources they have to become stronger or of how to use their existing soft power. This study showed that middle powers such as South Korea can deploy their soft power strategically, and that a country does not have to be a great power, or to be a Western power, to emerge.

Nye also affirms that “popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar” (Nye, 2004a, p. 16). The study proves that China and South Korea have created soft power in Latin America, while not sharing many cultural similarities with the subcontinent. The impact of US cultural soft power in several world regions also highlights how a country with a completely different culture\(^{140}\) dominates in diverse contexts.

At the same time, China’s and South Korea’s rise in East Asia could be used as an argument that supports Nye’s hypothesis. For instance, Confucian, Buddhist and other values resemble those in South Korea’s immediate neighborhood and surrounding region, which would explain the success Hallyu has had. Yet, this argument is no longer valid

\(^{140}\) At least at the beginning of the Americanization process.
when observing Latin American culture. This means that smaller countries, with completely different cultures can also have a regional and international impact. As a matter of fact, Asianness, cultural diversity, an “exotic” feel, along with curiosity, and other elements that surround Chinese and South Korean culture have been determining factors for the attraction that both countries have generated. Of course, there also exists the possibility that Korea’s K-pop’s similarities with US music, e.g., hip-hop have been the elements creating attraction in Latin America.

A third important aspect of Nye’s analysis is that the fails to clearly differentiate between hard and soft power. Calling the combination of both concepts “smart power” does not change the fact that hard power can be soft, and that soft power can be hard. Countless combinations of tools and policies exist in between both tools. If soft power means attraction, then military power, too, is soft. Chinese actions for instance, represent soft power in Latin America, but at times hard power in East Asia. Culture can also be perceived as hard or as soft, as this study showed. Korean cultural presence might be perceived as a threat in East Asia, and therefore as hard power, but not in Latin America, where Korean culture is considered soft power. Thus, the differentiation of both types of power cannot be established by the government or by authors beforehand, local perception is the determining factor.

Nye’s research reflects his stance on the role of governments that export soft power. According to him, the US created soft power by turning Coca Cola and Hollywood into international “brands”; the aforesaid aspect relates to nation branding being described as entirely under government control. As could be seen in this study, China’s cultural soft power, as intended by the government, does not convert into actual cultural soft power that enables China to rise in Latin America. The factor that has helped it rise, has been its economy. In the South Korean case, Hallyu may be supported by the government, but fans, social media and the internet have helped it grow further. Thus, in both cases, the government has not been able to control nation branding and soft power.

An important hypothetical scenario to consider for China and South Korea would be one with less government support. As I concluded in the third chapter, China’s cultural soft power might not be able to remain the same in Latin America, and if government support diminishes, cultural soft power might not maintain itself. On the contrary, because the Korean Wave is self-sustaining, less government support would not diminish South
Korea’s soft power significantly.

In summary, a crucial contribution by this study to the theory of IR is that it also takes into account how the foreign policy element is perceived. While I observe the outcomes, other authors trace the strategies behind them. Perception is fundamental as the perception of empathy leads towards attraction which, again, means more soft power. Essentially, the perception on the receiving side varies from region to region and from country to country. In East Asia, for example, China might be perceived as a threat when soft power is associated with political and economic pressure. That means, China’s foreign policy is perceived as hard and not as soft power.

**Defining emerging powers**

Emerging powers is a widely discussed concept within IR theory. Measuring power, and its variations, is difficult and so is deciding which country has “emerged” or is “emerging”. A consensus has been reached in literature (as discussed in the first chapter) that these countries rise through economic, diplomatic and political power. A cultural rise is almost completely left out from analysis. Furthermore, just those countries who are already strong are considered emerging. The realist perspective even excludes or neglects the possibility of a rise through soft power, even though, in a strict sense, diplomatic power can be soft and political power at the same time.

Not much can be found in literature, especially from the US and Europe, about the rise (ergo emergence) of a country within a specific world region that is not its own. One example would be Brazil as a rising power in Africa or India as a rising power in Central America. This study also contributes to IR theory by exploring such a constellation, i.e. analyzing whether and how China and South Korea have risen in Latin America.

It can be concluded that China has risen as an emerging power in Asia, having achieved the same status on an international level and in other regions, one of them being Latin America. Its growth has been such that the country has become a regional power in East Asia, and is starting to replicate that success in Latin America, where it is increasingly competing with the US and Brazil. China has not risen through cultural soft power, but rather through a byproduct of the economic hard/soft power mix it employs to achieve its
goals in its region and in Latin America. Cultural soft power is an accompanying catalyzer, not the main element.

Cultural soft power is not needed for Chileans to become interested in China. Findings in Chile attest that interest in Chinese history, Chinese political system, Chinese developments, is scarce and unimportant as long as the economic strength can be felt in the South American country. What would happen if China’s economic strength declined? Would cultural soft power stay the same? Would economic soft power shrink at a quick pace? Recent developments and China’s faltering economy worldwide, in its own region and in Latin America, ensure that such questions remain relevant.  

South Korea has become a middle power on an international level and an emerging power in Latin America. Its main strategy to position itself, in both world regions explored, has been a niche diplomatic approach as well as cultural soft power, with the Korean Wave being the main reason behind it. Cultural soft power has been implemented as part of its foreign policy, through governmental and non-governmental channels. Support for online presence is crucial, because it is Hallyu’s main channel of expansion into Chile and into Latin America in general, since results from soft power initiatives can be directly observed, and because internet facilitates, transmits and diversifies different types of contents. A conclusion drawn from the case study is that Hallyu keeps growing without requiring neither guidance nor government support.

To overcome its middle power status in Latin America, a feat difficult to achieve in its own region, South Korea has implemented policies that can help it connect cultural and other factors. The country’s chaebols are examples of bridges that create liaisons between culture and economic strength. Korea can serve as an example for growth, it can also cooperate with other middle powers in Latin America, i.e., the case study Chile. Compared to China, a reduction in economic strength may not be perceived immediately, but less cultural presence will -especially in the long run- as its attraction is based on cultural rather than economic factors. If culture fails, economic attraction may too.

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141 See for example an article from 2016, called “The Effect of China’s Slowdown in Latin America” which analyzes how China’s growth process has been and how its relation to Latin America might change, because of its economic slowdown (Gonzalez-Perez, 2016).
Finally, the answer to the research question is: Soft power has enabled China and South Korea to position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America. Yet, only South Korea has risen through the deployment of cultural soft power while China’s rise has taken place through the attraction its economic strength creates and not by using cultural soft power as a strategic tool.

The sub goal was achieved as the concept of emerging powers was further conceptualized, for example by showing that one country can rise through culture (South Korea) and that countries can rise in regions besides their own, which means that they can be a middle power in one region and emerging powers in the other one.

The main goal of operationalizing the concept of soft power was obtained as the Chilean case demonstrated how cultural soft power can be analyzed by filtering it through several benchmarks and interpreted through indicators, how statistical data along with qualitative analysis can be combined and how comparisons can be made of two actors within a third state.

The conceptualization of soft power was further specified. The elements that it consists of and that were ambiguous, were described and analyzed throughout the research, for example by showing that soft power does not necessarily benefit from the cultural closeness between two countries, that hard and soft power cannot be differentiated by “carrot” and “stick” categories, governments do not have complete control over soft power, and a foreign policy that is perceived as soft, is soft power as it fulfills its goal to create that type of attraction.

The main result from this study is that soft power and what it achieves lies on the eye of the beholder — the country — that is on the receiving end. If the population of country A perceives B’s military exercises as soft, then that is soft power. If, instead, the people from country A perceive C’s ideology as hard (for example as repressive), then that is hard and not soft power. If China’s attraction is created through economic strength, then China has used economic soft power, if South Korea attracts through the Korean Wave and its culture, then South Korea has used cultural soft power.
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